December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: kerberosV telnet
by Jef Poskanzer 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Perry Metzger: >Jef Poskanzer says: >> "That turns out not to be the case." The version of CNS that we have >> doesn't have any encryption beyond DES. 4.4BSD telnet is basically >> identical to kerberosV telnet, and the only encryption it has is DES. > >The 4.4 telnet is NOT identical. Its much better code, has lots of >neat new capabilities that you probably want, is more modular, and the >versions I saw had hooks for D-H and the like, which is where most of >the work is -- you can get the D-H code from RSAREF and steal the IDEA >code from PGP; from there the changes are small. I just did a diff -r between the Kerberos V telnet/telnetd/libtelnet and the 4.4BSD version. From 1.5 MB of source code I get 40KB of diffs. In my book a 2% difference qualifies as basically identical. Plus 90% of the diffs were memcpy/bcopy changes. I know there are nice hooks in the code for adding new encryption and authentication modules. I know it would be relatively easy to add IDEA and DH. That's why I'm asking whether anyone has already done it. Do you get it this time, or should I go for four? Perry, why don't you let someone else reply this time? --- Jef

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Re: kerberosV telnet
by Jef Poskanzer 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>Normally I like to answer inquiries, but it seems that Jef meets >answers with insults, so I don't see any reason to give him further >information. Not at all, Perry. It's only when a loudmouth gives *incorrect* answers multiple times that I start getting pissed. And I thank you for sparing the list any more of your "information", if it's of similar quality to what you've posted so far. --- Jef

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Re: Media Bias -- Chomsky
by jamesd＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Please put "Chomsky" in your threads title, or else we will get flamed by the numerous people who have "Chomsky" in their kill files j.hastings6(a)genie.geis.com describes a Chomsky movie where Chomsky protests about media priorities. The problem is that Chomsky does not use words such as "bias" and "persuasion". Instead he uses words such as "coercion" and "control" If he said "bias" the implication would be that we should deal with this problem by individual action, for example we should subscribe to magazines and so forth that give us diverse views - that we should respond as individuals. By using words such as "control" he implies that we should respond collectively to resist these acts of coercion. He calls speech, and thus implies they should be met with force. The natural and intended emotional response to Chomsky's lies and distortions is: "How do you explain that, Man?! Fight the Power! Right Awn!" By defining speech and ideas as force and coercion Chomsky is implicitly arguing for democratic control of speech and ideas. He implies that democratic control of speech and ideas would be a vast improvement in our civil liberties, that it would make us more free. If you say "bias" as Rush Limbaugh does, then the obvious implication is that one should start ones own newsletter and or attend to alternative sources of information. When Rush says "Media Bias" he is really saying "buy my book, listen to my radio show, watch my TV show." When Chomsky says that the public are "subject to a system of rigid ideological control" (not that particular newspapers are subject to rigid ideological control by imperialist capitalist stooges, but that *the people* are subjected to rigid ideological control by imperialist capitalist stooges") he is saying that the speech acts he that protests are acts of violence and coercion and thus he implies that we should defend ourselves collectively against such speech. In other words he is perverting the language so that for him "freedom of speech" is democratic control of speech and ideas by the people. Speech should be subjected to democratic control by the people, and this will make us more free and expand civil liberties. If Susie tells stories of how John ruined his life with drugs or booze, one might reasonably conclude that Susie is telling us to be selective and exercise self control. If Susie tells stories of how evil drug lords/publicans ruined Johns life by *forcing him* to consume drugs and or booze, one can only conclude that Susie is calling for drug/alcohol prohibition. Chomsky continually claims that we are *coerced* into accepting the ideas of the evil imperialist capitalist conspiracy. From this I reasonably infer he is arguing for democratic control of speech and ideas. He continually describes (and wildly exaggerates) the problem using language that implies that only a collective, rather than individual, response to misinformation can make us free. As you know, democratic control of speech and ideas was tried very successfully under the National Socialist German Workers party. In practice it proved remarkably similar to the undemocratic control of speech and ideas employed in the Soviet Union. j.hastings6(a)genie.geis.com writes > East Timor people suffered the same magnitude of oppression at the > hands of the U.S.-supported Indonesians, as did the Cambodians under > the Khmer [Rouge] ... > .... > > The reports of East Timor atrocities were relatively non-existent. > > How do you explain that, Man?! Fight the Power! Right Awn! (I assume that Right Awn! is a smiley) What Chomsky said about US involvement in Indonesian imperialism is a pack of lies. (Or rather what he implies - Chomsky mostly lies by carefully arranging truths and half truths so as to give a wildly misleading impression.) But even if what Chomsky said about the US involvement in Indonesian imperialism was completely true one can easily point to even more extreme examples bias in the opposite direction in the press. For example compare the massive publicity for Pinochet's murder of a handful of people, the deadly silence concerning the murder of huge numbers of people mostly women and children, by the marxist anti American regime in Ethiopia. This genocide was vastly greater than Timor, and you do not see Chomsky jumping up and down about media silence concerning Ethiopia. (One can easily dig up the real, rather boring, reasons why Ethiopia was ignored, and one can easily dig up the real, rather boring, reasons why East Timor was ignored, but is more fun to allege that the press is controlled by a vast evil immensely powerful communist conspiracy and force the commies write up the complicated boring research for a change.) > When I saw him live and on stage, Chomsky said he thought > the genocide stories about Cambodia were as bogus as the > other 99% lies told by the lapdog "adversarial" press (like > Yellow Rain "chemical warfare" actually caused by bee > droppings). ... > > Can we really blame him for doubting the unreliable media? > > He stopped defending Khmer Rouge (sp?) when he became > convinced that the killing fields were real. In other > words, he would never support genocide. That's the Party > Line anyway, comrade. Like practically everything Chomsky says, the above is a half truth that is used to imply a lie. Sure, in the beginning, all reasonable people assumed that the reports of genocide were more vomit by the Pentagon misinformation machine (not the lapdog press -- the press was very far from being lapdog -- it had been lapdog in the beginning, but dramatically shifted.) That is what I assumed -- at first. It soon became apparent that the reports of genocide were horribly real. But Chomsky kept right on pushing the same wheelbarrow on and on and on as the terrible evidence piled up, until the Vietnamese invaded - and *then*, when the winds of politics blew, he abruptly changed his position. This shows his position was based purely on politics, and that he displayed a contemptuous disregard for the truth, for principle, and for human lives. It reminds me of that scene in the book "1984" where in the middle of hate week, yesterdays enemy suddenly becomes today's ally, and yesterdays ally becomes today's enemy. Orwell's fictional hate week was based in part on real life abrupt shifts in magazines such as "New Republic" when Stalin made a non aggression pact with Hitler, and the further abrupt shift when Hitler broke that treaty. > Chomsky is an extreme free-speech anarchist, from what > I've read about and by him. He even defended the right of > Holocaust-revisionist Robert Faurisson to speak about his > historical beliefs against the French state's claim that it > has the right to determine what is "historical fact." > Chomsky himself does not deny the Holocaust. Chomsky is not an anarchist. He advocates an economic system very similar to that advocated by the National Socialist German Workers party, and somewhat different from that advocated by the Bolsheviks. This was demonstrated very nicely in his papers on GATT, which described managed trade as democratic control and as control by the people. If you define the Washington bureaucracy as "the people", as Chomsky does whenever he discusses acts of theft, coercion, and violence by the current American government against American individuals, then fascism is anarcho socialism by definition, and Chomsky is indeed an anarchist. Chomsky may well be tolerant of holocaust revisionists, as am I, but Chomsky fans show a notable lack of tolerance for other forms of speech, as is most noticeable on the net. This leads me to suspect that Chomsky's tolerance of holocaust revisionism may well be based on grounds somewhat different my own. If Chomsky was a fan of free speech, he would be celebrating what the laser printer and the internet have made possible. If he was genuinely concerned with monopolistic control of speech, rather than ensuring that "the people" exercised that monopoly, he would be celebrating what is now happening. Chomsky has the very clear objective of creating a economic, social and political system based on democratic control of speech, thought, work, and property, through the Democrat Party, using normal constitutional, legal, institutional and democratic means, just as the National Socialist German Workers party successfully did in Germany. Clearly this objective is far more realistic and achievable than the ridiculous fantasy of the Marxists of coming to power in America through revolutionary means. Since there are clearly a great many people who seek and desire totalitarianism, with their group at the top, we should hardly be surprised to see large number of people seeking to achieve this through means that are workable and feasible, rather than through means that are absurd and impossible. Nor should we be surprised to find that these people are mostly in the party whose ideas can most readily be perverted to this objective. > According to the S.F. Weekly in 1989, Noam Chomsky was > once described in a college newspaper as both "a Nazi > sympathiser" and "a Soviet apologist." That's a neat trick, The ideological difference between the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany is so slight as to be almost indiscernible. Stalin permitted abortion on a large scale, Hitler on a modest scale. Stalin murdered Jews on a modest scale, Hitler on a large scale - but this was more a tactic to create a body of killers who had no choice but to support him, rather than through any burning ideological difference. Apart from Jews and abortion, I cannot see any noticeable political difference between Hitler and Stalin, other than the very important fact that Hitler took power through democratic, constitutional, and institutional means, and that Hitler obeyed the letter of the constitution (while grossly violating the spirit of the constitution.) Similarly Hitler respected the form of property rights while brushing business owners aside and running their businesses directly by the German people for the greater good of the German nation. Chomsky would do likewise, rather than implementing the Soviet form of socialism. My impression is that if Chomsky or (more likely) one of his disciples were to achieve power he would resemble Stalin on abortion, and on America's Jews - the Asians, and he would resemble Hitler in regard to democracy and the constitution, and property rights. (Constitution as currently interpreted by the supreme court -- not constitution as originally written, of course.) But I would not be particularly surprised if he resembled Hitler on both Asians and on the Constitution (Supreme court version). I can definitely and confidently say that he would *not* resemble Stalin on the constitution and property rights. This is why people get hysterical when other people call Chomsky a totalitarian and a commie sympathizer. It is perfectly true, and perfectly clear, that Chomsky aims to achieve totalitarian terror by means radically different from those intended by the commies. In this sense he is clearly not a commie sympathizer. -- --------------------------------------------------------------------- We have the right to defend ourselves and our property, because of the kind of animals that we James A. Donald are. True law derives from this right, not from the arbitrary power of the omnipotent state. jamesd(a)netcom.com

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[John Ioannidis: Alleged RC4 speed and key setup times]
by Perry E. Metzger 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

John Ioannidis sent me the following interesting message. He's been playing a bit with the alleged RC4 code posted anonymously to cypherpunks a while back. He gave me permission to forward this to cypherpunks. Perry ------- Forwarded Message From: John Ioannidis <ji(a)cs.columbia.edu> Subject: Alleged RC4 speed and key setup times The key setup time for the alleged rc4 code is the same as the time to encrypt about 1200 bytes of data. Key setup time is independent of key length (if you discount possible cache interactions). I haven't tried to optimize (other than what the compiler (gcc -O4) can do) the key setup time, the way I optimized the cipher, but still... Anyway, you can do slightly over 4000 key setups per second on a S10/51 (the time to en/decrypt a 64-byte block is trivial), so you can test 2^12 keys per second on a S10, or 2^12*16 = 2^16 keys/sec on a 16-processor SparcCenter-1000. That's 2^16 * 2^17 keys per day, so you need 2^9 days to exhaustively search a 40-bit keyspace on a fairly common machine such as the S1000. Move that back down to 2^13 days for a S10; The CS dept easilly has 2^8 machines with the average speed of a S10 (some are slower, some are a LOT faster, and tehy have more than 256 machines anyway). That means that, by dedicating the CS dept's resources, we can crack a 40-bit key in 2^7 days (2^6 on the average, of course). As another example, Lehman has 2^11 S10 equivalents, so that figure would go down to 2^2 days or a 4-day weekend. Well, the above goes to prove that 40bits isn't all that much (which we already knew), but I wanted to get a feel of what it means it terms of resources that mere mortals like us have access to. /ji ------- End of Forwarded Message

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Re: kerberosV telnet
by Jef Poskanzer 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

<yawn> >I used to have a good deal of respect for Jef Poskanzer. He's written >a buch of good software over the years, especially his portable bitmap >manipulation stuff, and I found much of his other software to be >useful. I'd never dealt with him before, and I was suprised to >discover that he doesn't know how to behave in a civilized manner, and >doesn't deserve the respect. It always saddens me to find this sort of >thing out, but I suppose thats the way life is. > >Perhaps someone more gentle than I can explain to Jef that when people >try to help you and answer a question, even if you don't think their >answer is useful, that screaming obsenities at them (in private mail >he's called my information to him "bullshit", among other things) >isn't likely to serve your real interests. > >Perry > >Jef Poskanzer says: >> >Normally I like to answer inquiries, but it seems that Jef meets >> >answers with insults, so I don't see any reason to give him further >> >information. >> >> Not at all, Perry. It's only when a loudmouth gives *incorrect* >> answers multiple times that I start getting pissed. >> >> And I thank you for sparing the list any more of your "information", >> if it's of similar quality to what you've posted so far. >> --- >> Jef

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Re: kerberosV telnet
by Jef Poskanzer 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>I never once mentioned the Kerberos V code. I explicitly said >"Cygnus" in my message. As for the Kerberos V stuff, I've never seen >it and would not pretend to know what it looks like, and thus wouldn't >mention it. No, of course you didn't mention it. I mentioned it, in the subject of the first message of this ridiculous thread. Apparently you STILL DON'T GET IT. And I still fail to see how my pointing out that you are confused can reasonably be called an "insult". --- Jef

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Crypto in BYTE
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Peter Wayner writes in October BYTE on electronic documents in business. Admirably covers encryption, digital signatures, authentication, digital cash, timestamps and more. See "EDI Moves the Data", pp.121-128. The issue has some other mentions of crypto. John

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CEB - Sept 24, 1994
by Gary Jeffers 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

CYPHER-REBELS ELECTRONIC BOOK (CEB) SEPTEMBER 24, 1994 ISSUE 3 Publisher Gary Lee Jeffers ccgary(a)mizzou1.missouri.edu A compendium of the best software & info for today's electronic privacy freedom fighters. This text may be distributed in part or in full anywhere you want. It may be given away freely or copies may be sold. CEB wants to be free & valuable. If, as Chairman Mao says: "Political power grows out of the barrel of a gun.", then what is democracy? TABLE OF CONTENTS Chapter 1. PGP Section 1. PGP general Section 2. Michael Johnson's PGP FAQ contribution Section 3. Stealth PGP. Chapter 2. Steganography. "A picture is worth a thousand words." Chapter 3. Shells for PGP Section 1. Christopher W. Geib's WinPGP26.ZIP Section 2. Ross Barclay's WinFront 3.0 Chapter 4. Generally cool things. Section 1. Loompanics sources. Section 2. Viruses sources. Chapter 5. Getting the Cypherpunks' archived & indexed list. Chapter 6. Remailers & chained remailers. Chapter 7. Current problems in Crypt. Chapter 8. Text sources. Section 1. Books Section 2. Rants Section 3. CYPHERNOMICON - Tim May's "official" Cypherpunks' FAQ. Chapter 9. Cypherpunks' mailing list. getting on etc.. CCCCCCCCCC YYYY YYYY PPPPPP HH HH EEEEEEE RRRRRRRRR CCCCCCCCCC YY YY PP PP HH HH EEEEEEE RRRRRRRRR CCC YY YY PP PP HH HH EE RR RR CCC YY YY PPPPPP HHHHHHHH EE RR RR CCC YYY PP HHHHHHHH EEEEEEE RR RR CCC YYY PP HH HH EEEEEEE RRRRRRRR CCC YYY PP HH HH EE RRRRRRR CCC YYY PP HH HH EE RRRRRR CCCCCCCCCC YYY PP HH HH EE RR RR CCCCCCCCCCC YYY PP HH HH EEEEEEE RR RR PP HH HH EEEEEEE RR RR RRRRRRRRRRR RR RR RRRRRRRRRRRRRR EEEEEEEEE RRRRRRRRRRR EEEEEEEEEEE BBBBBBBB EEEEEEEEEE SSSSSSS RRRRRRRR EEEEEEEEE BBBBBBBBBBB EE EEEEEEE SSSSSSSSS RR RRRR EEEEEEEEEE BBBBBBBBBB EEEEEEE SSSSSSSSS RRR RRRR EEEEEEEE BBBBBBBB EEEEEEE SSSSSSSS RRR RRRRR EEEEEE BBBBBB EEEEEEEE SSSSSSSSS RRRRRRRRRRRRRR EEEEEEE BBB EEEEEEEEEEE SSSSSSSSSS RRRRRRRRRRRRRR EEEEEEEEEE BB EEEEEEEEEEE SSSSSSS RRRRRRR RRRR EEEEEEEEEE BBB EEEEEEEEEEEEEE SSSSSSSSSSSSS RRR RRRRR EEEEEEEEEEEE BBBBB EEEEEEEEEEEEEEE SSSSSSSSSSSS RRRRR RR EEEEEEEE BBBBBBB EEEEEEEEE SSSSSSSSSS RR RRRRR EEEEEE BBBBBBBBB EEEEEEE SSSSSSSSSS RR RRRRR EEEEEE BBBBBBBBB EEEEEEE SSSSSSSSSS RRR RRRRRR EEEEEEEEEEE BBBBBBBB EEEEEEEEEEEE SSSSSSSSSSS RRRR RRRRRRR EEEEEEEEEEEEE BBBBBBB EEEEEEEEEEEEE SSSSSSSSSSSS PPPPPPPPPPP GGGGGGGGG PPPPPPPPPPP PPPPPPPPPPP GGGGGGGGG PPPPPPPPPPP PPP PP GGG PPP PP PPPPPPPPPPPP GGG GGGGGGG PPPPPPPPPPP PPPPPPPPPP GGG GGGGGGG PPPPPPPP PPP GGG GG PPP PPP GGGGGGGGGGGGG PPP PPP GGGGGGGGGGGG PPP Chapter 1. PGP general. PGP is Pretty Good Privacy from Phil Zimmermann. It is currently the best available encryption available to civilians at large. Zimmermann is the programmer on the original PGP versions but now, apparently, just guides other programmers in making improved versions. PGP uses two encryption algorithms: RSA for its Public Key powers & IDEA for its bulk encryption. The advantages of PGP over other crypt/decrypt systems are: 1. RSA algorithm. Allows users to communicate without needing a secure channel to exchange keys. - PUBLIC KEY ENCRYPTION. 2. The program system has been very well done & has huge development support. 3. It has huge popularity. 4. Security is guaranteed with distribution of source code & public investigation. 5. Its free. 6. Both RSA & IDEA are "STRONG" algorithms. MIT,s PGP 2.6 has the blessing of Zimmermann. PGP 2.6 ui is believed to have Zimmermann's approval because he has not attacked it. It is believed that Zimmermann will not endorse the ui version due to possible legal problems. Section 2: Michael Johnson's PGP FAQ contribution Michael Paul Johnson <mpj(a)netcom.com> has an excellent faq on Subject: Where to Get the Latest PGP (Pretty Good Privacy) FAQ (Last modified: 7 September 1994 by Mike Johnson) You can get this faq by anonymous ftp to: ftp.csn.net /mpj/getpgp.asc It is also posted monthly on alt.security.pgp The latest versions of PGP are VIACRYPT PGP 2.7 , MIT PGP 2.6.1 & PGP 2.6ui. Which is best? I would say MIT PGP 2.6.1. It has source code which VIACRYPT doesn't give you & it is more advanced than the ui version. In comparing the MIT & ui versions, Michael Johnson had this to say: "The "unofficial international" versions are really just PGP 2.3a, modified just enough to make it compatible ust with MIT PGP 2.6, but do not include all of the fixes in MIT PGP 2.6 the and MIT PGP 2.6.1. They are named pgp26ui* or have "ui" somewhere a in their file names." In his faq, he gives some instances in which sions the ui version might be preferable. Section 3: Michael Johnson's PGP bomb contribution. From: Michael Johnson <mpj(a)csn.org> Subject: PGP Time Bomb FAQ PGP TIME BOMB FAQ Michael Johnson writes: "There has been some confusion about the annoying "Time Bomb" in MIT PGP2.6, as well as some other PGP version compatibility issues. This is an attempt to clear up some of that confusion." You can get this faq by anonymous ftp to: ftp.csn.net /mpj/pgpbomb.asc Section 3. Stealth PGP 37 Stealth PGP refers to a PGP file that does not have the RSA prefix tag on the beginning of a PGP encrypted file or to PGP utility software that disguises this tag. Possibly, a later version of PGP with have this as an option. The advantages of "Stealthy" PGP are that its files cannot be found by Internet search programs that hunt for the PGP/RSA tag & that a "Stealthy" file may be more securely hidden by a good steganography program. From: Mark Grant <mark(a)unicorn.com> Subject: Stealth PGP Responding to my question "Has Stealth PGP been done yet?" Mark Grant says: Kind of, there's a 'stealth' filter available that strips and attaches headers to PGP messages after encryption. It's available from various places, and the documentation is available on my 'other people's PGP addons' WWW page : http://www.c2.org/~mark/pgp/other.html There's also information about Privtool, my PGP-aware mail program for Sun workstations at : http://www.c2.org/~mark/privtool/privtool.html Mark EMAIL: mark(a)unicorn.com URL : http://www.c2.org/~mark/ Chapter 2. Steganography "A picture is worth a thousand words." ============================================= %% = !I = %% %%% = !!! BB = %%%* *%%%% = **!!** & = *** @** = u \ x! ) < = * *** + m ) c $ = ** = # k } º = º = $%- & u = = ------- = @!p +e$ ~ # = º = h 6& ; | = º = =,# {{ = º = = º º = = º º = = º º ============================================= º º STILL LIFE WITH CRYPT +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ Steganography is the craft of hiding messages in pictures. The text is, of course, encrypted text rather than plain text. The current best steganography program has been done by Arsen Arachelian Below, follows his text contribution: From: rarachel(a)prism.poly.edu (Arsen Ray Arachelian) WNSTORM is available from: ftp.wimsey.bc.ca:/pub/crypto/software/dist/US_or_Canada_only_XXXXXXX/Steg Usual routine to get it. i.e. cd /pub/crypto/software, get the README file, and if you agree to the terms then follow the instructions. Short description off the top of my head (I wrote the beastie) Another info scrap should be in the same directory as WNSTORM. WNSTORM is a data encryption/steganography utility which is pretty secure for most uses. Unlike some stego systems WNSTORM is expandible, all you have to do is write your own LSB injector/extractor for whatever data format you wish to hide information into. WNSTORM doesn't require the recipient of the host picture, sound, movie, etc. to have the original un-stormed picture. Unlike primitive stego programs, WNSTORM doesn't compare an stormed picture with an unstormed picture. WNSTORM will cover its tracks statistically. If it changes a 0 bit in the LSB data stream to a zero, or a 1 bit to a 1, it does nothing. If it changes a 1 bit to a zero, it will balance itself by changing an unused adjacent 0 bit to a 1. Ditto for a 0->1 transform. WNSTORM will NOT change every bit of the LSB in order to prevent detection. It will use a passkey along with a probabilistic algorithm to decide which bits it will change. The algorithm for picking bits depends on the previous succesfully encoded/decoded cyphertext AND the passkey. Internally WNSTORM works by picking "windows" or "packets" of bytes out of either a random number stream or an LSB stream extracted from a picture, sound, movie, etc. It then injects eight bits of cyphertext into this window. Each window is of variable size. The bit locations where the bits are inserted are randomly exchanged for each pass. The bit values are also randomly exchanged for each pass. WNSTORM includes an injector/extractor for PCX images, however I will write more injecotr/extractor programs for it in the future, and OTHERS can do so as well. Chapter 3. Shells for PGP. Section 1. Christopher W. Geib's WinPGP26.ZIP From: "David K. Merriman" <merriman(a)metronet.com> Subject: Christopher W. Geib's Windows PGP shell I've just finished making an ftp deposit to soda in the cypherpunks/ incoming directory of WinPGP26.ZIP; it's the latest version of the Windows PGP shell Shareware, and understands 2.6/2.6ui/2.7. Dave Merriman Section 2. Ross Barclay's WinFront 3.0 From: Ross Barclay <RBARCLAY(a)TrentU.ca> Subject: PGP WinFront 3.0 Now Available! (New Windows front end for PGP) To: cypherpunks(a)toad.com, ~rbarclay(a)TrentU.ca -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Announcing PGP WinFront 3.0 ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ A freeware Windows front end for PGP 2.3a and 2.6 Copyright 1994 Ross Barclay (rbarclay(a)trentu.ca) WHAT IT IS: - PGP WinFront is the most fully featured free (or otherwise) Windows front end available. It will make using PGP easy for beginners, and it will drastically increase the speed at which experts use it too. PGP WinFront is now into is third revision and I have tried to implement as many of the suggestions that I received as possible. PGP WinFront was designed by its users, but was coded by me. Features: - Supports secret key ring placement on floppy drive - Support en/decryption to/from clipboard - Move / Copy / Delete files - Online hypertext help - Online hypertext PGP help - Keyring reader to pick names, view key characteristics - Keyring reader supports less-often used "huge" keyrings - Signature Checker - Very configurable - over 25 user-definable settings - more . . . This program does too much to list here. And it's free! This version is a complete rewrite of the popular PGP WinFront 2.0. The feature-set has largely been set by users who sent in suggestions. Please read the file README.TXT and peruse the help files. Please send me your comments. HOW TO GET IT: At the moment, there are 2 ways to get this program: 1) Via FTP - The PGP WinFront 3.0 filename is called PWF30.ZIP. - It has been uploaded to the incoming directories of the following FTP sites: ftp.cica.indiana.edu ftp.eff.org ftp.wimsey.bc.ca black.ox.ac.uk soda.berkeley.edu ftp.informatik.uni-hamburg.de ftp.ee.und.ac.za ftp.demon.co.uk - Hopefully, they will be slotted into the PGP directories soon. On CICA, it will be placed into \pub\pc\win3\utils. That is where PWF20.ZIP was placed. - Once you get the program, please upload it to other FTP sites! 2) From Colorado Catacombs BBS - dial (303)772-1062. The file is called PWF30.ZIP - once you get the program, please upload it to other BBSs. *** The mail access system I had was discontinued. This is because the file was too big to fit into my account. However, you can still register PWF and request certain PGP and PWF related items using my mail access system. Details of these are on the "About" screen of PWF 30. - --Ross Barclay - ------------------------------------------------------------------------- Ross Barclay (rbarclay(a)trentu.ca) Assistant Editor | To receive my PGP | public key, send PC NEWS Review: Windows Edition | me e-mail with the Bellevue, WA (206) 399-8700 | subject: GET KEY - ------------------------------------------------------------------------- To receive PC NEWS Review, send me e-mail with the subject: GET PNR. - ------------------------------------------------------------------------- -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6 iQBVAwUBLmZ7fdgpRteEZ9JhAQFeXgIAxIpvJQeMsx7YecNgtusBDMqL662XFeX2 qL0qF8HcN4ReZ9MYjtn9t8N1zWGxkPOXQEI3KfM7uk8JTzxjZ5LG2g== =gSYT -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- Chapter 4. Generally cool things. Section 1. Loompanics sources. Something cool from Vincent: Most of the Loompanics Unlimited catalog is online as: gopher://gopher.well.sf.ca.us/00/Business/catalog.asc And you can send mail to them at: loompanx(a)pt.olympus.net You can also get their catalog at: Loompanics Unlimited PO box 1197 33 Port Townsend, Wa. 98368 P id Send $5.00 for their general catalog - free with any order. Section 2. Viruses sources. AMERICAN EAGLE PUBLICATIONS Cypherpunks, I have found a source of info. that I just must share! American Eagle Publications, Inc. P. O. Box 41401 Tucson, AZ 85717 I'm sure they will send you a catalog just for the asking. So, what are they about? They are about VIRUSES! They don't just carry a couple of virus things - they are the VIRUSES-ARE-US of the virus world! They have a journal: Computer Virus Developments Quarterly. They have books on viruses, virus protection, cryptanalysis, the science fiction book "Heiland", a CD-ROM for $99.95 of several thousand live viruses, disks of viruses with source code, executable & utilities, programs & cards for boot protection, & even a virus IDEA computer system protector. Copy follows for two items of particular interest to Cypherpunks: POTASSIUM HYDROXIDE, KOH By the "King of Hearts" A sophisticated piece of software which uses ideas first developed by computer virus writers to secure your computer system against those who would like to get their hands on the information in it. You give KOH a pass phrase, & it uses state of the art IDEA data encryption algorithm to encrypt all of the information on your hard disk & your floppies. It is, for all intents & purposes, unbreakable, & works well with DOS & Windows. Many encryption programs offered commercially are easily cracked, but this one is not. Some people call this program a virus, come say it is not. In ways, it acts like a virus to do some of your security housekeeping for you. Yet at worst it is a friendly virus that lets you choose when & how it will replicate. program & manual on disk, $10 program, full source, & manual on disk, $20 (Overseas customers add $12: KOH cannot be exported from the US, but since it was not developed in the US, we will forward your order to the overseas distributor. Please allow 6 weeks for delivery) HEILAND By Franklin Sanders 276 pages, Paperback, 1986 Here's an entertaining book about America in the year 2020. If you wonder if it's proper to use viruses in wartime or if such a virus could be termed "good", this book will give you some food for thought. Sanders makes use of computer "worms" when the oppressed people of the US attack the federal government in an all-out war against tyranny. Sanders uses his worms right too - not as some all-powerful monster. Rather, they are deployed as part of a larger military strategy. For a book written in 1986, that's not bad! And if you're fed up with the government, this book is sure to give you a vision for the future. Sanders has been part of the mounting tax protest in this country. He's fought the IRS in court for years & won some important battles. Unfortunately the government seems to be con- firming some of his worst suspensions about them. Now you can get a good dose of his philosophy & his ideas about remedying our problems. And if you work for the government, don't be offended - this book is doubly recommended for you! Book, $8.00 for shipping add $2 per book. 5% sales tax for AZ. residents. It is my belief that in the next few years more uses for viruses than just being a vandal will be found. Also, they may find a place in protecting our electronic freedom. - for instance virus remailers. Also see my previous post - The FREEDOM DEAMON. Also, they have a place in my CHATTERBOX concept(a remailer for chat mode or commands). "Viruses aren't just for Sociopaths anymore!" Also, I suspect the state may start cracking down on virus tech- nology. Incidentally, did you all know that crypt has a place in modern viruses? Encryption is used to hide "nasty" code & virus signatures until they get into the system & decrypt. Yours Truly, Gary Jeffers PUSH EM BACK! PUSH EM BACK! WWWAAAYYY BBBAAACCCKK! BBBEEEAAATTTTT STATE ! Chapter 5. Getting the Cypherpunks' archived & indexed list. Vincent also tells us about the complete Cypherpunk's text on line & indexed with fast access times: Eric Johnson has put one together as: http://pmip.maricopa.edu/crypt/cypherpunks/Cypherpunks.src Please don't think that you used to be safe doing something illegal on this list and that you no longer are. That would be foolish. -- Vince The "http" is for "Hyper-Text Transport Protocol". This is not FTP, though it is a protocol similar in function to FTP. It is used by "WWW" (World Wide Web) of which Mosaic is the most popular implementation. If you have Mosaic, you can just give the above path. If you do not have mosaic, you should spend some time trying to get it. Mosaic makes it really easy to quickly move through lots of information on the net. Mosaic is a point and click hypertext interface. You can FTP to ftp.ncsa.uiuc.edu and go into Mosaic. WWW has a simple language for writting your own hypertext documents - "HTML" (Hyper Text Markup Language). You can think of this as sort of like Troff, LaTeX or Postscript, but for hypertext documents. One page of HTML can make dozens of normal files easy to access. For example, my README.html security page points to many normal files: ftp://furmint.nectar.cs.cmu.edu/security/README.html It turns out that the mail database is really in "WAIS" (Wide Area Information Server). You can use WAIS directly, though I think it is easier to use through mosaic. To use WAIS you would do: ws -h pmip.maricopa.edu -d cpindex/Cypherpunks <keyword> The "ws" may be "waissearch" on your system. You can get lots of info on WAIS from ftp://wais.think.com/comp.infosystems.wais-FAQ As someone pointed out, this "http" method does not yet work with "lynx" (a text only implementation of WWW) on the cypherpunks mail database. It seems it will take a new version of lynx or WAIS for this to work. But the Unix "xmosaic" works fine. :-) This form of global filename starting with something like "ftp://", "http://", "gopher://" etc is also part of the WWW architecture. These names are called "URLs" for Universal Resource Locator. Well, that is probably enough acronyms for today. :-) -- Vince From: Vincent.Cate(a)FURMINT.NECTAR.CS.CMU.EDU To: cypherpunks(a)toad.com Subject: WWW Acronyms (was Re: Cypherpunks' mail database does exist) Gary Jeffers: > Vincent, you state that a fully archived, indexed cypherpunks >mailing list exists as: >http://pmip.maricopa.edu/crypt/cypherpunks/cypherpunks.src >Ok, so I ftp'ed to pmip.maricopa.edu & tried to get to cypherpunks.src, >but even the subdirectories weren't there. The "http" is for "Hyper-Text Transport Protocol". This is not FTP, though it is a protocol similar in function to FTP. It is used by "WWW" (World Wide Web) of which Mosaic is the most popular implementation. If you have Mosaic, you can just give the above path. If you do not have mosaic, you should spend some time trying to get it. Mosaic makes it really easy to quickly move through lots of information on the net. Mosaic is a point and click hypertext interface. You can FTP to ftp.ncsa.uiuc.edu and go into Mosaic. You also have a typo, it is "Cypherpunks.src" with a capital C. WWW has a simple language for writting your own hypertext documents - "HTML" (Hyper Text Markup Language). You can think of this as sort of like Troff, LaTeX or Postscript, but for hypertext documents. One page of HTML can make dozens of normal files easy to access. For example, my README.html security page points to many normal files: ftp://furmint.nectar.cs.cmu.edu/security/README.html It turns out that the mail database is really in "WAIS" (Wide Area Information Server). You can use WAIS directly, though I think it is easier to use through mosaic. To use WAIS you would do: ws -h pmip.maricopa.edu -d cpindex/Cypherpunks <keyword> The "ws" may be "waissearch" on your system. You can get lots of info on WAIS from ftp://wais.think.com/comp.infosystems.wais-FAQ As someone pointed out, this "http" method does not yet work with "lynx" (a text only implementation of WWW) on the cypherpunks mail database. It seems it will take a new version of lynx or WAIS for this to work. But the Unix "xmosaic" works fine. :-) This form of global filename starting with something like "ftp://", "http://", "gopher://" etc is also part of the WWW architecture. These names are called "URLs" for Universal Resource Locator. Well, that is probably enough acronyms for today. :-) -- Vince PS I only read cypherpunks once a day, some time after midnight when my collection for the day is done. From: rishab(a)dxm.ernet.in Subject: Accessing the Cpunk WAIS archive "Gary Jeffers" <vikram!CCGARY(a)MIZZOU1.missouri.edu> > http://pmip.maricopa.edu/crypt/cypherpunks/Cypherpunks.src > is the location of all the Cypherpunks' posts with index. I can > get to this place by placing a "www" in front of this instruction. Do an archie search for lynx or mosaic or some other decent browser. This is a WAIS indexed archive; no hyper links; you type in a keyword, and get a list of matching articles, and select one (or more) of them to look at. ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- Rishab Aiyer Ghosh "Clean the air! clean the sky! wash the wind! rishab(a)dxm.ernet.in take stone from stone and wash them..." Voice/Fax/Data +91 11 6853410 Voicemail +91 11 3760335 H 34C Saket, New Delhi 110017, INDIA Chapter 6. Remailers & chained remailers. From: wcs(a)anchor.ho.att.com (bill.stewart(a)pleasantonca.ncr.com +1-510-484-6204) Message-Id: <9408300753.AA22369(a)anchor.ho.att.com> To: CCGARY(a)MIZZOU1.missouri.edu Subject: Re: Using remailers, chained remailers? There's somebody who posts a remailer summary to the list about monthly. There are three or four sets of remailers out there: - anon.penet.fi, which gives you an account an12345(a)anon.penet.fi which people can reply to. Send "Subject: help" to anon(a)anon.penet.fi and it'll probably give you a useful reply. Its big use is for anonymous Usenet posting with working replies. - The cypherpunks remailers, which are mostly one-way no-reply mailers; some also support Usenet posting. Soda is pretty typical. - Various enhanced cypherpunks remailers, which have features like encrypted reply addresses you can attach at the end. You can get information on using the soda remailer by sending email to remailer(a)csua.berkeley.edu, with "help" somewhere in the posting; I'm not sure if it wants it in the Subject: or in the body. That's the remailer that posts from "Tommy the Tourist" with random NSA-bait at the bottom of postings. Here's a recent posting on getting status of remailers. Note that some really only remail once per day, so they may be working fine even if it says they're not. ---- Date: Mon, 15 Aug 1994 13:39:33 -0700 From: Raph Levien <raph(a)kiwi.CS.Berkeley.EDU> To: cypherpunks(a)toad.com Subject: "finger remailer-list(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu" now operational Hi all, I have written and installed a remailer pinging script which collects detailed information about remailer features and reliability. To use it, just finger remailer-list(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu There is also a Web version of the same information, at http://http.cs.berkeley.edu/~raph/remailer-list.html Please do not take the uptime figures too seriously, at least for another week or so. The script has only been running reliably for a few days. Please let me know about any other remailers which I missed. I've only included remailers which can mail to arbitrary addresses, so I already know chop and twwells are missing. If you've got a Web page, please feel free to include a link to this page. If you think your Web page is relevant to the subject of remailers, let me know and I'll link it in. Comments and suggestions welcome! Raph Levien ------- # Bill Stewart AT&T Global Information Solutions, aka NCR Corp # 6870 Koll Center Parkway, Pleasanton CA, 94566 Phone 1-510-484-6204 fax-6399 # email bill.stewart(a)pleasantonca.ncr.com billstewart(a)attmail.com # ViaCrypt PGP Key IDs 384/C2AFCD 1024/9D6465 Chapter 7. Current problems in Crypt. 1. We need an Internet Chat PGP system for conversations in real time. Note: #Freedom channel on the Internet Chat system has carried out fast encrypted conversations for years. When a Cypherpunk contacted one of their members (Sargent someone), he was politely told that their system was private. Sargent was unwilling to disclose method. Is their system some kind of security by obscurity code that cannot be varied (like by a drop in crypt/decrypt algorithm)? Or maybe the crypt method could be a drop in variable method & Sarge was unaware of it? Possibly other #Freedom members would be more knowledgeable? Possibly, a knowledgeable & diplomatic Cypherpunk could hit paydirt by pursuing this. 2. Has Arsen Arachelian really solved the problem of discovery of crypt in steganograpy by statistical examination of the least significant bits in his WNSTROM? I have seen no debate on this. 3. If the Feds capture the internet & put their anti-privacy hardware & protocols in place & outlaw remailers, does anyone have any idea how to build secure & effective remailers? A "Fortress remailer"? 4. If the above possibility happens & Cyperpunks' list is outlawed, does anyone have ideas how to make a "Fortress list"? Chapter 8. Text sources. Section 1. Books. From: Stanton McCandlish <mech(a)eff.org> Subject: O'Reilly PGP book Date: Wed, 7 Sep 1994 13:38:58 -0400 (EDT) coming soon, PGP hits the mainstream: PGP: Pretty Good Privacy by Simson Garfinkel 1st Edition November 1994 (est.) 250 pages (est),ISBN: 1-56592-098-8, $17.95 (est) PGP is a freely available encryption program that protects the privacy of files and electronic mail. It uses powerful public key cryptography and works on virtually every platform. PGP: Pretty Good Privacy by Simson Garfinkel is both a readable technical users guide and a fascinating behind-the-scenes look at cryptography and privacy. Part I of the book describes how to use PGP: protecting files and email, creating and using keys, signing messages, certifying and distributing keys, and using key servers. Part II provides background on cryptography, battles against public key patents and U.S. government export restrictions, and other aspects of the ongoing public debates about privacy and free speech. -- <A HREF="http://www.eff.org/~mech/mech.html"> Stanton McCandlish </A><HR><A HREF="mailto:mech@eff.org"> mech(a)eff.org </A><P><A HREF="http://www.eff.org/"> Electronic Frontier Fndtn. </A><P> Online Activist The best book in cryptography is: APPLIED CRYPTOGRAPHY Protocols, Algorithms, and Source Code in C by Bruce Schneier Loompanics advertising copy follows: In Applied Cryptography, data security expert Bruce Schneier details how programmers can use cryptography - the technique of enciphering messages - to maintain the privacy of computer data. Covering the latest developments in practical cryptographic techniques, the book shows programmers who design computer software and systems we use every day. Along with more than 100 pages of actual C source code of working cryptographic algorithms, this pratical handbook: * Explains data encryption protocols and techniques currently in use and likely to be used in the future. * Offers numerous present day applications - from secure correspondence to anonymous messaging. * Includes numerous source code fragments and shows how to incorporate them into larger programs. * Discusses related issues like patents, export laws, and legal rulings. And much more! 1994, 7 1/2 x 9, 636 pp, Illustrated, indexed, soft cover. APPLIED CRYPTOGRAPHY: $44.95 (order number 10062) $4.00 for shipping and handling. UPS ground. Additional $7.50 if you want UPS w day air(blue)- that would be $11.50. Loompanics Unlimited PO Box 1197 Port Townsend, WA 98368 Section 2. Rants. For good rants FTP to soda.berkeley.edu /pub/cypherpunks/rants Section 3. CYPHERNOMICON - Tim May's "official" Cypherpunks' FAQ. This is a giant (1.3MB uncompressed) faq by Tim May. To get it by anonymous ftp: ftp to ftp.netcom.com /pub/tcmay - This directory has it & its associated files. Chapter 9. Cypherpunks' mailing list. getting on etc.. ======================================================================== 63 X-Delivery-Notice: SMTP MAIL FROM does not correspond to sender. Received: from MIZZOU1 (SMTP) by MIZZOU1 (Mailer R2.10 ptf000) with BSMTP id 8875; Sun, 11 Sep 94 23:25:40 CDT Received: from relay2.UU.NET by MIZZOU1.missouri.edu (IBM VM SMTP V2R2) with TCP; Sun, 11 Sep 94 23:25:39 CDT Received: from toad.com by relay2.UU.NET with SMTP id QQxgzh01248; Mon, 12 Sep 1994 00:22:38 -0400 Received: by toad.com id AA27527; Sun, 11 Sep 94 21:22:46 PDT Date: Sun, 11 Sep 94 21:22:46 PDT Message-Id: <9409120422.AA27527(a)toad.com> To: CCGARY(a)MIZZOU1.missouri.edu From: Majordomo(a)toad.com Subject: Majordomo results Reply-To: Majordomo(a)toad.com -- >>>> help This is Brent Chapman's "Majordomo" mailing list manager, version 1.92. In the description below items contained in []'s are optional. When providing the item, do not include the []'s around it. It understands the following commands: subscribe <list> [<address>] Subscribe yourself (or <address> if specified) to the named <list>. unsubscribe <list> [<address>] Unsubscribe yourself (or <address> if specified) from the named <list>. get <list> <filename> Get a file related to <list>. index <list> Return an index of files you can "get" for <list>. which [<address>] Find out which lists you (or <address> if specified) are on. who <list> Find out who is on the named <list>. info <list> Retrieve the general introductory information for the named <list>. lists Show the lists served by this Majordomo server. help Retrieve this message. end Stop processing commands (useful if your mailer adds a signature). Commands should be sent in the body of an email message to "Majordomo(a)toad.com". Commands in the "Subject:" line NOT processed. If you have any questions or problems, please contact "Majordomo-Owner(a)toad.com". PUSH EM BACK! PUSH EM BACK! WWWAAAYYYY BBBAAACCCK! BBBEEEAAATTTT STATE!

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tier-remailing available in the remailer installer
by sameer 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I added a slight bit to the remailer installer that I've written which allows you to setup a "tiered" remailer. A "tiered" remailer is one which only sends outgoing mail to another remailer.. that way the remailer that you might run would not come under as much heat as a last hop remailer. (A message such as: To: remail(a)scaredsite.com From: sameer(a)c2.org Anon-To: cypherpunks(a)toad.com Subject: hi would turn into To: remail(a)c2.org From: nobody(a)c2.org Anon-To: cypherpunks(a)toad.com Subject: hi when it went out of the remailer) available on ftp.csua.berkeley.edu:/pub/cypherpunks/remailer/remailer-install.v1.tar.gz -- sameer Voice: 510-841-2014 Network Administrator Pager: 510-321-1014 Community ConneXion: The NEXUS-Berkeley Dialin: 510-549-1383 http://www.c2.org (or login as "guest") sameer(a)c2.org

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Secret evidence in judicial hearings
by Brad Dolan 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Links to crypto are weak (maybe!) but I think this may be of interest to some on the list: Associated Press reported yesterday: "A former NASA researcher has been ordered deported as a suspected North Korean agent following a hearing at which he was not allowed to see all the evidence against him. [...] Lee was ordered [deported] on Friday by federal immigration Judge Michael Suarez, partly on the basis of classified FBI information that Suarez refused to divulge to either Lee or his attorney, Herbert Gee. Lee said neither he nor his lawyer was allowed to attend the government's closing statements Wednesday."

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H.E.A.T. BEAT
by Sandy Sandfort 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ SANDY SANDFORT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . H.E.A.T. seekers, Please note my new title for these reviews in the subject line. Consider it a filtering aid--pro or con. CODE NAME: FRAME-UP The Team is in Culebra ("snake"), Panama to capture a gunrunner, Salazar, who's supplying terrorists. They pretend to be hanging out on the beach (bikini alert) and the grab him as he is making a "private" cellular call to the terrorists. During the snatch, they find that he is carrying cocaine, so that's what he gets busted for. He will being going before Judge Diaz, who is not corrupt, so he's toast unless his brother can rig something. "Something" comes in the form of Celia Alvarez, a Salazar gun moll who bears a striking resemblance to our own Romana Machado. She comes to our hero, Mike, and tells him she wants to make a break from Salazar's gang. She gets Mike to her room to talk about it, and gives him a Mickey Finn. When Mike comes to, he's in bed with his gun in his hand and a dead guy (shot with Mike's gun) on the floor. They dead guy is judge Diaz. The cops burst in, Celia says, "he did it" and away goes Mike. After this point, the plot self-destructs and makes no sense at all. No matter; that's not why we're here. Before all this happen, however, there is a gratuitous montage of babes in bikinis, intercut with scenes of our heroes basking on the beach, practicing martial arts, frolicking in the water, playing with puppies, etc. (For those of you who are more interested in good-looking guys than gals, there were plenty of shots of shirtless male Team members, posing and flexing their muscles.) The upshot of the weird plot twists is that the Team loses its official backing and has to go in on its own to save Mike. To do this, they first break into the DEA's computer. The purpose of the intrusion is to put information *into* the database. They create files that say that Marcos and Cat are big-time drug dealers. With this, they are able to infiltrate Salazar's operation and ... well I'm not sure what the idea was, but it gives Marcos a chance to slick back his hair (all bad guys on Acapulco H.E.A.T. have slicked back hair), and dress in a cheesy pimp outfit. Cat gets to put on too much makeup and tart it up in a short, tight, red dress. Besides the computer break-in, there is only one other "hi-tech" plot device. Outside Salazar's villa, the Team uses a "long range mike" to pick up Mike's voice inside. The microphone was an incredibly cheap-looking hand-held parabolic mike. It was only about a foot in diameter, and they were using it *through the windshield* of their car. There was also a briefcase with a flash bomb inside, but that's not particularly hi-tech. Of course, there is a climactic shoot-em-up, but the only thing that gets blown up is the aforementioned flash Grenada briefcase. There was, however, some deliciously irresponsible firearms role modeling. When Ashley finds Mike, he's handcuffed. They have one of their typical romantic banters that ends with her saying, "Maybe I should just shoot you and blame it on Salazar." Mike responds with a smart-ass comment, at which point Ashley points her pistol at Mike, causing him to cringe away with his hands over his head. She than pulls the trigger and shots through the links connecting the two wrist sections of Mike's handcuffs. Ya' gotta love a woman like that. (Or else!) S a n d y ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

3 2

Upgrade to Betsi
by rubin＠faline.bellcore.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Update on Bellcore's Trusted Software Integrity System ------------------------------------------------------ The format of Betsi certificates has now been upgraded to accomodate multiple files. The md5sum program, which is included in the contrib directory of the pgp 2.6.1 distribution, takes a list of files or wildcards as arguments and produces a list of md5 hash sums followed by file names. The format of a request for certificate message is the same as before for one file, and as follows for multiple files: To: certify(a)bellcore.com Subject: certify -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Bebeto J. Romario thumper.bellcore.com MD5 2ee29998b334297dcc32102eb857fbc3 Fontmap Version 2.1 c3e5704be89c4d4807d5fec11b1752e6 Great.Program.zip dc3a8031d65db8bb0ec3de046abe79b2 README 012ffa34521f97ae381fb5f11f837016 Trusted.Dist.tar.Z -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6 iQB1AwUBLoGbvJti/eSkC5bZAQFudQL/W4u7zOE9yp8rTXsSQK2L9pfHIYNzOkRB g4lNKTHzFXgbEdN8+DzpB2mKCYYTNw+k/qP/Hui0yaG0oeksNYnqJN1zzB0vWhgG TyFzJqVop/QlYIlrItFr+LD1ebDBOYon =UGQZ -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- The paper at thumper.bellcore.com in /pub/certify/Betsi.ps has been updated to reflect this upgrade, and it is further explained there. I am currently working on writing mosaic pages to facilitate the process of sending various messages to Betsi. For more information on Betsi send a message to certify(a)bellcore.com with the subject: help. ********************************************************************* Aviel D. Rubin Email: rubin(a)faline.bellcore.com Bellcore (MRE-2M354) http://www.citi.umich.edu/users/rubin/ 445 South St. Morristown, NJ 07960 Voice: +1 201 829 4105 USA FAX: +1 201 829 5889

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Re: kerberosV telnet
by Jeff Gostin 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Jef Poskanzer <jef(a)ee.lbl.gov> writes: > No, of course you didn't mention it. I mentioned it, in the subject > of the first message of this ridiculous thread. Apparently you > STILL DON'T GET IT. Since you two can't send what should be in private email anywhere but the list, I'm sending this discussion where it belongs... *PLONK* to Threads-From-Hell. (TM)

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Re: kerberosV telnet
by Jef Poskanzer 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>I was not continuing this on cypherpunks, but Mr. Pozkanzer seems to >have an insistance on posting bits of private mail, so I suppose I >should return the compliment. Gosh gee gee whillikers Perry, what did you expect me to do after you started quoting from private email, hmmmmmmm? --- Jef

2 1

Re: H.E.A.T. BEAT
by merriman＠metronet.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ > SANDY SANDFORT > . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . > For the Alison Armitage fans out there (YO! Sandy! :-), the local snoozepaper TV listings indicate that she's going to be co-host(ess) of an athletic competition program called (stand by....) BeachClash. Guest athletes compete against regular cast ("Hardbodies" with names like Ripper, Breeze, and Zuma) - Beach Blanket American Gladiators? Appears to be nationally syndicated; might be worth looking into (pun intended!). Here in the Dallas area, the new program is already slated for the old H.E.A.T. timeslot (midnight!); haven't found out where H.E.A.T. went off to.... Hmmmmm. Athletic competition. Alison. Beach. *drool* :-) Dave Merriman - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Finger merriman(a)metronet.com for PGP/RIPEM public keys and fingerprints. Unencrypted Email may be ignored without notice to sender. PGP preferred. Remember: It is not enough to _obey_ Big Brother; you must also learn to *love* Big Brother.

1 0

TIS, SKE, & CyberCash Inc.
by wfgodot＠iquest.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

John Young <jya(a)pipeline.com> wrote: > Peter Wayner writes in October BYTE on electronic documents in > business. > > Admirably covers encryption, digital signatures, > authentication, digital cash, timestamps and more. > > See "EDI Moves the Data", pp.121-128. > > The issue has some other mentions of crypto. Also worthwhile is the article on page 40 which discusses Trusted Information Systems' software-key escrow proposal. After seeing it I decided to hunt down the TIS Software Key Escrow paper at ftp://ftp.tis.com/pub/crypto/ske. It makes for interesting reading on the kinder, gentler, sugar-coated incarnation of key escrow that we're likely to be seeing more of. Sugar-coated or not, it still has poison inside. TIS's proposal is even more noteworthy considering their affiliation with the CyberCash Inc. venture written about in the 09/13/94 WSJ article posted here several days ago (ie. $whois cybercash.com = TIS). So, one of the leading proposals for SKE comes from a company involved with one of the leading digicash ventures. It looks like TIS is a company to watch. The TIS SKE paper asserts that: "Key escrow cryptography has been a controversial topic since it was proposed in 1993. We believe that it is most likely to be accepted for use outside of government if it is authorized by legislation that sets forth the circumstances under which keys may be released and the sanctions for abuse of the escrow process" Well, hell will freeze over before it is accepted by this citizen. Those who have seen how RICO and the Forfeiture Law have run amok in this country have no reason to feel sanguine about the potential future abuses of key escrow. I don't expect the statutory limitations on its misuse to be any more reliable than the search and seizure limitations or due process requirements of the Forth and Fifth Amendments which have been vitiated over the past decade or so. And the prospect that the surveillance state infrastructure which the Friends of Big Brother (FOBBs) are trying to put into place today will be available for potentially more tyrannical leaders that may appear in the future, even more inimical to liberty, privacy and personal sovereignty than the current ones, is not a comforting thought. -Michael

3 4

An Attempt to Hobble SAFE Crypto Bill
by Declan McCullagh 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

---------- Forwarded message ---------- Date: Fri, 25 Jul 1997 11:03:33 -0800 From: "--Todd Lappin-->" <telstar(a)wired.com> To: fight-censorship(a)vorlon.mit.edu http://www.wired.com/news/news/politics/story/5492.html An Attempt to Hobble House Crypto Bill by Rebecca Vesely 9:08am 25.Jul.97.PDT A Republican opponent of a House bill that would loosen controls on the use and export of encryption is circulating an amendment that would effectively cripple the legislation. The amendment, by Representative Benjamin Gilman (R-New York), who chairs the International Relations Committee, would make it unlawful to "manufacture, distribute, sell, or import any product within the United States that can be used to encrypt communications or information if the product does not permit the real-time decryption of such encrypted communications or information." This means that if law-enforcement officials could not crack an encrypted file within 24 hours - the time that FBI director Louis Freeh and other law enforcement officials say is reasonable for accessing information related to a crime - that strength of encryption would be illegal. The amendment set a civil penalty of US$100,000 for such violations. Currently, the most complex programs that can be cracked so quickly use 40-bit algorithms. The relative ease of breaking such code makes it nearly worthless on the marketplace, the high-tech industry has warned. Stronger encryption - 56-bit and 128-bit algorithms are being employed in many products now - is widely viewed as a cornerstone to the development of electronic commerce. Stronger code can safeguard data such as credit-card numbers as it travels over networks. Gilman had the amendment in hand earlier this week when his panel marked up the Security and Freedom through Encryption Act by Representative Bob Goodlatte (R-Virginia). The bill has been condemned by the government's chief law-enforcement and national-security officials because it would prevent domestic controls on encryption while relaxing export controls. The FBI and National Security Agency want a domestic key-recovery system to wiretap digital communications. Gilman was unsuccessful in trying to insert another provision during the mark-up - one to give the president the power to deny crypto export licenses on national-security grounds. "The second amendment was a staff proposal that basically was dependent on what happened to the first amendment," said Jerry Lipson, spokesman for the House International Relations Committee. "There was no sentiment that this one should be introduced when the first one failed." A staffer for a congressman who supports the Goodlatte bill said that the new amendment was a "scare tactic" meant to show committee members that law enforcement won't stand for a relaxed approach to encryption policy. Indeed, FBI director Freeh met one-on-one with 10 International Relations panel members for hour-long sessions in the days before the mark-up, the staffer said. Nine of the 10 voted for the bill anyway. Some staffers and observers suggest that the Gilman amendment could be introduced when the bill goes to the Select Committee on Intelligence. Although the legislation has 214 co-sponsors in the House, none are members of that panel. And the bill still must reach two other committees before it goes to a full House vote: Commerce and National Security. The deadline for all committees to address the bill is 5 September. "They don't draft amendments like this for the heck of it," said Alan Davidson, staff counsel for the Center for Democracy and Technology. "It's a glimpse at what could be a very frightening future." Copyright © 1993-97 Wired Ventures, Inc. and affiliated companies. All rights reserved.

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MS, IBM, Apple, EFF and DTB [was : TIS, SKE, & CyberCash Inc.
by Pat Farrell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

tcmay(a)netcom.com (Timothy C. May) writes: > - The latest "Internet World" (Oct. '94, p. 11) confirms that > Microsoft is building Internet connectivity into upcoming releases of > Windows and Windows NT. ^^^^^^^^^^ this one, at least has been released and should be at your local computer store RSN. I've been on the NT beta test, and it is really nice. The built in SLIP/PPP will massivly increase the number of real internet hosts. It is easy to use and robust. They don't ship Cello/Mosaic, but that is trivial to add. > (The scenario I think is likely: SKE is put in at the OS level, > perhaps with these SLIP/PPP/TCP-IP protocols. > > And given the EFF's recent sell-out on Digital Telephony (which is of > course related to this, especially since the OS makers like Microsoft > and Apple are negotiating deals with the cable-telco companies, thus > presumably making the OS makers partners in the "wiretapping" > requirements), I would not be surprised to see similar deals being > arranged behind the scenes. Much more than working deals, Microsoft wants to be an Internet Serivce Provider (ISP), much like Apple and IBM have recently become. IBM's new OS/2 has a "one button" signon/configuration onto their service. Apple has been bundling eWorld for a while. But I don't see Tim's OS-oriented collusion. The EFF sell out clearly focused on defining service providors and then excluding then, specifically, from the burden of DTB. Doesn't look like they like GAK any more than Tim or me. Pat Pat Farrell Grad Student pfarrell(a)cs.gmu.edu Department of Computer Science George Mason University, Fairfax, VA Public key availble via finger #include <standard.disclaimer>

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PGP, remailer@rebma.mn.org
by Bill O'Hanlon 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

The remailer at rebma.mn.org was not using pgp 2.6, and it was having trouble with messages that used the newer versions. (I think it was running 2.3.) Anyway, I fixed it, but I imagine there's been some traffic that didn't get remailed. Sorry. -Bill

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Re: Data Fellows announces F-Secure SSH Tunnel&Terminal
by Petri Laakkonen 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Hi guys, I'm afraid of that US sales has fallen off the tracks. We need to catch up ASAP. At 07:58 PM 7/24/97 +0200, Tom Helenius wrote: >FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE >23 July, 1997 > >Data Fellows announces F-Secure SSH Tunnel&Terminal > What's this product all in all ? Has this now replaced F-Secure SSH or is this one additional derivative of SSH a'la ISP SSH ? Are the features same as for the most recent SSH clients/servers ? HOw does this product differ from SSH ? Any data sheets ? Is the software a) shipping b) downloadable from the web ? >The remote worker can use e-mail, Internet browser, database tools and all >the usual applications at home, on the road or in any place with Internet >access. The big difference, though invisible to the remote worker, is that >all data communication between the server in the office and the remote user >is flowing through an encrypted tunnel. > Does this configure itself automatically for most popular office apps as discussed some time earlier, or do admins still need to do the installation manually for each computer or count on users doing this themselves ? >F-Secure SSH Tunnel&Terminal provides strong encryption of data and thus >sets a new standard for secure remote working. Existing solutions like >Cisco Systems L2F, IETF L2TP and firewalls dont provide strong encryption >and authentication, which makes these solutions insecure against >eavesdropping and IP spoofing attacks. In addition to encrypted tunnels, >F-Secure Tunnel&Terminal also provides secure terminal connections to UNIX >hosts and secures UNIX X11 applications. > What would be F-Secure Tunnel's added value over MS pptp ? > >The automatic deployment tool enables straightforward company-wide >installation and updates. > Interesting. Tell us more about this ? > > >F-Secure SSH Tunnel&Terminal is available for win3.1, win95, winNT and UNIX >operating systems worldwide in the end of July, 1997. > How about our friends from Cupertino (e.g. Apple) ? > Thanks for the additional info in advance, Petri -------------------------------------------------------------------- Petri.Laakkonen(a)DataFellows.com, World Wide Web: http://www.DataFellows.com Data Fellows U.S headquarters has moved ! Our new contacts as of March 24th, 1997 are: Data Fellows 675 N. First Street, Suite 605 San Jose, CA 95112 phone (408) 938-6700, fax (408) 938-6701 ********************************************************************* * F-Secure * * Award-winning Security for Peace of Mind * * from the Desktop to the Internet * * * * http://www.DataFellows.com/ * ********************************************************************

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Beach Clash first edition review
by merriman＠metronet.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Yup. Pretty much a case of Beach Blanket American Gladiators; except that it's two "teams", each team consisting of HomeTown Folks and 2 each of the HardBodies (1 each male & female). Swimsuits on contestants are "sports" types (can't afford to have anything popping free on national TV, eh?). Bystanders/Audience, however, suffer no such limitations :-) Ditto on "personal interviews" with contestants (guys, too, for those so inclined). Alison wears normal street clothes (sorry Sandy!) Team names are Suitably Impressive and Beach-y: Tigersharks and Sea Otters Tonights program included: > two-pass swim/climb: guys come in from out at sea, girls climb rope. One guy rides paddleboard in, tags girl who climbs rope to release flag, which signals other guy to swim in from raft - said guy then tags same girl who releases additional flag. > hill climb: guys & girls climb wet plastic fake hills, run back to beginning, tag another team member who climbs, until all have gone over the hills. > raft drag: guy team member on jet ski pulls girl team member hanging onto inflatable raft. > VolleySmash: 4-person/team volleyball on a giant airmattress > BungeeBall: contestants try to run against restraint of bungee cord, getting close enough to make freethrows. > BeachBout: contestants try to knock each other off horizontal pole using foam bats. > King of the Raft: male/female contestants paddle out to raft to join other members to try to climb pyramid and displace ball. > Walk the Plank: team members walk across the horizontal pole from BeachBout while opposing team throws "dodge balls" at them. > Surf War: tug-o-war in the surf. > Crash and Burn: obstacle course through/in the surf and beach. I'm sure there are crypto/privacy issues here, but I'm too thick to see them :-) Mildly amusing, but not something I'm going to stay up 'till midnight for next week. Dave Merriman - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Finger merriman(a)metronet.com for PGP/RIPEM public keys and fingerprints. Unencrypted Email may be ignored without notice to sender. PGP preferred. Remember: It is not enough to _obey_ Big Brother; you must also learn to *love* Big Brother.

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Re: Chomsky (Thread from Hell)
by blancw＠pylon.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Responding to msg by James A. Donald: >He implies that democratic control of speech and ideas >would be a vast improvement in our civil liberties, >that it would make us more free. But who pays attention to what Chomsky thinks (say, by comparison to others similarly inclined). >In other words he is perverting the language so that >for him "freedom of speech" is democratic control of >speech and ideas by the people. Then who is going to understand what he really means? >He continually describes (and wildly exaggerates) the >problem using language that implies that only a >collective, rather than individual, response to >misinformation can make us free. He isn't the only one who ever has, or ever will, advocate such things. He's not on the board of directors of the NII, is he; or how does he exert influence? >. . . .Chomsky fans show a notable lack of >tolerance for other forms of speech, as is most >noticeable on the net. So is it Chomsky, or his fans who are the problem? And how do they succeed in making themselves influential? >Since there are clearly a great many people who seek >and desire totalitarianism, with their group at the >top, we should hardly be surprised to see large >number of people seeking to achieve this through means >that are workable and feasible, rather than through >means that are absurd and impossible. This type of person is interchangeable: they could follow someone (like Chomsky) today or someone else tomorrow. It should always be possible to recognize the difference between one thing and another - one kind of idea or social system or another - just as you have, by seeing the contradictions and actual relations in the expressed statements, proposals, methodologies, etc. It looks as though you are simply fighting the ideas which many people have always found to their advantage to believe, but I can't see where Chomsky is the only & most important reason why they are willing to think as they do. So - those are my comments on Chomsky, about which I will write no more, as he doesn't sound interesting at all to pursue. Blanc

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Fwd: Anonymous Long Distance Phone Calling
by unknown＠example.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- > HOW TO PURCHASE YOUR CALLING CARD: >You send a $50 or $100 blank Cashier's check, or cash, to the address >stated below. I have purchased a pile of PIN cards and I randomly select >and send it to you. The company I buy these cards from, keeps no records, >if they did, all records of sales are to me in my name unfortunately. >keep no records of addresses or PIN numbers who I am sending to. After yo >receive your card you go about making your calls and then when you want to >add more time to your calling card (recharge the card), This is where yo >gain another level of privacy, because I step out of the loop and you will >communicate with Traceless, the providing company, directly. You send a >money order or cash and your PIN number to the address provided on the car >and they will recharge the anonyous PIN number with the amount sent. You >no name or return address on the envelope. Since all they did was send a >pile of cards to me and I sent them out they have no way of knowing who wh >or where the cards went to. Alternatively, for those who have an offsho >Visa, MasterCard or American Express accounts, you can set it up so t >your PIN account can be credited by certain amounts when you hit a certai >key while making phone calls to the special 800 number. If this option i >appealing to you, let me know and I can send some more information. Also >for those that need voice encryption that option is available. Again >you want more info on this let me know. I wonder how anonymous this will be once the subpoenas start flying. I think that this is still traceable via this method: 1) The authorities have you under physical surveillance (A tail) 2) Since they know where you've been they pull the phone records and see all of the outgoing calls. 3) They get the records from this company and match the time or the number that the call was placed from. (800 billing records have this) 4) Now they know where you called. You are relying on this unknown company to NOT cave in when subpoenas are flying around. I wouldn't, especially at 30+ cents a minute. - -----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- Version: 2.6.1 mQCNAy5pUekAAAEEAKrDj64Zj9AJU+gC7/Ivdk8b1ef6a1T9K5CGFeu1yFDSXLyD DLIdGunZR/4ilosLMxdlZcNqPwZ3HgxL+Gk3y2SwYfqKpeWExWPgb696lgzf2BRC tED15ZAwi3UDIkcouv2PBiDwPNUUmnLb5diDXdA3qtALb+XzlwpnimeWAf3FAAUT tCFTYW11ZWwgS2FwbGluIDwrMSAoNjEyKSA1MzAtNzMxNj6JAJUCBRAuaVLjQqfV nzRSzxkBAcXuA/47yIN+sltMyIRqCgUZz/gubdI6LUcpFsTcXsFWppROpAWFPJv0 J9z/UoP1kjJ+nrAAizuKuhmC5eg5OOxUE+tUgSPl6hAtu2xJYmKtCbQpxF0sG8ni 4e8I8Zsk5vcopO5Vub96CiVgPjI5vITCb32kcLKI1yyFaztbHdtOasUthrQuU2Ft dWVsIEthcGxpbiA8c2FtdWVsLmthcGxpbkB3YXJlaG91c2UubW4ub3JnPg== =J2S+ - -----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- Fido: Sam Kaplin 1:282/1018 | "...vidi vici veni" - Overheard Compuserve: 75240,131 | outside a Roman brothel. samuel.kaplin(a)warehouse.mn.org | 75240,131(a)compuserve.com | Change is the only constant in the For confidential communications use PGP | Universe..."Four quarters, please." ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.1 iQCVAgUBLoUKLwpnimeWAf3FAQHfCAQAlCNoT0syIxVnHp+IqQpXRsrwRmOpWBk3 pB+GLBSwBgz9Vyl/unPj8PsxekkN6O5j+3eLAvVLQvluC1Ab0bAwkK44ta1ltRnz 3nXb4SQmNeLieKk+42iEXDNTUoplDhrf4FyoNew+k/NT3DzdlQi3rGA7SHUzfsZ2 4DqqXx6f/pc= =iXgU -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Jim Bidzos
by unknown＠example.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- - ->:My humble opinion: Jim is not really the enemy, nor is he really a - ->:friend. He is a businessman trying to make a buck via the intellectual - ->:property laws. Sometimes this works out in our favor, sometimes it - ->:doesn't. He sends out letters defending his intellectual property - ->:rights that tend to be full of innuendo and that border on - ->:prevarication, but always stay on the proper side of the line; this is - ->:such a standard practice among people in businesses like his that I - ->:can't fault him for it. Overall, I'd say that anger towards him is - ->:misplaced. Unfortunately Herr Bizdos is not dealing with the business community, he is dealing with the INTERNET community. While all the sabre rattling may be acceptable within the business community, it is not acceptable within the INTERNET community. In effect Bizdos created his own problem. If the code was stolen, he should have had better physical security on it. If a licensee anonymously posted it, he should have included a means of tracing the code back to the source of the leak, then pursue that individual, not the whole INTERNET crypto community. If the code was reverse engineered, that's one of the risks in not patenting it. Personally I'm tiring of the whole affair. - -----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- Version: 2.6.1 mQCNAy5pUekAAAEEAKrDj64Zj9AJU+gC7/Ivdk8b1ef6a1T9K5CGFeu1yFDSXLyD DLIdGunZR/4ilosLMxdlZcNqPwZ3HgxL+Gk3y2SwYfqKpeWExWPgb696lgzf2BRC tED15ZAwi3UDIkcouv2PBiDwPNUUmnLb5diDXdA3qtALb+XzlwpnimeWAf3FAAUT tCFTYW11ZWwgS2FwbGluIDwrMSAoNjEyKSA1MzAtNzMxNj6JAJUCBRAuaVLjQqfV nzRSzxkBAcXuA/47yIN+sltMyIRqCgUZz/gubdI6LUcpFsTcXsFWppROpAWFPJv0 J9z/UoP1kjJ+nrAAizuKuhmC5eg5OOxUE+tUgSPl6hAtu2xJYmKtCbQpxF0sG8ni 4e8I8Zsk5vcopO5Vub96CiVgPjI5vITCb32kcLKI1yyFaztbHdtOasUthrQuU2Ft dWVsIEthcGxpbiA8c2FtdWVsLmthcGxpbkB3YXJlaG91c2UubW4ub3JnPg== =J2S+ - -----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- Fido: Sam Kaplin 1:282/1018 | "...vidi vici veni" - Overheard Compuserve: 75240,131 | outside a Roman brothel. samuel.kaplin(a)warehouse.mn.org | 75240,131(a)compuserve.com | Change is the only constant in the For confidential communications use PGP | Universe..."Four quarters, please." ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.1 iQCVAgUBLoW8JwpnimeWAf3FAQHSpQP+ONtJQFljElHW+cZqVS2Ad7qikN+58A/w SpUHb6jhkSjuQoEHMUxM54vpTPiPgaE+TGCvBt5u2d4zqJVeF52FYbS+MUvoT6rs 3pYuF0DxR23MBElthtJUdaLUOW6w2pSXk7bcCL5bgCiB9zHe+V/KmzvRdSX8y9xf ttke5IXHBeA= =QGMi -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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List of reliable remailers
by Raph Levien 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I have written and installed a remailer pinging script which collects detailed information about remailer features and reliability. To use it, just finger remailer-list(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu There is also a Web version of the same information, at: http://www.cs.berkeley.edu/~raph/remailer-list.html Please let me know about any other remailers which I missed. I've only included remailers which can mail to arbitrary addresses, so I already know chop and twwells are missing. This information is used by premail, a remailer chaining and PGP encrypting client for outgoing mail, which is available at: fftp://soda.berkeley.edu/pub/cypherpunks/premail/premail-0.22.tar.gz For the PGP public keys of the remailers, as well as some help on how to use them, finger remailer.help.all(a)chaos.bsu.edu This is the current info: REMAILER LIST This is an automatically generated listing of remailers. The first part of the listing shows the remailers along with configuration options and special features for each of the remailers. The second part shows the 10-day history, and average latency and uptime for each remailer. You can also get this list by fingering remailer-list(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu. $remailer{"chaos"} = "<remailer(a)chaos.bsu.edu> cpunk hash ksub"; $remailer{"vox"} = "<remail(a)vox.xs4all.nl> cpunk oldpgp. post"; $remailer{"avox"} = "<anon(a)vox.hacktic.nl> cpunk oldpgp post"; $remailer{"extropia"} = "<remail(a)extropia.wimsey.com> cpunk pgp special"; $remailer{"portal"} = "<hfinney(a)shell.portal.com> cpunk pgp hash"; $remailer{"alumni"} = "<hal(a)alumni.caltech.edu> cpunk pgp hash"; $remailer{"bsu-cs"} = "<nowhere(a)bsu-cs.bsu.edu> cpunk hash ksub"; $remailer{"rebma"} = "<remailer(a)rebma.mn.org> cpunk pgp hash"; $remailer{"jpunix"} = "<remailer(a)jpunix.com> cpunk pgp hash latent cut post"; $remailer{"wien"} = "<remailer(a)ds1.wu-wien.ac.at> cpunk pgp hash nsub"; $remailer{"c2"} = "<remail(a)c2.org> eric pgp hash"; $remailer{"soda"} = "<remailer(a)csua.berkeley.edu> eric pgp. post"; $remailer{"penet"} = "<anon(a)anon.penet.fi> penet post"; $remailer{"ideath"} = "<remailer(a)ideath.goldenbear.com> cpunk hash ksub"; $remailer{"usura"} = "<usura(a)xs4all.nl> cpunk pgp. hash latent cut post"; $remailer{"leri"} = "<remail(a)leri.edu> cpunk pgp hash"; $remailer{"desert"} = "<remail(a)desert.xs4all.nl> cpunk pgp. post"; $remailer{"underdog"} = "<lmccarth(a)ducie.cs.umass.edu> cpunk pgp hash latent cut post"; $remailer{"nately"} = "<remailer(a)nately.ucsd.edu> cpunk pgp hash latent cut"; catalyst(a)netcom.com is _not_ a remailer. Last ping: Mon 26 Sep 94 6:00:01 PDT remailer email address history latency uptime ----------------------------------------------------------------------- wien remailer(a)ds1.wu-wien.ac.at ++********#+ 5:08 99.99% c2 remail(a)c2.org *+*-*+**+-** 29:25 99.99% chaos remailer(a)chaos.bsu.edu #**#*****### 1:18 99.99% ideath remailer(a)ideath.goldenbear.com *-.++*+***** 31:44 99.99% leri remail(a)leri.edu *+*-*+****#* 13:43 99.99% bsu-cs nowhere(a)bsu-cs.bsu.edu ***+*--**# # 20:40 99.99% portal hfinney(a)shell.portal.com ********##*# 4:01 99.97% underdog lmccarth(a)ducie.cs.umass.edu **********+* 4:22 99.92% penet anon(a)anon.penet.fi ************ 34:17 99.81% jpunix remailer(a)jpunix.com * #*****-*#* 7:46 99.79% vox remail(a)vox.xs4all.nl -.- .-..-. 14:02:41 99.66% soda remailer(a)csua.berkeley.edu ...__..-.. 8:25:41 99.27% alumni hal(a)alumni.caltech.edu **** ******* 5:25 99.02% extropia remail(a)extropia.wimsey.com ++++-+-++ * 1:01:20 99.00% nately remailer(a)nately.ucsd.edu -+++* 54:21 98.17% rebma remailer(a)rebma.mn.org -+-_..--+-- 10:18:14 97.33% usura usura(a)xs4all.nl **+***+***+ 6:05 96.17% desert remail(a)desert.xs4all.nl -------.--- 24:51:16 82.67% Suggested path: chaos;c2;wien For more info: http://www.cs.berkeley.edu/~raph/remailer-list.html Options and features cpunk A major class of remailers. Supports Request-Remailing-To: field. eric A variant of the cpunk style. Uses Anon-Send-To: instead. penet The third class of remailers (at least for right now). Uses X-Anon-To: in the header. pgp Remailer supports encryption with PGP. A period after the keyword means that the short name, rather than the full email address, should be used as the encryption key ID. oldpgp Remailer does not like messages encoded with MIT PGP 2.6. Other versions of PGP, including 2.3a and 2.6ui, work fine. hash Supports ## pasting, so anything can be put into the headers of outgoing messages. ksub Remailer always kills subject header, even in non-pgp mode. nsub Remailer always preserves subject header, even in pgp mode. latent Supports Matt Ghio's Latent-Time: option. cut Supports Matt Ghio's Cutmarks: option. special Accepts only pgp encrypted messages. History key * # response in less than 5 minutes. * * response in less than 1 hour. * + response in less than 4 hours. * - response in less than 24 hours. * . response in more than 1 day. * _ response came back too late (more than 2 days). If you've got a Web page, please feel free to include a link to this page. If you think your Web page is relevant to the subject of remailers, let me know and I'll link it in. Comments and suggestions welcome! Note to remailer operators: this script generates hourly ping messages. If you don't want that, let me know and I will take your mailer off the list, or increase the interval between pings. Raph Levien

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