December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

KRAP is at it in the IETF
by William H. Geiger III 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hello, It has come to my attention that the KRAP (key recovery alliance program) has submitted an I-D (internet draft) to the IETF for adding GAK (government access to keys) to the IPSEC protocols: ftp://ftp.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-rfced-exp-markham-00.txt ISAKMP Key Recovery Extensions <draft-rfced-exp-markham-00.txt> 7. AUTHOR INFORMATION Tom Markham Secure Computing Corp 2675 Long Lake Road Roseville, MN 55113 USA Phone: 651.628.2754, Fax: 651.628.2701 EMail: tom_markham(a)securecomputing.com I consider this a perversion of the standards process of the IETF to advance a political agenda which must be stopped at all cost. Below are the e-mail addresses of some people that you should write (politely) expressing your objections to any such additions to the protocols: IPSEC Chairs: Theodore Ts'o <tytso(a)mit.edu> Robert Moskowitz <rgm(a)icsa.net> Security Area Directors: Jeffrey Schiller <jis(a)mit.edu> Marcus Leech <mlecch(a)nortel.ca> As I mentioned before, be polite. These people are not the ones proposing GAK be added to the IPSEC protocols. They have put a lot of time and effort in forwarding the cause for strong encryption. They should be made aware of the communities objections to these attempts by KRAP. Thanks, - -- - --------------------------------------------------------------- William H. Geiger III http://www.openpgp.net Geiger Consulting Cooking With Warp 4.0 Author of E-Secure - PGP Front End for MR/2 Ice PGP & MR/2 the only way for secure e-mail. OS/2 PGP 5.0 at: http://www.openpgp.net/pgp.html - --------------------------------------------------------------- Tag-O-Matic: It's OS/2, Jim, but not OS/2 as we know it. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.3a-sha1 Charset: cp850 Comment: Registered_User_E-Secure_v1.1b1_ES000000 iQCVAwUBNfOVk49Co1n+aLhhAQFJwwP+O4vrZVKFpOG8vCHFwbDuPIv/99AhBnKF RK/Ikc5y2gGKq9hfxkTb4o77YUrDaEGkYUPHk+ZC57Oag0Lu1v6W1EAbQ5T4RpzH JWYXOonQmbqw5rH0h6brzqrH3ep9Ej9DR0gv4mGgIfSNlJSUu6TWO5ZHXKWiE4yy 5flH0Ngg/TI= =EzNL -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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digital sig bill
by Vladimir Z. Nuri 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

------- Forwarded Message To: believer(a)telepath.com From: believer(a)telepath.com Subject: IP: About Digital Signature Bill 09/05/98 0752 Source: US Newswire http://www.usnewswire.com/topnews/Current_Releases/0904-138.txt Abraham Urges Senate to Pass Digital Signature Bill U.S. Newswire 4 Sep 17:30 Abraham Urges Senate to Pass Digital Signature Bill Next Week To: National Desk Contact: Joe McMonigle of the Office of U.S. Sen. Spencer Abraham, 202-224-8833 WASHINGTON, Sept. 4 /U.S. Newswire/ -- While President Clinton used a visit in Ireland today to digitally sign an electronic commerce agreement with Irish Prime Minister Bertie Ahern on a laptop computer, U.S. Sen. Spencer Abraham (R-Mich.) urged his colleagues in the Senate to pass his legislation requiring federal agencies to start allowing the public to do the same. S.2107, the Government Paperwork Elimination Act, would require federal agencies to make versions of their forms available online and allow people to submit these forms with digital signatures instead of handwritten ones. It also sets up a process by which commercially developed digital signatures can be used in submitting forms to the government and permits the digital storage of federal documents. "If it's okay for President Clinton and Prime Minister Ahern, it should also be okay for the federal government to recognize the digital signature of ordinary Americans," Abraham said. "This legislation will bring the federal government into the electronic age, in the process saving American individuals and companies millions of dollars and hundreds of hours currently wasted on government paperwork," Abraham said. "Each and every year, Americans spend in excess of $600 billion simply filing out, documenting and handling government paperwork. This huge loss of time and money constitutes a significant drain on our economy and we must bring it under control." "By providing individuals and companies with the option of electronic filing and storage, this bill will reduce the paperwork burden imposed by government on the American people and the American economy. It will allow people to move from printed forms they must fill out using typewriters or handwriting to digitally-based forms that can be filled out using a word processor. This savings in time, storage and postage will be enormous," said Abraham. The Government Paperwork Elimination Act would: -- Require the federal government make available its forms online and allow citizens to sign forms by the use of digital signatures. -- Direct the Commerce Department to conduct a study of the impact of this Act on the use of digital signatures for electronic commerce and on individual privacy. -- Allow Executive Agencies 18 months to establish a method for agencies to put forms online. The forms must be able to be filled out, signed and filed with the agency electronically. -- Work to develop a system whereby fees and payments associated with the forms can also be submitted at the same time. For example, a citizen could use their tax software to create all the information necessary for filling out their tax forms, fill in the IRS online form, submit it and any indicated payments, and immediately receive a tax receipt. -- Enable the federal government to allow its employees to have digital signatures for use with citizens and allow agencies to use electronic notice where written notice had been required, if the citizen prefers electronic notice. -- Establish that a digital signature will have legal standing. -- Provide that Administration guidelines and procedures for electronic signatures that are used for the government forms that are compatible with those the private sector will be using for commerce, and specifies that any system used by the government must be industry and technology neutral. -- State that if an employer is required to collect, file and store paper forms that are completed by employees, that electronic storage will likely be accepted. -- Allow the government five years to implement these provisions. "The information age is no longer new. We are in the midst of a revolution in the way people do business and maintain records. The Government Paperwork Elimination Act will force Washington to catch up with these developments, and release our businesses from the drag of an obsolete bureaucracy as they pursue further innovations," said Abraham. Co-sponsors of the Paperwork Elimination Act include Sens. Ron Wyden (D-Ore.), Jack Reed (D-R.I.), John McCain (R-Ariz.), Trent Lott (R-Miss.), Thad Cochran (R-Miss.), and Conrad Burns (R-Mont.) -0- /U.S. Newswire 202-347-2770/ 09/04 17:30 Copyright 1998, U.S. Newswire - ----------------------- NOTE: In accordance with Title 17 U.S.C. section 107, this material is distributed without profit or payment to those who have expressed a prior interest in receiving this information for non-profit research and educational purposes only. For more information go to: http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/17/107.shtml - ----------------------- ********************************************** To subscribe or unsubscribe, email: majordomo(a)majordomo.pobox.com with the message: (un)subscribe ignition-point email@address ********************************************** www.telepath.com/believer ********************************************** ------- End of Forwarded Message

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Re: What we are Fighting
by Information Security 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> From: Tim May <tcmay(a)got.net> > >Information "I am not a klook" Security wrote: > > >> Subject: Terrorist FBI, on Terrorism > >> Date: Fri, 4 Sep 1998 09:58:23 EDT > >> > >> Statement for the Record > >> FBI Director Louis J. Freeh before the Senate Judiciary Committee, > >> September 3, 1998 > > >> The FBI supports a balanced encryption policy that satisfies fourth > >> amendment concerns for privacy, the commercial needs of industry for > >> robust encryption, and the government's public safety and national > >> security needs. > > But it bears constant repeating, especially to the skeptical, that there > are NO DOMESTIC CRYPTO LAWS. > > We all know this, but Freeh and Company continue to mumble about "meeting > the legitmate needs of law enforcement." What can they be speaking of? > > Obviously his side is contemplating domestic crypto restrictions. > > They are planning domestic crypto restrictions, GAK, and all the rest of > what we have long expected. They have stated so openly; ~"if we hear a lot of encrypted hiss from [CALEA] intercepts, we'll need GAK to be the law of the land". (a tilde before the quote means I am paraphrasing). In fact, at the same time the FBI used to say they weren't calling for such a law, they were pushing behind the scenes for it. * http://epic.org/crypto/ban/fbi_dox/impact_text.gif * * SECRET FBI report * * NEED FOR A NATIONAL POLICY * * A national policy embodied in legislation is needed which insures * that cryptography use in the United States should be forced to be * crackable by law enforcement, so such communications can be monitored * with real-time decryption. * * All cryptography that cannot meet this standard should be prohibited. And here's the ECHELON/UKUSA slant: * What Is The OECD * * The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, based in * Paris, France, is a unique forum permitting governments of the * industrialized democracies to study and formulate the best policies * possible in all economic and social spheres. : From owner-firewalls-outgoing(a)GreatCircle.COM Wed May 14 18:54:15 1997 : Received: from osiris (osiris.nso.org [207.30.58.40]) by ra.nso.org : (post.office MTA v1.9.3 ID# 0-13592) with SMTP id AAA322 : for <firewalls(a)GreatCircle.COM>; Wed, 14 May 1997 12:56:13 -0400 : Date: Wed, 14 May 1997 12:58:46 -0400 : To: firewalls(a)GreatCircle.COM : From: research(a)isr.net (Research Unit I) : Subject: Re: Encryption Outside US : : : I was part of that OECD Expert Group, and believe I may shine at least : some light on what exactly was said and happened at the meetings. : : The main conflict during all sessions was the demand of the US to be : able to decrypt anything, anywhere at any time versus the European : focus: we want to have the choice - with an open end - to maintain : own surveillance. The US demand would have caused an immediate : ability to tap into what the European intelligence community believes to : be its sole and exclusive territory. In fact the Europeans were not at all : pleased with the US view points of controlling ALL crypto. Germany and : France vigorously refused to work with the US on this issue. : : The Clipper initiative (at the time not readily developed) was completely : banned, except for the Australian and UK views that felt some obligation : from the 1947 UKUSA treaty (dealing with interchange of intelligence). : : With a vast majority the US was cornered completely, and had to accept : the international views. And actually adopted those as well. EFF, EPIC and : other US organizations were delighted to see the formal US views barred, : but expressed their concern on the development of alternate political : pressure that would cause the same effects. : : As time went by that was indeed what the US did, and up to now with minor : success. : : Bertil Fortrie : Internet Security Review Declan, wanna track down this person and find out the names of those who spoke of the ultra-secret UKUSA treaty that's never been seen, and interview them? ---- When Sonny Bono hit a tree, yet another Senator convinced by the FBI/NSA's little presentation of horrors (which is preceded by a visible sweep for electronic bugs) was lost. Only an Executive Order seems like it will get domestic crypto "outlawed". One continued worrisome slant to the FBI/NSAs pushing for domestic GAK is that they use the same arguments for retaining export controls (which Clinton did by Executive Order, or they would have expired) as they give for wanting to extend these controls domestically. LART me if I'm wrong, but that makes the issue different from most other export-controlled non-secret technology/products. ---- I still think someone (without a job ;-) should test the export law by pulling in PGP from outside the US and then immediately putting it back at the same site. If could find someone on the lower East Side willing to do it for $5000. Gilmore, care to make another investment in making the government's position look silly? ;-) ---guy

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Re: Child-Molesting Forger's Chilling Confession!!!1!
by your name 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

application/www-form-urlencoded

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Re: [Fwd: ISAKMP Key Recovery Extensions]
by Information Security 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> From: "William H. Geiger III" <whgiii(a)invweb.net> > > In <35F37E90.76109489(a)brd.ie>, on 09/07/98 > at 07:34 AM, "Frank O'Dwyer" <fod(a)brd.ie> said: > > >Well, the attached draft is not designed for corporate recovery of > >encrypted email, that's for sure. > > 4. ACKNOWLEDGMENTS > > This document was produced based on the combined efforts of the protocol > subcommittee of the Key Recovery Alliance. > > Why am I not surprised? > > I hope the IETF will not accept the implementation of *any* GAK proposals > into the RFC's. If these people want to force Big Brother on us they > should not have the benefit of the IETF to do so. ftp://ftp.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-rfced-exp-markham-00.txt o Government Requirements: Governments must be able to intercept the CKRB at the time of key establishment or periodically while the security association remains active. This requires that the key recovery enabled entity transmit the CKRB during the key establishment protocol and every N hours during the security association. Whooey! They've been infiltrated by idjits. ---guy

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Re: IP: Encryption Expert Says U.S. Laws Led to Renouncing of Citizenship
by jimg＠mentat.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

M-K Shen wrote: > > Robert Hettinga wrote: > > > > Sameer Parekh, the president of the Web server company C2 Net, said: > > "I think it's essential if you want business that you're doing your > > development overseas. It's pretty clear to anyone internationally that > > anything exportable [from the United States] is a joke." > > Let's wait and see whether AES will be genuinely exportable. Why wait? None of the AES candidates is currently exportable without a license, and the much weaker DES algorithm that one of them will replace is not exportable without a license. In fact, according to the instructions posted at NIST the algorithm designers from outside the US and Canada were required to fill out export license applications in order to get a copy of their own algorithms back from NIST. Without a change in the regulations AES will be no more exportable than DES is now. Jim Gillogly

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KRAP is at it in the IETF
by Information Security 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> From: "William H. Geiger III" <whgiii(a)invweb.net> > > -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- > > Hello, > > It has come to my attention that the KRAP (key recovery alliance program) > has submitted an I-D (internet draft) to the IETF for adding GAK > (government access to keys) to the IPSEC protocols: > > ftp://ftp.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-rfced-exp-markham-00.txt > > I consider this a perversion of the standards process of the IETF to > advance a political agenda which must be stopped at all cost. > > Below are the e-mail addresses of some people that you should write > (politely) expressing your objections to any such additions to the > protocols: Dear Sirs, # o Government Requirements: Governments must be able to intercept the # CKRB at the time of key establishment or periodically while the # security association remains active. This requires that the key # recovery enabled entity transmit the CKRB during the key establishment # protocol and every N hours during the security association. Speaking as someone who monitors company Internet traffic (email) for compliance and security purposes, I would like to ask why the IETF is working on a key recovery standard. If a company chooses to deploy, say, PGP with key recovery internally, then any messages sent with it encrypted in the receiving party's public key are available to the sending company's Information Security personnel. If a company wishes to make the key recovery information available to the government, they can individually choose to do that. The IETF should not be helping to put such an infrastructure in place. Governments are our adversaries with respect to encryption and privacy. The US government, represented by the FBI/NSA, used to state that they weren't pushing for mandatory domestic encryption. (requiring people use curtains on their homes that the government can see through) Eventually we found out they lied, and were pushing for exactly that behind the scenes: * http://epic.org/crypto/ban/fbi_dox/impact_text.gif * * SECRET FBI report * * NEED FOR A NATIONAL POLICY * * A national policy embodied in legislation is needed which insures * that cryptography use in the United States should be forced to be * crackable by law enforcement, so such communications can be monitored * with real-time decryption. * * All cryptography that cannot meet this standard should be prohibited. Feel free to cite this manipulation when discarding key recovery proposals. If you put a key recovery proposal in place, it makes it that much easier for them to require its use. Plus my basic complaint: this proposal is of no use to business or Internet users. None. Its only purpose is to allow interception and decoding over the Internet. And if you think this would happen only with a court order, check out this "anytime, anywhere" wording by the US government... ---guy Don't be another cog in the ECHELON monitoring machine. The U.S. asked the OECD to agree to internationally required Key Recovery. * What Is The OECD * * The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, based in * Paris, France, is a unique forum permitting governments of the * industrialized democracies to study and formulate the best policies * possible in all economic and social spheres. : From owner-firewalls-outgoing(a)GreatCircle.COM Wed May 14 18:54:15 1997 : Received: from osiris (osiris.nso.org [207.30.58.40]) by ra.nso.org : (post.office MTA v1.9.3 ID# 0-13592) with SMTP id AAA322 : for <firewalls(a)GreatCircle.COM>; Wed, 14 May 1997 12:56:13 -0400 : Date: Wed, 14 May 1997 12:58:46 -0400 : To: firewalls(a)GreatCircle.COM : From: research(a)isr.net (Research Unit I) : Subject: Re: Encryption Outside US : : : I was part of that OECD Expert Group, and believe I may shine at least : some light on what exactly was said and happened at the meetings. : : The main conflict during all sessions was the demand of the US to be : able to decrypt anything, anywhere at any time versus the European : focus: we want to have the choice - with an open end - to maintain : own surveillance. The US demand would have caused an immediate : ability to tap into what the European intelligence community believes to : be its sole and exclusive territory. In fact the Europeans were not at all : pleased with the US view points of controlling ALL crypto. Germany and : France vigorously refused to work with the US on this issue. : : The Clipper initiative (at the time not readily developed) was completely : banned, except for the Australian and UK views that felt some obligation : from the 1947 UKUSA treaty (dealing with interchange of intelligence). : : With a vast majority the US was cornered completely, and had to accept : the international views. And actually adopted those as well. EFF, EPIC and : other US organizations were delighted to see the formal US views barred, : but expressed their concern on the development of alternate political : pressure that would cause the same effects. : : As time went by that was indeed what the US did, and up to now with minor : success. : : Bertil Fortrie : Internet Security Review : ==

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any relation?
by Steve Mynott 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

http://www.kiva.net/~tmay/ -- pgp 1024/D9C69DF9 1997/10/14 steve mynott <steve(a)tightrope.demon.co.uk>

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Re: What we are Fighting
by Information Security 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

[Cryptography Manifesto excerpts used for replies] > From: John Young <jya(a)pipeline.com> > > Tim asks: > > >Freeh and Company continue to mumble about "meeting > >the legitmate needs of law enforcement." What can they > >be speaking of? > ... > >Obviously his side is contemplating domestic crypto restrictions. > > Threat of terrorism will be the impetus for applying national security > restrictions domestically, for relaxing cold war limitations on spying > on Americans, for dissolving barriers between law enforcement > and military/intelligence agencies. Funny how the NSA's ECHELON monitoring machine keeps growing endlessly... : The Washington Post Magazine, June 23 1996 : "Government surveillance, terrorism and the U.S. Constitution" : from Main Justice, by Jim McGee and Brian Duffy, 1996, ISBN 0-684-81135-9 : : The FBI is growing in tandem with the NSA. With the help of the National : Security Agency, the U.S. eavesdropping bureaucracy that spans the globe, : the FBI operates a super-secret facility in New York code-named Megahut : that is linked to the other FBI listening posts. : : After the OKC bombing, Janet Reno and Louis Freeh asked Congress to raise : to 3,000 the number of FBI agents working counter-intelligence and counter- : terrorism. : : With the new legislation, the funding for just the FBI's counter-intelli- : gence/terror goals is now ONE BILLION DOLLARS a year, and their activities : will rise to a LEVEL HIGHER THAN AT ANY TIME DURING THE COLD WAR. 1984 means a constant State of War. Here's a new war: "cyberwar". # "Head of CIA Plans Center To Protect Federal Computers" # By Tim Weiner, The New York Times, 6/26/96 # # John Deutch, Director of the CIA, is building a "cyberwar" center in the NSA. # # Mr. Deutch said cyberwar could become a 21st-century national security threat # second only to nuclear, biological and chemical weapons. # # "The electron," Mr. Deutch warned, "is the ultimate precision-guided weapon." Haven't I heard bad dialogue like this on Mystery Science Theater 3000? ---- > From: John Young <jya(a)pipeline.com> > > Technical means for access to encrypted data will probably > come first in communications, then to stored material. There > will be an agreement for increased CALEA wiretap funding, which > is what the two cellular and wired suits against the FBI intend, > (paralleling what the hardware and software industries want from > federal buyers of security products). > > This will provide the infrastructural regime for the gov to monitor > and store domestic traffic as NSA does for the global, using the > same technology (NSA may provide service to domestic > LEA as it now does for other gov customers for intel). Question: How can the FBI use computers to monitor thousands and thousands and thousands and thousands of phone calls simultaneously, as they said they would do with CALEA, when we Americans speak so many different accents and languages? Answer: Thirty years of fine tuning by the NSA, y'all. ---- > From: John Young <jya(a)pipeline.com> > > As noted here, the features will appear first as optional, in response > to demand from commerce, from parents, from responsible > institutions, to meet public calls for protection, for privacy, for > combating threats to the American people. * "Project L.U.C.I.D.", by Texe Marrs, 1996, ISBN 1-884302-02-5 * * These changes are necessary, we are reminded each day by our mind control * jailers in the media, to solve the immigration crises, to institute gun * control, to counter domestic terrorism, to fight pornography, to find * deadbeat dads who don't pay child support, to "Save Mother Earth", * to war against drug kingpins, to stop crime in the streets, to watch and * monitor the militias, to put an end to hate crimes and bigotry, * to extend universal healthcare benefits, to guarantee welfare reform, to * improve public education...the list of crises and problems to be fixed * seems to be never-ending. * * Implement National ID Cards, they promise, and a bright, secure future * can be ours. [snip] ---- > From: John Young <jya(a)pipeline.com> > > Like wiretap law, use of the features for preventative snooping will > initially require a court order, as provided in several of the crypto > legislative proposals. > > Like the wiretap orders, gradually there will be no secret court refusals > for requests to use the technology in the national interest. > > Personal privacy will evaporate almost unnoticeably... * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** * * * * * * * * * * : The Puzzle Palace : Inside the National Security Agency, : America's most secret intelligence organization : Author James Bamford, 1983 revision, ISBN 0-14-00.6748-5 P468-469: Within the United States, FISA still leaves the NSA free to pull into its massive vacuum cleaner every telephone call and message entering, leaving, OR TRANSITING the country. By carefully inserting the words "by the National Security Agency" into the FISA legislation, the NSA has skillfully excluded from the coverage of the FISA statute as well as the surveillance court all interceptions received from the British GCHQ or any other non-NSA source. Thus it is possible for GCHQ to monitor the necessary domestic circuits and pass them on to the NSA through the UKUSA Agreement, giving them impunity to target and watch-list Americans. P475-477: Like an ever-widening sinkhole, the NSA's surveillance technology will continue to expand, quietly pulling in more and more communications and gradually eliminating more and more privacy. If there are defenses to such technotyranny, it would appear, at least from past experience, that they will not come from Congress. Rather, they will most likely come from academe and industry in the form of secure cryptographic applications to private and commercial telecommunications equipment. The same technology that is used against free speech can be used to protect it, for without protection the future may be grim. Senator Frank Church, chairman of the Senate Intelligence committee, referring to the NSA's SIGINT technology, ciirca 1975: At the same time, that capability at any time could be turned around on the American people and no American would have any privacy left, such is the capability to monitor everything: telephone conversations, telegrams, it doesn't matter. There would be no place to hide. If the government ever became a tyranny, if a dictator ever took charge in this country, the technological capacity that the intelligence commun- ity has given the government could enable it to impose total tyranny, and there would be no way to fight back, because the most careful effort to combine together in resistance to the government, no matter how privately it was done, is within the reach of the government to know. Such is the capability of this technology... I don't want to see this country ever go across the bridge. I know the capacity that is there to make tyranny total in America, and we must see to it that this agency and all agencies that possess this technology operate within the law and under proper supervision, so that we never cross over that abyss. That is the abyss from which there is no return. * * * * * * * * * * *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * "Data Show Federal Agents Seldom Employ Surveillance Authority Against * Terrorists", By Stephen Labaton, The New York Times, 5/1/95 * * An item in President Clinton's five-year, $1.5 billion plan to combat * terrorist acts: * * o It would ease restrictions on the use in American courts of * information from surveillance conducted by foreign governments. # "Moynihan Says U.S. Killed His Anti-Spy Measure" # By Irvin Molotsky, The New York Times, September 11, 1985 # # Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan charged that the CIA and State Department # had killed a measure he had introduced aimed at protecting American # citizens from having their telephone conversations intercepted by foreign # agents in this country. # # The Senator's bill would have made telephone call interception by foreign # agents illegal and would have provided for their expulsion. # # The Chairman of the Select Committee on Intelligence opposed the measure # as unnecessary and could lead to disclosing "sensitive intelligence # sources." British wiretappers at the helm of the NSA's domestic spy-fest. ---guy http://www.newsguy.com/~mayday/crypto/crypto0.html

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Re: KRAP is at it in the IETF
by Information Security 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

A reply already. ---guy > From rgm(a)icsa.net Mon Sep 7 09:32:47 1998 > Received: from homebase.htt-consult.com (homebase.htt-consult.com [208.235.169.130]) > by mail2.panix.com (8.8.8/8.8.8/PanixM1.3) with ESMTP id JAA04870 > for <guy(a)panix.com>; Mon, 7 Sep 1998 09:32:45 -0400 (EDT) > Received: from rgm ([208.235.169.131]) by homebase.htt-consult.com > (Netscape Mail Server v2.02) with SMTP id AAA340 > for <guy(a)panix.com>; Mon, 7 Sep 1998 09:32:50 -0400 > Message-Id: <3.0.5.32.19980907092146.00a108c0(a)homebase.htt-consult.com> > X-Sender: rgm-icsa(a)homebase.htt-consult.com > X-Mailer: QUALCOMM Windows Eudora Pro Version 3.0.5 (32) > Date: Mon, 07 Sep 1998 09:21:46 -0400 > To: Information Security <guy(a)panix.com> > From: Robert Moskowitz <rgm(a)icsa.net> > Subject: Re: KRAP is at it in the IETF > In-Reply-To: <199809071253.IAA01912(a)panix7.panix.com> > Mime-Version: 1.0 > Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" > Status: R > > Note that this is an individual submission. It is not the product of any > IETF workgroup. Anyone can submit an Internet Draft. The IETF maintains > an open process. However, the IESG has to approve all IDs before they can > become RFCs. There will be a period of last call on this draft on the IETF > list where appropriate comments will be taken. > > > Robert Moskowitz > International Computer Security Association > (248) 968-9809 > Fax: (248) 968-2824 > rgm(a)icsa.net >

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