December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Evans on tradition, common law & Hayek
by Robert Hettinga 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

--- begin forwarded text Date: Thu, 15 Oct 1998 11:43:25 EDT Reply-To: Hayek Related Research <HAYEK-L(a)MAELSTROM.STJOHNS.EDU> Sender: Hayek Related Research <HAYEK-L(a)MAELSTROM.STJOHNS.EDU> From: Stephen Carson <SWCarson(a)AOL.COM> Subject: Evans on tradition, common law & Hayek To: HAYEK-L(a)MAELSTROM.STJOHNS.EDU M. Stanton Evans has an excellent discussion of tradition & common law as it relates to liberty & consent in his _The Theme is Freedom: Religion, Politics, and the American Tradition_, (1994, Regnery). Chapter 5 of that book, "The Uses of Tradition", is particularly helpful. From that chapter... [emphases his] "The reason for this libertarian effect is that the common law created a tremendous obstacle to the *workings of unchecked power in the state*. For if the law grew up by way of custom and tradition, over great intervals of time, then it was not the work of any individual and could not be changed at anyone's discretion. It was outside the ordinary workings of the process, pre-existed the powers of the day, and would survive them. This made it superior to the will of any king, or group of legislators, and gave it independent status." -p. 80 "...the common law cannot be made over by the decree of any given individual, group, or even generation. It consists instead of the accretion, over time, of ways of thinking and acting that many generations have accepted. When you think about it - and the common lawyers did - this is a *species of consent*. It means that people are *voluntarily choosing to do things in a certain way, without any central direction or design*. Another common lawyer of the Stuart era, John Davies, put it as follows: 'The common law of England is nothing else but the common law and custom of the realm... A custom taketh beginning and groweth to perfection in this manner; when a reasonable act once done is found to be good and beneficial to the people, and agreeable to their nature and disposition, then they do use and practice it again and again, and so by often iteration and multiplication of the act it becometh a custom... customary law is the most perfect and most excellent, and without comparison the best, to make and preserve a commonwealth. For the written laws that are made by either the edict of princes, or by council of estates [i.e., Parliament] are imposed on the subject before any trial or probation made, whether the same be fit and agreeable to the nature and disposition of the people, or whether they will breed any inconvenience or no. But a custom doth never become a law to bind the people, until it had been tried time out of mind...'" -p. 88 "This notion of *custom as consent*, in contrast to top-down command, is among the key ideas of the free society. With the statements of Davies and Wilson, in fact, we approach the modern exposition of this point by Hayek, who devotes a series of penetrating essays to the subject. The distinctive features of a libertarian regime, Hayek argues, is that it permits the organization of society by free decision, and that this results in an ordered system that no single person or even group of people has designed, and that could not have been created by top-down methods. An obvious example is the development of language - a structure that has grown up over a considerable course of time, invented by nobody in particular, but used conveniently by many." -p. 89-90 I had never quite connected this aspect of consent in with the common law. This makes the connection between spontaneous order, custom, time & consent much clearer to me. Stephen W. Carson <mailto:SWCarson@aol.com> "Premature optimization is the root of all evil" -Donald Knuth --- end forwarded text ----------------- Robert A. Hettinga <mailto: rah(a)philodox.com> Philodox Financial Technology Evangelism <http://www.philodox.com/> 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity, [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'

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FW: IAB statement on "private doorbell" encryption
by Fisher Mark 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> From: The IAB[SMTP:iab@ietf.org] > Sent: Thursday, October 15, 1998 9:35 AM > Subject: IAB statement on "private doorbell" encryption > > > > The IAB and IESG are concerned by published descriptions of the > "private doorbell" approach to resolving the encryption controversy. > Essentially, the private doorbell requires that encryption and > decryption be done at a gateway, rather than at an end system; see > http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/779/govtaff/policy/paper/paper_index.html > for one description. This is in conflict with the "end-to-end" > principle, a fundamental tenet of the Internet architecture. While > there is certainly a place for gateway-based encryption in some > circumstances, to require it in all places (and to exclude end-to-end > encryption) would warp the protocol structure. Furthermore, it > offers a significantly lower level of security, in that there is > no longer protection against inside attacks, which by all accounts > are a serious threat. > > In addition, putting all security at the gateway ignores the need > for different levels of protection in different situations. For > some applications, encryption to the gateway may suffice. Others > may require encryption and cryptographic authentication of the > individual machine or even user. Should a strong encryption > algorithm be used, or a very efficient one? It is very difficult > to make these decisions anywhere but the end-system. But the > "private doorbell" scheme would block deployment of such fine-grained > protection. > > ========================================================== Mark Leighton Fisher Thomson Consumer Electronics fisherm(a)indy.tce.com Indianapolis, IN "Their walls are built of cannon balls, their motto is 'Don't Tread on Me'"

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FW: Protocol Action: OpenPGP Message Format to Proposed Standard
by Fisher Mark 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> From: The IESG[SMTP:iesg-secretary@ietf.org] > Sent: Thursday, October 15, 1998 10:27 AM > Cc: RFC Editor; Internet Architecture Board; ietf-open-pgp(a)imc.org > Subject: Protocol Action: OpenPGP Message Format to Proposed Standard > > > > The IESG has approved the Internet-Draft 'OpenPGP Message Format' > <draft-ietf-openpgp-formats-08.txt> as a Proposed Standard. This > document is the product of the An Open Specification for Pretty Good > Privacy Working Group. > > The IESG contact persons are Jeffrey Schiller and Marcus Leech. > > > > Technical Summary > > This document defines the formats used by "Phil's Pretty Good > Privacy" otherwise known as PGP. > > Working Group Summary > > After serious discussion the working group came to consensus on this > document. > > Protocol Quality > > The formats used here are the result of a second generation > engineering effort to define an efficient, one pass format for > representing information encrypted or signed with PGP. They were > reviewed by Jeffrey I. Schiller for the IESG. > > > Note to RFC Editor: Please add the following as an IESG Note: > > This document defines many tag values, yet it doesn't describe a > mechanism for adding new tags (for new features). Traditionally the > Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA) handles the allocation of > new values for future expansion and RFCs usually define the procedure > to be used by the IANA. However there are subtle (and not so subtle) > interactions that may occur in this protocol between new features and > existing features which result in a significant reduction in over all > security. Therefore this document does not define an extension > procedure. Instead requests to define new tag values (say for new > encryption algorithms for example) should be forwarded to the IESG > Security Area Directors for consideration or forwarding to the > appropriate IETF Working Group for consideration. > > ========================================================== Mark Leighton Fisher Thomson Consumer Electronics fisherm(a)indy.tce.com Indianapolis, IN "Their walls are built of cannon balls, their motto is 'Don't Tread on Me'"

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Re: Commerce Undersecretary William Reinsch defends the government's encryption policy
by HyperReal-Anon 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

nospam(a)freedom.net wrote: > > http://www.infosecuritymag.com/sept/q%26a.htm > Q & A WITH WILLIAM REINSCH > > Reinsch: What the government has also said is that if it's a > key-recovery product, it can be exported with any bit length > without constraint. And that's what we would prefer to focus > on -- to tell people, if you're product has recovery features, > bit length doesn't matter. Ah, something we can finally agree upon: "if your product has recovery features, bit length doesn't matter" (it's insecure).

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DCSB: Risk Management is Where the Money Is; Trust in Digital Commerce
by Robert Hettinga 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

--- begin forwarded text Mime-Version: 1.0 X-Sender: rah(a)pop.sneaker.net Date: Thu, 15 Oct 1998 11:01:58 -0400 To: dcsb(a)ai.mit.edu, dcsb-announce(a)ai.mit.edu From: Robert Hettinga <rah(a)shipwright.com> Subject: DCSB: Risk Management is Where the Money Is; Trust in Digital Commerce Cc: Dan Geer <geer(a)world.std.com>, Terry Symula <symula(a)ma.ultranet.com>, "Heffan, Ira" <HEFFAN(a)tht.com>, Roland Mueller <roland(a)secunet.com> Sender: bounce-dcsb(a)ai.mit.edu Precedence: bulk Reply-To: Robert Hettinga <rah(a)shipwright.com> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- The Digital Commerce Society of Boston Presents Dan Geer Senior Strategist and VP, CertCo, Inc. Risk Management is Where the Money Is Tuesday, November 3rd, 1998 12 - 2 PM The Downtown Harvard Club of Boston One Federal Street, Boston, MA The focus of "security" research today is the study of "trust management," i.e., the study of how trust is created, propagated, circumscribed, stored, exchanged, accounted for, recalled and adjudicated in an electronic world. This is both natural and mature -- natural because security is a means and not an end, mature because security technology must differentiate along cost-benefit lines. All the security technology that you can buy today enables some aspect of trust management and the academic and entrepreneurial segments alike are busy supplying many novel ways to propagate trust. They have it all wrong. Trust management is definitely exciting, but like most exciting ideas it is not important. What is important is risk management, the sister, the dual of trust management. And it is risk management that is the part of financial services that will drive the security world from here on out whether you realize it or not. Dan Geer is VP and Senior Strategist for CertCo, Inc., market leader in digital certification for electronic commerce. Dan has been at a number of security oriented startups in the Boston area since leaving academia where he was Manager of Systems Development for MIT's Project Athena. He holds a S.B. in EE/CS from MIT, and a Sc.D. in Biostatistics from Harvard. He was deeply involved in medical computing for fifteen years. A frequent speaker, popular teacher and member of several professional societies, he has been active in USENIX for some years at the Board level. His recent publications include "The Web Security Sourcebook" (Wiley, 1997) and the security chapter in Leebaert's "The Future of the Electronic Marketplace" (MIT, 1998). This meeting of the Digital Commerce Society of Boston will be held on Tuesday, November 3, 1998, from 12pm - 2pm at the Downtown Branch of the Harvard Club of Boston, on One Federal Street. The price for lunch is $32.50. This price includes lunch, room rental, various A/V hardware, and the speaker's lunch. ;-). The Harvard Club *does* have dress code: jackets and ties for men (and no sneakers or jeans), and "appropriate business attire" (whatever that means), for women. Fair warning: since we purchase these luncheons in advance, we will be unable to refund the price of your lunch if the Club finds you in violation of the dress code. We need to receive a company check, or money order, (or, if we *really* know you, a personal check) payable to "The Harvard Club of Boston", by Saturday, October 31st, or you won't be on the list for lunch. Checks payable to anyone else but The Harvard Club of Boston will have to be sent back. Checks should be sent to Robert Hettinga, 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, Massachusetts, 02131. Again, they *must* be made payable to "The Harvard Club of Boston", in the amount of $32.50. Please include your e-mail address, so that we can send you a confirmation If anyone has questions, or has a problem with these arrangements (We've had to work with glacial A/P departments more than once, for instance), please let us know via e-mail, and we'll see if we can work something out. Upcoming speakers for DCSB are: December Joseph DeFeo TBA January Ira Heffan Internet Software and Business Process Patents February Roland Mueller European Privacy Directive We are actively searching for future speakers. If you are in Boston on the first Tuesday of the month, and you would like to make a presentation to the Society, please send e-mail to the DCSB Program Commmittee, care of Robert Hettinga, <mailto: rah(a)shipwright.com>. For more information about the Digital Commerce Society of Boston, send "info dcsb" in the body of a message to <mailto: majordomo(a)ai.mit.edu> . If you want to subscribe to the DCSB e-mail list, send "subscribe dcsb" in the body of a message to <mailto: majordomo(a)ai.mit.edu> . We look forward to seeing you there! Cheers, Robert Hettinga Moderator, The Digital Commerce Society of Boston -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: PGP for Personal Privacy 5.5.5 iQEVAwUBNiYOVsUCGwxmWcHhAQFxUggAjVPIS2STdjusV7TZJd/VrrA9NOzw12al 9k9wFsEcWwvknad85QCiTY1Vkwa7hCakuH9YkU9BZlWLgNhpm0tBTZ/nkMjGRaaX 3V8d89CfjaXoMfxYEmL95Cm0HEND5hUFoSmlWPQUjvThcQwrbWzXubzsmPn0Jd7M kqUrp/oFmqv4XYjgFWQxIz6va4dB772fTKCCmGJankNYh/ho+/HWm0pasymTzl/b akPKYSnTgCNQrUqHy6zSJJiinrAWQkPYcEinWktnT/TJGU1DFuxciJzQhu1c1eVr 8xtkgPn86Rmz4HXKnLRRm+lTWOKAo6+IDR4N1vR38pCiHx4ySIQ+PQ== =/Xht -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- ----------------- Robert A. Hettinga <mailto: rah(a)philodox.com> Philodox Financial Technology Evangelism <http://www.philodox.com/> 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity, [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire' For help on using this list (especially unsubscribing), send a message to "dcsb-request(a)ai.mit.edu" with one line of text: "help". --- end forwarded text ----------------- Robert A. Hettinga <mailto: rah(a)philodox.com> Philodox Financial Technology Evangelism <http://www.philodox.com/> 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity, [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'

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Re: Commerce Undersecretary William Reinsch defends the governments encryption policy
by Ernest Hua 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> We want to work through the market. What that means is, if the market > turns in unexpected directions, we have to be ready to re-evaluate our > policy. So I don't think you're going to see a "final" version > ever. As long as the market moves and changes, our policy will be > tweaked to accommodate what's happening. In other words ... If we don't approve, it's time to go back to ITAR and 40-bits. > I don't think they're doing it just because the government asked them > to; they're doing it because they see a market. In addition, in the > spring the FBI and the Justice Department asked companies to come in > to see if a technical solution could be found to deal with these > issues. Companies have done that, too. It must be nice to be able to pressure and threaten companies behind the scenes and then come out to the public to say that they are "cooperating" or "volunteering". > At the same time, of all the economic sectors in the country, this > one's moving the fastest. There's a real danger that, if we can't get > our policy together and out there in the marketplace soon, we could be > overtaken by events overseas. In other words, "all this time we've been denying that there was overseas competition, well, we were lying through our teeth." "And that thing with the EU complaining about Echelon and the Germans trying to head up the Europeans to bust ITAR/EAR ..." Oops! Can't say the "E" word in public because "nobody" knows about that! > I think you have to contrast that situation, which was reasonably > artificial, with the reality of law enforcement. In this case, it took > a decent amount of resources to crack a specific message that, I > believe, the people doing the crack knew was in English, and knew was > one message. Must be nice not having real technologists pointing out blatant flaws/lies in your public statments. > Now, if you're the FBI, think about that. From their standpoint, we're > talking about traffic that isn't so easily identifiable. It might be a > long stream of encrypted material that they're trying to intercept in > real time; they don't necessarily know what language it's in; they > don't necessarily know what Sure ... if the FBI were really stupid ... and the FBI didn't really want to do any homework, but instead, would rather have NSA's dictionaries do the walking ... encryption would be a real bitch, wouldn't it? Even 40-bit. Ern

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FBI Affidavit on Ex-NSA Cryptanalyst
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

We offer the FBI's 23-page affidavit of charges against David Sheldon Boone, ex-NSA cryptanalyst who allegedly passed top secret SIGINT, EW and nuclear targeting plans to the Soviets: http://jya.com/dsb100998.htm Tantalizing hints on means and methods, quoting the affidavit of the FBI agent in charge: On one occasion, "Igor" [Soviet agent] told BOONE that the KGB/SVRR had access to United States Signals Directive (USSID) Zero, which was an index of all other USSIDs, and from this index IGOR asked BOONE to obtain specific USSIDs. I have ascertained that USSIDs are classified NSA publications for use in providing Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) support to the United States military. BOONE told the OA [FBI Operational Asset posing as Soviet agent to set up Boone] that he had given "Igor" a photocopy of an NSA document entitled "United States Signals Intelligence Directive (USSID) 514," dated May 6, 1988. BOONE told the OA that this USSID was unusual because it was one of few USSIDs to be classified TOP SECRET rather than SECRET. BOONE told the OA that USSID 514 was not widely disseminated but that one copy had been at USAFS Augsburg. And more on Boone's training and duties in cryptanalysis at Fort Meade and in Germany. Bad Ausburg is the location of one of the NSA intercept stations for the Echelon program is it not?

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mail2fax remailer capability?
by Adam Back 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I am noticing the odd free email2fax "your fax was sent successfully" report in the dud messages sent to (the non-replyable) nobody(a)remailer.ch. Warming to the heart that -- anonymous fax. Now I am wondering what the coverage is like on fax gateways -- it clearly only is going to work in places where there are free local calls, for numbers counting as local to the gateway. Just thinking it would be kind of nice if one could send a message To: +1.234.567.891-mail2fax(a)anon.lcs.mit.edu via mixmaster and have it sort out the delivery if possible to mail2fax gateways operating with local calls in that area code. (Analogously perhaps to the auto USENET posting from those remailers with this option turned on -- that is either direct (remailer posts) or indirect (forwarded to a mail2news gateway)). Has anyone come across any mail2fax site which tries to keep track of other free fax services and forward faxes to one in the right area? ('Course if we could get some damn working ecash, we could fax it anywhere -- sender pays:-) Next stage -- anonymous voice mail delivered via voice modem / soundcard, all via mixmaster, that would be nice! Adam

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Re: Commerce Undersecretary William Reinsch defends the governments encryption policy
by Ernest Hua 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Michael, Absolutely! But I still really am hoping in desperation that some people in the main stream press would get a clue that this is all double speak, and that they are simply playing a game to buy time for their old system, and buy political wins for the next system. Heck, if I was in FBI/NSA's shoes, and this was the slimy game I see everyday in D.C., it would be the same game I play to get what I need. And I would be very irresponsible if I did not play the game, however slimy it is. The problem is that it seems like most of the public take speeches like the speakers are pretty much honest, when in fact, most of the time, they are playing spin control. I have no doubt the FBI/NSA are in trouble. Echelon (or whatever they call it) is in trouble. They are irresponsible if they did not fight to the end to preserve some of their multi-billion $$$ investment, but they are in dire straits if they are hoping for a second generation centralized scanning intelligence machinery like Echelon. My belief is that they have to gather automated intelligence from far more disparate and heterogenous (and possibly conflicting) sources in the near future, and find ways to make sense out of all of the data. But I think the intelligent observer would see that they have no choice because this technology .. I hate that word because people call some of the most simple and dumb stuff "technology" in order to make money from it .. this technology is impossible to control, which means that precisely the most important target worth going after will have plenty of resources to foil Echelon, but the people made most vulnerable (because of the regulations) are the common folks. THAT is what is pissing me off. If they have some effective way to regulate underground trade of encryption, then they would have a story to tell. However, the fact that most encryption get out of this country so darn fast (we're counting minutes now ...) means they are not even trying. Prosecuting that guy in San Jose is just nuts. Since when does prosecuting a legitimate business man will actually stop people, who firmly believing that they have some natural right to distribute encryption? And I must emphasize that my opinion has NOTHING to do with whether encryption SHOULD, from a social/political/legal view, be exportable or not. Ern

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