December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: Need Mail-to-News gates
by User A. 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

You sez: : On Fri, 27 Oct 1995 bluebird(a)alpha.c2.org wrote: : > Could someone PLEASE netmail me some _known reliable_ gates that use the : > straight netmail address format (alt.whatnot(a)bosco.kollege.edu)? : If someone will direct me to sources, I'll try and setup a gate. (We use : INN). 'ftp.hacktic.nl/pub/replay/remailer/mail2news.shar -AJ-

1 0

SSL Remailer interface w/premail
by sameer 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

https://www.c2.org/remail/by-www.html Note that this uses SSL and that messages are encrypted using premail -- the entire remailing chain is not in the clear anymore. This is still a single point of failure system, but secure against attacks which do not involve the compromise of c2.org. (Unlike the non-encrypting one on http://www.c2.org/remail/by-www.html) -- sameer Voice: 510-601-9777 Community ConneXion FAX: 510-601-9734 The Internet Privacy Provider Dialin: 510-658-6376 http://www.c2.org (or login as "guest") sameer(a)c2.org

1 0

S. 1284 To Amend (C) Act
by Tom Bell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

The 9/28/95 Congression Report states that Senators Hatch and Leahy have introduced a bill to amend the Copyright Act in accord with the suggestions of the recent White Paper on the National Information Infrastructure. In relevant part, S. 1284: 1) makes transmission of copies a type of publication (and thus potentially a means of infringing a copyright); and 2) prohibits the importation, manufacture, or distribution of any device the primary purpose of which is to deactivate any technological protections that prevent or inhibit the violation of copyrights. Though I can imagine cypherpunks objecting to the first of these two provisions, I'm especially interested in how you regard the second. Imagine that Microsoft devised a program to prevent unauthorized copying of its software, and that you (perhaps in response to another of Sameer's contests!) wrote a program to counteract it. It looks as the proposed law would forbid your counter-programming. Bob would thus find it easier to sell defective copyright protection devices. I'm thinking of writing an article about the White Paper and S. 1284, arguing that cypherpunks render a valuable public service in finding gaps in copyright protection, and that they therefore ought not be forbidden from pursuing their research. I invite you to email me privately if you have a strong opinion about the proposed changes to the Copyright Act. I've attached a copy of the proposed s1201 below. In a related vein, Senators Leahy and Feingold have introduced S. 1122, which criminalizes willful infringements that do not have the purpose of commercial gain. This aims to close a percieved loophole under the current law, by which LaMacchia was able to distribute copyrighted works. S. 1284, s1201: "No person shall import, manufacture or distribute any device, product, or component incorporated into a device or product, or offer or perform any service, the primary purpose or effect of which is to avoid, bypass, remove, deactivate, or otherwise circumvent, without the authority of the copyright owner or the law, any process, treatement, mechanism or system which prevents or inhibits the violation of any of the exclusive rights of the copyright owner under section 106." Tom W. Bell Assistant Professor Law and Technology Program UD Law School bell(a)odo.law.udayton.edu PGP fingerprint: 78 06 76 AC 32 38 A6 4C B3 81 F4 1E 2E 27 AC 71

2 1

Returned mail: warning: cannot send message for 4 hours (fwd)
by Moroni 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

---------- Forwarded message ---------- Date: Fri, 27 Oct 1995 19:45:02 -0400 From: Mail Delivery Subsystem <MAILER-DAEMON(a)prufrocks.scranton.com> To: moroni(a)prufrocks.scranton.com Subject: Returned mail: warning: cannot send message for 4 hours ********************************************** ** THIS IS A WARNING MESSAGE ONLY ** ** YOU DO NOT NEED TO RESEND YOUR MESSAGE ** ********************************************** The original message was received at Fri, 27 Oct 1995 15:38:29 -0400 from moroni@localhost ----- The following addresses had delivery problems ----- majordormo(a)toad.com.uc.edu (transient failure) ----- Transcript of session follows ----- Warning: message still undelivered after 4 hours Will keep trying until message is 5 days old ----- Original message follows ----- To: majordormo(a)toad.com.uc.edu From: Moroni <moroni(a)prufrocks.scranton.com> Date: Fri, 27 Oct 1995 15:38:27 -0400 (EDT) subscribe Cypherpunks Deirdre A. Greene

1 0

Re: Linux security issues
by frantz＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>>Actually keeping the pass phrase out of swap space is fairly easy (although >>I havn't looked at the PGP code to see if it actually does this). >>... >>However, the pass phrase is not the only dangerous information. >>... >>N.B. This problem affects all virtual memory operation systems. > >Not all of them. In at least one (VMS) you can pin pages in physical >memory, Good point. Too bad the invocations of pinning aren't portable. Maybe in the next POSIX. >Actually, any OS that does I/O directly to user pages has that capability in >the kernel... All the OSs I am familar with pin the pages only for the duration of the I/O operation. After the I/O has completed, the page can be swapped out. What you really need is to pin the page in memory (with an implicit contract with your OS that it won't be written to swap space while it is pinned), put the sensitive information in the page, use the information, wipe the information, and un-pin the page. I wonder if NSA has built a virus to collect PGP keys? Bill

1 0

Re: digital cash and identity disclosure
by Bill Stewart 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 08:53 AM 10/20/95 -0700, tomw(a)cthulhu.engr.sgi.com wrote: >> I don't understand how this could happen? The two coins are identical >> (as I understood it from the tech backgound of ecash). what has a double- >> spended coin what a copied single-spended coin not has? >The process of spending a coin is not simply that of transfering data. >There is a complicated protocol in which Alice decrypts some of the >identity information in the coin. There are several approaches - in the immediate-clearing model, you can tell if someone's spent coin 111111111111 because the bank keeps a record of which coins have been spent and refuses to pay anybody who tries to spend the same coin later; this almost forces you to use on-line clearing solutions. Chaum's blinding protocols make it possible for the bank to sign a coin without being able to trace it to the person withdrawing the coin, so she can spend it anonymously. Another model uses the protocols Tom described which place a random chunk of the spender's identity into the coin - one chunk gives away no information, but two chunks have an extremely high probability of doing so - so you can go prosecute the guilty double-spender later (or just debit her account twice...) Then there are the non-anonymous models. #--- # Thanks; Bill # Bill Stewart, Freelance Information Architect, stewarts(a)ix.netcom.com # Phone +1-510-247-0664 Pager/Voicemail 1-408-787-1281 #---

1 0

Re: 50 attacks... [NOISE]
by Bill Stewart 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 05:31 AM 10/20/95 -0700, tomw(a)engr.sgi.com wrote: >To date, MD5 appears to be a secure hash. If you manage to find a way >to reverse it, please let us all know. There are a couple of analytically known collisions, and a birthday attack can generate more after a mere 2**64 tries or so; for some applications, this can be a problem (e.g. a if a collision between real input and random-trash input can let you get the system to do something unexpected by handing it the random-trash input.) Also, you can easily MD5-hash a dictionary of a billion wimpy passphrases to let you catch people who use wimpy passphrases, and similarly hash a dictionary of a billion reasonably-probable plaintexts for applications that have reasonably-probable plaintexts that leave the hashes in plain view (e.g. checksums for messages like "send $X to account Y"); this kind of attack works for any hash, including cryptographically strong hashes, as long as the system being attacked lets you crack it by reversing a hash and doesn't use salt in its hashes. >Sure we spend a lot of money, but that doesn't mean | Tom Weinstein >we *do* anything. -- Washington DC motto | tomw(a)engr.sgi.com But Washington not doing anything is *good* :-) #--- # Thanks; Bill # Bill Stewart, Freelance Information Architect, stewarts(a)ix.netcom.com # Phone +1-510-247-0664 Pager/Voicemail 1-408-787-1281 #---

1 0

Technology: The Great Deregulator
by rah＠shipwright.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

St. Pete (Peter Huber, that is) Speaks! Cheers, Bob Hettinga --- begin forwarded text Date: 27 Oct 1995 14:23:50 GMT From: khh(a)access4.digex.net () (by way of rah(a)shipwright.com (Robert A. Hettinga)) To: rah(a)shipwright.com Subject: Technology: The Great Deregulator Organization: Express Access Online Communications, Greenbelt, MD USA Path: sundog.tiac.net!daily-planet.execpc.com!news.moneng.mei.com!uwm.edu!chi-news .cic.net!newsfeed.internetmci.com!in2.uu.net!news3.digex.net!access4.digex.n et!not-for-mail Newsgroups: alt.politics.economics Lines: 91 NNTP-Posting-Host: access4-2.digex.net X-Newsreader: TIN [UNIX 1.3 950824BETA PL0] X-Newsreader: Value-Added NewsWatcher 2.0b27.1+ Following is an article by Peter Huber. More articles by Mr. Huber can be seen at http://khht.com/huber/home.html. ----------- The sun is finally setting on a dismal century of economic commissars. Not Russia's, ours. I mean the people who, for most of this century, controlled price and output in markets for trucking, air travel, railroads, telephone service, cable TV, natural gas and electricity. Until recently, these mammoth industries, representing a sizable fraction of the U.S. economy, had about as much to do with free-market competition as the steel industry in Stalingrad. It started with the Interstate Commerce Commission. Established in 1887, the ICC was to be the federal antidote to rapacious railroad monopolies. Perhaps it was, for a while, but in the end it drove them into bankruptcy. Meanwhile, local, state and federal legislators set up baby ICCs left and right on the assumption that highways, pipelines, phone wires and power grids all required much the same handling as railway track. In track-like industries, monopolies were natural. Competition was wasteful. Commissions were smart enough to run things better. Most of the people who believed such things died years ago, but the government pyramids they built have endured. A great decommissioning of economic life in America is now under way. The job is almost finished for airlines and trucks. It's inching ahead in the communications arena. Electricity is just getting started. We'll find out in due course whether Newt Gingrich and Bob Dole can deregulate as boldly as Ted Kennedy and Jimmy Carter, who kicked off serious economic deregulation in the 1970s. As the Kennedy/Carter legacy confirms, the impetus for change isn't hatred of government. Nor can the decommissioning of America be blamed on right-wing capitulation to big business. We've just learned the hard lessons of commissariat collectivism, in much the same way as the Hungarians and the Czechs. Consumers end-run the regulators. Fed up with prices that force them to subsidize residential consumers, factories and hospitals cogenerate electricity in their heating plants. They install "private branch" telephone exchanges that displace about one-third of the phone service they'd otherwise buy from the local phone company. Landlords set up rooftop satellite dishes on apartment buildings and sell "private cable" service to tenants. When you mow your own lawn, regulators get trimmed too: There's no income tax for them to collect, no maternity leave to grant, no minimum wage to enforce. Technology outwits the regulators. Hub-and-spoke routing and yield-maximizing pricing schemes concocted on supercomputers that shattered the old Civil Aeronautics Board's point-to-point vision of how air travel should operate, and at what price. The FCC's vision of "local" broadcasting provided by a few, community-based stations collapsed when Ted Turner began bouncing his UHF station off a satellite and back down to cable systems nationwide. And billions of dollars of commission-prescribed prices will soon have to be rejiggered because smart-aleck programmers have worked out how to transmit two-way voice conversations live over the Internet. The commission's policy is to price voice connections about $ 4 an hour higher than "date," but digital technology obliterates the distinction. Regulators are cannibals. As commissions proliferate, they undercut each other. Long distance phone companies and "access providers" like Teleport expand under lenient federal control -- at the expense of local phone companies kept on a tighter leash by state commissions. Wireless phone service has been almost completely deregulated by its federal regulators, so it grows far faster than service by way of telephone pole, which remains heavily regulated under the price regulation maintained by one bureau of the FCC. Direct broadcast satellite, cable's competitor, is booming under the hands-off watch of another bureau of the same federal commission. Regulators invest badly. They direct utilities to put billions in overpriced power plants, inefficient wires and extravagant service out to the very last ranch at the end of nowhere. Cost is no object; it just gets dumped in the "rate base." Competition, when it arrives, is devastating, just as the fall of the Berlin wall was devastating to the factories that built Trabants. In these times of radical technological change, utility monopolies are as unstable as politburos. Many of the old-guard enterprises may still grow and prosper, but only if they learn to sell to a whole new class of buyers. Consumers, not commissars. -- Copyright 1995 by Peter Huber. Electronic copies of this document may be distributed freely, provided that this notice accompanies all copies. --- end forwarded text ----------------- Robert Hettinga (rah(a)shipwright.com) Shipwright Development Corporation, 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA (617) 323-7923 "Reality is not optional." --Thomas Sowell >>>>Phree Phil: Email: zldf(a)clark.net http://www.netresponse.com/zldf <<<<<

1 0

Re: Anonymity: A Modest Proposal
by Pierre Uszynski 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

kelso (kelso(a)netcom.com) suggested: [Let's split the message, get both parts independently to the end-recipient and let him sort it out] Thomas Grant Edwards (tedwards(a)Glue.umd.edu) continued: [Well, let's just get it there still encrypted] I'll continue in this direction: My understanding is that it is a Good Thing for the last stage remailer to be able to claim: "I received high entropy stuff. There is no way I could tell what it was. I just forwarded it. I just make sure I do not forward low entropy stuff." Furthermore, it would help everybody if end-recipients were somehow able to signal whether they are or are not willing to read clearly anonymous material (and are suckers for pseudonyms :-) The problem is that it is currently the last stage's responsibility to decipher most messages, and it is very difficult (at best) to go back and modify all mail and news readers so their user can shield himself from anonymous stuff. We could however provide servers that make it "Very Easy" or at least easier for the end-recipient to make sense of split or still encrypted email messages: (In broad lines, depending on the remailer type.) The end-recipient may receive one encrypted message, or k split parts of a message that say, prominently at the top (ni the message body so that braindead mail readers show it to their users): "If you are the end-recipient for this email message, you can get it decrypted by forwarding it as is to a Handyserver such as handyserver(a)well.known.site. Don't worry about formats, the server knows what to do. If you received several such messages, forward all of them one by one or together. They may all be parts of one message. The server remembers parts for a week, while waiting for more parts, and will respond when done." Now, we need a way for this to work for the end-recipient but not for the last stage remailer. How about the message sender sending, through the remailer network, to the Handyserver (How about Johnnyserv as an other possible name :-), the decryption key, the end-recipient email address and name, and the first few bytes of the encrypted messages. The Handyserver authenticates service requests with some heuristic based on name and email, and knows which key to apply based on the message's first few bytes. That's extremely weak authentication but it usually takes no effort by the end-recipient and the last stage remailer can now say "I cannot attempt to get all my traffic through Handyservers. Not only it would be very time consuming, but I would have to illegally forge the recipient's address and the Handyserver would forward the decrypted version directly to the end-recipient anyway." The Handyserv can also keep a list of tokens publically posted for the sender to be able to confirm whether his message was or was not decrypted (that's an acknowledgement for a successful transmission through the remailer system, too.) In summary, the Handyserver provides a "mild" function: Its logs could permit the identification of the last stage remailer, but so what, the end-recipient had this info already. The last stage remailer now is safer. And the end-recipient has to choose and voluntarily get the message decrypted. That could take care of email. Maybe something similar is possible for news (more or less the way rot13 worked, way back then, in the good old times when it was deemed sufficient to protect sensitivities.) Pierre. pierre(a)shell.portal.com

1 0

Re: Electric Communities (was: COS_sec)
by Anonymous User 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

In article <v02120d04acb6f56280f0(a)[199.2.22.120]> cman(a)communities.com (Douglas Barnes) wrote: > >FWIW, this is the company I work for. Not a bad article; more >info is available at: http://www.communities.com/. Three of >the nine people who work here are long-time subscribers to this >list... I was recruited at a c'punks Bay Area meeting. > >--doug "member of the cryptographic staff" barnes > >> Electric Communities began work began in 1993 on the >> Cyberspace Operating System, or COS, designed to manage >> the resources of shared computing -- like security and >> bandwidth -- just as operating systems like the >> Macintosh OS or Windows 95 manage resources inside a >> desktop PC. The team is inventing some technology, >> including a programming language (compatible with Sun >> Microsystems' new Java language for Internet >> applications) and a design concept for software building >> blocks which it is in the process of patenting. In >> addition, staff cryptographers are weaving encryption >> throughout the system to make it absolutely secure and >> private. >> >> >> COS_sec (6 kb) > > Great! Just what we need! java wannabees! Ripoffs of secondrate, insecure software by thirdrate people! Hey Dougie, "invented" any viruses lately?

1 0

Re: New release of CFS Unix encrypting file system available
by Anonymous User 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

In article <199510271954.PAA20647(a)universe.digex.net> Scott Brickner <sjb(a)universe.digex.net> wrote: >Matt Blaze writes: >>CFS pushes encryption services into the Unix(tm) file system. It >>supports secure storage at the system level through a standard Unix >>file system interface to encrypted files. Users associate a >>cryptographic key with the directories they wish to protect. Files in >>these directories (as well as their pathname components) are >>transparently encrypted and decrypted with the specified key without >>further user intervention; cleartext is never stored on a disk or sent >>to a remote file server. CFS employs a novel combination of DES >>stream and codebook cipher modes to provide high security with good >>performance on a modern workstation. CFS can use any available file >>system for its underlying storage without modification, including >>remote file servers such as NFS. System management functions, such as >>file backup, work in a normal manner and without knowledge of the key. > >What happens to hard links? > >mkdir foo bar >CFS_set_directory_key -directory ./foo -key foo-key >CFS_set_directory_key -directory ./bar -key bar-key >cp /etc/passwd ./foo/test1 >ln ./foo/footest ./bar/bartest >cmp ./foo/footest ./bar/bartest This is a serious flaw. The emperor has no clothes. People should sue at&t for this shit.

4 3

Re: CJR returned to sender
by Anonymous User 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

In article <> bal(a)martigny.ai.mit.edu wrote: > Date: Wed, 25 Oct 1995 09:08:15 -0700 > X-Sender: tcmay(a)mail.got.net > Mime-Version: 1.0 > Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" > From: tcmay(a)got.net (Timothy C. May) > Sender: owner-cypherpunks(a)toad.com > Precedence: bulk > > At 6:35 AM 10/25/95, Timothy C. May wrote: > > > >(* Hal Abelson of MIT says there are possible export problems with the MIT > >Press book on PGP, and MIT dropped plans for a version in a special OCR > >font. So, I agree that _some_ books cross the line and look like pure > >software. However, I continue to maintain that a badly-printed barcode is > >just a joke, nothing more.) > > Brian LaMacchia sent me e-mail saying the MIT book _was_ published with the > OCR font as originally planned. No response to their CJR request, submitted > in Jan or Feb. > >[Blatant plug for MIT Press...] > >For reference, the title of the book is "PGP: Source Code and >Internals", ISBN 0-262-24039-4, hardcover, $60.00. There are links to >the MIT Press pages from my keyserver home page (http://www-swiss.ai.mit.edu/~bal/keyserver.html) or you can go to MIT >Press's site (http://www-mitpress.mit.edu/) and look under >Books/Computer Science. Orders accepted over the net using either HTML >forms (SSL) or e-mail (PGP). > >MIT Press is also selling "MIT PGP" T-Shirts, but I don't have pricing >or size information on them yet. They have the logo from the book cover >on the front & back. Front says "Mind your own business," back has a >copy of MIT Press's PGP public key (in ASCII-armored form). > > --bal Its worth 60 buckx because the book has the old version without the weakness in it. they are probably assuming that people will look at the book instead of the ftp source code and then get lazy and complie the code off the ftp instead of typing or scanning the book.

2 1

Re: MD4-derived hash functions
by daw＠quito.CS.Berkeley.EDU 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- In article <9510261603.AA26221(a)zorch.w3.org>, <hallam(a)w3.org> wrote: > > 3DES with only two independent keys is only slightly more secure than > DES, consider a variant of the meet in the middle attack exploiting > the fact that the constraint network is reductible to two equations > in one unknown. > Huh? Are you sure you're not thinking of 2DES? 2DES is known to be not much more secure than DES: 2DES can be broken with 2^56 operations and 2^56 space. (The space requirements can be eliminated without too much extra cost in time.) Could you post a reference for your claim that 2-key 3DES is insecure? Or post an attack? Or anything? - --- [This message has been signed by an auto-signing service. A valid signature means only that it has been received at the address corresponding to the signature and forwarded.] -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 Comment: Gratis auto-signing service iQBFAwUBMJLJdSoZzwIn1bdtAQFFRQGAgPceMs6vYCq4nGQQ5QT9tOLIgiGAoY8M B71KIQDP75TMiF1rgvorSWQsNZjzjhbm =3bH5 -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

1 0

Digicash will not fly
by James A. Donald 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

While Chaum is a brilliant cryptographer, he is an incompetent businessman He has demonstrated this in numerous ways. The latest being "Cash" where the bank skims off 4% to 10% every time. No one is going to use digicash under these kinds of terms and conditions. --------------------------------------------------------------------- | We have the right to defend ourselves | http://www.jim.com/jamesd/ and our property, because of the kind | of animals that we are. True law | James A. Donald derives from this right, not from the | arbitrary power of the state. | jamesd(a)echeque.com

1 0

1995-10-27 Members Named to Nat Security Telecom Committee (fwd)
by Ed Carp [khijol SysAdmin] 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

---------- Forwarded message ---------- Date: Fri, 27 Oct 1995 20:11-0400 From: The White House <Publications-Admin(a)WhiteHouse.Gov> To: Public-Distribution(a)clinton.ai.mit.edu Subject: 1995-10-27 Members Named to Nat Security Telecom Committee THE WHITE HOUSE Office of the Press Secretary ________________________________________________________________________ For Immediate Release October 27, 1995 PRESIDENT NAMES MEMBERS TO THE NATIONAL SECURITY TELECOMMUNICATIONS ADVISORY COMMITTEE (NSTAC) President Clinton today announced his intent to appoint the following individuals to the National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee (NSTAC): Dr. Vance D. Coffman is the president of Lockheed Martin Corporation. Previously, he was president of the Space Systems Division of Lockheed Missiles and Space Co. and vice president of the corporation. Dr. Coffman was responsible for the Hubble Space Telescope, MILSTAR, Follow-on Early Warning, and the worldwide mobile commercial cellular phone system, Iridium. He holds a B.S. degree in aerospace engineering from Iowa State University, and masters and doctoral degrees in aeronautics and astronautics from Stanford University. Mr. Paul E. Wright is chairman of Chrysler Technologies Corporation (CTC), the aerospace and defense electronics arm of the Chrysler Corporation. He was president and chief operating officer of Fairchild Industries prior to joining CTC. Mr. Wright guided the company's focus toward spacecraft, defense electronics, and selected industrial products. Mr. Wright spent 28 years with RCA Corporation, during which time he rose to senior vice president. He was responsible for developing and administrating the strategic plans for RCA. Van B. Honeycutt is president of Computer Sciences Corporation (CSC), the largest independent provider of information technology consulting, systems integration, and outsourcing to industry and government. He began his career with CSC in 1975, serving as a regional marketing manager for Infonet, the company's timesharing and value-added network, which CSC sold in 1989. In 1983, Mr. Honeycutt became president of CSC Credit Services. He was later promoted to corporate vice president and president of CSC's Industry Services Group in 1987. He led CSC's advance into the growing outsourcing market, negotiating the industry's largest outsourcing pact, a 10 year, $3 billion agreement with General Dynamics Corporation. The President's National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee (NSTAC) provides the President with information and advice from the industry's perspective regarding specific measures to maintain, protect, and enhance the nation's telecommunications resources that support national security and emergency preparedness capabilities. The Committee addresses telecommunications issues throughout the year and periodically reports directly to the President, and also to the Secretary of Defense in his capacity as the Executive Agent for the National Communications System. -30-30-30-

1 0

Conference in Eugene, OR - 11/3 and 11/4
by Greg Broiles 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- One of the professors at the U of Oregon School of Law here in Eugene, Keith Aoki, has put together what looks like a pretty good conference. As far as I can tell, it's going to be something of a sleeper - lots of good speakers, and probably not very many people in the audience who'll be able to appreciate what they're seeing. Folks on the west coast interested in law and technology policy might do well to pop up to Eugene for the weekend. I've got limited floor space for people who need a place to crash and don't want to pony up the $ for a place in Eugene. (I'm in Springfield, the redneck town across I-5 from Eugene - I'm about 15 mins from campus by car, and can give folks a ride over if they're willing to stay for the day.) Motel rooms ought to run between $30 and $80 per night in Eugene, depending on whether or not knife marks on the headboard and the smell of old cigarettes bothers you. :) Eugene is 2 hours (~ 110 miles) south of Portland on I-5 and 8 or 9 hours north of the Bay Area by car, up I-5. There's an airport here, so it's possible to fly in - some rocket scientist planners put the airport way north and west of anything interesting in town, though. The conference is Friday, November 3, and Saturday, November 4. Speakers include (in no special order): John Perry Barlow James Boyle Rosemary Coombe Steven Winter Rudy Rucker Tim Sloan A. Michael Froomkin Marc Rotenberg Lee Tien Cait Clarke Gary Glisson Rex Heinke Eric Hughes Matthew Ghourdjian Benjamin Kaminash Barry Schrader Vibeke Sorenson Dhruv Khann Jerry Kang Peter Jaszi Jessica Litman David Peterson Brian Stine Alfred Yen Richard Stallman James Love Pamela Samuelson Jerry Berman Shari Steele E. Wally Van Valkenburg Margaret Chon Folks who want to stay with me (you should be at least dog-tolerant) or who want help getting picked up at the airport/finding a motel/whatever are welcome to give me a call (503 744 2713) or send E-mail. I think there's some charge to get in (not for law students, so I haven't been especially attentive to it) but Keith said that we can probably waive that if folks are interested and can't pay. If that sounds like a problem, send mail, and I'll see if I can get him to issue some Cypherpunk passes. (The idea is to extract $ from working attorneys without scaring away interested non-attorneys.) It ought to be quite a conference. By all means, if you can make it, come on up (or down). -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBMJMtEH3YhjZY3fMNAQHSBQP/R4OdjIQIYbpcR0sloIBc+ZVeR8hzQ81w c8o2NyKncO0P/Hthxx+peCAUwN2S7RJr8k/jNvY0ah5Qcy4lmPnhn3uBVZFeY9O4 7I+NPimj38xNjvYdnUYrQT1HuEyVknnwi1s/2VsSGCVvbfJkHOWkuc0nR8JCX1cI sc5GsGR2zzk= =W/r5 -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

1 0

Re: Human ID through insecure channel
by Carl Ellison 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>Date: Mon, 16 Oct 1995 13:51:27 -0700 >From: Hal <hfinney(a)shell.portal.com> >Subject: Human ID through insecure channel > >Here is an example of the Matsumoto/Imai scheme for identifying yourself >via a shared secret over an insecure channel, a system which is simple >enough to be done in your head but which can withstand repeated >observations by an adversary without being broken. Hal, has this been written up someplace where I might read their description? From your description of it, I have a way to break it in O(N) samples, where N is the number of characters in the challenge string and the factor of proportionality is strictly a function of how sure you want to be that you have a correct break. - Carl +--------------------------------------------------------------------------+ |Carl M. Ellison cme(a)tis.com http://www.clark.net/pub/cme | |Trusted Information Systems, Inc. http://www.tis.com/ | |3060 Washington Road PGP 2.6.2: 61E2DE7FCB9D7984E9C8048BA63221A2| |Glenwood MD 21738 Tel:(301)854-6889 FAX:(301)854-5363 | +--------------------------------------------------------------------------+

1 0

ques. regd. STT
by Mahesh Prakriya 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Hi. A group of us at the U. of Penn. are doing a presentation on STT. I would like to know if you have any suggestions for us. I've taken a look at the Visa & MS home pages and have a good amount of information on STT. I'm esp. interested in finding out about the potential weaknesses in STT. thanks, Mahesh +-----------------------------------------------------------------------+ Work Home ------- ----- 1717 Arch St., 3E4 1801 JFK Blvd., #512 Phila., PA 19103 Phila., PA 19103 (215)-466-5476 (215)-567-2006 Internet: prakriya(a)gradient.cis.upenn.edu http://www.cis.upenn.edu/~prakriya/home.html PGP fingerprint = 6A EC 5B F3 D4 33 F6 D1 4C DA 99 11 F9 D9 89 A7 +-----------------------------------------------------------------------+

1 0

Austin E-Commerce Conf -- BOF?
by Stephan Somogyi 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

If there are any other cypherpunks-readers attending the e-commerce conference in Austin on Monday and Tuesday, it might be fun to get together for an impromptu BOF either at lunchtime or later in the evening. Email me if there is interest. _______________________________________________________________________ Stephan Somogyi Senior Editor Digital Media

1 0

EE Times on IDEA
by nobody＠REPLAY.COM 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Electronic Engineering Times Oct 23, 1995 p. 66 T.R MADHUSUDAN SASTRY, T. GANESAN, B.MADHUKAR AND N. SRINIVASA MOTOROLA INDIA ELECTRONICS Pvt. Ltd. BANGALORE, INDIA Time is right for a good, secure 'Idea' Computers are the medium in which almost all of today's business deals and international transaction transpire. That calls for the development of secure systems, which protect data from being accessed by unautho-rized users. Digital Encryption Standard (DES) is a cipher system that uses a 64-bit-long secret key. With present comput-er technology, it is not difficult to break DES by trying all possible keys. That made cryptographers look for different encryption algorithms that take a long time for today's computers to break the code. The International Data Encryption Algorithm (Idea) is a private key-block ciphering scheme, which is computationally highly secure since it uses a 128-bit-long secret key. The brute force method of breaking the code, (trying all possible combinations as keys) would require 10^24 years for a chip that can test a billion keys per second. The design philosophy of Idea is to niix the operations from different algebraic groups to add confusion and di! ffusion to the input data. The operations are addition modulo, multiplication modulo, and exclusive OR (XOR). We have implemented Idea in electronic-code-book (ECB) mode on the Motorola DSP 561xx family of processors. In ECB mode, a 64 bit input block is encrypted to generate a 64-bit output block that is transmitted to the receiver through insecure but error free channels. In Idea, all the algebraic operations work with 16-bit blocks of data. That makes the algorithm efficient on a 56 to DSP, which has a very good instructioln set to perform the addi-tion modulo 2^16, multiplication modulo 2^16 + 1 and 16-bit XOR operations. The Idea is a block-cipher scheme in which the incoming data is divided into blocks of 64 bits and fed as input to the encryption algorithm (see figure). The 64 bit data X= (X1 X2 X3 . . . X64) is initially divided into 4 subblocks X1, X2, X3 and X4each of 16 bits. These four sub-blocks become input for the first round of operation. In each round, each subblock is added and multiplied under modulo fields with key subblocks, thus adding more confusion and diision. The sequence of operations for the first round is given below; it's the same for all rounds of operations except for different key subblocks. [1] Multiply X1 and Kl, (first key subblock Zl^l) under modulo 2^16 + 1 [2] Add X2 and K2 (Z2^1) under modulo 2^16 [3] Add X3 and K3 under modulo 2^16 [4] Multiply X4 and K4 under modulo 2^16 + 1 [5] XOR the results of step 1 and step 3 [6] XOR the results of step 2 and step 4 [7] Multiply the results of step 5 and K5 under modulo 2^l6 + 1 [8] Add the results of step 6 and step 7 [9] Multiply the re sults of step 8 and K6 under modulo 2^16 + 1 . [10] Add the results of step 7 and step 9 under modulo 2^16 [11] XOR the results of step 1 and step 9 [12] XOR the results of step 3 and step 9 [13] XOR the results of step 2 and step 10 [14] XOR the results of step 4 and step 10 The results of each round from steps 11, 12, 13, and 14 form the input blocks for the second round of opera- tion after swapping the two inner blocks (see figure). After eight rounds are over, the following transformation has to be done before taking output cipher text. It should be noted that swapping is not done for the last round. [1] Multiply X1 and the 49th key subblock K49 (Z1^9) [2] Add X2 and the 50th key subblock to k50 (Z2^9) [3] Add X3 and the 51st key subblock k51 (Z3^9) [4] Multiply X4 and the 52nd key subblock K51(Z3^9) The decryption algorithm is also exactly the same except for the change in the subblock keys. From each of the key subblocks in the encryption, either additive inverse or multipli cative inverse is used. For example, the subblock key used to multiply this data subblock is re placed with its multiplicative inverse. Also the order in which that multiplicative and additive inverse occurs in the decryption algorithm takes care of the shuffling of the intermediate data subblocks. As stated earlier the encryption key is 128 bits long. The 52 encryption subblock keys are derived from the encryption key, and the corresponding subblock keys are derived from the encryption-key subblocks. The key subblocks for the first round of encryption are derived by dividing the 128-bit-long key into 16-bit blocks. Then, for every next round, the encryption key is circularly shifted by 25 bits and then divided into 16-bit blocks to yield encryption-key subblocks. In the last round, only the first four key subblocks are generated. The Idea can be implemented in all three modes of operation: ECB, output-feedback mode (OFB) and cipher-feedback mode (CFB). In ECB, the input is split into 64-bit blocks, encrypted and transmitted. In CFB, the output cipher text from one block of encryption is used to form part of in input block. And the output of the algorithm is XORed with the input plain text, and transmitted. Similarly, the feedback is taken after the XORing operation. In thepresent implementation, only ECB mode is done, which is the fastest among the three. Since all the operations are on 16-bit blocks, the powerful instruction set of 561xx can beused for efficient implementation. The modulo 2^16 + 1 multiplication operation is used many times, and it is computationally intensive when compared with XOR and modulo 2^16 addition. The fixed-point multiplication construction of 561xx can be utilized to perform 32-bit multiplication. The modulo 2^16 addition operation can be done just by ignoring the carry of 16-bit addition in 561xx. The XOR operation is also supported in one instruction as in any other DSP processor. Hence all three algebraic operations can be implemented efficiently using the instruction set of 561xx Again the decryption algorithm is exactly the same as the encryption algorithm, except, that the decryption-key sub block is used instead of encryption. The whole program can be reused for decryption by changing the input variables and output variables. Circular shift The main computation in encryption-key subblock generation is the circular shift of the l28-bit-long key. The encryption key can be stored as eight words in memory. In the present implementation, instead of shifting the key circularly, the mask patterns are used to pick up suitable key subblocks. That is, the second set of eight key subblocks can be generated by picking up 16 bits from the ninth bit of the second word of the encryption key. Hence, for each round, we need to multiply each encryption key word by a suitable mask pattern, and left shift it with a suitable number of bits. The left-shifting operation for any arbitrary number of bits can be performed using the integer multiplication. Storing the mask patterns can be eliminated by using the shifted version of left-shift constants as right-shift constants. The left-shift constant is multiplied with the current encryption-key word, and the right-shift constant is multiplied with the next keyword, and both are combined to generate one key subblock. The right-shift constants are gotten by right shifting the left shift constant by 1 bit, which considerably reduces the computation involved. The current implementation of Idea in ECB on Motorola's DSP 56166 running at 60 Mhz supports up to 625 kbits/second in full-duplex mode. That is 3.6 times faster than using the DES algorithm.

3 2

pna.show_story?p_art_id=318329&p_section_name=Sci-Tech
by Jim Choate 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

CNN Custom News logo Home [INLINE] World U.S. Weather Sports Your Money Business Sci-Tech Showbiz Lifestyle On Target [INLINE] Customize Profile [INLINE] Help Feedback Switch User CNN Interactive CNN Interactive Sci-Tech [INLINE] CNN SI [INLINE] CNN FN [INLINE] All Politics [INLINE] InfoSeek Link of the Day [LINK] Video Pick of the Day [LINK] [INLINE] September 16, 1997 7:50 pm EDT [INLINE] Sci-Tech Title [INLINE] Ad Space The story below was selected from CNN Custom News - a new personalized service that delivers only the news that's important to YOU. Sign up now to receive your personal news stories, weather, sports scores, and stock quotes from over 100 different sources - all for FREE. If you're already a user, please login. Custom News Criminal Intellegence Eases Policeman's Lot Reuters 16-SEP-97 CAMBRIDGE, England, Sept 16 (Reuter) - Privately held Harlequin Group Ltd said it introduced a software product which harnesses artificial intelligence to speed up criminal investigations. The product, Harlequin Intelligence, displays criminal investigation data in graphical form. Artificial intelligence is used to break down witness statements into their component form and instantly links evidence to existing databases. The graphic displays allow a quick snapshot of the progress of an investigation. In a statement released at the Cambridge International Symposium on Economic Crime, Harlequin said the system discovers links or identifies associations that may not be immediately apparent to an investigator or analyst. ``Harlequin Intelligence is designed for use by major law enforcement and investigation agencies to combat many different types of crime including homicide, fraud and drug related offences. It is also designed for use in commercial business information environments where these powerful technologies can be equally applied to corporate business concerns,'' the Cambridge based company said in a statement. A spokesman declined to reveal the cost of the system or the company's sales targets but said the system had already been sold to the Los Angeles Police Department, a force in Florida, the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation, and four police forces in Britain. Search the net: InfoSeek _________________ ____[Help] [INLINE] Ad Space Top Copyright © 1997 Cable News Network, Inc. A Time Warner Company ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. Terms under which this information is provided to you. [INLINE]

2 1

Re: CJR returned to sender
by Bill Stewart 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 10:10 AM 10/27/95 -0400, "Josh M. Osborne" <stripes(a)va.pubnix.com> wrote: > They may help spread the word about >how foolish the ITAR is, and that is their only real value (well >aside from entertainment). US News & World Report, October 16, 1995, page 28, has a short article on the shirt in their Washington Whispers column :-) It's not totally accurate, but it talks about how the Feds oppose export of "simple but powerful computer programs that can be used to encrypt electronic communications. Computer buffs and private security experts say such restrictions are a threat to privacy - as well as an absurd anachronism, since the programs are already widely available. To underscore the point, one disgruntled citizen is now offering for sale over the Internet (http://colossus.net/ wepinsto/wshome.html) a T-shirt emblazoned with an encryption program known as RSA" and a bit more about the shirt and issues (and Don's refund offer to anyone arrested for wearing it) >However I think it is a good idea to slowly approch the dividing >line between exportable and non-exportable. Wouldn't it be nice >to be able to hold up the shirt and say "this is exportable", and >then scan it & save it onto a floppy and then say "this is not" >(assuming that a floppy of the shirt is denyed CJ) when arguing >with someone about how arbatary the export laws are? Obviously the next revision of the shirt should have a pocket for the optional non-exportable floppy disk :-) #--- # Thanks; Bill # Bill Stewart, Freelance Information Architect, stewarts(a)ix.netcom.com # Phone +1-510-247-0664 Pager/Voicemail 1-408-787-1281 #---

1 0

Notes from the Cypherpunks September Bay Area Meeting
by Martin Minow 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Here are some notes I took at the Cypherpunks September Bay Area Meeting on September 13 at "PGP World Headquarters" in San Mateo. Quotes are summaries and interpretations, but hopefullfy fair and accurate. My interpolations enclosed in square brackets. Cypherpunks meetings are not particularly formal, but more like a dialog between a number of people, punctuated with slightly more formal presentations. ---- Introductory discussion of the recent crypto-gutting legislative proposals. ---- Eric Hughes (EH): This is the fifth anniversary of Cypherpunks. At the first meeting, we demonstrated a number of the technologies that are now becoming widespread, including remailers, and breaking weak (i.e., exportable) cryphograph. Tim May (Tim): What we feared five years ago is worse than Clipper -- it's an absolute disaster. The government has declared war on privacy. The only survivor is likely to be Trusted Information Systems, which has very close connection to the NSA. EH: The government now desires access to all plaintext communication. Tim: The British, and OECD, trusted third party proposal is a nightmare: even if you have access to software such as PGP and Explorer that provides strong privacy, the British now regard the keys you need to use that technology as "crypto material" -- and it will be illegal to distribute unbreakable keys [presumably without license or escrow capabilities]. Vinnie Moscaritalo (Vinnie): Black market? EH: No: there will be an underground market [the distinction is important] what we need are legitimate distribution of keys and crypto. Social pressure will otherwise keep crypto unused. Tim: Quoting Whitfield Diffie: this is like the war on drugs. Ban grypto and companies will dpeutize themselves to assist the government just as they did by requiring urine tests. EH: [The computer industry is moving to] remote policy enforcement -- copyright enforcement [to prevent you from using software if you don't have a license to it, or to prevent you from viewing a copy of a movie]. The same mechanisms can be used to enforce crypto regulations. You can characterize GAK/ATP (Government access to keys, access to plaintext) as possession with the intent to communicate. Tim: The intelligence community wants to be your supplier of big-brother crypto. They are not fascists; they just don't have a clue. Intel's next [next plus one?] generation processors will devote 3-4% of their chip area to functions that facilitate encryption. All processors will be serial-numbered. [This makes it very simple to "seal" a program so it can only be used on a single, specific, processor. This capability has been used for a decade in the minicomputer world.] Tim/EH: The battle must be fought in [the context of] the First Amendment. Qooting Don Hayes: "Nothing good can come out of crypto." [I think Hayes was referring to crypto legislation.] ----- Jeremy of Blue Money Software briefly described their electronic cash programming interface. Someone (Jeremey?) described an "onion routing" electronic mail protocol that conceals all information. This lets two people communicate without any external party either reading the mail or determining the sender or receiver. This was developed by the U.S. Naval Research Laboratories. They need ths because they otherwise cannot conceal sensitive communications within public traffic. ----- Kelly Blough, PGP's Government Relations representative discussed the recent legislation initiatives. The Pro Code bill is dead. Stuck in a senate committee. The McCane Kerry bill passed commerce, but was not reported out: McCain doesn't like it. This is good news. The SAFE bill (in the House) passed the [which?] committee in a way that we like. The bill removes export control on public code. It allows Americans full access to strong crypo. It was referred to National Security, Commerce, and [International Relations?] committees. National Security gutted the bill. Intelligence added FBI-requested access to plaintext. This was done in an unusual closed-door markup. [These are usually only done for military and intelligence funding bills.] "The intelligence community wants to set policy." Dave Del Torto (DDT): A friend says that the military intelligence personnell are swarming on the Hill. Kelly: thinks that this is mostly driven by domestic law enforcement, not the military Commerce added a gutting amendment, but now waiting two weeks. Tim: Declan McCullogh said that Louis Freeh said that, if a Congressman votes against gutting crypto, the FBI will blame the next Oklahoma City bombing on that Congressman. Kelly: This is good in one way: the cards are now on the table. The regional telephone companies, auto manufacturers, are all on PGP's side: "How can we help?" Banks and other financial institutions are not on PGP's side: because of the export exception.. Maybe this will change when the impact of domestic restrictions sink in. John Gilmore (JohnG): sens a fax to his respresentative, Nancy Pelosi. Asked whether this law should be passed without review. Her chief of staff replied that Pelosi brought up issues, but didn't change the consensus. Also brought up the lack of law enforcement tracking and notification. Tom Lantos, who sits on both the National Security and International Relations committees (and who is the representative for PGP's district) -- for someone who is strong on on human rights, he is voting against strong crypto. Tim: Why does PGP participate in export committees. Kelly: Industry group to lobby: Microsoft, etc. Big companies: trying to demonstrate that it's not just software. DDT: Electronic Freedom Foundation? JohnG: We got out of lobbying. Focussing on the Bernstein appeal. John is talking to Pelosi individually. She will write a minority report of disagreement with the National Security committee decision. EH: PGP needs support from cypherpunks. Kelly: Lobbying media. Gutting crypto gives government access to reporters' notes, to communication with anonymous sources. [Also lawyer, client.] The SAFE bill will probably go to the floor as written. Amendments must be voted upon. Pro Code is dead. DDT: Political liability: Gore was thought to be a friend to Silicon Valley -- maybe not now. But, maybe he doesn't think that Silicon Valley helped Clinton in 1996. JohnG: The "one time review" proposal lets "NSA read your source code" Lets them find holes in your product. Pelosi's chief of staff said to John that it will be illegal to sell strong crypto immediately after the law passes. But distribution will be allowed until 2000. This was put in for PGP: human rights workers are using it -- this will let PGP spread around for three years. Tim [?]: WIPO (world intellectual property agreement) will ban all forms of code cracking. Pushed by content providers to secure their intellectual property. Kelly, with PGP former president Tom Steddings, wrote the recent California legislature resolution. JohnG: Trusted Information Systems has three patents on key recovery. EH: Why do the Fed's want access to plaintext? The motivation has not been made clear. Policy goals are stated in technological terms, not in policy terms. ------- Other notes (more technical) Don't use a hardware black-box to generate private keys: they can leak private key information in the public key. Use a mix of software and hardware: do final generation in auditable software. Ian Goldberg: Move crypto to Palm Pilot. Demonstarted secure e-mail and web browsing on a Palm Pilot connected (through a bizarre collection of cables) to a Metricom radio modem. Dave Lainer [??] discussed cell phone privacy. There are three kinds of information that needs to be secured: the voice message, the number that you are calling, and the cell-phone identification. None of this is secure on analog phones. The phone companies don't care about user privacy: only about call setup privacy. NSA lied to telecom committees about call security. Voice privacy is trivial. PGP is trying to get their PGP phone technology into digital cell phones. This can do end-to-end encryption between PDP-enhanced phones. There are several kinds of information that need to be secured: voice, billing information, dialed numbers, and the caller's physical location. The government likes secure billing information -- if they don't know who made the call, they can't use it as evidence against an accused. JohnG: the cell phone authentication algorithm was recently cracked. EH: New Japanese phenonemon: tiny PKS cell phones. Teen-agers (who are driving lifestyle changes) all use them. ---- DDT: Discussed Open PGP: a non-proprietary standard presented to IETF: This includes a public-key infrastructure, trust model, message format, MIME (content format), and meta-certificate technology. Proposed to the Vatican (Papal representatives must communicate with Rome). Big battle in Rome between Netscape and Microsoft to be the "official browser of the Vatican." Big is an underestimate: Microsoft is offerring "eternal" licenses. ---- My notes end here. Apologies for any errors in transcription or understanding. Martin Minow minow(a)apple.com

4 4

Re: Don't Kill the Messenger--A New Slant on Remailers
by Bill Stewart 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 07:45 PM 10/20/95 +0100, "Rev. Mark Grant" <mark(a)unicorn.com> wrote: >> "You have a piece of mail awaiting at our mail delivery service. The >> originator is unknown. The title of the message is "Tentacles of Medusa >> Must Die!" You may retrieve this message by replying to this notification >> with the word "Yes" anywhere in the Subject field. This message will be >> kept for 60 days and then deleted." > >I suspect that I could easily hack this into Mixmaster in a day or two, >but wouldn't it open you to attacks where Anonymous Fed, say, sends >terrorist kiddy-porn through your remailer and busts your ISP during those >60 days for possession ? I'm not sure if it would be better or worse than >current setups from that point of view. One way to deflect this attack is to encrypt the message for storage using a symmetric-key algorithm with a randomly generated session key, and send the session key to the recipient with the notification. You still have 300 MB of planted kiddy-terrorist narcopornography on your machine, but it's encrypted and you can happily tell the judge that you _can't_ decrypt it because you don't have the key. The Feds _could_ get the keys by eavesdropping on your outgoing correspondence or using your system to send the material to themselves (or a conveniently employed child), but at least you're not storing it in plaintext. More of a problem with this system is that it's only useful for terminal remailers; to use it in the middle of a chain, the next remailer would need to be configured to auto-accept such messages, or else your remailer would need to have a list of known remailers and use direct delivery for all mail sent to them. #--- # Thanks; Bill # Bill Stewart, Freelance Information Architect, stewarts(a)ix.netcom.com # Phone +1-510-247-0664 Pager/Voicemail 1-408-787-1281 #---

1 0

Quebec Libre
by J. Kent Hastings 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-- [ From: J. Kent Hastings * EMC.Ver #2.5.02 ] -- Cpunx, especially offshore banking "fonts of wisdom," A friend asks: > Concerning Quebec Libre, I would love to establish residence there before the > separation (not necessarily physical residence). Have these fonts of wisdom > on St. Louis and Anguilla banking anything on getting Quebec residency, mail > services, and bank accounts? Any plans if Quebec secedes? Kent -- "Put pages for your business on the World Wide Web, just $5 per month!" -- J. Kent Hastings -- zeus(a)pinsight.com -- http://www.pinsight.com/~zeus/

2 1