December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: Admiral Inman
by Connie Sadler (415)725-7703 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Subject: Re: Admiral Inman From: "Connie Sadler"@MR.STANFORD.EDU Date: Tue, 22 Nov 1994 07:58:00 PDT A1-type: DOCUMENT Posting-date: Tue, 22 Nov 1994 00:00:00 PDT In list.cypherpunks, jgrubs(a)voxbox.norden1.com writes: > jamiel(a)sybase.com (Jamie Lawrence) writes: > >> It does amaze me that what can be a victimless activity is such >> a hotbutton. > > Drugs are victimless? What about crack babies, which cost a million > dollars EACH in medical care, btw. Exactly! And this is just one example of the victims. What about the extremely high rate of crime motivated by the need for drugs? I have personally been a victim twice (theft of my car and *nice stereo system* and a breakin to my house where much was taken) in crimes which appeared to be motivated by the the need for drugs. I don't see where legalizing drugs would motivate addicts to start working to legitimately pay for their habits. CJS

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NYT on DNA Compute
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

If anyone wants to know the NYT has a longish article today on Leonard Adleman's experiment using DNA as a molecular computer. It amplifies the Science article mentioned here earlier and quotes several computer scientists who praise the work. To see it, send a blank message with subject: DNA_la

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Borenstein Speech
by Rich Salz 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Nat Borenstein is speaking nearby on Monday. OPEN PROTOCOLS FOR INFORMATION COMMERCE Nathaniel Borenstein, Chief Scientist First Virtual Holdings Inc. Traditional one-way payment mechanisms, such as cash, credit cards, and digital cash, presuppose the necessity of payment validation in advance of the completion of a transaction. In contrast, a "closed loop" protocol that verifies both payment information and customer satisfaction permits a far simpler payment engine in an open Internet environment, and is well-suited to a broad sub-class of Internet commerce applications. In this talk, I will present the underlying philosophy, design rationale, and specification overview for a recently-developed set of open protocols for information commerce. Send me questions :-)

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Wired Whitehall
by m5＠vail.tivoli.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Has anyone heard off or seen a report by a UK firm called "Kable" entitled "Wired Whitehall 1999"? I've just been looking at a summary of parts of it, and it seems scary: national ID cards and a concept called "Single Citizen's Account" for management of money flow from (and certainly to) the government. This fits with what Levy described as the low-resistance path most likely to be taken for online money schemes: more visibility, less privacy. | GOOD TIME FOR MOVIE - GOING ||| Mike McNally <m5(a)tivoli.com> | | TAKE TWA TO CAIRO. ||| Tivoli Systems, Austin, TX: | | (actual fortune cookie) ||| "Like A Little Bit of Semi-Heaven" |

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A Chance Encounter with Brad Templeton, of ClariNet
by blancw＠pylon.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Responding to msg by Mike McNally: "Put yourself in his place. Mr. Templeton's attitude makes perfect sense. The entire fabric of his business is based upon state-supported protection of the "property" that's his stock in trade. I would think very little of him as a businessperson were he to simple roll over and give up." ........................................................ Businessmen must find a way to channel their goods & services so that they can reach their customers and receive the desired return on their efforts and their investments. It's a paradoxical quagmire, isn't it, to be both open, available, and accessible, while yet needing to be exclusive, particular, and restricted. Blanc

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re: Wired Whitehall
by m5＠vail.tivoli.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Duhh. Reading a little further, I find that Kable can be reached at +44 171 410 9046. I called and there's a two-tier pricing policy for the report: about L40 (that's a fancy "pounds sterling" sign) for public sector & university purchases, and about L200 for private-sector purchases. They can't do credit cards, ironically enough. | GOOD TIME FOR MOVIE - GOING ||| Mike McNally <m5(a)tivoli.com> | | TAKE TWA TO CAIRO. ||| Tivoli Systems, Austin, TX: | | (actual fortune cookie) ||| "Like A Little Bit of Semi-Heaven" |

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Re: Pentium bug and CRYPTO
by cwedgwood＠cybernet.co.nz 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

chris.claborne(a)sandiegoca.ncr.com writes: [Will the following error (Re [Pentium Floating Point Bug ... cause problems with PGP key generation or] [any other normal operations with PGP or other crypto.] It shouldn't effect PGP in the slightest. Its a bug that effects only certain mantissa (23 are known so far) when doing a floating point divide (double precision). PGP doesn't use floating point for its big-numbers and it has no need for double precision. Since most version of PGP compiled for Intel platforms will be or the MS-DOS or Windows variety then it is very unlikely that even floating point instructions will be used - emulations libraries will be used instead for floating point. NT is a slightly different matter - but as I said PGP doesn't use floating point for the key generation or ANY of the RSA/IDEA code.... An interesting point about this rather obscure bug though. It won't effect over 99% of all Pentium machines in use. It won't effect word, windows or any of the other numerous programs that hold a large market share and high-usage stats.... but people making a big deal out of this and demanding fixes (I have heard new Pentiums don't do this and am going to test this next week) could cost Intel millions potentially..... and I doubt whether it would effect PovRay or whatever things people might actually use floating point for anyways.... Serious scientific work could suffer severely, and since Intel boxes are good power for dollar there are quite a few used in various places for intensive calculations.... (e.g. seismic ray-tracing - but that done of 486-DX2-66 machine because here is NZ they are about half the price of a Pentium so are even better value for money). Chris

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Re: Borenstein Speech
by Rich Salz 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I know better then this. >Nat Borenstein is speaking nearby on Monday. What's the global definition of nearby? :( I'll be the one yelling "thief, thief" as he talks about safe-tcl... MITSUBISHI ELECTRIC RESEARCH LABORATORIES 201 Broadway Cambridge, MA 02139 617-621-7500 OPEN PROTOCOLS FOR INFORMATION COMMERCE Nathaniel Borenstein, Chief Scientist First Virtual Holdings Inc. Date: Monday, November 28, 1994 Time: 9:30 am Abstract: Traditional one-way payment mechanisms, such as cash, credit cards, and digital cash, presuppose the necessity of payment validation in advance of the completion of a transaction. In contrast, a "closed loop" protocol that verifies both payment information and customer satisfaction permits a far simpler payment engine in an open Internet environment, and is well-suited to a broad sub-class of Internet commerce applications. In this talk, I will present the underlying philosophy, design rationale, and specification overview for a recently-developed set of open protocols for information commerce. (Dr. Borenstein is well known for his work at Bellcore on the MIME standard for multimedia messaging; he is also the author of the Andrew Message System, ATOMICMAIL, Metamail, Safe-TCL, and _Programming as if People Mattered_.) Host: David B Anderson <anderson(a)merl.com> Directions to MERL can be found in ftp://ftp.merl.com/pub/directions.map

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Re: Admiral Inman
by jamiel＠sybase.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I knocked this off Cypherpunks. It has no relevance there, although I was tempted. I'm also responding to both of you in the same message for my convenience. Also, forgive the spelling. For some reason my spell checker keeps bombing today. At 8:39 AM 11/22/94, Connie Sadler (415)725-7703 wrote: >In list.cypherpunks, jgrubs(a)voxbox.norden1.com writes: > >> jamiel(a)sybase.com (Jamie Lawrence) writes: >> >>> It does amaze me that what can be a victimless activity is such ^^^^^^^^^^^ >>> a hotbutton. >> >> Drugs are victimless? What about crack babies, which cost a million ^^^ First, you switched verbs on me. Semantic games are usually pretty pointless, but here you are twisting my meaning. Anyone who doesn't believe that the issue of drugs can be dealt with on a societal level with rationality and respect should read up on or take a trip to Holland (I'm talking drug policy here, not economics or anything else). If you want to talk crack-babies, I'd ask you what are the causes of the situation: some depraved, subhuman need for the drug or an economic and social environment that rapes most people in living it of their self- respect and dignity (I don't see being raised in a U.S. ghetto as being all that far removed from being raised in a totalitarian state, but this is a different conversation topic, and I won't get too into it here). "Gosh, Batman, how can we begin to deal with the root of this issue?" "Well, we have two choices. We can assume that the drug user is a depraved, subhuman beast that deserves to suffer and be incarcerated (and maybe spit on, too), or we can try to find a way to either help them out of a nasty situation, or at least not make their plight any worse than it already is." And we are making it worse, as a nation. As others have noted, legalization would cause prices to fall significantly (less drug related theft), end most related violence (as a smoker, I've never even been *tempted* to mug someone for a butt ;), and probably have significantly better quality, thereby alleviating many of the drug-related health concerns. >> dollars EACH in medical care, btw. > >Exactly! And this is just one example of the victims. What about the extremely ^^^^^^^ If you have this take, look at DCF's comments on the topic. 'Nuff said. >high rate of crime motivated by the need for drugs? I have personally been a Is that 'high rate of crime' attributable to the drugs, the users, the dealers, the economic makeup of the illegal drug industry, the U.S.'s method of responding to what I will agree is a problem, public morality or what? Saying that drugs causes crime is the equivivelent of saying the welfare state causes poverty. Without looking too closely, both statements can seem true, and may have some validity for a particular situation, but is a vast, politically expedient oversimplification that paves the way for a lot of ruthless puritanical moralizing and self-righteous demonization, a lot of public expense in money, human life and human dignity, and a senseless rigidity in response to a situation that can be much better dealt with, any way you measure it. >victim twice (theft of my car and *nice stereo system* and a breakin to my >house where much was taken) in crimes which appeared to be motivated by the ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ So drugs are nasty becuase you have lost something to someone who *might* have stolen becuase of dependency? "Hey - I think that Republican stole my wallet! Republicans should be illegal!" (Yes, I'm being snide, and no, I won't defend it. I think my point, that this is a rather lame, nonempirical appeal, should be clear. I must say that all of this is so basic that I think some sarcasm is not out of line.) >the need for drugs. I don't see where legalizing drugs would motivate addicts >to start working to legitimately pay for their habits. Look harder. >CJS -j

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Brad Templeton, ClariNet, and remailers
by collins＠newton.apple.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>Brad and ClariNet have already caused one remailer to go down (the >operator of it has commented here before and of course can do so again >if he sees this), and his comments Saturday night cause me to think he >may be considering a test case of some sort. (He is fearful of losing >his Associate Press/etc. franchise if he fails to enforce his rights.) I might be the (ex-)remailer operator in question. I find Brad's lack of knowledge about remailers quite surprising in light of almost 4 hours of conversation devoted solely to this topic, by telephone, over the course of a month. My summary analysis of Brad is: he'll try to scare/bully you into getting what he wants by citing (or imagining) laws upon which he will base prosecution. Prosecution never follows. If you debate his law, he resorts to "You are Netcom's customer; Netcom is my customer; if you want to remain Netcom's customer then you had better toe my line." Persection of more or less potency always follows. I try not to flame, but the greater my contact with Brad---the greater my disdain for him. He is an extremely small-minded man. Brad can't yet even demonstrate a crime. He constantly reports remailer abuses in the form of AP Newswire articles distributed anonymously; and thus (_obviously_) stolen from ClariNet. The AP Newswire, however, is already distributed electronically has a vast army of legitimate direct-subscribers. Brad never offers evidence that the posts actually come from ClariNet, and in fact ***he immediately deletes the posts whenever he sees them*** (and saves no copies!). I have no idea how or why he is allowed to do this. Though it certainly cuts down on `competition'. ............................................................ collins(a)acm.org Scott Collins

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Re: Admiral Inman
by jamiel＠sybase.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 10:50 AM 11/22/94, Jamie Lawrence wrote: >I knocked this off Cypherpunks. It has no relevance there, Er, I thought I did. Sorry all. It is the thought that counts, right? -j

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Brad Templeton, ClariNet, and remailers
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Responding to msg by collins(a)newton.apple.com (Scott Collins) on Tue, 22 Nov 11:5 AM >My summary analysis of Brad is: he'll try to >scare/bully you into getting what he wants by citing >(or imagining) laws upon which he will base >prosecution. Prosecution never follows. If you debate >his law, he resorts to "You are Netcom's customer; >Netcom is my customer; if you want to remain Netcom's >customer then you had better toe my line." Persection >of more or less potency always follows. A couple of months ago a registered threatening letter from who cares appeared near here about my posting a ClariNet article to this list. It was ignored and after a couple of weeks returned itself in shame. End of story. Everyone knows I would never ever post copyrighted material to this list unless an insane over-riding out-of-control compulsion forced me to do so against the scientificly-rational self-preserving law-abiding judgment I've had rammed down my obedient brain since

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size restrictions on jpunix
by John A. Perry 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hello everyone, Just a quick note to let you know that the 20k size restriction on messages has been lifted from the remailer at jpunix.com. It caused more problems than it solved. John A. Perry - KG5RG - perry(a)jpunix.com WWW - http://jpunix.com PGP 2.62 key for perry(a)jpunix.com is on the keyservers. PGP-encrypted e-mail welcome! Finger kserver(a)jpunix.com for PGP keyserver help. Finger remailer(a)jpunix.com for remailer help. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 Comment: Finger kserver(a)jpunix.com for PGP keyserver help. iQCVAwUBLtJHE1OTpEThrthvAQFoegQAh4dEIxRMIgmtBi2Utt0Dn4Yj0iRbj6l0 LZV0UhMUH2H2+MVK6FyCZz28hndjF9ONrW5adUEI1JYucvJLvWRKAZchIkqX0QVx vsC4k4D9fcq8DpR18OIecorasu4YHxRdM9MUnGe+S2wL481iC5nEUmjDqJgNUrun KseYqtXuk40= =8vy2 -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Freemon vs. AT&T
by nobody＠nately.UCSD.EDU 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

This is an excerpt from an Hearing Designation Order adopted by the FCC 20 July 1994 in the case of Freemon vs. AT&T. For more detail, try the FCC Web server: (http://fcc.gov:70/0/Orders/Common_Carrier/orcc4012.txt) I had not seen it mentioned here: >4. The crux of the Freemons' complaint is the allegation that the >AT&T operator who handled Elehue Freemon's May 30, 1988 call improperly >interrupted and divulged the contents of his call and thus violated >Section 705(a) of the Act. According to Mr. Freemon, AT&T's operator >listened to their eight-minute conversation and then interrupted to ask >Lucille Freemon if her son needed medical help. Mr. Freemon claims that >he had already refused two offers of assistance by the operator and that >the operator's subsequent actions were inappropriate. At the outset, AT&T denies that [1] this ever happened and [2] if it did happen the FCC has no jurisdiction in this matter. http://www.fcc.gov/ is the FCC Web Server address. _/_/_/ _/_/_/ _/ _/ _/_/_/ _/ _/ _/ _/ _/ _/ _/ _/ _/_/ _/ _/_/_/ _/ _/ _/ _/ _/_/_/ _/ _/ _/ _/ _/ _/ _/ _/ _/ _/_/_/_/ _/ _/_/_/ _/_/_/ _/_/_/ _/_/_/ _/ _/ _/_/_/ _/ All men recognize the right of revolution; that is, the right to refuse allegiance to, and to resist the government, when its tyranny or its inefficiency are great and unendurable. From Thoreau's "Civil Disobedience"

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Re: MEMS
by rah＠shipwright.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 9:15 PM 11/1/94 -0500, John Young wrote: >Benevolent advances on the ankle monitors cherished by >half-free culprits. Position indicators, DNA IDs, body >condition monitors (drugs, anyone), Nicoderm patches, first put >on soldiers for their protection and survival, to ease the way >to more general acceptance, kind of like the G.I. Bill for >tomorrow. One of the first places I read about this personal transponder stuff was in a book by G.K. O'Neill, of space colony fame. The book _2081_ (published in 1981, obviously), talks among other things (he thought magnetic levitated trains in evacuated tunnels were *way* cool) about transponders, and the uses of them in all kinds of computing, including electronic commerce of a sort: pick up the object you want to buy in a store and walk out with it. The store's systems know what the object is, who you are, and sends a message to your bank to deduct the amount from your account. He thought we were going to have to give up privacy to get this boon (and others which I can't remember), but with PKC and blind signatures, we know better now. Of course we also know now that he was copying Xerox PARC ubiquitous computing studies straight into his Apple II, but I had never heard of PARC, much less ubiquitous computing, and was amazed by the idea at the time. Cheers, Bob Hettinga ----------------- Robert Hettinga (rah(a)shipwright.com) "There is no difference between someone Shipwright Development Corporation who eats too little and sees Heaven and 44 Farquhar Street someone who drinks too much and sees Boston, MA 02331 USA snakes." -- Bertrand Russell (617) 323-7923

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Snoop program for Linux
by Jim Pinson 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Thought ya'll might want to know that the latest Slackware Linux distribution has a "ttysnoop" program that watches a users login tty. I haven't tried it, and probably wont', but thought I'd pass it along. Jim Pinson Galapagos.

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CID
by merriman＠metronet.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>>I've got the specs for a program to use with your modem to generate >>what'll resemble a full CID. So with the computer set up to dial, even >>standard voice calls too and faxes, too, can be equipped with a fake >>field (or "header" if you will), displaying a homemade caller ID. >> >>Since it uses the exact same structure as the real caller ID, no telco >>along the entire system will ever doubt it. I can send the full >>specifications if you are seriously interested in doing the code in >>full or in part. Sorry, I can't implement it myself (lack of skills). I, for one, would be *very much* interested in receiving the specs and any additional information you could provide. Dave Merriman (not _caring_ who you are, where you're from, etc :-) - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Finger merriman(a)metronet.com for PGP public key and fingerprint. PGP encrypted Email welcome and encouraged. War is Peace. Freedom is Slavery. Ignorance is Strength. No?

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California Code online
by Hal 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

For the "book disadvantaged" among us, I saw a reference today to the California civil code online. It is at: http://www.law.indiana.edu/codes/ca/codes.html. The form of this URL suggests that other states might be there, too, but I didn't look. This is a very nice presentation, structured with each section in a separate page, and a nice table of contents. I was browsing the commercial code which has lot sof interesting info on commercial paper and other subjects of interest with regard to digital cash. Hal

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Re: Admiral Inman
by blancw＠pylon.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Our enemies are industriously corrupting the language in order to make the ideas of liberty inexpressible. In particular they are seeking to make the concepts behind the declaration of independence and the bill of rights unspeakably and therefore, they hope, unthinkable. .................................................... Do you think that 'our enemies' are doing this consciously, purposefully, deliberately? Do you think that they know these concepts well enough to apprehend what it is about their meanings that should be corrupted? Do you think that, having understood what these concepts represent, they are in such abhorrence of them that the only thing they can do, short of physical fighting against the promoters of the concepts, is disorient everyone into a confused state of cognitive indeterminancy & inefficacy? Maybe that's what happened to Inman during his rejection speech! Blanc

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White Knight Remailers [was: Guerrilla Remailers]
by N. Cognito 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- On Tue, 22 Nov 1994, Adam Shostack wrote: > Real remailers (with return address features) should probably >be advertised in alt.support.* and alt.recovery, in order to build a >class of "good" users for them. Nb, I don't see this use as superior >to any other, I simply see it as being politically useful to provide >anonymous services to a group of people who society seems to think >should be anonymous. > > "But Brad, you can't shut down my remailer. Its used to let >victims of sexual abuse post anonymously to the net!" I have been thinking along these lines lately, too. The situation with the reputation of the twwells.com anon-server and its continued use in spite of those questions by under-informed individuals in the alt.sexual.abuse.recovery newsgroup have motivated me to do a couple of trial postings there. So far I have posted the "remailer.help.all" file from chaos.bsu.edu as a "how-to" and the most recent update posted here of Raph's Reliable Remailers List as a "where-to." Neither has generated any visible response in the newsgroup as of yet. My thinking is that it would be a Good Thing to post this kind of information on a regular basis (weekly?) to some of the "support" and "recovery" newsgroups. Unless I begin drawing a lot of flames for inappropriateness, this is what I plan to do in the immediate future. Introducing the people using those groups to remailers, encryption, etc. would not only be helpful to them, but would also be helpful to the publicly perceived reputation of remailers, etc. in just the manner to which Adam alludes. N. Cognito =-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-= N. Cognito "Don't put no constrictions on da people. an234(a)vox.xs4all.nl Leave 'em ta hell alone." -- J. Durante =-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-= public key available via keyserver -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBLtJrYqL3ipYu3mvVAQGMKwQAnkkKRHVrnqOwXbnNLfZTZ6IZRt4dwrP1 f4ubBMjjva9mvlZVTc2073ZmdwQaiEdGfmM4j7QE7NN71fIILl0/qPsvQsePYiDE a3ZsppzV6HftQPISyoBV+GgA58Sx9eTJe8pTEojpF3xT2KKzPcRnOl3uX/WQo7iR /CcwnT1kx5s= =x95Z -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Voice PGP, When?
by jamesh＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Punksters; Do we know when Voice PGP will be available? Can anyone point me to more info about it? I understand that "Call Security" does not include source, so I don't think I can consider using it. I'm wondering if I should continue writing my own. JJH -- Relationships are like modular furniture... Dardy Chang

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PGP
by jwhull＠cats.ucsc.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Hey y'all, I saw Gengis Kahn's note on alt.usenet.kooks. Could you send me over your manifesto or what have you and anything accessible on PGP. Thanks Will Hull <jwhull(a)cats.ucsc.edu>

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cyphertext-only remailers / cryptanalysis code ?
by L. McCarthy 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Alex Strasheim writes: > One solution that I've thought about is only passing messages which are > composed of cyphertext. Does this make any sense? This sounds useful, but I'm curious how you would enforce it. I would think you'd need to do some nontrivial statistical analysis to be reasonably sure you weren't allowing various binaries, uuencoded files, etc. with faked PGP headers, without preventing people from using other encryption schemes. I'd say this is the flip side of the challenge faced by governments trying to outlaw transmissions using strong crypto. Incidentally, I'd love to get pointers to online pieces of code which perform various statistical tests on data to find patterns characteristic of particular encryption schemes, &c. for cryptanalysis. I want to cryptanalyze a couple of encryption algorithms and would like to do some experimental work. Please send me mail directly and I will summarize to the list later on. My starting points are Applied Crypto, the CEB, and Tim's Cyphernomicon. -L. Futplex McCarthy; use "Subject: remailer-help" for an autoreply PGP key by finger or server; "Better watch what you say, or they'll be calling you a radical...a liberal" --Supertramp "[CIA/KGB mole Aldrich Ames] took information in shopping bags out the front door" --miscellaneous Congressperson -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.1 iQCVAwUBLtJ3tWf7YYibNzjpAQGOVwQApexTVG/PfeHNQcE+xr5lsCWxtnC13/EL GE8A8T77YavVQDUt3P7zWH8nw05OUosUgwe3QQKu+rRQGV1Y5dLcpxMQIk/iFSE1 3hMzZYCv6L6OQ0wyt8VOuEGmg8ffvBIod9C9i9PndmHZY73j3WPoSbDXLsBXlQu4 my8Oz2NLAP4= =Zxlu -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Guerilla Remailers
by anonymous-remailer＠xs4all.nl 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> From: skaplin(a)skypoint.com (Samuel Kaplin) > Has anyone else given thought to "Guerrilla Remailers?" Basically someone > obtains an account on one of the freenets or similar free account, sets up > a remailer and lets it sit for a while. (Until telnet and/or phone logs > are overwritten) After this time frame the address of the remailer is > posted. The remailer then would be used until it is shut down by the Powers > that be. The account would be set up under a bogus name etc. This would I think such a scheme would be limited by how difficult it is to integrate the remailer software into the Freenet mail routines. Most Freenets (at least Toronto, Buffalo do) use a generic type of software, Freeport, developed by the Cleveland Freenet. I'd need other's comments as to how easy it is to configure the remailer software to integrate with the Freeport software that you get a working remailer. If that step is possible, then yes, it is certainly possible to set up a guerilla remailer. > make the remailer the ideal candidate for the last hop in a remailer chain. > (After all if they can't find Juanna DuBone or Jack Mehoff they can't apply Both Cleveland and Buffalo, at last check simply require you to send in a signed form (that you can capture when you log in) as to your age, address, etc. No photo ID (ie Drivers license etc) is required so a phoney account is relatively easy to set up.....I know...I had one on the Buffalo Freenet until certain anarchistic activities got it canned :>. However....here is another interesting point. I'm a Canadian, living across the border basically from Buffalo and Cleveland. Not only would the authorities be unable to do anything due to it being a phoney account, but being across the border would also place me beyond the pale of the U.S. authorities even if I actually was ever tracked down. All that would happen is the account would be shut down. Same for a U.S. resident utilizing the Toronto, Victoria or Ottawa Freenets. Overall, this is an interesting concept and I'd be willing to give it a shot. They key facet of it is whether we can configure the Freeport software with the remailer software.....or vice-versa.

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Re: Brad Templeton, ClariNet, and remailers
by Alex de Joode 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

In article <aaf7ed2a000210042b2a(a)[17.205.6.17]> you stated: : I might be the (ex-)remailer operator in question. I find Brad's lack of : knowledge about remailers quite surprising in light of almost 4 hours of : conversation devoted solely to this topic, by telephone, over the course of : a month. My remailers have been used several times, to redistribute ClariNet articles, apperantly ClariNet has an "snitch"-line where people can mail to to get an reward, some people have the courtisy to inform the remail-operator that they have done so. I have *never* received any request for information from ClariNet. (maybe because my 5-line disclaimer says it all: the account used was an anonymous-remailer: so if you donnot like that, start your own !!) Regz, -- Exit! Stage Left. Alex de Joode <usura(a)xs4all.nl>

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