December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: Why is cryptoanarchy irreversible?
by Sean Roach 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 04:02 AM 11/8/96 -0500, Black Unicorn wrote: ... >You know, I've always wondered, how did the genie get in the bottle in the >first place. Someone must have coaxed him in there. ... Yes, they told him that it was for his own protection and that if he didn't do it, no one else would either. They told him that it wasn't nice, but it was far better than what he would be enduring if he stayed outside. Upon being released, however, he had the insight of the confinement. You can fool a being once easy enough, everyone has to learn somwhow. Its much harder to fool that being a second time, they know better. Like someone said, the government has to act now before the people know better.

1 0

FW: Validating a program
by James A. Tunnicliffe 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>>> My question is as >> >follows: If PGP and DES are as secure as thought to be, then why is it >> >not ruled illegal software, just as they do with silencers, narcotics, >> >certain type weapons, etc..... > >[snippo] > >> Why does it follow that these must be crackable, or the government would >> have outlawed them? Despite recent moves to limit encryption, there are >> currently NO domestic (U.S.) restrictions on crypto. Nothing prohibits >> you from using a true One Time Pad, which is mathematically proven to be >> unbreakable, now and forever, even against infinite resources. If this >> is not prohibited (and it isn't), doesn't that refute your argument? > >Dale Thorn replies: >This is a misleading challenge. There's a helluva difference between the OTP >and a >Public Key system. If, for example, it can be proven that I can crank up PGP >to its >most cryptic level, and send the OTP overseas with "absolute security", so >that I >can now send messages with the OTP which was crunched with PGP's highest >security, >then that would mean something. > >My point here is that Ed was asserting that PGP, DES, etc., must be >crackable, otherwise the U.S. government would have ruled them illegal >(domestically). I pointed out that one can legally own and use a true OTP >with impunity in the U.S., despite its unquestioned unbreakability. >Therefore, his argument falls. If it made sense, the USG would have AT LEAST >outlawed OTP's (which they most assuredly cannot break). > >Just so there's no misunderstanding: > >1. The OTP is absolutely unbreakable. (if done correctly) >2. The OTP encryption cannot be decoded on the other end unless you can >deliver the > OTP to the person on the other end by a secure means. >3. PGP, which is not usually used at its highest level of security (for all >bits in > a message), *will* be used at its highest level of security to send the >OTP to the > person on the other end. >4. The OTP arrives on the other end, completely safe from snooping. > >Now you see the problem. #4 above can't be assured, and that is why Ed says >that PGP >is not shut off "right now", because it's probably not "really secure". > >I'm not sure what you're claiming here, or what point it is intended to >demonstrate. No matter the strength of PGP, delivering a OTP in this fashion >would render it no longer a OTP. Besides, this scenario makes no sense. In >any case, there is no restriction I know of in sending encrypted data (or >even One Time Pads) to whomever you choose, by whatever means. (Granted, if >you send encrypted traffic to khadafi(a)libya.gov, or dispatch couriers with >briefcases handcuffed to their wrists, you might invite suspicion...) > >Could you clarify the point you're making above? > >I'm amused to think that, in a nation armed with 20,000 or so nukes, the >paranoid of >paranoid nation-states as it were, some of the erstwhile intelligent citizens >think >that the U.S. military are just sitting around wringing their hands over the >"fact" >that the citizens have "unbreakable" crypto. > >Bear in mind the Scientific American articles on Public Key crypto back in >the 1970's. >The military knew the score back then, and if you think they just sat back >and allowed >all this to happen, well, sorry, I don't believe in Santa Claus or the Easter >Bunny. > >Well, while the feds are no doubt powerful, they ARE subject to the same laws >of mathematics as the rest of us. While it is _possible_ they know much more >about factoring than the rest of the world, I find it unlikely that they are >advanced enough to factor 2000-bit numbers. (I can't prove it, just as I >can't prove they don't know how to make their agents invisible.) > >And they didn't just sit back and allow this information out -- witness >Bernstein, et. al., and all the continuing ITAR/GAK fallout. Of course, I >expect that some will claim this is just for appearance's sake, so as not to >make it obvious that they can actually read all our thoughts directly, using >technology they got from the Greys from Zeta Reticulon... > >Tunny >====================================================================== > James A. Tunnicliffe | WWWeb: http://www.inference.com/~tunny > Inference Corporation | PGP Fingerprint: CA 23 E2 F3 AC 2D 0C 77 > tunny(a)Inference.com | 36 07 D9 33 3D 32 53 9C >====================================================================== > >

2 1

DOUBLE the Reward for Errors in _Digital Cash_
by pcw＠access.digex.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Last week, I offered $10 for the first person to report any technical errors in the first edition of my book, _Digital Cash_. I got many good suggestions for additional topics to add to the book, but not one mention of any errors. So I'm doubling the reward. $20 for the first person to report a technical error to me. The details and restrictions follow this message. I would also like to encourage people to continue to send suggestions. If you thought some topics were covered too lightly, let me know. This isn't a technical error, but I reserve the right to reward you anyways. Also, I hope that any company with new or improved products will write. One of the biggest problems I've found in researching the book is finding the right person to contact in a company. So I encourage you to volunteer. --Peter Wayner (pcw(a)access.digex.net) 1) The offer may withdrawn at any time. Check my web page for any changes. 2) The offer could be increased at any time, but it probably won't be. So don't push your luck waiting for more money. 3) My decision on the "first" person to send me a technical error is final. I may choose to reward both people if it is clear that they found the error independently. The limitation is necessary to keep people from telling their friend, "You want $20? Just send this email message to this guy." 4) My decision on what constitutes a technical error is also final. Errors in grammar or word choice are not rewarded. But you're free to write about them. It's not that I don't want to hear about them. I just think that the concept of "grammatical error" is so ill-defined that I don't want to get in arguments in that domain.

1 0

Re: Secrecy: My life as a nym. (Was: nym blown?)
by Hal Finney 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Black Unicorn makes a lot of good points regarding privacy. One thing I wanted to follow up on: > Unfortunately, in the United States most citizens only become interested > in privacy in their 20s or so. By this time it is difficult to overcome > the mass of information which has been stored up. (Pseudocide can be an > attractive option for some perhaps). I have two kids entering their teens, and I'm sure other list members are parents as well. What can we do for our children to help them enter their adult lives with better chances to retain privacy? Unicorn mentions keeping them absent from school on picture day, although I'm not sure how much this helps. I suppose it makes it harder for an investigator to find out what they look(ed) like. Then when they get old enough to drive you have a new problem avoiding the photo (and thumbprint) on the license. Are there other measures which parents could take while their children are young to get them off to a good start, privacy-wise? Hal

9 14

Re: Rarity: Crypto question enclosed
by Hal Finney 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On Sun, 10 Nov 1996, David K. Merriman wrote: > > My simple question is regarding key/certificate distribution: > > Is there any particular reason that such can't be accomplished via > on-line lists, and made available via a service on a port, using standard > (textual) commands, like mail and such are now? There are a few things available or in the works right now. Most of the PGP key servers respond to WWW requests already. You connect to them on a port, the HTTP port, send some standard textual commands following the HTTP protocol, and get the requested PGP keys back in text form. How does this differ from what you were thinking of? Other proposals, including Ron Rivest's SDSI, envision an environment where most people make their own keys available via a URL. Certificates would have this URL in them and you could check it to make sure the key has not expired or been revoked. Then the only problem is distributing the URL... John Gilmore's SWAN project is working to put keys into Domain Name System (DNS) databases. He has sample code which will get keys dynamically via DNS calls, and DNS servers are now available which will support the new data types necessary. You can actually get his own key right now from toad.com via this method. This is a binary protocol rather than a textual one but could be a good way to do it. So I think you are right that on-the-fly key grabbing is the direction in which things are moving, replacing large local databases of keys. Hal

2 1

So how does the crypto crackdown go?
by Hal Finney 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I've enjoyed Peter Hendrickson's provocative postings and the many good responses. However I don't think we should forget that the FBI and other law enforcement agencies almost certainly do hope to ban strong encryption in the U.S. and in other countries as well. So it is worth discussing how the ban is likely to happen and what impact, if any, it would have. I could see such a measure going into effect after the next terrorist attack as part of a comprehensive bill that also includes taggants in explosives, more permission for wiretaps and surveillance of terrorists, and similar items on the LEA laundry list. Keep in mind the effects of the current ban on U.S. exports of crypto technology. Obviously this have not stopped crypto from moving overseas. But it has definitely had significant effects. It is _not_ widely ignored, at least in public. That is why we work so hard to overturn it; if it had no effect, we wouldn't care. Companies are much more careful about how and whether they will distribute crypto on the net; for many months Netscape's free software didn't have strong crypto; Americans even on this list are afraid to publish algorithms and envy Adam Back's freedom to do so. My guess about how a crypto ban would go is that it would be an extension of the export ban, and be based on interstate commerce regulation. It would ban distribution of crypto software, commercial, freeware, and shareware, which had the ability to hide the content of messages. Exceptions would exist along the lines of the recent export proposals, where the software would be OK to use if it had a small key size with an approved cipher, or other means to ensure law enforcement access. The ban might also cover stego and stealth type software, at least if that were the primary purpose of such programs. The U.S. would also work to convince foreign countries to implement similar bans. One question is whether they would also try to make it illegal to use (rather than to distribute) crypto software. On the one hand, if they don't do that, they have a problem with all the installed base of code. But the legalities of stopping people from encrypting code on their own computers, or writing crypto programs for personal use, seem a lot more questionable to me, and I don't know how much precedent there would be for that kind of restriction. So as I see it the main target of the ban would be distributors of software rather than end users. This would be in line with the often stated goal of the law enforcement people that their main concern is with crypto that is built in, transparent, and trivial to use, rather than hacker's crypto. So what are the impacts of this kind of ban? They might not be all that bad. Already on the net Americans have to be careful about what they say. We can't describe crypto algorithms because they might leak overseas. With a ban on domestic distribution we would still be prevented from talking about crypto. So this is not very different. Commercial companies building in crypto would have to go back to escrowed or weak encryption. All those export controlled sites would treat Americans the same as foreigners and prevent them from getting the strong crypto. The few commercial products sold in the stores which do crypto would have to be changed. Strong crypto might be distributed via an underground network, but this would be about as risky as running Internet sites that export strong crypto is today. There are very few such sites, although granted there is little call for them because overseas crypto sites are widely available. The end result is that almost nobody in the U.S. would have access to strong crypto, except for the motivated few who write their own, keep old strong versions around, or obtain new strong software illegally. This sounds bad, but as far as actual _users_ of strong encryption it is not so different from the way things are today. Weak/escrowed crypto would still be widely used and built in to communication software. The big question in my mind is whether they could get away with banning the use of strong crypto rather than its distribution. This would be much more effective from the law enforcement perspective. But they have not tried this so far even for international messages, presumably due to the serious Constitutional questions it would raise. Hal

3 2

Getting attention the old-fashioned way
by Timothy C. May 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

A second journalist has contacted me for reaction quotes for a story he's working on about the evolution of the Cypherpunks list, people leaving the list, and so forth. Presumably Vulis figures in a central way, though this second journalist did not mention him by name in his short request for comments. I sent him a note saying I would not give him such quotes. Many of you apparently received a letter from another journalist last week asking for comments for another story, with a mostly-similar theme. There, Vulis was the obvious focus. (I ignored his letter. The journalist who mailed me this morning I actually refused with a reply, as he's written some good pieces in the past. I just won't cater to assisting Vulis in disrupting the list by giving him more publicity.) Well, these "stories" prove that a disruptor can get the attention he craves by shitting all over the list, mailbombing it, referring to list members as pedophiles and "limp-wristed blonde bitches" (methinks Vulis has a pretty strong latent fixation, given his constant focus on certain topics and words). Sad that journalists cater to this kind of thing. I guess "personality pieces" are ever so much more popular than technical pieces, or even careful explications of things like crypto anarchy and the real implications of the tecnologies we are involved with. By the way, nothing in this post may be used by any journalist in any story. Rights are reserved. Readers of this list may read these comments, but reporters may not quote them. (I'm not sure of the legal status of such comments, but if they can assert their copyrights for their widely distributed stuff, why can't I?) --Tim May "The government announcement is disastrous," said Jim Bidzos,.."We warned IBM that the National Security Agency would try to twist their technology." [NYT, 1996-10-02] We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, I know that that ain't allowed. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Higher Power: 2^1,257,787-1 | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."

3 2

Re: another possible remailer attack
by anonymous＠miron.vip.best.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Steve Reid writes: > > >> You want to know if Dimitri is the person regularly posting these > >> messages. So, you use your powers as ISP to block his access to all > >> remailers. If the public messages suddenly stop then you can be > >> reasonably certain that Dimitri was sending them. > > I'm not following something...just how to your "powers as ISP" affect a > > remailer in, say, Holland, or one for that matter on another ISP? (As a > > Packet filtering at the ISP's router. If Dimitri can't connect to a > remailer, he can't send anonymous messages. Sure there are a lot of hacks > that could be done (like have sendmail on another system send it to a > remailer) but such things could be detected and blocked by clever filters. I disagree, it's easy to bounce mail through ANY Internet-connected host running sendmail and thence to a remailer. In fact this mail was sent that way, I bounced it through sun.com before hitting a remailer. > In fact, the ISP could just claim to be "going down for maintenance" and > completely block Dimitri from the internet for a while. Only if the Backbone Cabal (there is no Cabal) is re-formed (and given special SuperPowers!) with the sole purpose of blocking Dimitri from posting to cypherpunks. > > Just as the Nazis could isolate spy transmitters by selectively > > turning off electricity to different neigborhoods, so, too, can various > > Isolating spy transmitters by selectively cutting power is exactly > alalogous to what I have suggested. The spy transmitters couldn't bounce their transmissions off of regular radio transmissions, could they? Buck Satan

2 1

[URGENT] Cryptoanarchy
by nobody＠replay.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Timothy C. May will fuck anything that moves, but he'd rather be fucking his own mother's dead body.

1 0

RE: Apology to Dale Thorn
by James A. Tunnicliffe 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Dale Thorn writes (in part): >I'm tending to think that, instead of using PGP for all encoding (even >though it may have multiple facilities for all situations), a message >could be encrypted with a good trusted private-key system or whatever, >then the private key encrypted with the Public Key software and sent >either separately or with the message. But you've described exactly what PGP does. It encrypts the message with a "good, trusted private-key system" -- IDEA, which has undergone significant peer review, has a long-enough key (128 bits), and has exhibited no significant weaknesses or shortcuts to brute force (which is impossible, given the key length). It then encrypts the IDEA session key that was used with the recipient's public key, and bundles the the IDEA-encrypted message and the RSA-encrypted session key (and optionally, a signed hash of the message) for delivery to the recipient. Tunny ====================================================================== James A. Tunnicliffe | WWWeb: http://www.inference.com/~tunny Inference Corporation | PGP Fingerprint: CA 23 E2 F3 AC 2D 0C 77 tunny(a)Inference.com | 36 07 D9 33 3D 32 53 9C ======================================================================

2 1