December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Anonymous code name allocated.
by daemon＠anon.penet.fi 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

You have sent a message using the anon.penet.fi anonymous forwarding service. You have been allocated the code name an611909. You can be reached anonymously using the address an611909(a)anon.penet.fi. If you want to use a nickname, please send a message to nick(a)anon.penet.fi, with a Subject: field containing your nickname. For instructions, send a message to help(a)anon.penet.fi.

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[hrdware] Is Tempest detecting only video?
by Jean-Francois Avon 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On 11 May 96 at 20:35, jim bell wrote: > I'm waiting for cheap flat-panel displays for desktop computers > to arrive, because they will probably be almost impossible to > detect usably by Tempest systems. Does Tempest detects only the emission from the electron gun in the monitor or can it get a usable "lock" on some other signals generated within a computer? As an example, can it grab the keystrokes? If the answer is yes, can it do it: a) rarely b) occasionally c) most of the time d) almost all of the time e) never Could somebody knowledgeable in Tempest can rate the various emissions from a computer? (such as: keyboard, COM port, modem, lpt, video signal(from the card), disk write, monitor emission, network comms, etc) Ciao JFA Just curious... PGP key ID# C58ADD0D at: http://w3.citenet.net/users/jf_avon Key Fingerprint: 529645E8205A8A5E F87CC86FAEFEF891 Unsollicited commercial e-mail will be proofread at US165 $/h Any sender of such material will be considered as to have ac- cepted the above mentionned terms.

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Re: Again: [hrdware] anti-Tempest video settings
by Jean-Francois Avon 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On 12 May 96 at 13:51, Julian Assange wrote: <technical tips snipped> > Equipment > capable of the latter would be extremely complicated and expensive > to design and produce; Even too expensive for entities with the power of taxation? > I suspect there has been no call for it to > date, given that if you are dealing with a target who understands > the risks of van-eck they usually have shielding and or a faraday > cage. You have a point for big outfits. But for small companies or cypherpunks on a restricted budget, they also know that there is most likely *no* shielding of any sort... Regards jfa Why is it that govt employees makes the best spouses? Because after they come back from work, they are not tired and they already read the newspapers. PGP key ID# C58ADD0D at: http://w3.citenet.net/users/jf_avon Key Fingerprint: 529645E8205A8A5E F87CC86FAEFEF891 Unsollicited commercial e-mail will be proofread at US165 $/h Any sender of such material will be considered as to have ac- cepted the above mentionned terms.

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Re: Again: [hrdware] anti-Tempest video settings
by jim bell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 08:02 PM 5/11/96 +0000, Jean-Francois Avon wrote: >Or, to the contrary, is it reasonable to assume that modern Tempest equipment can >work around theses impediments almost all of the time, therefore >making any attempts at this futile? It's probably worth investigating. Chances are good that as long as the total beam current remains as constant as possible, the signal will be much harder to interpret. One way to investigate this comparatively easily is to measure the total power consumption of a monitor when the screen is filled with different colors at different saturations, etc. Supply the AC to the monitor through a 1-ohm resistor, measure the AC voltage across the resistor to 1 mv accuracy or better, and you have a pretty good way to distinguish different beam currents. I'm waiting for cheap flat-panel displays for desktop computers to arrive, because they will probably be almost impossible to detect usably by Tempest systems. Jim Bell jimbell(a)pacifier.com

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Crypto++ 2.1
by Wei Dai 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Crypto++ 2.1 has just been released. You can find download instructions on the Crypto++ home page at http://www.eskimo.com/~weidai/cryptlib.html. Crypto++ is a free C++ class library of cryptographic primitives. Changes made in version 2.1 include: - added Tiger, HMAC, GOST, RIPE-MD160, LUCELG, LUCDIF, XOR-MAC, OAEP, PSSR, SHARK - added precomputation to DH, ElGamal, DSA, and elliptic curve algorithms - optimizations in elliptic curves over GF(p) - changed Rabin to use OAEP and PSSR - changed many classes to allow copy constructors to work correctly - improved exception generation and handling This is likely to be the last major revision of Crypto++. Future versions will probably only be released for bug fixes and compliance to new standards. Wei Dai P.S. A new set of benchmarks done using Crypto++ 2.1 is available at http://www.eskimo.com/~weidai/benchmarks.txt.

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Re: Remailer in a box
by Matts Kallioniemi 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 00:24 1996-05-12 -0700, Lucky Green wrote: >May I suggest convincing that Swedish ISP to offer up a signup form >accepting Ecash? They probably will once the Post Bank gets going with ecash. Until then there are legal difficulties. Swedish online merchants can't even accept credit cards. They need an order in hand writing or voice before they can charge the card. My offer was to open an account with any ISP, whether they accept ecash or not. I think that improves the anonymity of the account. Matts

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Re: found nym-differentiation! Still need perpetual motion, FTL travel, coldfusion
by shamrock＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 19:02 5/11/96, Perry E. Metzger wrote: >I doubt that will work even were it implemented. Every phone on the >planet and terminal would need to constantly do biometric analysis of >every user, and even then people could program their terminals to lie. Telling your terminal to lie will be rather difficult once the CPU refuses to run an OS with out propper signatures. The OS in turn won't run applications without such signatures. All commercial software has to undergo code review by CAs. Your machine won't even run anything but approved software. Should you think about keeping an old machine around that does, my advice would be: don't. At least not unless you are willing to face the ten years prison term mandatory for such a computer crime. Disclaimer: My opinions are my own, not those of my employer. -- Lucky Green <mailto:shamrock@netcom.com> PGP encrypted mail preferred.

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Re: distinctive properties of ecash, netbill, cybercash and iKP
by shamrock＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 16:40 5/11/96, Jüri Kaljundi wrote: >This is one question why the central bank in Estonia (I am not sure about >other countries) does not allow issuing e-cash here in Estonia. While the >banks issue e-cash to people, they get some real cash from people. This >leads to actually doubleing the money in circulation, each monetary unit, >either dollar or kroon, can at the same time be used by owner of e-cash >and at the same time by the bank. The central banks are afraid that when >the amount of e-cash in circulation gets big, this could lead to >devalvation of money, especially a small country like Estonia is afraid of >such development. That's simply silly. The same argument would hold true for travelers checks. Are Estonian banks allowed to issue them? I thought so. Disclaimer: My opinions are my own, not those of my employer. -- Lucky Green <mailto:shamrock@netcom.com> PGP encrypted mail preferred.

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Re: Remailer in a box
by shamrock＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 12:52 5/11/96, Matts Kallioniemi wrote: >-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- > >At 17:39 1996-05-10 EDT, E. ALLEN SMITH wrote: >>Yes, for the cryptographic purposes. It doesn't make much difference >>on the juristictional end of things - I'd need to locate a UNIX account >>in another country for that. Hmm... possible. >> -Allen > >Anybody who want's an anonymous shell account in Sweden, send me MTB ecash >and I'll get an account opened for you with a local ISP. Sweden has the best >Internet access outside North America. A 34 Mbps line to the US, soon to be >upgraded to 155 Mbps! May I suggest convincing that Swedish ISP to offer up a signup form accepting Ecash? Disclaimer: My opinions are my own, not those of my employer. -- Lucky Green <mailto:shamrock@netcom.com> PGP encrypted mail preferred.

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Re: Again: [hrdware] anti-Tempest video settings
by Adam philipp 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 08:02 PM 5/11/96 +0000, you wrote: >But of course. But what I want to know is: is there some >combination of >display colors that will be visible for the eye, but not for the >Tempest equipment? I am not an electrical engineer and do not play one in real life. However in my on TEMPEST I heard nothing about varying colors to reduce RF radiation from a monitor. Just set up a Faraday cage, much simpler. >That might answer it. I suppose that if some "stealth" settings >exists, they are highly hardware dependent. Better to get TEMPEST rated hardware then... check government surplus... I've had reports of TEMPEST class computer cases being sold with power supplies real cheap... >My question was not "would it work in all instances?" but rather >"had this tactic been implemented successfully in *some* instances?" Not that I have ever heard... Hopefully I am not feeding this troll too much. >Or, to the contrary, is it reasonable to assume that modern Tempest equipment can >work around theses impediments almost all of the time, therefore >making any attempts at this futile? No modern equipment can detect radiation that does NOT leave a Faraday cage. Adam, Esq. -- =-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-+-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-\ | My PGP key is available on my |Unauthorized interception violates | | home page: http://www.rosa.com |federal law (18 USC Section 2700 et| |=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-|seq.). In any case, PGP encrypted | |SUB ROSA...see home page... |communications are preferred for | | -=[ FUCK THE CDA]=- |sensitive materials. | \=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-+-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-/ If A is a success in life, then A = x + y + z. Work is x; y is play; and z is keeping your mouth shut. Albert Einstein (1879-1955)

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Reply to anonymous ping.
by daemon＠anon.penet.fi 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Your code name is: an611909(a)anon.penet.fi.

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Re: distinctive properties of ecash, netbill, cybercash and iKP
by minow＠apple.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> >> >> Anonymity of monetary transactions is another thing that Bank of Estonia >> has declared illegal. > >Cash is illegal, too! How does the economy in Estonia work these days? >Barter? If you think about it, anonymous cash transactions above a certain limit ($4,000?) are illegal in the United States, too. Martin Minow minow(a)apple.com

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Notes from the SF Physical Cypherpunks meeting
by minow＠apple.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Here are my notes -- without significant editing or correction -- from Saturday's (96.05.11) cypherpunks meeting in Palo Alto. Discussion of crypto user interfaces (particularly NetScape and e-mail) -- How to tell user that "installation" not secure in a decent GUI? -- Expectation of what leaves user machine. -- Vendor's "shouldn't distinguish products on security: security is the bedrock of our industry." (Quote from some industry person who was not present to defend this thesis). -- Someday, there will be a "Word virus that attacks your CyberCash wallet." -- If the message is insecure with respect to the user's expectation, there should be a user-visible window border (or similar): NetScape's little key isn't good enough. Did you know that the netscape key has 1 tooth for 40-bit, and 2 teeth for 120 bit encryption? -- Signed code is the new industry meme. Bonded agents who certify signed code. Do you know how much bonding costs, and how little it offers? -- Security dialogs need a help button that explains security. -- Error messages (of all kinds) should have a url that gives more info. Can be a file:// or http:// for local help. Eudora and Netscape will provide S/Mime. PGP is going nowhere, S/Mime becoming ubiquitous (Eudora, future Netscape) S/Mimepretty good. 2 Flaws: signature's name is not encrypted. Major flaw: encryption defaults to 40-bit. No good way to negotiate for stronger encryption. c2.org: 90% of all connections are 40-bit RC2. Need to publish negotiation info so that sender and receiver can agree on crypto strength. PGP lost in Eudora/Netscape: ongoing legal problems with Phil Zimmerman. Strong concern that companies can't use PGP without problems with RSA. Do they need Viacrypt. Web of trust: not working. Hard to map an e-mail address to a key. Hal Finney's Java implementation not sufficient for signature distribution. S/Mime will support Verisign. Verisign certificates have "trust" level: class 1 is untrusted (equivalent to PGP self-signed?) Next Netscape beta will have five additional non-verisign CA's: ---- Crypto toolkit: need certification for code fragments. Need "web of trust" for software validation. There will be a zillion Java applet's out there: how do you know one does what you claim it do? When will Java signed classes/signed applets be released. Two weeks. Hmm, Java One conference is in two weeks. Surely a coincidence. You can sign a class by signing the class file (zip), then archiving it together with the source and then sign the combined archive. I think that Stuffit (on the Macintosh) supports signed archives if PowerTalk is provided. ----- Norm Hardy talked about the E programming language from Electric communities. (Java with capabilities). [[These are notes, and occasionally incoherent, for which I humbly apologize.]] Capabilities. Should be able to import code and run it even when you don't trust the code. Java-type scheme can succeed. No short description. Here are some of the reasons you should believe it: -- History: late 50's Algol 60. Code shouldn't be able to escape it's storage. Compilers and hardware thought this was not sufficiently important to do this. Not implemented on actual compilers or hardware (hmm, Burrows 5000, Basic timesharing systems offer counter-examples). Intent was to be neat and modular, not to be secure against intruders. Garbage collectors forced better, formal, theory of storage. Gave us storage security. Multics gave cross-trust subroutine calls. KEYCOS Started in TimeShare, early 1970's. Ran customers (competitors) on the same machine. Machine code didn't get in other people's way. Customers needed to interact. NCSC (part of NSA) looked at this, recommended B3 rating. Archtecture was good for A1 (next to top, as good as it comes). Needed rewriting by cleared people, needed formal proofs. NSA judging systems to protect NSA secrets. Main idea: programs have rapid communication, with strong security properties that they themselves arrange. HYDRA earliest system (Bill Wulf). KEYCOS improved on HYDRA. Capability: designates something and conveys authority to that thing Can't pull this apart: can't access without having capability. Can't get information, can't affect its state. No specific superuser state: privileged programs have different set of capabilities, not necessarily all. COM e-mail/bbs system (Sweden) -- operator could backup e-mail, but not read it. Object oriented programming system is a capability system. Crypto (public-private key) similar to capabilities. Public key is a capability. Private key is the thing that the key designates. Access lists: people access data. However, it's really the computer program that accesses the data on the person's behalf. Access control lists (VMS, Mac filesharing) -- more prevalent than you might expect, but can be made unobtrusive. Few people notice that Mac filesharing has access control lists. Contraxt Unix and capability system. On Unix, programmer gives a filename to the shell, shell tells the compiler. Compiler opens the file. Capability: give "read" capability to shell, shell gives it to compiler. Compiler uses capability to access data. Cannot hide capability from programmer. When you build something (create something), you have to present a "space bank" (sub-pool). You can buy space bank, determine the amount of free space, zap parts of it, etc. Money object: can do in Java -- two classes: mint, pot. Pot has two private fields, mint reference, value. Pot method: produce a sibling pot with same mint object and no value. Transfer -- if two pots refer to the same mint, transfer value between them. I own program, you own data. I don't trust your data, you don't trust my program. I want to allow you to run your data on my program. Factory (mutually trusted). Give access to code to factory. Give you access to factory. You invoke factory, factory creates object that can execute code on data, but lacks capability to send data. Capability architectures (narrower sense): for A to affect B, necessary and sufficent for A to have capability for B. Can't add onto Unix since old, non-capability mechanisms are still there. Get capabilities two ways: create object, gets ownership to message. Can pass capability in a message. Give to subcontractor only narrow capabilities it needs. Build system so capabilities can be very narrow. Can grant capability "Q := zero" -- receiver executes capability, but never know name of variable. Algol call by name -- caller passes a "thunk" to the subroutine. Subroutine executes the thunk that carries out the caller's computation. Debugger subject to same capability restrictions. Keeper -- computational resources become capabilities -- meters grant ability to use cpu time. Meter has "amount of ticks" -- when hits zero, task is suspended. Attached to another program with role of meter keeper. Meter keeper can decide to replenish meter. Can allocate budget (rate-based) -- useful for real-time app's. Jewel manual (agorics web site). Market-based control Scott Clearwater. Fractional (Fractal) reserve bank. http://www.agorics.com/agorics. Can grant subsets of own capabilities. Can (by prior arrangement) revoke capabilities. Language-based vs OS based. Can run large parts of o.s. in capability model. Get some advantages, but there are pitfalls. Capability systems can protect against denial of service. Can administrate cpu/space usage. Language-based systems can message across trust boundaries quickly. O.S. based may need many machine cycles. Crypo-based capability may need millions (exponent). ---- Marianne Mueller. Reported on Java Security Workshop. [[Dumb jokes self-censored to protect the guilty.]] Java team interested in security -- nobody is specifically Mr. Security. Everybody's responsiblity. 1st Morning. Status + foodfight: Steve Bellovin: Java is a virus. Venting. We all got minimal trusted computing base (with verifying, formally) religion. Need better formal model of the language. with better specificiation, can get better testing. Need better test suites to ensure that Microsoft implements the same model as Netscape. VM spec, language spec, also working on policy spec (what the sandbox policy actually is). Funding an outside security group. 1st Afternoon. Paul Karger, Mark Schaffer. How to use capabilities with Java. "If you do capabilities, make sure it does these 15 properties. " 2nd Morning. Proposal to do code signing. Afternoon, continued to discuss code signing and key management. Discussed trust models. Butler Lamson and Ron Rivest paper on Rivest's home page (on capabilities). Lamson now working for Microsoft. IEEE symposium on security and privacy. Security theory people. Princeton stuff. Security folk all over the Princeton folk -- think they're just a bunch of hackers. Java folk impressed; find Princeton stuff useful. Working on crypto API's. Sun lobbying govenment to free crypto API's. Signing classes, applets, applications (application is classes + data). Microsoft coming out this summer. Code signing very important. Needs very soon. Hard to do real capabilities on Java. Transitive closure is very difficult. ----- Transcribed in real-time by Martin Minow minow(a)apple.com

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Re: Mandatory Voluntary Self-Ratings
by E. ALLEN SMITH 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

It is interesting to note from the CIEC trial bulletin (which they won't let me quote part of, according to their initial notice - stupid policy) and other sources that the conservatives won't let people just rate "objectionable" material in order to keep it from them. They want it off the net/world whether or not it's rated. Thus, the idea that vznuri and others (such as the various proponents of its current use) have that PICS can save the net from the conservatives et al doesn't work. Nice idea (maybe), but no cigar. -Allen

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Re: Why I Pay Too Much in Taxes
by Jean-Francois Avon 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> Thanks to Philip Zimmermann and Lance Cottrell the balance of power > between the state and the little guy has changed completely. It's > good to see that both of them are going into mass market business. > Perhaps they can get some of the billions of dollars they deserve. Thumbs up! JFA DePompadour, Societe d'Importation Ltee Limoges porcelain, Silverware and mouth blown crystal glasses JFA Technologies, R&D consultants. Physists, technologists and engineers. PGP keys at: http://w3.citenet.net/users/jf_avon ID# C58ADD0D : 529645E8205A8A5E F87CC86FAEFEF891 Unsollicited commercial e-mail will be proofread at US165 $/h Any sender of such material will be considered as to have ac- cepted the above mentionned terms.

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No Subject
by Jeremiah Harmsen 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

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Re: Notes from the SF Physical Cypherpunks meeting
by Matts Kallioniemi 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 09:29 1996-05-12 -0700, Martin Minow wrote: >COM e-mail/bbs system (Sweden) -- operator could backup >e-mail, but not read it. Sure. The database was encrypted by using XOR with the string "KOM". That was the sorry state of encryption in the early eighties. Matts

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Cybercash snake oil merchant
by E. ALLEN SMITH 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I've located a new snake oil merchant, by the name of cybank. Their url is http://www.cybank.net, and they're claiming things like "public key encryption has been broken." Well, yes... if you use a too-short key length. -Allen

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KWTX (fwd)
by anonymous-remailer＠shell.portal.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

---------- Forwarded message ---------- Subject: KWTX Vincent Miller / April 25, 1996 International Society for Individual Liberty (ISIL) Update Letter --------------------excerpt------------------------------------ The Onslaught Against American Liberties Escalates The US Justice Department is currently suing radio station KWTX in Texas over what they term "malicious disregard for the truth in reporting on Waco". If convicted the station will be both civilly and criminally liable for any alleged harm caused to property or government agents. This is of course ironic. In a sea of federal propaganda, and self-serving FBI-ATF press releases, the small radio and TV stations (and the Internet) were the Only source of real information about what actually happened at Waco. Even before this case has been heard the judge revealed his bias by stating that he thought the conduct of the station was "outrageous." Source: CBS Evening News with Dan Rather (Apr 19th). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ISIL, 1800 Market Street, San Francisco, CA 94102 415-864-0952, fax 415-864-7506 This organization gives permission to reprint provided that proper credit is given. --------------------------------------------------------------------

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FYB_oss
by jya＠pipeline.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

5-12-96. NYPaper: "Who's Reading Your E-Mail? Maybe the Boss. More Companies Say Messages Are Their Property." Reports on various spying policies and employee rights. Quotes PRZ demurring: "You don't check your constitutional rights at the door." Notes Apple's snooping not. And, scare-escrowing, it asks, "what happens if an employee encrypts important company documents, and then dies [or is fired or extorts]. How will the company get to vital information." FYB_oss

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Re: Notes from the SF Physical Cypherpunks meeting
by Tom Weinstein 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

sameer(a)c2.org wrote: > > > c2.org: 90% of all connections are 40-bit RC2. > > The number is 94.5%, and it's RC4, not RC2. RC2 is not in any > SSLv2 products. The domestic version of Netscape has always done RC2. The export version of Netscape 3.0 now does 40-bit RC2 in SSL v2 mode. -- One tag to rule them all, One tag to find them; One tag | Tom Weinstein to bring them all, and in the source tree bind them. | tomw(a)netscape.com

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Civil liberties of employees (Re: FYB_oss)
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 10:03 PM 5/12/96, John Young wrote: > 5-12-96. NYPaper: > > "Who's Reading Your E-Mail? Maybe the Boss. More Companies > Say Messages Are Their Property." > > Reports on various spying policies and employee rights. > Quotes PRZ demurring: "You don't check your constitutional > rights at the door." Notes Apple's snooping not. > Actually, one _does_ check one's Constitutional rights "at the door" (of an employer), and the confusion over this issue is pervasively destroying real Constitutional rights. For instance, if I hire someone, I can require him or her to wear a uniform, to not wear blue jeans to work, to not smoke (or even to smoke, if this is what the job involves), to take off his or her clothes, to tap dance, to not say anything to my customers, and on and on. If the government required these behaviors, this would be a legitimate issue, but not if employers set these conditions as terms of continued employment. If an employer says that all messages will be read by him, this is not a violation of anyone's "civil liberties." (And, on a practical note, companies are often held responsible for the messages emanating on company time from employees, so there are actual reasons why such monitoring may be necessary.) An employee who dislikes the terms of his employment is of course free, in our society, to leave. The Constitution is about what the government can and cannot require, not about what I as an employer can require. This point is frequently confusing to people who, in my opinion, haven't thought about it. Thus, a "Hooters girl" suddenly decides she doesn't like "displaying herself" to men and announces that her civil liberties are being violated by being told to wear skimpy outfits. (I haven't read Zimmermann's comments in full, to get the full context, but I doubt we'll agree on such things. His achievement with PGP was considerable, but I know from first-hand experience that his political views are very non-libertarian and are, in fact, counter to liberty.) --Tim May Boycott "Big Brother Inside" software! We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, we know that that ain't allowed. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Licensed Ontologist | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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Re: Notes from the SF Physical Cypherpunks meeting
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I'd like to thank Martin Minow for his summary of what happened at yesterday's Bay Area Cypherpunks meeting (note that it was Bay Area, held at Stanford, not "SF"). Clarifications and corrections are starting to come in, which is fine. But these clarifications and corrections should not dissuade Martin or anyone else from doing such summaries. This meeting was somwhat languid, I think because of the outdoor (and warm!) location at Tresidder Union at Stanford University...normally our meetings have been held in the cool corporate environs of Cygnus, Silicon Graphics, or Sun, but Stanford is the likely meeting place for upcoming gatherings. (For one thing, an outdoor gathering at Stanford makes it unnecessary for a corporate type to be there. We are also too big a group--about 20-40, typically--to meet in a coffee shop or pizza joint.) For whatever reason, only a handful of such summaries have ever been done in the three and a half years our group and other groups have been having physical meetings. (I did a couple, but not for the past couple of years.) Anyway, well done! --Tim May Boycott "Big Brother Inside" software! We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, we know that that ain't allowed. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Licensed Ontologist | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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Re: Notes from the SF Physical Cypherpunks meeting
by frantz＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I would also like to thank martin for his notes. I was unable to attend the meeting and the notes are the best I can do. A small correction and some pointers: At 9:29 AM 5/12/96 -0700, Martin Minow wrote: >KEYCOS Started in TimeShare, early 1970's. Ran customers (competitors) The correct spellings are KeyKOS and Tymshare. That may help people searching for other information. URLs for KeyKOS information are: http://www.cis.upenn.edu/~KeyKOS/ http://www.agorics.com/agorics/allkey.html Also, a system being built on similar ideas is described at: http://www.cis.upenn.edu/~eros ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Bill Frantz | The CDA means | Periwinkle -- Computer Consulting (408)356-8506 | lost jobs and | 16345 Englewood Ave. frantz(a)netcom.com | dead teenagers | Los Gatos, CA 95032, USA

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Re: Why I Pay Too Much in Taxes
by nobody＠replay.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Robin Powell wrote: >>>>>> Black Unicorn <unicorn(a)schloss.li> writes: > > On Sun, 12 May 1996, Mixmaster wrote: > >> if you spend $50k. Or do it yourself for $1k. Start by reading > >> everything from Scope (www.britnet.co.uk/scope) The books you find > > ^^^^^ > >> there cover everything you need to know in perfect detail. > > > Woops. What dwindling credibility you had in my view is now gone. > > Poof and -PLOINK-. > > > (I suggest cypherpunks so interested pursue other options). > >Any particular reason why this statement lost that person's >credibility for you that you'd like to share with us? Have someone >say, "Man, that site sucks!" is of very little use without knowing >what the problem is so we can avoid it in the future. The reason should be obvious from the earlier discussion. Mr. Unicorn is in the deluxe tax planning business. He is worried that his costomers will stop paying $50-100k for his services if they find out that they just need to spend $100 in the book store for even better advice. X -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.3i Charset: noconv iQEVAwUBMZdmjVtwWVJrMFYlAQG/7Qf/Znhd2nJlWsKCsgQ0GYBbxcYJLqHL+4tw Dmco49A17P3wbukKxMxY/5qkNEFZTBfLZXsH+pmkWNncv+5OYrMqjusV1OnAB8Ab 3eDWrNH3i7ga6yf1AHPg54nwOBFXDgMNG3U76tQwSb9NWF7YCMah+3TEtBlNi5/9 nSnq7fLKQjc3wT37DwaZHxbOOSloEPuJKD3WTxdCvfkL4lu9HcAFN2oBjag3XDu/ ikpxNJzRsYwzpCOgMX4cXxDY3E5cHKrxdi1XRj1cfgIR//C1kqnV9VgWpfbm/qBh PT8GFdjLT/r9y1t4TUhjJC7GPWhIbFDwjsTFD/bATWwsnfQ8pTTHPQ== =XDO+ -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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R U Bugged How To Debugging Video
by SpyKing 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

R-U Bugged? "How-To" De-Bugging Video Are you a target of electronic surveillance? Do you suspect someone is invading your privacy? The first "Do-it-Yourself" De-Bugging video available to the general public... Over 100,000 bugs were planted in the US last year...Could you find one in your home or office? This video will teach you how! Simple step-by-step instructions...Produced by an expert with 25 years in the business... Guaranteed to help safeguard your privacy Demonstrations of sophisticated and inexpensive commercially available bugging devices and how to find them... If you're serious about privacy, you can't afford to miss this video... Mention electronic eavesdropping, wiretaps or "bugging" and most people think of the police or secret agents...Who, you might ask would want to bug an office, a boardroom, a research lab or for that matter, someone's bedroom? The answer: More people than you might ever imagine, according to experts. With the cost of eavesdropping electronics falling sharply each year, it has become very easy for a jealous spouse, business competitor, or disgruntled employee to eavesdrop on just about anyone. Experts estimate that last year, over 100,000 bugs were planted in businesses alone! No one knows exactly how many were planted by jealous lovers, spouses, or worse by stalkers, but it should be at the very least an equal amount...Very few of these eavesdropping targets ever knew they were being spied on. Is there any way to know if one's home or business has been bugged? Yes. You can bring in a professional "sweeper", TSCM Expert", "De-Bugger". With his electronic equipment, he can find and deactivate those bugging devices. That will cost you $500 to $1000. to start! The average home or business can cost thousands of dollars... But what if you've been bugged and you can't afford an expert? That's where a brand new do-it yourself video comes into the picture. Titled "R-U-Bugged" this video was produced for the non-technical person by an expert with over 25 years of international experience in electronic countermeasures. It fully explains eavesdropping devices, how they work and how to find them... It shows simple step by step "how to" basics that anyone can understand. If you think that bugging equipment is only found in the latest adventure of 007, you're mistaken...This video shows how common and inexpensive equipment, readily available at almost any electronics store, can compromise your privacy... "R-U-Bugged" is available and in stock for $59.95 + $5.95 shipping & handling. Foreign orders please add $14.95 S & H . Playing time: 90 minutes Send or Money Order to: Codex Publishing 286 Spring Street New York, NY 10013 Tel: 212-989-9898 Sorry, No C.O.D.'s or credit cards... Check out our WEB SITE - The Codex Privacy Page URL: http://www.thecodex.com Home of The Codex Surveillance & Privacy Newsletter DataScan - Diagnostic TEMPEST Evaluation System Technical Surveillance CounterMeasures (TSCM) Forensic Audio Restoration & Audio Tape Enhancement -----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- Version: 2.7.1 mQCNAzDgc7MAAAEEAK1gzGapvWKn287T8QPYphpIzF6+uHAyf/shVPbrGD/f5v8i sgMOSC5x05w9xyijpzx2ua5i4eXXzjiq257y7oJy60TEFWRHYqGJtZRpqlh9DKjD 0EA5dVitmEgKNot3rmcF9amBxUP2RwIq2nzHfgiLGB3obqeKYp0MXw7qZrH7AAUR tB5TcHlLaW5nIDxzcHlraW5nQG5vdmFsaW5rLmNvbT4==UBv6 -----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----

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Administration letter vs ACTA petition
by E. ALLEN SMITH 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

From: IN%"rre(a)weber.ucsd.edu" 12-MAY-1996 23:22:09.31 From: Phil Agre <pagre(a)weber.ucsd.edu> =-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-= This message was forwarded through the Red Rock Eater News Service (RRE). Send any replies to the original author, listed in the From: field below. You are welcome to send the message along to others but please do not use the "redirect" command. For information on RRE, including instructions for (un)subscribing, send an empty message to rre-help(a)weber.ucsd.edu =-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-= Date: Wed, 8 May 1996 21:13:48 -0400 From: "Thomas A. Kalil" <KALIL_T(a)a1.eop.gov> To: Multiple recipients of list <com-priv(a)lists.psi.com> Subject: Administration opposes ACTA petition May 8, 1996 The Honorable Reed Hundt Chairman Federal Communication Commission Room 814 1919 M Street, N.W. Washington D.C. 20554 Re: RM 8775 Dear Chairman Hundt: This letter addresses the petition for rulemaking filed before the Commission by America's Carriers Telecommunication Association (ACTA) in March 1996. ACTA asks the Commission to: (1) order Internet software providers to "immediately stop their unauthorized provisioning of telecommunications software"; 2) confirm the Commission's authority over interstate and international telecommunications services offered over the Internet; and 3) institute rules to govern the use of the Internet for providing telecommunications services. On behalf of the Administration, NTIA strongly urges the Commission to deny the ACTA Petition. The Petition not only mischaracterizes the existing law, but also reflects a fundamental misunderstanding of the way in which the Internet operates and of the services now making use of the Internet. ACTA requests that the Commission stop firms such as the Respondents from selling software that enables "a computer with Internet access to be used as a long distance telephone, carrying voice transmissions, at virtually no charge for the call" [ACTA Petition at i]. ACTA asserts that such firms are common carrier providers of telecommunications services that should not be allowed to operate without first obtaining a certificate from the Commission [ACTA Petition at 6-7]. That argument is wrong. The Respondents provide their customers with goods, not services. Although the software that those firms sell does enable individuals to originate voice communications, all of the actions needed to initiate such communications are performed by the software users, rather than the vendors. At no time do the Respondents engage in the "transmission" of information, which, according to the Telecommunications Act of 1996, is the sine qua non of both a telecommunications service and a telecommunications carrier. [See Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56, 3(a) amending Section 153 of the Communications Act of 1934 to add new definitions of "telecommunications," "telecommunications service," and "telecommunications carrier."] In that critical sense, the Respondents are no more providing telecommunications services than are the vendors of the telephone handsets, fax machines, and other customer premises equipment that make communications possible. ACTA also asks the Commission for a declaratory ruling "confirming its authority over interstate and international telecommunications services using the Internet." [ACTA Petition at 6. While ACTA claims the Commission has jurisdiction to regulate the Internet pursuant to Section 1 of the Communications Act, citing United States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157 (1968), ACTA also acknowledges that such jurisdiction is limited to actions ancillary to the effective performance of its specific responsibilities under other parts of the Act. Id. at 5,7-8. ACTA suggests that unregulated growth of the Internet presents "unfair competition" to Title II regulated interexchange carriers that "could, if left unchecked, eventually create serious economic hardship on all existing participants in the long distance marketplace" and could be "detrimental to the health of the nation's telecommunications industry and the maintenance of the nation's telecommunications infrastructure." Id. at 4, 5. Voice telephony via the Internet, however, is still a limited and cumbersome capability: both parties to the call need computers and must have compatible software. Moreover, there is no assurance that a call placed will be completed or not interrupted. While the technology involved may improve rapidly, presently there is no credible evidence to justify Commission regulation of the Internet.] In fact, as the Federal Networking Council pointed out in comments filed on May 4, there are no telecommunications services currently being offered via the Internet. The services that now involve the Internet are more likely to be "enhanced," or information services over which the Commission has disclaimed jurisdiction under the Communications Act. The Commission decision in the 1980's not to regulate enhanced services was a wise one that has conferred substantial benefits on American consumers. The Telecommunications Act of 1996 in no way requires a change in that decision. The Internet now connects more than 10 million computers, tens of millions of users, and is growing at a rate of 10-15 percent a month. This growth has created opportunities for entrepreneurs to develop new services and applications such as videoconferencing, multicasting, electronic payments, networked virtual reality, and intelligent agents. Perhaps more importantly, it creates a growing number of opportunities for consumers to identify new communication and information needs and to meet those needs. The Commission should not risk stifling the growth and use of this vibrant technology in order to prevent some undemonstrated harm to long distance service providers. If Internet-based services eventually develop to an extent that raises concerns about harm to consumers or the public interest, the Commission would have ample time to more fully address the issue. Now is not that time. NTIA, therefore, urges the Commission to reject the ACTA petition without delay. Larry Irving Assistant Secretary for Communications and Information cc: The Honorable James H. Quello The Honorable Rachelle B. Chong The Honorable Susan Ness

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Why does the state still stand:
by jamesd＠echeque.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I intend to post this to a bunch of rant newsgroups. It is the common wisdom of cypherpunks: Any corrections or objections? ************************************************************************* Why does the state still stand? At 07:26 AM 5/5/96 -0400, Duncan Frissell wrote: > Even though the population of those who regularly violate > federal tax laws is smaller (20 million?) the records show > that even for this population the odds of being convicted are > approximately the odds of being murdered. > > http://www.trac.syr.edu/tracirs/analysis/IRS019page.html Now if the state had to compel everyone to write a check for ten thousand dollars every quarter, or to make little trip to the IRS with a brown paper bag full of hundred dollar bills, there would be massive tax resistance, massive state violence to enforce taxes, and the many individual violent conflicts with the state would swiftly become collective armed revolution. The state can get away with this extraordinary and exorbitant tax rate, because for the most part it does not apply coercion directly to individual people. Instead it disrupts the large scale institutions that we have created to facilitate large scale cooperation. Now it is easy to coerce the transactions in physical marketplace, or a physical large scale factory or office, because the state can easily find the market place and see what people are doing in it, far easier than it can find individual people and see what each person is doing overall, and if people do not play by the state's rules it can easily send in the bad boys to close down the marketplace. Thus the state obstructs the large scale specialization of labor, and charges us a high price to participate in that specialization. The state can do this effectively because such specialization depends on large numbers of people regularly meeting face to face in recognizable physical places: company offices, stock exchanges, and the like. The state can extract this tax because it can send the bad boys into any such meeting place and close it down. It is this, rather than direct coercion of taxpayers that enables it to charge such savage and extraordinary taxes. Any attempt to directly coerce taxpayers on this scale would swiftly lead to rivers of blood. Electronic marketplaces are less easy to coerce. Note how states find themselves largely powerless before the international money market. This has caused a substantial retreat of the state in many countries throughout the world. The socialists complain because the World bank asks the Ukraine and Belarus to be slightly less socialist, but the international money market will not touch such governments with a ten foot pole, while it will roll over like a puppy for governments such as Estonia and Tunisia which really are dismantling socialism. The challenge then is to move the meetings that make specialization of labor possible to the net, thus making us less easy for the state to coerce. The anarcho socialists have one half of an important truth: In order to smash the state, we must first transform capitalism. Right now not much is happening. Ecash today is rather like email eight years ago. You had a bunch of email systems none of which would talk to each other and none of which were very easy to use and all of which cost too much. Most good groupware, for example source code control programs, is designed, perhaps intentionally, in ways that make it only useful for intranets, not for WANs. That is to say only useful inside the kind of corporations that presently exist. Also, to be useful in a post corporate economy, a source code control tool would need to have better view control, since the boss cannot simply announce. "OK, we are now in alpha, so we shall now have feature freeze on the product." Instead somebody has to announce "I have constructed and will maintain a feature frozen buildable source code view." We would be vastly further ahead on PGP 3.0 and on ecash if we had a tool like that. How then did we solve the email problem? The email problem was not a problem that big corporations were capable of solving. Whenever one network, such as Compuserv, negotiated with another network, such as AOL they could never agree about settlements. How much would compuserv charge AOL to deliver AOL customers mail to Compuserv customers, and how much would AOL charge Compuserve to deliver Compuserve customers mail to AOL customers. And how would it be metered, and what software standards would be used to enable the metering, and the lawyers would talk to the accountants, and the accountants to the software guys, and up and down the corporate hierarchy it would go, and back and forth between corporations. Eventually, on the internet, the custom and expectation grew up that you did not charge for delivering mail to your customers, largely due to the influence, and the moral and political outlook, of the IETF. Problem solved: Nothing to negotiate; Nothing to be metered. Turned out it was a moral and political problem, not a pricing problem. Now right now we are in the same pickle with electronic transactions as we once were with email. We have a bunch of proprietary systems with proprietary software and proprietary money that do not talk to each other. Worse, anonymous ecash is patented by Chaum. This is an algorithm for how people structure promises to pay, and is therefor even less well suited to be intellectual property than most software patents. As a result anyone who wants to make an agreement with Chaum to implement anonymous electronic cash faces a lot of cost and delay. Such agreements are difficult to make and implement. What we need in addition to our existing electronic cash mechanisms is a general mechanism for exchanging and transferring promises to pay, so that Betty can exchange a promise by John to pay in system X for a promise by Sam to pay in system Y. Such a system must make every man their own bank and their own credit agency, and must not be tied to any one proprietary institution that issues promises to pay. Now once we have that, it will cobble all the different ecash systems together, just as the internet cobbled all the email systems together, and we will start to make some real progress in moving the institutions that facilitate large scale specialization of labor to the net. Right now nothing much is happening, despite the fact that several big names have issued ecash systems. Now in order to create such a system we need a patent free public key system: (Rabin will be free from the DH patent in one year) and we need a satisfactory public key management system, one that can couple to standard databases. Lots of folk are twiddling their thumbs waiting for Phil Zimmermann to issue the PGP 3.0 key management system. Possibly someone will issue a PGP key management system that works with the Microsoft Crypt API. The Microsoft default key management system is crummy, and is limited to keys small enough for the NSA to break. So guys, that is the plan: We destroy the state through higher mathematics. We do this by replacing the current institutional mechanisms of corporations with cryptographic mechanisms. This will give more people the opportunity to evade and resist taxes. --------------------------------------------------------------------- | We have the right to defend ourselves | http://www.jim.com/jamesd/ and our property, because of the kind | of animals that we are. True law | James A. Donald derives from this right, not from the | arbitrary power of the state. | jamesd(a)echeque.com

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Accidental subscriber needs help off of list.
by jim bell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I'm just another subscriber to the list; I can't see any indication that you've sent your message to the list itself. I will forward this response to the list; somebody should see it and be able to help. At 11:08 PM 5/12/96 EDT, Jeff D. Mendelson wrote: >Dear Sir, > >My name is Jeff and I was accidently placed on your Cyberpunk mailing list. I >am currently being bombarded with e-mail from your list with information that I >am not interested in. Compuserve has not been able to help me get my name off >of this list. And since I am new at Internet e-mail, I am at a loss of what to >do. > >Can you please send me exact instructions on removing my name from this mailing >list? Thank you very much for your time. You don`t know how much I would >appreciate it. > >Sincerely, > >Jeff M. >74407.350(a)compuserve.com > > > Jim Bell jimbell(a)pacifier.com

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Re: Civil liberties of employees (Re: FYB_oss)
by E. ALLEN SMITH 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

From: IN%"tcmay(a)got.net" 13-MAY-1996 00:55:07.93 >Actually, one _does_ check one's Constitutional rights "at the door" (of an >employer), and the confusion over this issue is pervasively destroying real >Constitutional rights. >For instance, if I hire someone, I can require him or her to wear a >uniform, to not wear blue jeans to work, to not smoke (or even to smoke, if >this is what the job involves), to take off his or her clothes, to tap >dance, to not say anything to my customers, and on and on. If the >government required these behaviors, this would be a legitimate issue, but >not if employers set these conditions as terms of continued employment. In general, I agree... but one important point to make is the contract. If the contract says that you can require the employee to tap dance, then you can require the employee to tap dance. If the contract _doesn't_ require the employee to get shot, then the employee can refuse to get shot (including shooting back if you try it anyway, bringing in law enforcement, etcetera.) The problem is that current contracts don't (usually) cover employee privacy in its electronic aspects. They don't say whether or not the employer can read your email. Thus, it's up in the air. If it says the employer can, then the employer should be able to. If it says the employer can't, then the employer shouldn't be able to - including via the employee using PGP to encrypt the mail. -Allen

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Any DLL's that handle Public Key Encryption or Key Exchange?
by draven＠infi.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I'm in the process of writing a freeware IRC client in Visual Basic 3 and wanted to encorporate a secure variant of DCC chat. Trouble is I can't find a precompiled library that has either RSA or DH in it. This doesn't do me much good as I don't even own a Windows C compiler... (is that a crime in some countries? :) ) I'll appreciate any help you folks could give.. Greg Morgan Vice President: Crescent Moon Productions draven(a)infi.net PGP Public Key via E-Mail

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Re: Edited Edupage, 9 May 1996
by Clay.Olbon＠dynetics.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 10:08 PM 5/9/96 EDT, E. ALLEN SMITH wrote: >From: IN%"educom(a)elanor.oit.unc.edu" 9-MAY-1996 22:01:14.77 > >>REGIONAL BELLS WANT RATE HIKES FOR WIRING SCHOOLS >>The United States Telephone Association would like to raise the average U.S. >>monthly phone bill by about $10 over the next five years to pay for wiring >>schools and libraries with new lines for phones and computers, and to >>subsidize poor and rural customers. The proposal assumes an $11 billion >>cost for wiring schools and libraries, with local phone companies paying >>about a third to a half of that. The rest would come from a surcharge on >>other services, such as cellular. "No single industry should be held >>responsible for fulfilling this major goal," says USTA's president. "Each >>has a role and should make a significant contribution to the national >>education technology mandate." (Investor's Business Daily 8 May 96 A7) OK, someone tell me why the END USERS don't pay for this! If a school wants to be wired, the local school board can pay for it (and the local taxpayers can vote for the millage increase). If you don't think every five year old needs a net connection (maybe because you are afraid of them seeing nekkid ladies, or because you just think teachers should teach and not rely on technology to do their jobs for them), you can vote against spending the money. As for subsidizing rural customers, those people made a choice to live in a rural area, for whatever reason. I see no reason to subsidize that choice. Unless of course they want to pay higher taxes to subsidize the costs for my living in the city. Clay

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S-Tools 4 now available
by Andy Brown 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Hi, S-Tools version 4 is now available from the following URL: ftp://idea.sec.dsi.unimi.it/pub/security/crypt/code/s-tools4.zip You will need either Windows 95 or Windows NT (at least v3.51) to use this, and all further releases of S-Tools (Win32s is not sufficient). This latest release fixes all reported bugs in v3, and adds compression before encryption before hiding, drag-and-drop operation and a multi- threaded working model. Further information can be found in the on-line help. Regards, - Andy

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web proxy article in Unix Review
by Clay.Olbon＠dynetics.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I just finished Richard Morin's Internet Notebook column in Unix Review. This month's column was entitled "Censorship-Thwarting Tools". It discusses a prototype web proxy called Rover (http://www.cfcl.com/tin/P/9606.nph-rover) And gives some sites (http://www.cfcl.com/tin/P/9606.rovers.html) The best part of the article is a discussion at the end that describes enhancements - to include encrypted links. It was great to see these issues discussed in a "mainstream" computer publication. BTW, Richard's columns are available on-line at http://www.cfcl.com/tin. The article I referenced is 9606. The on-line version is not as complete as the one in Unix Review however. Clay

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Elementrix Snake Oil Spam...
by Robert Hettinga 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Was it just me, or did others on this list get three whopping MS Word docs sent to them from the POTP snake-oil folks? Came from one Charles W. Morgan, <charlie(a)outcomesinc.com>, of "Outcomes 2000, Inc.", whoever *that* is... Probably somebody trying to give the Albuquerque Spam King a run for his money, I bet. Feh! Cheers, Bob Hettinga ----------------- Robert Hettinga (rah(a)shipwright.com) e$, 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "If they could 'just pass a few more laws', we would all be criminals." --Vinnie Moscaritolo The e$ Home Page: http://www.vmeng.com/rah/

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Re: Anti-Scientologists
by nobody＠REPLAY.COM 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>1. There's a gang of flamers (David Gerard, Jon Noring, Ron Newman, Rob J. >Nauta, and the like) who try to stop $cientologists from discussing their >religion on the Usenet newsgroup alt.religion.scientology. Most of them are >disgruntled former cult members and/or members of other similar cults. Untruth #1. Aside from the "religion" red herring you tossed in (it's a cult), the critics expose the lies, doubletalk and inconsistencies posted by cult apologists. (It should be noted that these people aren't generally "just another satisfied Scientologist," but are cult employees who are carefully vetted to distribute propaaganda without ever answering critics' questions.) [snip] >3. These harrassers are Usenet Cabal supporters, and they are sometimes >joined by initerant cabal enforcers such as Peter Vorobieff, who visit a.r.s >to lend a helping hand and to flame Co$. So what's your point? Besides, there is no Cabal fnord. :-) >4. Recently the anti-scientologists have asked me for a copy of my cancelbot, >and have been using it to forge cancels for scientologist posts on a.r.s. Untruth #2. Articles canceled from a.r.s. have been multiple postings of standard Scientology tracts (over 10,000 in all, so my newsreader says), spread out over various alleged users. These aren't intended to promote discussion -- they're intended to bury the newsgroup in noise. Apparently being selected Kook of the Month causes disturbances in one's ability to distinguish the correct from the incorrect. (Or is that how one gets the award in the first place?)

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Rabin patented?
by Mark M. 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Is Rabin encryption patented? I have never heard of any patent covering Rabin encryption, but I have also heard that Diffie-Hellman will be the first PK algorithm that is patent-free when the patent expires in '97. I know that until recently, ElGamal was considered to be covered under the DH patent. I wonder if the same is also true for Rabin. - -- Mark =-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-= markm(a)voicenet.com | finger -l for PGP key 0xe3bf2169 http://www.voicenet.com/~markm/ | d61734f2800486ae6f79bfeb70f95348 "In Christianity neither morality nor religion come into contact with reality at any point." -- Friedrich Nietzsche -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.3 Charset: noconv iQCVAwUBMbozMrZc+sv5siulAQH2ugP8C0ymdTJJLUa9NQxj7ahkcGD/u0tFZWfN DtMDRm08b0aupADNgDntn7ZHAZKXo5RRAClLfvB3Z/gIGMbqAQKFMItSN7CbJ4k1 osY2enhnrDN840LH0jQmC/dS0MjVWh5CaC3R9SqHqhiu5S5oZUP4fAJhIyDMcQuo VLGUQzLZVxs= =P3wZ -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: [NOISE] Buying whales with digicash Re: Anonymous stock trades.
by drose＠azstarnet.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

hallam(a)Etna.ai.mit.edu wrote: >>usually, people just call me Davve. > >Unusual to spell Dave with two v's, were your parents also dyslexic? Er, Phill (if I may make so bold, sir--arggh, treasure ahead laddies), I'm being a tad sarcastic, Phillll. Get it? Frankly, my wanker/tosspot amigo, I am more than a bit sick of your self-professed ignorance. And your ad hominem attacks don't amount to a hill of beans. I am more than through with you. Perhaps Perry has more patience.

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Re: [Off-Topic] "Curfews"
by Jean-Francois Avon 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On 8 Jun 96 at 12:40, jim bell wrote: > JFA wrote: > >I did something I always bitch at when done by others: looking at a > >situation outside of it's appropriate and complete context. > > As you can see, this is one of the big difficulties that people can > have understanding AP: Since it changes just about everything about > how a society works, you can't analyze it "easily" using your > built-up knowledge of societies. Actually, it makes one realize that society and the "collective" is nothing, that the basic building block is the individual. If you analyse the motivation of the individual, AP is not difficult to understand. > As I've said so many times before, AP is like a political Rorschach > test: Your reaction to it is strongly related to your political > philosophy. That's part of the magic. Please stay out of magic. The actual politician are enough into it. JFA DePompadour, Societe d'Importation Ltee; Limoges porcelain, silverware and crystal JFA Technologies, R&D consultants: physicists, technologists and engineers. PGP keys at: http://w3.citenet.net/users/jf_avon ID# C58ADD0D : 529645E8205A8A5E F87CC86FAEFEF891

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Re: US: Domestic Encryption Protected by US Constitution?
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 3:26 AM 6/9/96, C Matthew Curtin wrote: >Given that the US State Department classifies strong crypto as >munitions, is it possible that any laws passed outlawing the use of >strong crypto among US citizens could be declared unconsitutional, in >violation of the second amendment? > >Are there any legal precedents that apply here? Is the question purely >academic (i.e., no such laws exist, no such bills are in the works, or >none have been tried)? Does anyone know of any laws on the books that >might be relevant to my question? I recall that this general issue was discussed several times on the "Cyberia-l" mailing list, a list consisting mostly of law professors, lawyers, law students, and a bunch of Cypherpunks. (I left that list several months back.) Some points: 1. There are currently no laws restricting crypto use in the U.S., save for some special circumstances (e.g., sending code over the ham radio band). There being no laws, no courts have been asked to rule on such laws. (I don't mean to sound confusing and circular here. The point is that the boundaries of a law get shaped when the law is tested. Inasmuch as there have been no laws about domestic use of crypto, we have little guidance as to how the courts will frame arguments should such a law ever be passed.) 2. Most advocates for a continued right to use strong crypto have used the First Amendment centrally. That is, "encrypted speech is still speech." Any demand that speech conform to government standards would run into the basic point that Congress is not to make such laws. I believe this approach is the strongest one. Even if there are some limits on speech (a la the infamous "falsely shouting 'Fire!' in a crowded theater" example), this sort of limit does not limit the _form_ of speech. (Quibblers may point out other such limits, even some on _form_. For example, speech at 95 dB is OK, but "speech" at a jet-engine level of 135 dB is not. I won't get into such quibbles here.) Casting a pro-crypto argument in terms of the Second Amendment ("encrypted speech is a weapon") opens the door to all kinds of potential arguments for restricting access to crypto. Think of all the various limits on firearms ownership and use: certain calibers and types are restricted, the shapes of firearms are controlled, special taxes are often required, waiting periods for purchase, no ownership by convicted felons, no possession on or near schoolgrounds, bullet types are controlled, limits on magazine capacity, no possession of biological weapons, etc. etc. etc. I don't think we want crypto controlled by the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms, do we? --Tim May Boycott "Big Brother Inside" software! We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, we know that that ain't allowed. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Licensed Ontologist | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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Re: [NOISE] Re: RFD: Time to kick some anti-scientologist ass?
by Rich Burroughs 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- At 10:52 PM 6/8/96 CST, roy(a)sendai.scytale.com wrote: [snip] >Am I the only one whose ironometer just pegged? Actually, now that you mention it, mine is pegged. I hadn't noticed, because I was busy trying to recalibrate my bullshit detector which was off the fucking dial. LD's post is full of shit. David Gerard, Jon Noring, and Ron Newman are not "flamers." People who have even lurked there for a short while should know this. I've seen Ron urge people towards compassionate behavior on a.r.s. more than just about anyone on a.r.s. It's a bit hard to be compassionate when you're dealing with a group that uses every means at its disposal to silence its critics. I don't even think Nauta is on a.r.s., except for perhaps an occasional crosspost or two. Perhaps he lurks, but he doesn't post there to any significant extent. I don't know of any "Anti-Scientologists" who are forging cancels. I really doubt anyone would have checked with Dimitri first, though :) JEM did issue a bunch of cancels, as have some of the ISPs whose services have been abused. We have been inundated with over 12,000 "vertical spam" posts since May 19th, and it's still coming in. Many of these posts are repetitions of the same materials, and must be well over the BI by now. "Anti-Scientologists" have discussed various technological methods of dealing with the spam (cross-posted to news.admin.net-abuse), but no plan has been seized upon due to lack of consensus. I've written an article in the latest issue of my zine about the spam, if people would like more info. URL in my sig. Rich -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBMbp6fYT0GKfZRA/9AQFGVgQAvvH4Fa8nwF6qbqHGVuKfO2uv0Ynw388Z 0QxO42wIzt9VrNckRvn+geYFRRYu9DoasGCw8imQqBN85OY3OasjpOIycyQnrjEW C3MqyP44esuyThI6Ds30bwFYc4rP+ZWFWp1rmgv3LmYAaPdh1dAwtzPsKzy4N4NF 0pLAsusDr9k= =PSIh -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- ______________________________________________________________________ Rich Burroughs richieb(a)teleport.com http://www.teleport.com/~richieb See my Blue Ribbon Page at http://www.teleport.com/~richieb/blueribbon New EF zine "cause for alarm" - http://www.teleport.com/~richieb/cause

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Re: Asendmail Status & Politikal Rant
by attila 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Addressed to: Ben Holiday <ncognito(a)gate.net> Cypherpunks <cypherpunks(a)toad.com> ** Reply to note from Ben Holiday <ncognito(a)gate.net> 05/29/96 10:30pm -0400 as to the politiks --if we do not standup now, we will not even be able to speak up later. there is no question that every means of confronting a totalitarian driven government apparati must be developed, and the means of impletation well known. the only safety is in numbers; and, yes, some of the "brethern" will fall. anymore than the aging Chinese despots were able to contain the news of Tinnamin square, and I stood at the corner by the Forbidden City as it was starting to form, despots everywhere are faced with the same problem. in China, the free speach and democracy protestors faced enormous technological and communication deficiencies --so far, we do not. -- The result of today's 'government' is new world disorder, unfolding at warp velocity.

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You bet they have/are: NSA/CIA to snoop INSIDE the U.S.???
by attila 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

** Reply by attila to note from Anonymous User <nobody(a)c2.org> 06/08/96 5:05pm -0700 anyone who believes the FBI and a host of other U.S. agencies even less scrupulous does not wiretap without permits, has been standing behind the door. generally, it does not matter if the information learned is admissable in court --they never admit wiretapping in the first place as the agency themselves, in many cases, *did*not*wiretap* --but the agency does buy info from usually unsavory "contractors" who do wiretap. as for the NSA/CIA spying on US citizens --they dont, they spy on British citizens with facilities provided by M5 and M6. in return, British M5/6 agents spy on U.S. citizens from Langely or Gaithersberg, or wherever. The fact they just happen to share information is an "accident." so, why legalize it? --if it aint broke, don't fix it. when the great sleeping, well-fed dog awakes in slavery, they will look for the "false"-prophets who have long since been purged by the adversary government --and fools like Baker-Halle will be in power (temporarily). --- original post by anon-remailer --- = : This is a fucking big story. = : Allowing the CIA and NSA to snoop domestically, and using only a handful of = : suspicions and anecdotes about cybernastiness and evil cryptohackers to = : justify this major policy shift -- well, it's fucking amazing. = : Nunn's proposal, unfortunately, was more than a "suggestion." = = This is very serious. Why has there not been more discussion about = this on the list? = = How close/far is this from becoming law? = = If they are now trying to make it legal for the CIA and NSA to snoop = inside the US I would guess that it's happening already. Remember = wiretaps? Do it now and they will make it legal later. -- The result of today's 'government' is new world disorder, unfolding at warp velocity.

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RE: [NOISE] Buying whales with digicash Re: Anonymous stock trades.
by blanc 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

From: hallam(a)Etna.ai.mit.edu How to save the whales is a logical outcome of Friedman's thesis that markets are everything. It is unfortunately very common for great men to get megalomania and believe they have the solution to the worlds problems in one theory. The flaw in Perry's "stakeholder" theory is the same one in many academic theories. It assumes that most people are smart enough to realise their true interests. It assumes that people take a longer term look than they do. ................................................................................................ A point about the free market: Those "great men" who advocate it realize that one theory may not solve the world's problems, that individuals themselves can come up with the answers to their own problems. Instead of other people's theories and solutions being imposed upon them, individuals are seen as capable of interacting with each other and making decisions and trades in the market of choices made available through commercial enterprise, thus involving themselves in the discovery, pursuit, and satisfaction of their true interests. It doesn't assume that because people's judgements can be flawed and that they can make mistakes, that therefore others (governments & other authoritative types) have the right to step in and determine for them how their dreams should be realized. .. Blanc

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middleman status
by Middle Man 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Damn!! A corrupted reply block! Anyway, the middleman remailer seems to be functional again. Give it a try and see if it works for you. The middleman remailer will respond to both middle-man(a)alpha.c2.org and middle-man(a)nym.jpunix.com. I will eventually drop one of the nyms in favor of the more robust nym server. I've tested it and it works for me. Please let me know if you have problems. middle-man-admin(a)alpha.c2.org middle-man-admin(a)nym.jpunix.com

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Re: Anonymous stock trades.
by jamesd＠echeque.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 02:25 AM 6/8/96 +0200, Asgaard wrote: > Who is going to assure that someone has an ownership stake in the > Humpback Whales? The World Government? Brand them and herd them like open range cattle: The west did not need a government to do that, though they did need to hang a few folk who favored a different method of open ranging. --------------------------------------------------------------------- | We have the right to defend ourselves | http://www.jim.com/jamesd/ and our property, because of the kind | of animals that we are. True law | James A. Donald derives from this right, not from the | arbitrary power of the state. | jamesd(a)echeque.com

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Re: FOR WHOM THE BELL TOLLS
by nobody＠REPLAY.COM 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Bryce wrote (whilst on his high horse): > Hm. I think the best we could hope for is along the lines of > "The suspect subscribed to the 'Cypherpunks' discussion group on > the Internet, but his violent views were rejected by the members > of the group." Not every member of this list rejects his views. I for one do not reject them outright, but will not defend his views publically for fear of embarassing the corporation that I work for. I do not reject Jim Bell's violent views for the simple reason that violence is often required to fight violence. In other words, the best you can hope for is "... but his violent views were rejected by some members of the group." > It is important that the reporter manages to _not_ use the word > "member" to indicate that Bell is a "member" of Cypherpunks. He *is* a member. And why shouldn't he be? Are you suggesting that this group become moderated? (hiss). The whole AP concept is very relevent to the Cypherpunks, whether the majority like it or not. > I think that conversing with Bell, or publically replying to him > at all, even to insult him, makes him more of a "member" and > makes his pet topic more a part of cypherpunks, both in appearance > and in substance. So don't do it. That means you, too, > Black Unicorn. At _least_ you can take it to private e-mail in > order to prevent the reporters from getting the wrong idea, and > in order to spare the rest of us the tedium of deleting the > messages. No platform for lunatics??? If there is one thing that a Cypherpunk should have learned during his time in the group, is that the answer to hate speech (or violent speech, or whatever you wish to call it) is more speech. If your fear is that reporters will get hold of the wrong end of the stick, then perhaps you are correct, but the real problem is the *reporters*, not the attitude of the Cypherpunks. blame them. propose a solution. (how about abolition of all libel laws?) > This is assuming that the statement "his violent views were > rejected by the members of the group" is actually true! If > there _is_ anyone else here who shares Bell's evil enthusiasms, > I strongly encourage you to begin a new list dedicated to that > topic. I disagree with the phrase "evil enthusiasms." Bell is not an evil man. A little crazy perhaps, but not evil. If you bothered to listen to him, you would find that his aim is to create a "better" world, where people (especially politicians) are very much more responsible for their own actions. He suggests that the number of deaths due to AP will be less that the number of deaths due to the current corrupt system. think about it. how many on this group would have another man killed for his views? For his noisy stereo? For a competive advantage in business? I am confident the answer will be zero. On the other hand, I would gladly throw in a few dollars to have certain politicians killed. gladly. and I will be able to sleep at night. I will sleep better knowing that, although I was partly responsible for a mans death, I will have saved countless others (a bit like dropping an a-bomb on Japan). Question for Jim - would you resort to AP to have Bryce popped off? Question for Bryce - would you resort to AP to have Jim popped off?

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Re: Anti-Scientologists
by nobody＠REPLAY.COM 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Anonymous wrote: > > >1. There's a gang of flamers (David Gerard, Jon Noring, Ron Newman, Rob J. > >Nauta, and the like) who try to stop $cientologists from discussing their > >religion on the Usenet newsgroup alt.religion.scientology. Most of them are > >disgruntled former cult members and/or members of other similar cults. > > Untruth #1. Aside from the "religion" red herring you tossed in (it's a cult), the critics expose the lies, doubletalk and inconsistencies posted by cult apolo Truth #1: It is a religion Truth #2: It is no longer a cult, since the leader is dead.

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Re: [Off-Topic] "Curfews"
by jim bell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 12:03 AM 6/9/96 +0000, Jean-Francois Avon wrote: >On 8 Jun 96 at 12:40, jim bell wrote: >> As you can see, this is one of the big difficulties that people can >> have understanding AP: Since it changes just about everything about >> how a society works, you can't analyze it "easily" using your >> built-up knowledge of societies. > >Actually, it makes one realize that society and the "collective" is >nothing, that the basic building block is the individual. If you >analyse the motivation of the individual, AP is not difficult to >understand. It is, however, hard to separate out all the familiar assumptions we make about the world based on the current way of doing things. > >> As I've said so many times before, AP is like a political Rorschach >> test: Your reaction to it is strongly related to your political >> philosophy. That's part of the magic. > >Please stay out of magic. The actual politician are enough into it. Well, I was speaking hyperbolically. (hyperbole.) Jim Bell jimbell(a)pacifier.com

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Re: Minority vs. majority
by jim bell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 10:40 PM 6/8/96 EDT, Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM wrote: >ichudov(a)algebra.com (Igor Chudov @ home) writes: >> You haven't seen _real_ corrupt officials. :) > >Jim - could corrupt gov't official hide behind anonymity too? >E.g., a particularly obnoxious gov't regulation being issued from >behind anon remailer? Regulation issued? Sure. Regulation _enforced_? Far more difficult! Maybe even impossible, when considered over the entire population. I've been considering this for a long time, and I came to the conclusion that you really can't enforce regulations dictated by a small fraction of the population onto the large majority. Enforcing a regulation costs effort. (money? time? people?) People are not going to put in this kind of effort unless they feel strongly about an issue. It would be possible for a large majority to enforce a standard of behavior on a tiny minority ("rules" against theft and other common crime) but this will work only if the average individual is willing to donate money to see those general rules enforced. Over time, few people will donate money to see victimless crimes (drugs, gambling, prostituion) enforced, for instance. Jim Bell jimbell(a)pacifier.com

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