December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

[ISN] Privacy Group Pushes For Hearings on ECHELON (fwd)
by Jukka E Isosaari 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

---------- Forwarded message ---------- Date: Fri, 13 Nov 1998 06:52:45 -0700 (MST) From: mea culpa <jericho(a)dimensional.com> To: InfoSec News <isn(a)repsec.com> Subject: [ISN] Privacy Group Pushes For Hearings on ECHELON Push for hearings on Echelon: Global spy system needs scrutiny, says rights group http://www.worldnetdaily.com/bluesky_exnews/19981112_xex_push_hearing.shtml Stephan Archer In an effort to create some accountability between the country's citizens and the National Security Agency's top-secret global surveillance system known as Echelon, the Free Congress Foundation is urging that congressional hearings be held concerning the NSA's use of the system. Originally, Echelon was designed to spy on the Communist Bloc during the Cold War. However, since the end of the Cold War, the NSA has used it for other questionable purposes that include spying on the citizens of U.S. allies as well as the citizens of other countries, commercial spying, and even domestic spying. In essence, Echelon works through a series of high-tech spy facilities located primarily in five countries: the United States, Canada, England, New Zealand, and Australia. These countries, which are sworn to secrecy about the project in a secret agreement known as UKUSA, all actively take part in this encroachment of privacy into the lives of the people of the world by collecting virtually all fax transmissions, e-mails, and phone calls. Not even cellular phone calls escape the grasp of the Echelon system. "Obviously, we need to have these capabilities," said Wayne Madsen, who worked in the National COMSEC Assessment Center at the NSA's Fort Meade, Maryland, facility back in the 1980s and is currently a senior fellow at the Electronic Privacy Information Center. As an example of our country's need for the system, Madsen said, "No one can argue about using the system to counter terrorism. Where people will have a problem is where Echelon is used for political and business interests." The Echelon system gets most of its data by collecting all transmissions handled by the Intelsat and Inmarsat satellites, which are responsible for much of the electronic communication that takes place between countries. Earth-bound communication is sucked up and absorbed by other spy satellites that the NSA has launched into space. "It's a huge vacuum cleaner," said Madsen. Once these spy facilities collect the phone calls, e-mails, and faxes, of virtually everyone on earth, the Echelon system sorts them through a kind of filter system known as the Echelon dictionary. This dictionary looks for "flag" words in all of the transmitted communication. While it lets a majority of all collected material pass through its filter, it tags those that may pose a threat and tracks all subsequent communication coming from the source of the original "flagged" message. Concerning Echelon's inherent intrusion on people's privacy, Patrick Poole, the deputy director for the Center of Technology Policy at the Free Congress Foundation, said, "While we understand the need for the intelligence power embodied by Echelon, the indiscriminate use of Echelon presents major threats to liberty not only to U.S. citizens but to citizens around the world." And this threat is real. The foundation's report states that U.S. leaders have, in fact, already abused this awesome technology. For example, the report states the following: "In September 1993, President Clinton asked the CIA to spy on Japanese auto manufacturers that were designing zero-emission cars and to forward that information to the Big Three U.S. car manufacturers: Ford, General Motors and Chrysler." "You can assume that all major U.S. corporations are fed items of interest (via Echelon) from time to time to give them a leg up on international competitors," said Madsen. Although this may be seen as a strategic corporate weapon for American businesses, in reality, it's an example of technology that can get out of hand. For example, former Canadian spy Mike Frost stated in his book, "Spyworld," that in 1981, there was an "accidental" cell phone intercept of the American ambassador to Canada that resulted in the U.S. getting outbid by the Canadians in a grain deal with China. The deal brought in $2.5 billion for the Canadian Wheat Board. With this kind of abuse of Echelon's power, the question as to whether or not the U.S. government has been using this power for political purposes can be easily raised. This question is seemingly answered in the foundation's report. "The discovery of domestic surveillance targeted at American civilians for reasons of 'unpopular' political affiliation -- or for no probable cause at all -- in violation of the First, Fourth and Fifth Amendments of the Constitution is regularly impeded by very elaborate and complex legal arguments and privilege claims by the intelligence agencies and the U.S. government," the report says. When asked if the system has been used by the U.S. government to spy on its citizens, Madsen told WorldNetDaily that he was sure it has been. "I don't believe that the NSA or the current Administration would hesitate to use this system on American citizens for their own agendas," he said. Outraged by this flagrant abuse of power illustrated by our country's elected officials, Poole said, "While the U.S. is the prime mover behind the Echelon system, it's shameful that the European Parliament is the body holding the constitutional debate in regards to Echelon today." A September 1998 report for the European Parliament by the Omega Foundation said, "Within Europe, all e-mail, telephone, and fax communications are routinely intercepted by the United States National Security Agency. According to the Omega Foundation report, it is this ability of the NSA that brings major concern to the European Parliament. In an effort to bring the issues surrounding Echelon to the forefront of American politics, the Free Congress Foundation plans to send out a report about Echelon to all of the 500 policy organizations in the U.S. as well as to select members of Congress. These select individuals include members from both the House and Senate intelligence committees as well as House and Senate Constitution subcommittees. Copies of the report will also be sent to the congressional leadership of both parties. Although the foundation is hoping to get some action out of these members of Congress, Poole said that support at the grassroots level of our nation's political structure will be a must if this issue isn't to end up buried by the intelligence committees. "For there to be any account and oversight to the Echelon system, the American people are going to have to contact their elected representatives in order to investigate the abuses that we know have occurred in regards to the Echelon system," Poole said. See Free Congress Foundation's report on Echelon at: http://www.freecongress.org/ctp/echelon.html -o- Subscribe: mail majordomo(a)repsec.com with "subscribe isn". Today's ISN Sponsor: Repent Security Incorporated [www.repsec.com]

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Enter Symbol's Developer Contest at the Palm Computing Platform Developer Conference!!! (revised message)
by palmdeveloper＠palmdevcon.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Symbol announces the first annual Symbol SPT 1500 Developer Contest!!!!! You could win a Toshiba Tecra 780 DVD 266 MHz Pentium II Notebook by developing the Best SPT 1500 Application or You could win a EXP PC Card DVD Traveler Bundle by developing the Best Riverbed Scout MTS Application or the Best Puma Satellite Forms Application or the Best IDEAM EZTrak Application. Other cool prizes will also be awarded. Everyone who participates will receive a t-shirt. You must be a registered attendee of the Palm Computing Developer Conference to participate. Winners will be announced at the Conference on December 4. For more details on the contest, and to register for the conference, point your browser to http://www.palmdevcon.com.

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Enter Symbol's Developer Contest at the Palm Computing Platform Developer Conference!!! (revised message)
by palmdeveloper＠palmdevcon.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Symbol announces the first annual Symbol SPT 1500 Developer Contest!!!!! You could win a Toshiba Tecra 780 DVD 266 MHz Pentium II Notebook by developing the Best SPT 1500 Application or You could win a EXP PC Card DVD Traveler Bundle by developing the Best Riverbed Scout MTS Application or the Best Puma Satellite Forms Application or the Best IDEAM EZTrak Application. Other cool prizes will also be awarded. Everyone who participates will receive a t-shirt. You must be a registered attendee of the Palm Computing Developer Conference to participate. Winners will be announced at the Conference on December 4. For more details on the contest, and to register for the conference, point your browser to http://www.palmdevcon.com.

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Re: DBS, Privacy, Money Laundering nonsense.
by Robert Hettinga 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- At 11:57 PM -0500 on 11/13/98, Black Unicorn wrote: > If only we could be rid of this pesky cash would could eliminate organized > crime forever. Reminds me of something Vinnie Moscaritolo, my alter ego and Samoan attorney, once said. "'If we could just pass a few more laws' we could all be criminals." Nonetheless, I think that DBS will be much more about economics than privacy or even law. The contrapositive of Unicorn's excellent rant is that the market for money "laundering" and financial privacy is a rediculuously small fraction of the market for economic efficiency. That digital bearer settlement gives us more or less perfect financial privacy if done under certain conditions is much more a happy accident than anything else, just like the cheapest way to do a transaction prior to blind signatures and hash collisions was with book-entry transactions instead of paper bearer certificates. I suppose it *might* turn out that you really *can* do an instantaneously executing, clearing, and settling on-line realtime book-entry transaction, for everything from pico- to quadridollars, and it would be cheaper, both macroeconomically and microeconomically, than a digital bearer one, but I just don't think it's possible at all. And, of course, we wouldn't have coach fare to Cleveland without a bunch of "fanatics" out there, prattling away about slipping the surly bounds of earth, the joy of flight, and all that... ;-). Thank god for the "fanatics", I say, but let's make sure we pay attention to Bill Bradley's adage that it's bad luck to be behind at the end of the game. Whatever is cheapest while still remaining a functional bearer protocol wins, in other words. And, in my book, "functional" means "functionally anonymous". It's just cheaper that way. Having a plane that actually flies is way cheaper than one which just goes fast down the runway, or even one which scoots along nicely off the ground, but only in ground effect. Cheers, Bob Hettinga -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: PGP for Personal Privacy 5.5.5 iQEVAwUBNk0f7cUCGwxmWcHhAQErBQgAhaFscqaknL0EMnsiKMWYgoHntw88JE2Z 11K8/oyoG/dX8eus5Wqnh05eVY8JWGQ9Fu3C2uXPZbZCa5wh7tjrmIcWOTDgx8kC Sz11IJJLdcWrdTPw7a1sf/WwhyG4f7NVlyVGNqMVuGrBjImsC5TtG2yU39DVME08 ZR3bVdn6egcCDpve+E7RQ0LYWDHxitxYV3RIaCG/wj9zp5JrMPTAvIgbT+J62T8s bYUNJyf7XQnkcT5275VLAzFYy+3KBRuyp9k6uIhBaBGKBNRUw/wBwTB8NoBMPcd8 AT3276SNz1oBA+Z/R0JPRBrRkAfio2o3DFIXoC5NY49ikpBuyOEQHg== =R0aY -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- ----------------- Robert A. Hettinga <mailto: rah(a)philodox.com> Philodox Financial Technology Evangelism <http://www.philodox.com/> 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity, [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'

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New Electronic Financial Services Links
by Robert Hettinga 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

--- begin forwarded text X-Sender: johnmuller(a)mail.earthlink.net Date: Fri, 13 Nov 1998 16:11:55 -0800 To: e-carm(a)c3po.kc-inc.net, dbs(a)philodox.com, dcsb(a)ai.mit.edu From: John Muller <johnmuller(a)earthlink.net> Subject: New Electronic Financial Services Links Mime-Version: 1.0 Sender: <dbs(a)philodox.com> Precedence: Bulk List-Subscribe: <mailto:requests@philodox.com?subject=subscribe%20dbs> X-Web-Archive: http://www.philodox.com/dbs-archive/ New links that will shortly be added to the ABA Joint Subcommittee on Electronic Financial Services Web site (http://www.abanet.org/buslaw/efss) in no particular order: Dept. of Commerce request for input on data privacy principles "safe harbor" http://www.ita.doc.gov/ecom/menu.htm SEC announces 23 enforcement actions for Internet stock fraud http://www.sec.gov/news/netfraud.htm RISKS Digest Vol. 20 No. 6, Dan Geer - "Risk Management is Where the Money Is" http://catless.ncl.ac.uk/Risks/20.06.html European Commission proposes a directive on distance selling of financial services http://europa.eu.int/comm/dg15/en/finances/consumer/891.htm European Commission proposes a framework for the European financial services sector to facilitate cross-border operation http://europa.eu.int/comm/dg15/en/finances/general/fsen.htm European Commission press release: the EU Data Protection Directive takes effect http://europa.eu.int/comm/dg15/en/media/dataprot/news/925.htm Federal Reserve announcement on enhanced settlement services http://www.bog.frb.fed.us/boarddocs/press/BoardActs/1998/19981103/ Federal Reserve announcement of reduction in fees for electronic payment services http://www.bog.frb.fed.us/boarddocs/press/BoardActs/1998/19981104/ OTS policy statement on privacy of customer information http://www.ots.treas.gov/docs/77879.html Journal of Information Law and Technology issue on Globalisation and E-commerce http://elj.warwick.ac.uk/jilt/issue/1998_3/default.htm Papers from the 21st National Information Systems Security Conference http://csrc.nist.gov/nissc/1998/papers.html BCI - Northern Trust 2nd Circuit case under UCC Article 4A and common law seeking a return of funds from an electronic funds transfer http://www.law.pace.edu/lawlib/legal/us-legal/judiciary/second-circuit/test3 /97-7633.opn.html Hogan Systems v. Cybresource 5th Circuit decision on copyright and trade secret claims arising out of third party contractor use of software licensed to a bank http://laws.findlaw.com/5th/9710645CV0.html FTC comments on proposed UCC Article 2B http://www.ftc.gov/be/v980032.htm The ERISA Industry Committee comments to the IRS on the use of new technologies in retirement plans http://www.eric.org/testimony/technologies.htm Council of Europe - model contract clauses on transborder data flows http://www.coe.fr/dataprotection/ectype.htm E*Trade invests in International Securities Exchange, an electronic options exchange in development http://www.etrade.com/cgi-bin/gx.cgi/AppLogic+Home?gxml=pr111098c.html Electronic Markets Vol. 11 No. 3 on electronic contracting http://www.electronicmarkets.org/netacademy/publications.nsf/all_pk/929 Adrian McCullagh article on Trust in Electronic Commerce http://www.acs.org.au/president/1998/past/io98/etrust.htm CheckFree and others form the Electronic Banking Association http://www.e-banking.org/ John Muller johnmuller(a)earthlink.net "Things are not as they seem, neither are they otherwise" --- end forwarded text ----------------- Robert A. Hettinga <mailto: rah(a)philodox.com> Philodox Financial Technology Evangelism <http://www.philodox.com/> 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity, [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'

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DBS, Privacy, Money Laundering nonsense.
by Robert Hettinga 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

--- begin forwarded text From: "Black Unicorn" <unicorn(a)schloss.li> To: <tboyle(a)rosehill.net>, "dbs" <dbs(a)philodox.com> Subject: DBS, Privacy, Money Laundering nonsense. Date: Fri, 13 Nov 1998 22:57:51 -0600 Keywords: dbs MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Priority: 3 (Normal) X-MSMail-Priority: Normal Importance: Normal X-MimeOLE: Produced By Microsoft MimeOLE V4.72.2106.4 Sender: <dbs(a)philodox.com> Precedence: Bulk List-Subscribe: <mailto:requests@philodox.com?subject=subscribe%20dbs> X-Web-Archive: http://www.philodox.com/dbs-archive/ tboyle(a)rosehill.net comments: [...] > But I simply cannot comprehend the breadth of the agreement > on this dbs conference, and depth of conviction, that DBS money > should be designed with the **deliberate objective** of being > untraceable, for purposes of law enforcement or taxation. In the case of some DBS advocates you are overstating the matter. In the case of others, vastly understating it. > I have a lot of respect for you guys' intellect but I think > you're wrong on two fundamental points: > > 1. Rule of law. Money laundering is a critical piece in > organized crime. The democratic countries have banking laws. > Do you think these laws should be followed, or NOT? (Scurrying > of feet as all the DBS readers avoid answering.) Well let's examine this. The view that all democratic countries have banking laws really begs the question. "What are the differences between said laws." I can tell you with solid authority, they are many. I've often repeated this story here and elsewhere. It's all a matter of public record. Set the way-back-machine to just after Reagan has entered office. Ole Ron began to crack down on tax evasion and in particular offshore havens. Taxes would be cut, it was reasoned, but only if loopholes were filled and evaders rooted out. (Those of us old enough to remember might even recall nodding at the sense of it). This policy was particular hard on certain Caribbean nations. This was the time of operation Tradewinds (search for it in the congressional record) and other IRS black projects where the IRS actually violated local law to spy on foreign banks even going so far as to drug guards, steal the briefcases of banking executives, perform unwarranted searches, bribe foreign officials and all manner of nonsense to root out tax evaders which might also be U.S. citizens. For a long while there was a project which opened and Xeroxed all the incoming mail at JFK which appeared to originate from offshore havens. This wasn't in the 50's mind you, but the 80s. It was acts like these which prompted the Swiss to strengthen their banking secrecy during the Second World War. Just another day in the park in the U.S. Just recently this year Mexico nearly indicted several U.S. law officials for breaking Mexican law during the investigation of several Mexican banks. Clearly the practice hasn't abated much in the last 15 years.. (Note also that today all these methods (except for drugging guards maybe) have their legal equivalents in the United States, which is in itself a powerful statement). This continued for some time back when Ron was at the helm until the United States finally began to threaten to revoke the U.S. charters of certain banks it considered uncooperative. At this point a visitor, unannounced, flew into D.C. and literally dropped by the White House with no press coverage or fanfare at all in the late evening. That visitor was Margaret Thatcher and she proceeded to explain to Ron over the course of a few hours that if he kept it up many of the British Protectorates would literally have their economies crippled. Literally overnight the matter was dropped and the offshore centers left to quietly continue their business. So much for democratic countries with universal ideas about banking law, or the rule of "law and order" in banking regulation. This is but one example. So: Rule of Law - means little in the global-political scheme of things Democratic Countries Have Banking Laws - none of which are consistent or consistently applied Money Laundering is a Key Piece of Organized Crime - This begs a definition of Money Laundering. "Concealing the proceeds of a criminal act" sounds legitimate, but consider that it has been held to apply to a store clerk who sold food stamps for cash and deposited the proceeds in his personal (non-anonymous) checking account: Indicted in Federal Court for Money Laundering with a maximum possible term of 35 years. (This is a prosecutorial tactic to get a guilty plea to the basic theft charge). Consider also that third parties often take it on the chin with the wide definition currently applied. Case in point: Ma and Pa travel agency innocently accepts a deposit from notorious attorney of drug dealer. Their entire holding account is seized including the deposits of some 700 other potential travelers. After 7 years of fighting the seizure, the money is finally returned, without interest. (Effectively halfing the value of the funds). The business is ruined, its reputation in tatters. Ma and Pa fight it out in bankruptcy, lose their house, most of their retirement proceeds, etc. In the process this case sets the precedent that any amount of illicit funds ($1) deposited in any size account ($500 million) will render the entire account liable to seizure and permit it to be held in lieu of forfeiture hearings. That can go on for 7 years or so. Money which is "laundered" has its title literally revert to the U.S. Treasury. This means third parties who innocently accept these funds are liable for their return, even if they are passed on in the course of business. Beginning to seem silly? Money laundering is an invented offense. It's definition in the United States has grown so broad so as to be laughable, if not so frightening. Do not think that these are isolated incidents. So, money laundering in its commonly understood sense might be key to organized crime, but what passes for money laundering in the United States has little to do with it. Myth: Money Laundering laws have a serious impact on organized crime. This is increasingly nonsense. The United States spends close to $22,000.00 to seize $1.00 of illicit funds. Money Laundering today is extremely sophisticated and enforcement doesn't catch the drug dealers, it catches professional money launderers. Today if you are a drug lord you drop $30 million in cash with a professional launderer who cuts you a "clean" check for 85% of that figure or so on the spot and takes the risk of laundering the funds on his own. Myth: Money Laundering can be detected accurately and effectively and leads to drug and organized crime convictions. Nonsense. Assume for sake of argument that you could detect 99% of fraudulent transactions with the measures in place (entirely impossible) and that your false positive rate was only 1% (also entirely impossible). SWIFT alone processes $2 trillion per day. That's on the order of $600 trillion per year, just in SWIFT. (Add another $1.3 billion for CHIPS and $989 million for Fedwire daily. Oh, don't forget the foreign exchange markets, oh and NYSE, oh and NASDAQ, oh and international letters of credit, oh and...) The most sinister estimates of the global criminal economy (primarily drug money) run around $400 billion per year. Your false positives will identify $6 trillion in naughty funds that are actually pure just in SWIFT. Your correct hits will identify $396 billion in naughty funds in all systems worldwide. In this example you will have 15 times as many false hits as correct hits ignoring the lionshare of world financial systems. This is under the very best of circumstances. It's a losing game.. It's a game only the mathematically challenged or politically motivated will play. In fact, money laundering is a tack on offense that is brought to bear after an arrest on other charges has been made. The number of cases that originate with a money laundering investigation is vanishingly small. The payment system today eats up over 1.5% of the GNP primarily because of nonsense regulations like CTR's and other transaction reporting requirements which can cost up to $15 per transaction and (as we see above) have little if any effect on professional money laundering. Given these numbers the degree of "fraud" in the world financial system is far better than in the credit card system, which has pretty much reached equilibrium. (Fraud accounts for about 5% of credit card costs. Customer service accounts for about 15%). > There is a certain logic in the notion of having a legislative > process and laws. Our laws in the U.S. weren't written by > angels up in heaven, but they are better than some other places. In the case of money laundering regulation I should say almost _no_ other places. > If DBS participants advocate that money laundering laws are > not to be followed, I'm sorry but YOU GUYS have the burden > of logically arguing your position. So shut up and quit > raggin' on *me* about it. I would just like to see them applied with rationality. It's fairly clear that that's too much to ask of the United States. Interestingly enough it's typically multi-party systems of government that have a balanced approach to money laundering. Perhaps this is because grandstanding with things like "the war on drugs" isn't as effective outside of a two party system. Sheds new light on your comment about democracies and banking regulations. Some jurisdictions get along quite well without the nonsense perpetrated in the United States. Like Switzerland. Switzerland has one of the nicest things in a cash economy I have seen. A freely circulated 1000CHF note. It's worth about $750. (The United States phased out $500 bills long ago to deal with laundering). In Switzerland you can drop a 1000CHF note at a restaurant and no one bats an eye. In the U.S. you cant take a cab home from the International Terminal unless you have something smaller than a $50. Somehow Switzerland has manage to survive without looting in the streets and rampant crime. Luxembourg is in a similar situation. I tried to purchase a car some years ago outside of D.C. with cash. Completely legitimate transaction. No interest nonsense for me to worry about. No waiting for the car while the check clears. Simple. Right? The dealership called the police, convinced they were striking a blow against drug dealers. It's really gone too far. > 2. Practicality. Without at least a fig leaf of cooperation > with banking authorities and other police, DBS will not be > permitted. Transactions denominated in DBS won't be enforceable > in courts, and fraud won't be a crime. Reporting fraud in DBS > deal would be like reporting a fraud in purchase of heroin. Practicality? Of course any student of political science will understand that where government enforcement of contracts fails or falls short, organized crime tends to move in. Reporting fraud in the purchase of heroin to the right enforcement cartel tends to be much more effective in rendering results than U.S. courts I'd wager. Clearly, the United States would not benefit by forcing DBS underground. Several jurisdictions will permit DBS and enforce it. (I'm involved in the legislative process for one such law in a European jurisdiction now). If you believe that DBS should be outlawed then you must agree that cash should be outlawed. There is effectively no difference but velocity. > The principal reason for failure of electronic money, other > than cards used in physical establishments, is you can't trust > the seller to send you the goods. That's why everybody is > using credit cards, and bearing the 2-3% charge for "insurance". > > You guys seem to think untraceable DBS will be accepted, if > only a good enough encryption algorithm can be found???? 1% of the GNP. Instant 1% growth for changing a system of clearing. Think about that for awhile. > I think your ideas have a fatal, logical weakness. Without > any practical means to verify who got your money, or even > a legal *right* to enforce a contract, what good is dbs? > It's not even money. It's more like a coupon or something. What you are missing is that all your arguments apply equally to cash. Why is cash used if this is so? Prove to me that you just gave me six $100 bills. You are, "without any practical means to verify who got your money or even a legal *right* to enforce a contract" if the transaction is larger than $500. If only we could be rid of this pesky cash would could eliminate organized crime forever. --- end forwarded text ----------------- Robert A. Hettinga <mailto: rah(a)philodox.com> Philodox Financial Technology Evangelism <http://www.philodox.com/> 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity, [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'

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usubscribe
by Ixion 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

usubscribe Life is a dream

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USPS "Know Your Customer" Draws Fire
by Eric Cordian 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Privacy advocates are beginning to take notice of the implications of the new Postal Service regulations concerning private mailboxes. ----- SACRAMENTO -- New postal regulations will make private mailboxes "private" no more, may endanger individual safety, and represent another government attack on privacy that should not be tolerated, the Libertarian Party of California announced today. "Why must government continue to erode individual privacy?" asked Libertarian state chair Mark Hinkle. "What's next? Eliminating unlisted phone numbers? Criminalizing the use of pseudonyms?" Under the new rules, published in the March 25th Federal Register, private mailbox customers will now be required to show two forms of ID -- including one with a photo -- when applying to rent, and mail delivered to private mailboxes must bear a new address designation, "PMB," or risk being undelivered. The rules went into effect April 26th. According to the Postal Service, the new rules are designed to combat mail fraud. But that sounds eerily like another recent government proposal, Hinkle noted. "It's 'Know Your Customer' all over again. The government just keeps wanting to invade our privacy." "Know Your Customer" was the name given to proposed government regulations that would have required banks to develop profiles on every customer and report suspicious banking activity to the government. Thanks to a campaign led by the Libertarian Party, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation rescinded the proposed rules in March. But the similarities remain: * The postal regulations will increase the burden on "Commercial Mail Receiving Agencies" -- or CMRAs as private mailbox businesses like Mailboxes Etc. are known -- by making them responsible for verifying the customer's identity. "Mailbox companies have an interest in reducing fraud but not in inconveniencing customers," said Hinkle. "Their employees should not have to act as deputies for the Postal Service." * The rules will eliminate the privacy enjoyed by CMRA customers -- and may endanger some of them. "Private mailbox renters often have very good reasons for keeping a low profile, such as battered spouses in hiding, celebrities, and law enforcement officers who want to keep their home addresses confidential," Hinkle pointed out. "The Postal Service is literally endangering these individuals." Small businesses started in a home or a garage may rent a private box to give the appearance of having a physical office. "Thanks to the PMB designation, all that privacy is now gone and those businesses will probably suffer as a result," said Hinkle. Even worse, anyone -- not just the police -- can request to see a customer's application information if that customer is doing or soliciting business from their private mailbox. * Most troubling, the regulations operate under the assumption that the customer is guilty until proven innocent. "Just like with 'Know Your Customer,' the Postal Service is depriving the many of their liberties for the sake of a very small few lawbreakers. The problem is, criminals do not follow the law and will find ways around these rules while law-abiding customers are forced to sacrifice their privacy," charged Hinkle. There's one crucial difference between "Know Your Customer" and the new postal regulations: whereas "Know Your Customer" was a proposed rule, the Postal Service has already adopted the new rules, having first proposed them in August, 1997. "With 8,645 regulations adopted in the last two years, it's easy to see how this one slipped through the cracks," Hinkle concluded. "Libertarians denounce the new postal regulations and call on Congress to recognize the erosion of American privacy -- and to stop it before privacy goes the way of the Pony Express." -- Eric Michael Cordian 0+ O:.T:.O:. Mathematical Munitions Division "Do What Thou Wilt Shall Be The Whole Of The Law"

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baby carrier
by chungdoo 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

We are pleased to take this opportunity to introduce ourselves as one of the leading manufacturers-exporters of high grade Baby walker, Baby carrier, Baby swing, Mickey Basketball and Accesorries with beautiful shape in Korea. We hope the articles will be just what you want for outstanding ones compared with the competitors' in quality and design as well. Our baby products has the outstanding points as follows: * Baby walker - Spring Cushion Type * Baby carrier - Comfortable, safe and ligh frame - Padded headrest and Shoulder straps - Adjustable inner seat - Large removable storage bag for baby supplies - Padded waist belt * family carrier - Ages 6 months to 2 years - Frame : Aluminum - Fabric : Nylon - Weight : 1200 g/PC - Double seats for baby and child * simple carrier - Ages 6 months to 3 years - Fabric : Nylon - Support baby with your arms - Simple fuction, simple carrying - Pouch for storage - See through vinyl package * 3+ SWING Our toys are tested to company the requirement of European Standard (Safety of Toys). This high quality product is on all age swing. If has different size settings, depending on the size of your child you can fit the back into either inside (smaller)or(larger)setting. Back Support and front restraint shield are removable. So if can be converted into three swings(infant Swing, Chair Swign and Seat swing) suitable for children 6 months up to 12 years old. * DO RE MI SWING * SEVEN MICKEY - A Mini Basketball Set - Non Toxic PVC Ball * TEN MICKEY * FIFTEEN MICKEY * Accesorries * Feeding echievements * Baby Gift Set To see the design, pls visit our web site, http://www.chungdoo.co.kr and do not hesitate to send your requirements so that we may show you our best service. We are looking forward to hearing a good news from you soon. Faithfully yours, K. J. Kang, President Chung Doo Corporation Tel : (82-2) 565-3115, 565-3885 Fax : (82-2) 565-3110 e-mail : chungdoo(a)chungdoo.co.kr URL : http://www.chungdoo.co.kr

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No Subject
by Anonymous 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

xxxx is exactly right on this. Several years ago I posted to sci.crypt my "novel" idea for packing bits into the essentially inaudible "least significant bits" (LSBs) of digital recordings, such as DATs and CDs. Ditto for the LSBs in an 8-bit image or 24-bit color image. I've since seen this idea reinvented _several_ times on sci.crypt and elsewhere...and I'm willing to bet I wasn't the first, either (so I don't claim any credit). A 2-hour DAT contains about 10 Gbits (2 hours x 3600 sec/hr x 2 channels x 16 bits/sample x 44K samples/sec), or about 1.2 Gbytes. A CD contains about half this, i.e., about 700 Mbytes. The LSB of a DAT is 1/16th of the 1.2 Gbytes, or 80 Mbytes. This is a _lot_ of storage! A home-recorded DAT--and I use a Sony D-3 DAT Walkman to make tapes--has so much noise down at the LSB level--noise from the A/D and D/A converters, noise from the microphones (if any), etc.--that the bits are essentially random at this level. (This is a subtle, but important, point: a factory recorded DAT or CD will have predetermined bits at all levels, i.e., the authorities could in principle spot any modifications. But home-recorded, or dubbed, DATs will of course not be subject to this kind of analysis.) Some care might be taken to ensure that the statistical properties of the signal bits resemble what would be expected with "noise" bits, but this will be a minor hurdle. Adobe Photoshop can be used to easily place message bits in the "noise" that dominates things down at the LSB level. The resulting GIF can then be posted to UseNet or e-mailed. Ditto for sound samples, using the ideas I just described (but typically requiring sound sampling boards, etc.). I've done some experiments along these lines. This doesn't mean our problems are solved, of course. Exchanging tapes is cumbersome and vulnerable to stings. But it does help to point out the utter futility of trying to stop the flow of bits. --Tim -- .......................................................................... Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)netcom.com | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero 408-688-5409 | knowledge, reputations, information markets, W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA | black markets, collapse of governments. Higher Power: 2^756839 | PGP 2.0 and MailSafe keys by arrangement.

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Revealing identities
by Anonymous 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Johan, I haven't been paying close attention to the latest on the anonymity debate, so please tell me if the following has been raised before. In your message <9302260807.aa01498(a)penet.penet.FI> of Fri, 26 Feb 93 08:50:19 +0200 on the subject "Moral dilemma." to the cypherpunks list, you mentioned that >One rule is >that I *never* reveal the true identity of an anon user, While I believe that you should be able to use any policy you want for this sort of thing, I do not believe that both your server and this policy can survive together. Because you/the-server cannot censor the content of anonymous postings/mail (you lack the time, and knowledge of what is legal in every corner of the world), you can only withdraw someone's anonymous posting permission in response to complaints to something that they have already posted. I believe that eventually, someone will post something so damaging/incensing that sufficient pressure will be applied that either: the service cannot continue (e.g. disconnected from the network), or you will be forced to reveal or destroy the mappings between alias(es) and user(s). For example, on the cypherpunks list, the question of what would happen if someone claiming responsibility for the New York bombing posted through the anonymous server. Bodies in the US (from people providing parts of the Internet service through to political and criminal bodies such as the FBI/CIA/NSA) could easily apply very strong pressure. Unfortunately, I feel that this pressure will come sooner rather than later because there is nothing preventing people opposed to the anonymous service from making these postings merely to discredit your service. I think that there *MAY* be a way around this. I assume the reasons behind your non-disclosure policy are: i. You cannot decide which identities should be revealed. ii. Revealing an identity removes their anonymity from all of their previous postings, some of which may have had reason to be anonymous. For example, I think it "unjust" to reveal what someone wrote to alt.sex.abuse because they violated copyright or whatever in some other group. The second of these reasons could be avoided by permitting anonymous users to have a different alias for each posting that they make. This would increase the loading on the alias space and records of alias<->ID mappings. I can see no reason why you would need to reveal all of the aliases of one real identity. The decision of when an identity should be revealed could be left to a jury: If you receive a reasonable complaint about a posting (not just a flame, but something more significant such as copyright violation, libel, etc) then you would post this complaint to a group of anonymous jurors who decide on what action should be taken. The plaintiff and defendant could even argue their positions to the jury, and might advertise on a newsgroup asking for assistance from relevant groups (e.g. pro/anti-anonymity groups). The problem now is how to select the jury. Some factors are: i. The number of jurors influences the probability that the decision can be swayed because of the random composition of the jury. So one juror would be too few, 12 as used in orthodox courts might be reasonable, etc. ii. Jurors would not want to spend too much time on the case, so there should be an upper limit on the number of bytes transmitted by defendant and plaintiff, and the time span of the case. iii. The degree of "consensus" required for a decision. Perhaps 2/3 majority is OK, perhaps 75%. The larger the majority required, the less likely that the case will be swayed by the composition of the jury, but also the longer it would take to reach the decision. iv. The jury can't be composed just of users of the anonymous service because of their bias. Perhaps jurors could be selected at random from the names of people who have posted to the news in the past? v. Jurors would have to accept their position -- there's no use in having a juror who doesn't read the information passed to him/her. I feel that the problem of selecting a jury would be easier to solve than that of defending the anonymous service against the uproar that may result from some postings. With this judicial process, anonymous users would also be accountable for what they post. Some other issues would be i. What happens if the jury can't decide? ii. What sort of "punishment" is possible? Warning the person? Barring the person from anonymous posting? Revealing their identity to the necessary body? etc The idea is *VERY* rough at the moment, but perhaps it has some merit? As I see it, the good part for the anonymous service provider is that they do not have to participate in the process (apart from filtering trivial flaming cases from the judicial system), which will avoid claims of bias and lessens your already considerable load. Comments? Tim ---- 8< Cut Here 8< ---- Tim Moors __________________________________________________________ Australian Telecommunications Research Institute .-_!\ GPO Box U 1987 Email: tim(a)atri.curtin.edu.au / \ Perth, WA 6001 Phone: +61 9 351 3243 \_.-._/ Australia Fax: +61 9 351 3244 o "beLIEve" -- U2 Zoo TV Tour

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No Subject
by Martin Hellman 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Subject: Clipper Chip Most of you have seen the announcement in Friday's NY Times, etc. about NIST (National Institute of Standards & Technology) announcing the "Clipper Chip" crypto device. Several messges on the net have asked for more technical details, and some have been laboring under understandable misunderstandings given the lack of details in the news articles. So here to help out is your friendly NSA link: me. I was somewhat surprised Friday to get a call from the Agency which supplied many of the missing details. I was told the info was public, so here it is (the cc of this to Dennis Branstad at NIST is mostly as a double check on my facts since I assume he is aware of all this; please let me know if I have anything wrong): The Clipper Chip will have a secret crypto algorithm embedded in Silicon. Each chip will have two secret, 80-bit keys. One will be the same for all chips (ie a system-wide key) and the other will be unit specific. I don't know what NIST and NSA will call them, but I will call them the system key SK and unit key UK in this message. The IC will be designed to be extremely difficult to reverse so that the system key can be kept secret. (Aside: It is clear that they also want to keep the algorithm secret and, in my opinion, it may be as much for that as this stated purpose.) The unit key will be generated as the XOR of two 80-bit random numbers K1 and K2 (UK=K1+K2) which will be kept by the two escrow authorities. Who these escrow authorities will be is still to be decided by the Attorney General, but it was stressed to me that they will NOT be NSA or law enforcement agencies, that they must be parties acceptable to the users of the system as unbiased. When a law enforcement agency gets a court order, they will present it to these two escrow authorities and receive K1 and K2, thereby allowing access to the unit key UK. In addition to the system key, each user will get to choose his or her own key and change it as often as desired. Call this key plain old K. When a message is to be sent it will first be encrypted under K, then K will be encrypted under the unit key UK, and the serial number of the unit added to produce a three part message which will then be encrypted under the system key SK producing E{ E[M; K], E[K; UK], serial number; SK} When a court order obtains K1 and K2, and thence K, the law enforcement agency will use SK to decrypt all information flowing on the suspected link [Aside: It is my guess that they may do this constantly on all links, with or without a court order, since it is almost impossible to tell which links over which a message will flow.] This gives the agency access to E[M; K], E[K; UK], serial number in the above message. They then check the serial number of the unit and see if it is on the "watch list" for which they have a court order. If so, they will decrypt E[K; UK] to obtain K, and then decrypt E[M; K] to obtain M. I am still in the process of assessing this scheme, so please do not take the above as any kind of endorsement of the proposed scheme. All I am trying to do is help all of us assess the scheme more knowledgably. But I will say that the need for just one court order worries me. I would feel more comfortable (though not necessarily comfortable!) if two separate court orders were needed, one per escrow authority. While no explanation is needed, the following story adds some color: In researching some ideas that Silvio Micali and I have been kicking around, I spoke with Gerald Gunther, the constitutional law expert here at Stanford and he related the following story: When Edward Levi became Pres. Ford's attorney general (right after Watergate), he was visited by an FBI agent asking for "the wiretap authorizations." When Levy asked for the details so he could review the cases as required by law, the agent told him that his predecessors just turned over 40-50 blank, signed forms every time. Levi did not comply and changed the system, but the lesson is clear: No single person or authority should have the power to authorize wiretaps (or worse yet, divulging of personal keys). Sometimes he or she will be an Edward Levi and sometimes a John Mitchell. Martin Hellman ======== And, his permission to repost. PLEASE NOTE HIS "RESTRICTION." --jim =======

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Re: Marty's 4/17 Clipper Chip post-to-many ...
by Martin Hellman 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Jim, It is fine to post my previous message to cypherpunks if you also post this message with it in which: I ask recipients to be very sparse in their requesting further info from me or asking for comments on specific questions. By this posting I apologize for any messages I am unable to respond to. (I already spend too much time answering too much e-mail and am particularly overloaded this week with other responsibilities.) martin ========= Finally, there has been a significant reponse to this by a cryptoid well-known to all of us. Am seeking permission to repost it, also. --jim Incidentally, Marty sez he had no forewarning that Clipper was about to sail. The NY Times article blind-sided him about 11:30 Thursday night. Sounds like the government is really doing an outstanding job of careful, collaborative policy-making. [Danger! Novice gunslinger is shooting from the hip!] --jim

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Re: Clipper Chip
by denning＠cs.cosc.georgetown.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I just had another conversation with NSA to clarify some of the features of Clipper. Please feel free to distribute this and my other messages on Clipper. The name of the encryption algorithm is "Skipjack." Martin Hellman had written and the serial number of the unit added to produce a three part message which will then be encrypted under the system key SK producing E{ E[M; K], E[K; UK], serial number; SK} To which I responded: My understanding is that E[M; K] is not encrypted under SK (called the "family key") and that the decrypt key corresponding to SK is held by law enforcement. Does anyone have first hand knowledge on this? I was correct in that E[M; K] is not encrypted under SK. However, Skipjack being a single-key system, there is, of course, not a separate decrypt key for the family key SK. The unit key, also called the "chip key," is generated from the serial number N as follows. Let N1, N2, and N3 be 64 bit blocks derived from N, and let S1 and S2 be two 80-bit seeds used as keys. Compute the 64-bit block R1 = E[D[E[N1; S1]; S2]; S1] (Note that this is like using the DES in triple encryption mode with two keys.) Similarly compute blocks R2 and R3 starting with N2 and N3. (I'm unlear about whether the keys S1 and S2 change. The fact that they're called seeds suggests they might.) Then R1, R2, and R3 are concatenated together giving 192 bits. The first 80 bits form K1 and the next 80 bits form K2. The remaining bits are discarded. The seeds S1 and S2 do not change. The whole process is performed on a laptop computer, and S1 and S2 are supplied by two independent people so that no one person knows both. The same S1 and S2 are used during an entire "programming session" to generate keys for a stream of serial numbers. Everything is discarded at the end (the computer could be thrown out if desired). The serial number is 30 bits and the values N1, N2, and N3 are formed by padding the serial number with fixed 34-bit blocks (separate padding for each value). The resulting keys K1 and K2 are output onto separate floppy disks, paired up with their serial number. Each pair is stored in a separate file. The floppy disks are taken away by two separate people on behalf of the two escrow agencies. Dorothy Denning denning(a)cs.georgetown.edu ====== >From eff.org!interesting-people-request(a)netcomsv.netcom.com Mon Apr 19 20:07:50 1993 Posted-Date: Mon, 19 Apr 1993 21:17:27 -0500 From: David Farber <farber(a)central.cis.upenn.edu> X-Sender: farber(a)linc.cis.upenn.edu Subject: More technical details -- Chipper To: interesting-people(a)eff.org (interesting-people mailing list) Personal note. Denning suggests such firms as " SRI, Rand, Mitre, the national labs (Sandia, LANL, Los Alamos), Treasury, GAO" as possible escrow organizations. I personally believe that firms which get their funding from the government are just too susceptible to pressure which we have seen historically. It would be best to use organizations that have a more arms length relationship with the government so everyone believes the escrows task is being performed properly. Dave From: smb(a)research.att.com (Steven Bellovin) Subject: More technical details Date: 19 Apr 93 13:43:46 GMT Here are some corrections and additions to Hellman's note, courtesy of Dorothy Denning. Again, this is reposted with permission. Two requests -- first, note the roles of S1 and S2. It appears to me and others that anyone who knows those values can construct the unit key. And the nature of the generation process for K1 and K2 is such that neither can be produced alone. Thus, the scheme cannot be implemented such that one repository generates the first half-key, and another generates the second. *That* is ominous. Second -- these postings are not revealed scripture, nor are they carefully-crafted spook postings. Don't attempt to draw out hidden meanings (as opposed to, say, the official announcements of Clipper). Leave Denning out of this; given Hellman's record of opposition to DES, which goes back before some folks on this newsgroup knew how to read, I don't think you can impugn his integrity. Oh yeah -- the folks who invented Clipper aren't stupid. If you think something doesn't make sense, it's almost certainly because you don't understand their goals. --Steve Bellovin ----- Date: Sun, 18 Apr 93 07:56:39 EDT From: denning(a)cs.georgetown.edu (Dorothy Denning) Subject: Re: Clipper Chip To: (a long list of folks) I was also briefed by the NSA and FBI, so let me add a few comments to Marty's message: The Clipper Chip will have a secret crypto algorithm embedded in The algorithm operates on 64-bit blocks (like DES) and the chip supports all 4 DES modes of operation. The algorithm uses 32 rounds of scrambling compared with 16 in DES. In addition to the system key, each user will get to choose his or her own key and change it as often as desired. Call this key plain old K. When a message is to be sent it will first be K is the session key shared by the sender and receiver. Any method (e.g., public key) can be used to establish the session key. In the AT&T telephone security devices, which will have the new chip, the key is negotiated using a public-key protocol. encrypted under K, then K will be encrypted under the unit key UK, and the serial number of the unit added to produce a three part message which will then be encrypted under the system key SK producing E{ E[M; K], E[K; UK], serial number; SK} My understanding is that E[M; K] is not encrypted under SK (called the "family key") and that the decrypt key corresponding to SK is held by law enforcement. Does anyone have first hand knowledge on this? I will also check it out, but this is 7am Sunday so I did not want to wait. The unit key will be generated as the XOR of two 80-bit random numbers K1 and K2 (UK=K1+K2) which will be kept by the two escrow The unit key, also called the "chip key," is generated from the serial number N as follows. Let N1, N2, and N3 be 64 bit blocks derived from N, and let S1 and S2 be two 80-bit seeds used as keys. Compute the 64-bit block R1 = E[D[E[N1; S1]; S2]; S1] (Note that this is like using the DES in triple encryption mode with two keys.) Similarly compute blocks R2 and R3 starting with N2 and N3. (I'm unlear about whether the keys S1 and S2 change. The fact that they're called seeds suggests they might.) Then R1, R2, and R3 are concatenated together giving 192 bits. The first 80 bits form K1 and the next 80 bits form K2. The remaining bits are discarded. authorities. Who these escrow authorities will be is still to be decided by the Attorney General, but it was stressed to me that they will NOT be NSA or law enforcement agencies, that they must be parties acceptable to the users of the system as unbiased. Marty is right on this and the FBI has asked me for suggestions. Please pass them to me along with your reasons. In addition to Marty's criteria, I would add that the agencies must have an established record of being able to safeguard highly sensitive information. Some suggestions I've received so far include SRI, Rand, Mitre, the national labs (Sandia, LANL, Los Alamos), Treasury, GAO. When a court order obtains K1 and K2, and thence K, the law enforcement agency will use SK to decrypt all information flowing on the suspected link [Aside: It is my guess that they may do this constantly on all links, with or without a court order, since it is almost impossible to tell which links over which a message will flow.] My understanding is that there will be only one decode box and that it will be operated by the FBI. The service provider will isolate the communications stream and pass it to the FBI where it will pass through the decode box, which will have been keyed with K. for "the wiretap authorizations." When Levy asked for the details so he could review the cases as required by law, the agent told him that his predecessors just turned over 40-50 blank, signed forms every time. Levi did not comply and changed the system, but the lesson is clear: No single person or authority should have the power to authorize wiretaps No single person does, at least for FBI taps. After completing a mound of paperwork, an agent must get the approval of several people on a chain that includes FBI legal counsel before the request is even taken to the Attorney General for final approval. Dorothy Denning

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Re: Marty's 4/17 Clipper Chip post-to-many & Dorothy's 4/8 response
by denning＠cs.georgetown.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Fine with me. Post anywhere. Dorothy =====

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No Subject
by Anonymous 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Based on previous experience, a couple more will appear overnight. Hal Finney hfinney(a)shell.portal.com

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on line books (not just in risk mgmt)
by Tapen Sinha 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

If you are looking for information on new books, how to buy them (on line!) and review of these books, there is a neat way to do it on internet: telnet books.com if the above does not work on your machine, try telnet 192.148.240.9 It will ask you a bunch of questions (like your name and address) and then you can look at info on books by author, subject... You can look at reviews of those books too. You can order books by email even (have your credit card handy)! It can be quite useful. A word of caution: there are some unhappy users out there who claim that they got billed for books they did not order. tapen_sinha(a)macmail.bond.edu.au

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No Subject
by Anonymous 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Yes, I remember that now. My interpretation, though, was that with the bank's help you could tell when a coin had been re-used. This could impair the anonymity of the cash. Generally in the analysis of these proto- cols one wants anonymity even if the bank and the other participants collude. That is the whole point of cryptographic (non-transferable) cash, after all; otherwise the bank could just use the "Poor Man's Cash" idea which Tim May suggested here last year and just issue cash in the form of magic numbers with no blinding or digital sigs. Hal

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No Subject
by Anonymous 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I read this paper some time ago. Couldn't the cash still be detected as having belonged to the original owner even after you have transferred it? If so, then the other requirement is that you must transfer it anonymously, otherwise they can still get back to you. An example would be if you are doing something which the government doesn't like, such as shipping tracts advocating egalitarianism to a country with explicitly racist policies. The government might be able to put pressure on some members of the organization and use this (in effect) "marked money" to find the others. If you pass the money on to someone else, but they know it came from you, and then the government comes to them, determines that this is "dirty money" (which was given to the threatening egalitarians) they can say "who did you get this from" and your jig is up. Hal

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No Subject
by mkj＠world.std.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Has anyone here seen the so-called Lehman Panel report? It is available by ftp from ftp.uspto.gov, in the directory /pub/nii-ip. It is offered there in several formats. The deadline for comments is September 7th. (Sorry about the short notice, but I've only just recently discovered the report myself.) The Lehman Panel is more officially known as the "Working Group on Intellectual Property Rights", a subcommittee of President Clinton's "Information Infrastructure Task Force". The Lehman Panel report makes a number of recommendations concerning changes to current intellectual property law, in light of challenges presented by the National Information Infrastructure (NII) project. This appears to me to be quite an important report, which could play a major role in shaping vital aspects of our near-future society. I find the whole approach taken by the panel disturbing, though perhaps not surprising. Very briefly, my general concerns are these: There appears to be a natural tension between current intellectual property law and the widespread deployment of computer networking. (John Barlow has put it more simply: "Copyright is dead".) The Lehman panel's report, rather than trying to accomodate and adapt to the inevitable effects of the NII, instead recommends tightening up existing laws, and expanding their scope, in an attempt to preserve the status quo and protect established interests. It seems to me that this approach would dramatically undercut the potential of the NII, making many of its most natural uses and benefits illegal. Worse, I believe this approach would create a body of law which will make speed limits look well-respected by comparison, and any attempt to enforce these laws is likely to be destructive and unpleasant for all of us. There are numerous other, more specific things in this report which make me unhappy, too -- such as the presumption that the NII should be little more than a new marketplace for old businesses; the creation of gratuitous new rights for major record labels which would hurt artists, and would enable the record companies to control the digital audio server industry; and most frightening of all, the shameless suggestion that the public schools should be used to pound these new rules into the heads of children as early as Kindergarten. I've obviously considered firing off a letter of comment myself, but after I calmed down I realized how little impact that would be likely to have. So I decided the most constructive thing I could do would be to post this "alert" here, in the hope that someone with better qualifications and resources than myself might pick up the ball. Thanks for your attention. --- mkj

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Re: Why Doesn't Wired.....
by jimp＠wired.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

In article <v4cAlOwscUg6077yn(a)io.org>, werewolf(a)io.org (Mark Terka) wrote: > .....if it is sooooooo hooked in the online culture have a PGP public key > that 'net users could use to send in their credit card numbers for > subscriptions? Here it is. We're just implementing it. Send us a message (send to talk2subs(a)wired.com) -----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- Version: 2.7 mQCOAy8EM1EAAAEEANqhOZTAwWI/99ZZ7t77VHH02n+xM4CQEk2DJe2zZhpjKP8v EHndzBPr3dIsHOZUJABi7ztk5NiQhNVR5EBE7Tqz/7HhGFUE2ErVjAS3OQckcmvW BrCgNXfe0G4tlX1paXFGHsoVT3UgE2IKjttwmZA1WtOH1lbgLCGi/5f257vHAA9A AbQnV2lyZWQgQ2lyY3VsYXRpb24gPHRhbGsyc3Vic0B3aXJlZC5jb20+ =xdqc -----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- -- Jim Petersen Argue for your limitations.... jimp(a)wired.com And they are yours.

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No Subject
by david＠arch.ping.dk 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

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No Subject
by Anonymous 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

It is interesting that the situation is so symmetrical. Given collusion with the bank by the other party, with regular ecash we protect Alice's but not Bob's anonymity. With this "reverse ecash" we protect Bob but not Alice. (Alice is the payor, Bob the payee.) If people were allowed to exchange coins anonymously, either system will provide anonymity for both parties. (In the reverse ecash system Alice hands the the blinded proto-coins along with some regular coins to the bank and receives blinded new coins.) Earlier there was discussion of an ecash coin-exchanging service ("Charlie") designed to provide payee anonymity in the regular ecash system. Bob would send his newly-received coins to Charlie along with blinded proto-coins. Charlie would then exchange them at the bank and send the new (blinded) coins back to Bob. Charlie and Bob can be anonymous to each other, but Bob has to trust Charlie with his coins. A similar service would work for the reverse ecash system to protect Alice's anonymity. Bob blinds some proto-coins and sends them to Alice, who further blinds them and sends them to Charlie along with some regular coins of the same values. Charlie exchanges the regular coins for new coins using the doubly blinded proto-coins. He gives the blinded coins back to Alice, who unblinds them and gives them to Bob, who removes the last blinding to reveal the valid coins. It is Alice in this protocol who has to trust Charlie with her coins. Hal

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Re: whois cypherpunks.org ?
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On the Ft. Meade addresses for two of the cpunk domains, was there not a humorous explanation for this posted a couple of years back? Dimly remembered: there's a town of Ft. Meade as well as The Mad Fort itself, or something like that, and that a mail drop would be handy for swapping useless bits of bs-buffer overflow. If this is now classified, hit D, Degausse and deodorize your Farradage!

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Re: In Search of Genuine DigiCash
by rah＠shipwright.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 9:25 PM 8/22/94 -0700, Timothy C. May wrote: >Anonymity is what gives digital cash it's raison >d'etre, it's technological advantages over conventional schemes. I'll try to to come at this from another tack. Cryptography gives anonymity. Anononymity reduces the overhead. The reduced overhead should make digital cash more economically efficient than on-line systems like NetBank, or credit-cards or much of anything else, at the moment. The economic efficiency is what may make digitial cash economical as a way to provide liquidity for internet commerce. The major selling point is *not* privacy. The major selling point is economic efficiency. >If anonymity, untraceability, and other "Chaumian" notions are only >seen as peripheral side effects, then we already _have_ "digital cash" >in the encrypted credit card systems some folks are already offering. They are peripheral side effects. They also are the very things that make digital cash a more efficient medium of exchange. They are not necessary and sufficient conditions for the adoption of digital cash for the very same reasons you outlined above. Privacy is like flight. It's cool. It's literally marvelous. But flight also gives you speed, and speed is what sells flight as a usable technology to most people. Is that a better explaination? >Without the technological approach to untraceability and anonymity, >all we have is the usual "trust". Granted, credit card numbers ought >not to be sent over unsecured channels, but fixing that is easy (with >end-to-end encryption). Trust-based systems are not the foundation for >a free society most of us are seeking. Printing is a faster way to transcribe information than copying a book by hand. A secondary benefit of printing is that improves information flow through a culture. A consequence is increased education, which gives you an enlightment ethic and eventually Jeffersonian democacy. I think we're looking at the elephant from opposite ends here, Tim. You seem to be holding the trunk, I believe... >"Digidollar" was one of the many names coined by folks on this list, >along with Cypherbucks, Digimarks, etc. Ah. How grateful I am not to be burdened with its parentage... Cheers, Bob Hettinga ----------------- Robert Hettinga (rah(a)shipwright.com) "There is no difference between someone Shipwright Development Corporation who eats too little and sees Heaven and 44 Farquhar Street someone who drinks too much and sees Boston, MA 02331 USA snakes." -- Bertrand Russell (617) 323-7923

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Re: MIT Fascism
by No Taxes through No Government 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>True enough. Most of our rules have been bundled together. Either you >accept all of them or you walk away. So Tim, if you don't like the FBI The above false information incorrectly assumes that all laws apply to all people.

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Re: U.S. in violation of Geneva convention?
by Anonymous Sender 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Harmon Seaver wrote: > > This isn't a ski mask burglary. We KNOW Saddam ruled Iraq. > > We KNOW what crimes were committed. Simple syllogism. > > No we don't. We only know what the propaganda mills have told us. > Twenty years ago it was a different story. The propaganda mills were working for Saddam, not against him. http://www.indybay.org/news/2003/04/1599076.php "Over the last dozen years I made 13 trips to Baghdad to lobby the government to keep CNN's Baghdad bureau open and to arrange interviews with Iraqi leaders. Each time I visited, I became more distressed by what I saw and heard - awful things that could not be reported because doing so would have jeopardized the lives of Iraqis, particularly those on our Baghdad staff." http://www.techcentralstation.com/041103H.html "It appears there is another, more troubling, reason Jordan decided not to report these hideous crimes until the regime was safely out of the way: CNN didn't want to lose its on-the-ground access to a big story." Human Rights Watch, Amnesty, and countless Iraqi refugees all report similar stories of widespread torture and murder. Is it your position that these are all propagandists? Dismissing as "propaganda" any reports that oppose your argument, while accepting as truth any claim that supports it, is simple intellectual dishonesty.

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U.S. in violation of Geneva convention?
by James A. Donald 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-- On 16 Dec 2003 at 2:36, Anonymous wrote: > I saw several people commenting the issue of Geneva > convention on CNN during the day. Also I saw an expert on > this field from another country commenting on the issue > stating that it was a clear violation of the convention. In > either of these interviews were there any discussion on > whether it didn't apply to this specific case due to what > clothings he happened to wear or whattever. I got the > impression that it was clear that the U.S. treatment wasn't > fully appropriate. If you were watching the BBC, you would have thought most of the Iraqi population were outraged by his capture. I think you are suffering from New York Times syndrome "If even the New York Times admits that the kulaks are happy and prosperous under Stalin, that shows you how great the Soviet Union really must be when you discount all that capitalist propaganda." --digsig James A. Donald 6YeGpsZR+nOTh/cGwvITnSR3TdzclVpR0+pr3YYQdkG Lh9C/c3J2U0bybWlK/P0f5hnnZT1z+2QEe1K9Ev2 4cVVWOLkCVsvYQG/u75vRB5xVrL2GjBeaEl+j6x07

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Re: Sunny Guantanamo (Re: Speaking of the Geneva convention)
by Michael Kalus 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 On 17-Dec-03, at 5:43 PM, Jim Dixon wrote: > >> According to the US Government though they are not soldiers. They are >> "unlawful enemy combattants". > > I can only interpret this as your saying that the US Government's > judgement in this issue is correct, and they are not POWs. > I only tell you what they are telling us. I do not agree with this assessment personally. >> >> The war in Afghanistan is over. This is were they were caught. Thus >> they >> should be released, no? > > Oh, we are back to their being POWs. Fine. In that case, the answer > to > your question is no. > > The war in question was begun by an attack on the United States, by the > murder of 3000 people in New York City. Is this war over? Not > according > to tapes attributed to al Qaeda. They still profess to be at war with > the United States. > Where the war begun is probably debatable. The US had (and has) their fingerprints over a lot of things that are happening. And all of these you could construe as an act of war. > Is the war in Afghanistan over? Not according to news reports. Osama > bin > Laden remains free. The Taliban remain active. But the regime has been replaced, thus the war is over, no? That was the case in Europe. Germany was defeated, a new government installed (with a lot of people from the old one) and you called it "done deal". Same in Japan. So what's different this time? > >> If they are terrorists and they have proof of >> this they should put them in front of a court (and I guess that should >> be a civil court, not a military tribunal as I don't quite see since >> when the US Army is performing law enforcement duties). > > Please make your mind up. Now they are terrorists again. > I am answering to your statements. We have already established that if they are POWs then they should be released because the war is over (see above). If they are not POWs but held because of terrorist charges, than they should be tried no? > Whose law requires that terrorists be treated in this fashion? > Our "enlightened" western society, led by the USofA who proclaims to know what right and wrong is (and who wants to teach it to all those "primitive" cultures in the middle east). > The US Army's responsibility is not to enforce the law. It is to > defend > the United States. They seem to be doing a good job at the moment. > Sure sure, nobody has flown another plane in a building. Is this because of the US Army and all those nifty security screenings at the airport (just last weekend I flew out of Dallas and saw more than enough ways to get something through security), or because nobody really wanted to do it right now? Guess we'll never know. But of course the Spinmeisters are going to say it's because of the war in Iraq and added security. I wonder who or what they are going to blame the next time someone gets blown up. > In the United States it is the responsibility of the police to enforce > the > law in their jurisdiction. There is no US police force with > responsiblities in Guantanamo. US law does not apply to Cuba. Nifty, isn't it? "Well people, we see your point. But you have to Understanding, even though we control Guantanamo Bay and even though Diego Garcia is a British Island which we just annexed, we can't really do anything to help those poor people. But don't fret, if they would be in an Afghani jail they would be off worse. Remember, we are the good guys, we only do what's in humanities best interrest." If they would be held in New York State they would have more rights. So let's just not even try that, we might actually HAVE to treat them according to the gospel that we preach. >> But they are not POWs by their own account. If they could be charged >> with any of these crimes above, then what takes two years to actually >> convict them? > > By your way of thinking, if I am taken prisoner in a war, I can decide > that I am not a POW and walk free. That's not what I said. What I DID say was that if they are not POWs and are not charged with a crime, they should be set free. > > In what war has this been common practice? See above. >> Some of them ARE US Citizens. Others are citizens of other states. >> International Law means that if I (holding a German passport) have to >> be >> allowed to contact MY government in order to receive any aid that I >> might require. This right has not been given. > > What "International Law" says that unlawful combatants get to contact > their governments in this manner? > The term "unlawful combatants" doesn't exist either. So the question is mute. Let's say "Human being" instead. > What if the government contacted, say Afghan or Pakistani, would prefer > that they not be contacted as you desire, or prefers that you be held > as > a prisoner indefinitely? Than you have a problem with your government. But neither British, nor Canadian nor French authorities were notified / could be contact OR, after they found out, were allowed to talk to their people. > >> Granted, I would not be protected under the rights of the US >> constitution, but I do have other rights and those are clearly >> violated >> as well. > > What's so clear about this? Do you actually have any knowledge at all > of customs and practices in countries in the region? Do you care at > all > about the opinions of local people, about their customary practices? I > think not. It is not only about people from Afghanistan, it is also about other countries, see my text above. >> >> Treason would need to be proofen. Considering that no charges have >> been >> brought forward after almost two years it is pretty clear (or at least >> appears to be) that there is no proof that any of these people did >> anything wrong. > > Do you know for a fact that there are US citizens held at Guantanamo? > If > so, who are they? > There have been several reports. What about John Walker? Whatever happened to him? >>> >> It doesn't. But if that would be the case than the captured Afghans >> should be returned to the Afghan authorities, why is this not >> happening? > > Perhaps the Afghan authorities don't want them back. > > Hello? > Perhaps you just look for the easy way out? Michael -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: PGP 8.0.3 iQA/AwUBP+DwTmlCnxcrW2uuEQL6iwCeOK5U56u8xVB9aT1SAqj+yi7OULcAoOd0 bml/UV9L7YtJFFoAq77OCilk =aXZZ -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: U.S. in violation of Geneva convention?
by Michael Kalus 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 On 17-Dec-03, at 5:23 PM, Jim Dixon wrote: >>> Damn lucky, to be honest. >>> >> No I did not omit this little bit. This is not the question. > > Oh but it is. > Ah? Why? >> Guilt or not guilt is not (supposely) decided when captured but in a >> court of law. You remember, "Justice" the thing the US supposely is >> standing for? > > Are you saying that the United States has to be a light to the world, > that > it has an extraordinary responsibility to be morally correct, that its > actions should be judged by a different standard from those of other > countries? The US makes these claims on their own. If they are the "good guys" than they should act like it. Not only when it is convenient but also when it is not. Morale is not about the "best bang for the buck" but about integrity. The US Government clearly does not possess a lot of integrity when it comes to morale. > What are you, some kind of pro-American fanatic? Last time I checked I was a human being. > >> Whatever he did before, it does not matter at this point. At this very >> moment the people who have to abide are the victors and that means the >> US Government (and thus the US Military). >> >> Two wrongs still don't make a right. > > What exactly is wrong with inspecting a prisoner's teeth and giving him > a haircut? Televising this for propaganda purposes. > > Why exactly do you say that mass murder, invasion, genocide somehow > are outweighed in the scales of justice by a medical examination? > No, what I am saying is that no matter what he did, the US still has to play by international rules (or should at least). Using those images from Saddam as Propaganda clearly is wrong. Michael -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: PGP 8.0.3 iQA/AwUBP+DxBGlCnxcrW2uuEQJqKQCgujw7xjSVAPdzXDcEW9abBkRyaF8AoNOL H+VuSTqSPFSTA834qQS2X36C =ULJm -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: U.S. in violation of Geneva convention?
by Nomen Nescio 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Tim, sorry it was unclear from my post whom I was referring to. It was "James A. Donald". I did put his message id in a reply-to header. Jim Dixon wrote: > Hitler, you mean? Or did you have Milosevic in mind? No what I meant was what IF somehow Bush or Blaire or some other high ranking coalition politician were captured by Iraq during the war and was treated in the same way. I can only presume you would support Saddam's soldiers checking Bush for lice then. You are also utterly missing the point and you are one pretty good example of how "the mob" are thinking. EVERYONE, including Saddam, Pol Pot or whattever should be treated in accordance with the laws by us who call ourselves the free democratic part of the world. Then they shall stand trial. A fair trial and being represented by lawyers. What would be more satisfying for the critics of U.S. than to see U.S. not being able to get its act together and instead conducting itself in a manner inconsistent with international law during this rather criticl phase of the Iraqi campaign. Mark my words, U.S. will be in regret later. Jim Dixon, you also wrote some half trouths on the subject of Palestinians and the support they received. You should read up on this subject. Saddam also has a history of building up edicational institutions and so on. He recived awards by U.N. earlier on for his wellfare programs and the development Iraq was gaining. Anyone can check this up, just call U.N. in NY and you'll receive a few references I'm sure. What I mean by this is not to defend him in any way but I feel that this rewriting of history and propaganda is serving noone in the long run. If you believe that 100% of the arab world in their harts and minds hate Saddam you're wring. Very wrong. Steve Schear: thanks for your interesting post! Some people need to learn more of that. I also noticed on the news that CIA was conducting the questioning of Saddam. (Did anyone expect anything else?!) I guess this also means that U.S. now will join all dicatators and awful beasts in performing various forms of abuse and torture on him. Iraq formally removed the death penalty just a few weeks ago. Regardless of what you feel about that in general, I think it's embarrasing once again to see U.S. almost "lobbying" against the Iraqis to have them not honouring their own laws to satisfy Bush on this specific issue! Remember there's only one reason for Bush wanting to see Saddam dead and that he does. And that is the fact that "Saddam tried to kill my papa" as Bush put it, I've seen it in interviews myself. Jim Dixon, going through your post again I see yet another half trough, you write > The people on this list are less.. public humiliation and hanging of Americans.. And you seem to forget that U.S. was in bed with Saddam during the Iran-Iraq war era and that there was a friendly tone then. U.S. officials met with Iraqi, I think that Tareq Azis met with Reagan even? Your whole post is based on the feeling that we're gonna do what they did to us. In doing so you have manifested what has been written here about "gasing into the abyss" and so on. You have become what you hunt. Be ware. It is my opinion that we shall distinguish ourselves from these bastards by not committing their deeds ourselves. You seem not to agree on that. And that is a major mistake.

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Re: Don't worry...it's just one of Saddam's doubles
by Tyler Durden 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

"If I don't remember incorrectly, they said something about identifying him by DNA testing." Well, of course "Saddam" is going to test positive...he's apparently an actual CLONE. Actually, from what I understand this is the 'original' Saddam (note how much older he seems than the Saddams we've been seeing in the press over the last few years), but he hasn't actually controlled things for a couple of decades. The Saddam we're really looking for is approximately Saddam #3, and he's still at large, and directing the insurgency. -TD >From: Thomas Shaddack <shaddack(a)ns.arachne.cz> >To: Tyler Durden <camera_lumina(a)hotmail.com> >CC: cypherpunks(a)minder.net >Subject: Re: Don't worry...it's just one of Saddam's doubles >Date: Mon, 15 Dec 2003 03:33:53 +0100 (CET) > > >On Sun, 14 Dec 2003, Tyler Durden wrote: > > > Spread the word. The adminstration got desparate. In a few weeks they'll > > announce this isn't the real Saddam, but that rounding up all of the >clones > > is necessary progress in the fight to get the real Saddam. > >If I don't remember incorrectly, they said something about identifying him >by DNA testing. But it wasn't widely quoted in the mainstream news. So >even if it really is him - they may still claim he isn't the real McCoy if >the insurgency won't stop. > >The timing is definitely weird. Too soon before the Elections. > >But there is still the backup, the Lost TV Star, also known as Ossama; >whether They intend to announce capturing him, or whether he will be >claimed responsible for Something Scary in a psyops attempt to make the >voters more susceptible to the beat of the Homeland Security drums. _________________________________________________________________ Wonder if the latest virus has gotten to your computer? Find out. Run the FREE McAfee online computer scan! http://clinic.mcafee.com/clinic/ibuy/campaign.asp?cid=3963

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Re: U.S. in violation of Geneva convention?
by Tyler Durden 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

"I'd be real happy about millions of bleeding hearts all over the world jerking their knees in unison, ready to cry a fucking ocean over this unbelievably cruel haircut and medical check-up I'm being given. Fucking tools." A thread that started out quasi-interesting has descended into non-Cypherpunk levels of triviality. The original point stands, and is valid. The Islamic world and, in particular, the Arabic part of the Islamic world, are probably going to forget their dislike of Saddam when they see those newreels of the great Dictator being rubbergloved and de-loused. For them it's almost certainly going to resound as a symbol of how we've systematically manipulated and fucked them over all these years. They're not going to respect our "Power", they're not going to care much that WE supported Saddam in the first place. They're just going to get angrier. Look for bin Laden to grow in status until he's just a notch or two below Mohammed. Look then for more bombings and 9/11s here in the US. That Saddam was a cruel, butchering dictator will soon be nearly irrelevant. -Tyler Durden >From: Anatoly Vorobey <mellon(a)pobox.com> >To: cypherpunks(a)lne.com >Subject: Re: U.S. in violation of Geneva convention? >Date: Wed, 17 Dec 2003 22:54:57 +0200 > >You wrote on Wed, Dec 17, 2003 at 03:19:43PM -0500: > > Jim Dixon wrote: > > > > > > > >I have gazed into the abyss and seen a man having his teeth checked and > > >getting a haircut. :-| > > > > > > > > > > And how would you have felt to be the one who got your teeth checked and > > get a haircut with the whole world watching? > >If I had record like Saddam's on me? > >Gee, I'd be real happy I wasn't shot on the spot, or maybe cruelly >tortured and then shot, the way I'd behaved to people I'd captured. >Or maybe torn into pieces by a shrieking mob. > >Instead of doing any of that, they check my teeth and give me a haircut >in front of the cameras? Boo fucking hoo. I'd be real happy about >millions of bleeding hearts all over the world jerking their knees in >unison, ready to cry a fucking ocean over this unbelievably cruel >haircut and medical check-up I'm being given. Fucking tools. > >-- >avva _________________________________________________________________ Working moms: Find helpful tips here on managing kids, home, work and yourself. http://special.msn.com/msnbc/workingmom.armx

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Re: U.S. in violation of Geneva convention?
by Tyler Durden 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

"Later today, a source close to the interrogation said that Saddam would be subjected to stress and sleep deprivation. Basically, teams of interrogators will ask questions over and over again, and no one will get any rest until answers are provided." At least here in NYC local news, it's common to hear newsmaggots issuing leadins such as, "Will the CIA be able to make Saddam talk?" and so on. I think this implies the "obvious", but it's an obvious that should be stated: The US public basically now generally knows that some forms of extreme measures are being applied to prisoners and detainees, and we're willing to look the other way. After all, 9/11 proves "they" (picture a cluster of darkish-skinned turbanned men wearing fatigues and huddling in caves) are out to take away our freedoms. so why shouldn't we do the same thing to them? >From: Eric Cordian <emc(a)artifact.psychedelic.net> >To: cypherpunks(a)minder.net >Subject: Re: U.S. in violation of Geneva convention? >Date: Tue, 16 Dec 2003 19:04:43 -0800 (PST) > >Natt writes: > > > You're one-hundred percent correct. I saw that sack of shit Rumsfeld on > > a press conference this afternoon where he answered the specific > > question of does parading Saddam around violate the Geneva convention.? > >Rumsfeld also revealed that the CIA has taken over the Saddam >interrogation, and pundits are speculating that they will use the same >torture techniques that are being used on the "detainees." > >Later today, a source close to the interrogation said that Saddam would be >subjected to stress and sleep deprivation. Basically, teams of >interrogators will ask questions over and over again, and no one will get >any rest until answers are provided. > >Bill Bennett said just a few minutes ago, that Saddam's capture made >America safer, because the world has learned that "If you mess with >America, you wind up in a hole." > >A friend of mine, when asked what he wanted from Santa for Christmas, >replied, "A crater the size of DC." > >Clearly, the world's leaders are looking closely at Saddam's treatment, >and realizing how easily pissing off the Bush family could result in them >being shown on International TV unbathed, unshaven, checked for fleas, and >bent over for a rectal probe. > >Of course, all of this is provoking a new arms race of astronomical >proportions, as the other nations of the world realize international law >means nothing, and that the US and Israel think they can judge everyone >else on the planet, no one can judge them, and they can act with impunity. > >This will, in a few years, result in the usual "force meets force plus >brains" low level format of the arrogant, and after a few hangings, and a >big round of applause, life on the planet will move on. > >-- >Eric Michael Cordian 0+ >O:.T:.O:. Mathematical Munitions Division >"Do What Thou Wilt Shall Be The Whole Of The Law" _________________________________________________________________ Have fun customizing MSN Messenger learn how here! http://www.msnmessenger-download.com/tracking/reach_customize

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Re: U.S. in violation of Geneva convention?
by Freematt357＠aol.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

In a message dated 12/17/2003 1:00:16 PM Eastern Standard Time, jamesd(a)echeque.com writes: > Firstly, the US army has not violated the Geneva convention: How so? > we will > cheerfully wade knee deep through blood and the body parts of > innocents to destroy those that threaten us, as the crusaders > waded to the holy sepulchre. > I obtained the below quote from your website located at: http://www.jim.com/liberquo.htm "America does not go abroad in search of monsters to destroy. She is the well-wisher to freedom and independence of all. She is the champion and vindicator only of her own." John Quincy Adams Regards, Matt-

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TSA/FBI No-Fly Nexus
by J.A. Terranson 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Terrorism: The New Aviation Threat http://www.c-spanstore.com/172153.html Since I started loading this video stream I am now watching several hours ago, I no longer remember where I saw the link I clicked on that has allowed me to watch this without buying it :-( But the regular purchase link is above. This presentation by an FBI Counterintel agent (Art Cummings) is mostly a standard promo for the bureau, a bunch of rah-rah, we're great, terrorists suck, etc., but he opens with a firm statement that the TSA no-fly list is a direct product of the FBI itself ("we feed the information to TSA"). Someone correct me if I'm wrong, but hasn't the FBI stated several times (and in several places) that TSA's list is their own, and that FBI has nothing to do with it? Does this data provide anything for John's suit? -- Yours, J.A. Terranson sysadmin(a)mfn.org "Unbridled nationalism, as distinguished from a sane and legitimate patriotism, must give way to a wider loyalty, to the love of humanity as a whole. Bah'u'llh's statement is: "The earth is but one country, and mankind its citizens." The Promise of World Peace http://www.us.bahai.org/interactive/pdaFiles/pwp.htm

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Re: U.S. in violation of Geneva convention?
by Freematt357＠aol.com 16 Dec '03

16 Dec '03

In a message dated 12/15/2003 9:44:03 PM Eastern Standard Time, timcmay(a)got.net writes: > There are specific clauses which refer to not publically humiliating a > prisoner. I'm surprised the Agitprop Division didn't show video of > Saddam taking his first dump while in custody. > > Saddam is not a good guy. But this went beyond the pale. You're one-hundred percent correct. I saw that sack of shit Rumsfeld on a press conference this afternoon where he answered the specific question of does parading Saddam around violate the Geneva convention. His answer was that some things are more important, that it was necessary to show to the world that Saddam was in custody and he wasn't going to be back in power, etc. He added that Saddam is being treated humanly, and he takes offense to anyone who suggests otherwise. Regards, Matt-

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Saddam drugged says daughter.
by Harmon Seaver 16 Dec '03

16 Dec '03

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/3324021.stm And probably they're using drugs to "interview" Saddam, which explains the quick following busts. -- Harmon Seaver CyberShamanix http://www.cybershamanix.com

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[fc-announce] FC'04: Call for Participation
by R. A. Hettinga 16 Dec '03

16 Dec '03

--- begin forwarded text

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CarBomb Rips Berkeley, CA
by wguerin＠tulane.edu 16 Dec '03

16 Dec '03

CarBomb Rips Berkeley California A large though prude carbomb rips through the student community of Berkeley, CA at exactly 4:20 am pacific time on friday Dec. 12th. Friday December 12th, 4:20am Pacific, Berkeley California: The device, a 10 element remotely detonated carbomb rips through the dense student populated section of Berkeley, CA less than 4 blocks from the southwest corner of the UCB campus. An audio recording by a student preparing her oral component of a final documents the sequential detonation of a 3-element primary fired by a tap off the vehicles car horn security system, followed by between 5 and 8 secondary charges detonated presumably by burnout. Students in the area have exactly 2 comments on the event: Most living in the adjacent appartments say in a monotonic way: "I'm sorry, I do NOT know what you are talking about." and a limited few others, also from the same areas, say "I am not at liberty to discuss these issues." Students from the surrounding appartment complexes are concerned about the excessive secrecy regarding this explosion that woke over half the people within a quarter mile radius, early friday morning. The explosive elements, after audio analysis, appear to be roughly equivalent to 10 cases of TNT. At least one Berkeley Police Department officer has said that they had a "NO RESPONSE VECTOR" during and prior the time of the explosion. This author has not yet determined the meaning of this phrase. Numerous appartment complexes in the surrounding area have had multiple unexplained fire alarms and other strange activities in the last few days. No mass media coverage or documentation has been available to this author, and most parties researching this event are hesitant to discuss for obvious reasons. -------- (forwarded - WLG)

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cpunk-like meeting report
by Major Variola (ret.) 16 Dec '03

16 Dec '03

I went to a meeting of the Irvine Underground (irvineunderground.org) which reminded me of late-90s SF CP meatings. Although the overall tech level was probably lower and social implications weren't a big topic. Also, at this meeting, there were far more cameras or videocams than were present (at least overtly :-) at the few CP meats I attended. However, nyms were used more than they were (overtly :-) at CP meatings; this may have been due to a "introduce yourself" poll. The IU group seems to be a bit more social, going to movies for instance, than the topic-only CPs were. The meeting was held in a room at an IHOP (pancake restaurant for furriners) The exploit mentioned in http://www.usatoday.com/tech/news/2003-12-11-microsoft2_x.htm was demonstrated, we were debriefed on the recent LA 802.11b War Flying mission (and the EMI resistance of 1960's era single-engine airplane instruments :-). Toorcon organizers were present. About 30+ people were there, with what appeared to me to be a bimodal distribution of skills, some advanced, some admitted unix newbies, etc. There was even recreational lock picking. A WiFi LAN, net connectivity through someone's cell phone eventually. A video projector. I didn't notice persons with exceptional Euler numbers, though black was definately the color of choice for garments. Ages appeared well distributed from undergrad to hoary. One gent noticed a certain TLA on my cypherpunks T-shirt and admitted that he had once worked in Ft Meade, though he wouldn't say on what :-)

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Remailers and TLAs
by Nomen Nescio 16 Dec '03

16 Dec '03

Even though I agree this issue is important I wouldn't be surprised if NONE were run by TLAs today and NONE has ever been run by TLAs. We will never get any such answer and therefore these speculations will continue. Personally I think it sounds really stupid when I read comments like "you can only trust remailers from pre 9/11" (these kinds of silly/stupid/dumb-paranoid comments are often seen on A.P.A-S). The reason being really that I think they are too stupid and perhaps doesn't really understand what good it would do them to actually operate a few. I may be wrong I guess. When thinking of these things I also remeber having read several comments by remops that actually have been visited by police. Both in U.S. and abroad. The feeling I got from reading their comments is that the police (in case of U.S. I think it was FBI who was inviolved) actually didn't even know what a remailer was. If (and this is a bif "if") that is true in general amongst FBI agents I don't think th ere's a major risk of beeing flooded by TLA operated remailers any time soon. But who knows.

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Re:Textual analysis
by Major Variola (ret) 16 Dec '03

16 Dec '03

At 10:36 AM 12/14/03 -0500, John Kelsey wrote: >It's not obvious to me how you'd change your writing style to defeat these >textual analysis schemes--would it really be as simple as changing the >average length of sentences and getting rid of the big words, or would >there still be ways to determine your identity from that text? Its like steganalysis. Its an arms race between measuring your own signatures vs. what the Adversary can measure. If sentence length is a metric known to you, you can write filters that warn you. Similarly for the Adversary. You end up in an arms race over metrics ---who has the more sensitive ones that the other does not control for?

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Re: Zombie Patriots and other musings
by Anonymous 15 Dec '03

15 Dec '03

Nomen pondered: > Why robbing banks? Aside from allowing the > government to regulate them, what have they > done to deserve being robbed Why not? Revolutionaries need money, and the financial sector has always been asshole buddies with the police, politicians, and other pigs.

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U.S. in violation of Geneva convention?
by Anonymous 15 Dec '03

15 Dec '03

The U.S. official's way of behaving like Texas rednecks are embarrassing. Not only are they cheering "we got him" like a child who can not withhold his enthusiasm. Displaying Saddam the way they did are also possibly a clear violation of the Geneva convention as far as I can tell. What was that quote by Nietsche again? One person who actually did behave in a respectable manner was the President. No lame "we got him" or cowboy hats there. At least not this time.

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Re: U.S. in violation of Geneva convention?
by privacy.at Anonymous Remailer 15 Dec '03

15 Dec '03

>The U.S. official's way of behaving like Texas rednecks are embarrassing. Not Crosspost from nettime: Subject: <nettime> wrong signals If symbols really do matter we might conclude that American administration's PR machine has got it badly wrong. In the carefully orchestrated news management of Saddam's capture, once again, the public opinion which *really* matters in the middle east: Arab public opinion, has been conclusively misread The image of an Arab leader (however terrible) being objectivised by a white gloved American medic like a bug on a lab bench, will not be read in the Arab world as a moment of liberation. It will be seen as a special kind of humiliation, the kind which typifies the depth of ignorance which has inspired this campaign from its outset. Once again the images (chosen with great care one imagines, given the time lapse between Saddam's capture and the John Wayne style triumphalism of the announcement) treats Arab opinion to a further demonstration of the power of the west to objectivize the world under a coolly scientific gaze. In this context no mediaeval torturer could have conceived of a greater humiliation than the medical torch's pencil thin beam illuminating the inside of the tyrant's mouth. A stupidity of almost incomprehensible proportions seems bent on prosecuting a war against terror in which the twenty-four hour news machine is mobilized to disseminate images that do little more than fan the flames of hate.

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Re: Zombie Patriots and other musings
by Anonymous 15 Dec '03

15 Dec '03

A question for the moment might well be how many if any of the remailers are operated by TLAs?

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Re: Idea: Simplified TEMPEST-shielded unit (speculative proposal)
by Anonymous Sender 15 Dec '03

15 Dec '03

While I agree with much of what you say I don't think it's likely that any kind of advanced SIGINT operation was what brought him down. The most important thing to have is intelligence from humans. From insiders. This is partly the problem with the intelligence agencies today. They think too much of the technology and it's possible uses. Good old fashion "spies" will always be the most powerfull way to get information if you can get someone to cooperate. This is also why it is a bit harder in countries with a lot of people willing to kill or be killed for the sake of ideas. Even so it seems that someone sold him for the money in this case. It was bound to happen sooner or later since it's not possible to be on the run without trusting at least one or a few individuals from time to time.

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Hack the Vote: cause a blackout
by Major Variola (ret) 15 Dec '03

15 Dec '03

(This inspired by comments in Scheier's cryptogram) Do all the newly electronic voting places have UPS? I doubt it. Think of the fun you could cause if you downed a few substations or poles. >> And because elections happen all at once, there would be no means of recovery. Imagine if, in the next presidential election, someone hacked the vote in New York. Would we let New York vote again in a week? Would we redo the entire national election? Would we tell New York that their votes didn't count? >>What we need are simple voting systems--paper ballots that can be counted even in a blackout.

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Using PCR to find Hussein via the sewers? [GATTACA]
by Major Variola (ret) 15 Dec '03

15 Dec '03

At 04:50 AM 12/15/03 -0800, John Young wrote: >There's a good possibility that Saddam was traced by Tempest >sensing, airborne or mundane. I wonder if you can trace DNA in sewers back to the source, esp. in an inbred locale? (Peter? PCR with Saddam specific primers?) Or did he just dig a cat-hole instead of using the infrastructure? You can trace industrial contamination up sewer lines back to the source. How about the cells we shed? Just theoretically. Papers fnord says someone used to the good life narced, couldn't handle a jail cell.

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