December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Paper available via ftp
by Matt Blaze 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

A preliminary draft of my paper, "Protocol Failure in the Escrowed Encryption Standard" is now available via anonymous ftp from research.att.com in the file /dist/mab/eesproto.ps . The paper is in PostScript format and seems to print on most PS printers. This is only a preliminary draft; the final published version will likely include additional material on the production version of the PCMCIA card, which, I understand, will differ in some respects from the prototype I examined. -matt

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PGP 2.6 FAQ (PGP Signed)
by Jeffrey I. Schiller 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

This version is identical to the version mailed out by Hal Abelson. I was out of town so I was unable to sign it. The only change to this document (besides the addition of the PGP signature) is the conversion of tabs to spaces and the removal of trailing whitespace. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Questions and Answers about MIT's Release of PGP 2.6 by Hal Abelson, Jeff Schiller, Brian LaMacchia, and Derek Atkins June 2, 1994 Q: Is PGP 2.6 an official release from MIT? A: Yes. PGP 2.6 is distributed via the Internet to non-commercial U.S. users by MIT Information Systems, via anonymous ftp from net-dist.mit.edu in the directory pub/PGP. Planning for the PGP 2.6 release was conducted with the knowledge and approval of the MIT administration. The MIT News Office officially announced the availability of PGP 2.6 in a press release dated May 26, 1994. *** Q: Was PGP 2.6 released in cooperation with RSA Data Security, Inc.? A: Yes. PGP 2.6 uses the RSAREF(TM) Free Cryptographic Toolkit (Version 1) licensed by RSADSI. RSADSI has granted MIT permission to access the non-published routines in RSAREF required to support PGP. *** Q: Was Phil Zimmermann involved in the PGP 2.6 release? A: Yes. Zimmermann has been fully involved in the release process. In addition, he approved all code changes from earlier versions of PGP and updated the PGP documentation for version 2.6. *** Q: Can PGP 2.6 interoperate with previous versions of PGP? A: Not completely. There are two different incompatibilities between PGP 2.6 and earlier versions of PGP. The first incompatibility is a deliberate format change that will trigger on September 1, 1994. The intent of this change is to discourage PGP users in the U.S. from using PGP 2.3a, which potentially infringes patents. The second incompatibility is that PGP 2.6 requires signatures to be in PKCS format, which has been the default since PGP 2.3, although PGP 2.3 was able to process non-PKCS signatures. *** Q: What's the effect of the September 1 format change? Will I still be able to use my old keys? Will I still be able to decrypt old messages? A: Both now and after September 1, PGP 2.6 will decrypt messages and uses keys generated by PGP 2.3a. To quote from the PGP 2.6 manual: PGP version 2.6 can read anything produced by versions 2.3, 2.3a, 2.4, or 2.5. However, because of a negotiated agreement between MIT and RSA Data Security, PGP 2.6 will change its behavior slightly on 1 September 1994, triggered by a built-in software timer. On that date, version 2.6 will start producing a new and slightly different data format for messages, signatures and keys. PGP 2.6 will still read and process messages, signatures, and keys produced under the old format, but it will generate the new format. *** Q: What about the PKCS requirement? A: PKCS Stands for Public Key Cryptography Standards and is a voluntary standard created by RSA Data Security and several industry leading organizations, including MIT. PKCS specifies standard encodings for encrypted and signed objects as well as some key formats. The standard documents themselves may be obtained via anonymous FTP from rsa.com. Starting with PGP version 2.3, PGP signatures have conformed to the PKCS signature standard. Although PGP version 2.3 generated PKCS format signatures, it was capable of understanding the non-PKCS format generated by PGP 2.2 and earlier versions. PGP 2.6 removes this compatibility code. This makes some of the PGP 2.6 code cleaner and ensures compatibility with future versions of RSAREF and other future standard software. Making the change now also encourages people to obtain fresh signatures on their keys, which is a prudent thing to do every so often. Note: The PKCS requirement has nothing to do with the September 1 PGP format change. It is an independent decision of the PGP development team. *** Q: Is there a technical reason for the September 1 format change? A: No. The format change is being made for legal reasons, not technical reasons. MIT wanted to bring out a version of PGP that would have the support of RSADSI. RSADSI would not lend their support to a product that fully interoperates with PGP 2.3, which, when used in the United States, potentially infringes patents licensed to them by Stanford and MIT. The intent of this format change is to discourage people from continuing to use the earlier software, which will mitigate the patent-caused problems that have hampered use of PGP within the U.S. The time delay between now and September is to give people adequate time to upgrade to the new software. *** Q: Does using RSAREF make PGP 2.6 run more slowly than previous versions of PGP? A: No. The speed-critical portions of PGP 2.6 use the same multi-precision integer libraries as in PGP 2.3a. We have noticed no appreciable speed difference between PGP 2.3a and PGP 2.6 on any of the platforms we have tried. If you observe a performance problem with PGP 2.6, please send details to pgp-bugs(a)mit.edu. Be sure to tell us what platform and compiler you are using. *** Q: Is there a back door in PGP 2.6? A: No. You need not take our word for it. PGP is distributed in source code, so that you can verify its integrity yourself, or get someone you trust to verify it for you. The 2.6 MSDOS executable file that we distribute has been digitally signed, so you will know that it has not been tampered with. In general, you should be wary of using encryption programs that you receive as object code, whose origin you cannot authenticate. *** Q: Why is PGP 2.6 limited to 1024-bit keys? Does this compromise the security of PGP 2.6? A: To quote from the PGP 2.6 manual: Beginning with version 2.4 (which was ViaCrypt's first version) through at least 2.6, PGP does not allow you to generate RSA keys bigger than 1024 bits. The upper limit was always intended to be 1024 bits. But because of a bug in earlier versions of PGP, it was possible to generate keys larger than 1024 bits. These larger keys caused interoperability problems between different older versions of PGP that used different arithmetic algorithms with different native word sizes. On some platforms, PGP choked on the larger keys. In addition to these older key size problems, the 1024-bit limit is now enforced by RSAREF. A 1024-bit key is very likely to be well out of reach of attacks by major governments. Cracking a 1024-bit key is far beyond any publicly known computational capability. The table below, originally posted to Usenet in October, 1993, gives some numbers for the expected amount of work required to crack keys of various sizes. The prediction for RSA129, which was finally factored in April, 1994, was very close to the actual time required. (The time was about 5000 MIPS-years, depending on your definition of a MIPS.) RSA129 (429 bits): 4,600 MIPS-YEARS a 512 bit key 420,000 MIPS-YEARS (safe for a little while!) a 700 bit key 4,200,000,000 MIPS-YEARS (seems pretty safe to me!) a 1024 bit key 2.8 x 10^15 MIPS-YEARS (Wow!) The above table is based on the Multiple-Polynomial Quadratic Sieve (MPQS). Other algorithms under development may have slightly better performance. The bottom line is that cracking a 1024-bit key using anything like presently known factoring methods will probably not happen within the lifetime of anyone reading this FAQ at the time of this writing (1994). A breakthrough in computer technology or algorithm efficiency that threatens a 1024 bit key is likely to be so powerful that it will threaten much larger keys as well, and then all bets are off! Any successful attack on PGP with large key sizes is more likely to come from exploiting other aspects of the system (such as the prime number generation algorithm) than by brute-force factoring of keys. Given this, it is not at all clear that key sizes larger than 1024 bits provide increased security in any practical sense. Nevertheless, RSADSI has granted MIT permission to modify RSAREF to increase the key size, and larger keys will be supported in a future PGP release. These larger keys, however, will not be manipulated by PGP 2.6 and earlier releases, so users will need to upgrade in order to use them. *** Q: There is no patent problem with using PGP 2.3a outside the U.S. Isn't it offensive to impose a change on PGP users around the world to accommodate a legal problem in the U.S.? A: To quote from the PGP 2.6 manual: Outside the United States, the RSA patent is not in force, so PGP users there are free to use implementations of PGP that do not rely on RSAREF and its restrictions. Hopefully, implementors of PGP versions outside the US will also switch to the new format, whose detailed description is available from MIT. If everyone upgrades before 1 September 1994, no one will experience any discontinuity in interoperability. We apologize to PGP users outside the U.S. We are asking them to undergo the inconvenience of making a change to the non-U.S. version of PGP for no technical reason. We hope that the effect of this change, which will remove any legal controversy from the use of PGP in the U.S., will benefit PGP users outside the U.S. as well as within the U.S. *** Q: How can PGP users outside the U.S. upgrade, if PGP 2.6 might be subject to U.S. export controls? A: The format change that will become effective on September 1, 1994 can be accomplished by a simple modification to the PGP 2.3a code, which was developed outside the U.S. MIT has published the new format specification. Consequently, a non-U.S. version of PGP that interoperates with PGP 2.6 can be produced without the need for anyone to attempt to export PGP software from the U.S. *** Q: With this incompatible change, what provisions are being made for users of ViaCrypt PGP (PGP 2.4) ? A: ViaCrypt has announced a new release of their product, called PGP 2.7, that supports both the old and new formats. They will also provide upgrade kits for users for version 2.4. For further information, contact Paul E. Uhlhorn Director of Marketing, ViaCrypt Products Mail: 2104 W. Peoria Ave Phoenix AZ 85029 Phone: (602) 944-0773 Fax: (602) 943-2601 Internet: viacrypt(a)acm.org Compuserve: 70304.41 *** Q: Does PGP 2.6 use RSAREF version 1, or RSAREF 2.0? A: PGP 2.6 uses RSAREF version 1. PGP 2.5 used RSAREF version 2.0. During the discussions that led to the creation of PGP 2.6, RSA Data Security requested that MIT switch to RSAREF 1. Furthermore, RSADSI gave MIT formal written permission to make calls to internal program interfaces in RSAREF 1, consistent with the RSAREF 1 license. From a technical standpoint, it doesn't matter which version of RSAREF is used by PGP. The major enhancements to RSAREF 2.0 have to do with functionality not required by PGP. Also, RSADSI's licensing restrictions (which require non-commercial use only) are not significantly different from RSAREF 1 to RSAREF 2. It is possible that later releases of PGP from MIT may use a different release of RSAREF, but we see no reason to do so at this time. *** Q: What is PGP 2.5 and what is its status? A: MIT initially released PGP 2.5 for beta test on May 9, 1994. During the beta test period, we continued discussions with RSA Data Security. These discussions led us to decide to install the September 1 format change, as well to use RSAREF 1 (see question above). PGP 2.5 contained several important bugs that have been fixed in PGP 2.6. PGP 2.5 does *not* contain the software necessary to understand messages generated by PGP 2.6 after September 1. We therefore urge all U.S. users to upgrade to PGP 2.6 (or a subsequent version). *** Q: What is PGP 3.0? A: PGP 3.0 is an anticipated upgrade to PGP. Unlike PGP 2.6, PGP 3.0 will be a major rewrite and reconstruction of the PGP internal software. PGP 3.0 might be ready before the end of 1994, but there are no specific release plans yet. *** Q: Will there be further incompatible changes to PGP? A: Almost certainly. As new features are added, the format of messages and other data structures will no doubt be changed. For example, we have considered adding a new packet type for signatures that places the signature at the end of a signed packet rather then the beginning. This will permit restructuring the PGP software so that it can operate in one pass, with no need to create the numerous temporary files that PGP now creates. This will facilitate applications that are not now currently possible. For example, a one-pass PGP could be used to encrypt data to a tape drive during backup. This cannot be done with PGP today because it would need to create temporary files that consume almost twice as much disk space as the data being backed up! *** Q: Will keys generated prior to PGP 2.6 continue to be usable? A: Yes. PGP 2.6 will always be able to use keys created by prior versions. New keys, generated *after* September 1 will *not* be usable by prior versions of PGP. However we hope that all PGP users will have upgraded to PGP 2.6 or better (or its non-U.S. equivalent) by September. *** Q: Why did MIT release PGP 2.6, when PGP 2.3 is already available? A: Using PGP 2.3 in the U.S. potentially infringes patents licensed exclusively to Public Key Partners by Stanford University and MIT. This sticky patent situation has deterred the spread of PGP, because many people and institutions did not wish to risk violating intellectual property restrictions. MIT has addressed this problem in PGP 2.6 by using RSAREF, which is licensed by RSA Data Security, Inc. RSADSI acknowledges that PGP 2.6 is a legitimate RSAREF application. The RSAREF license includes rights to all of the relevant U.S. patents on public key cryptography for non-commercial use. *** Q: Will there be version of PGP 2.6 for the Mac? A: People are working on this, but it's not ready yet. We hope it will be available within a couple of weeks. *** Q: Is MIT distributing PGP 2.6 to Canada? A: No, or at least not yet. There are some legal issues involved, having to do with possible U.S. export control restrictions, and we're getting advice on how to deal with these. We hope to sort this out next week. *** Q: Who are the people who are working on the PGP 2.6 release? A: People outside MIT working directly on the 2.6 release are Phil Zimmermann and Colin Plumb. People at MIT coordinating the PGP 2.6 release are Jeff Schiller, MIT Network Manager; Hal Abelson, Prof. of Computer Science and Engineering; Brian LaMacchia, graduate student in Computer Science; and Derek Atkins, graduate student in Media Arts and Sciences. Support from the MIT administration was provided by Jim Bruce, MIT Vice-President for Information Systems; David Litster, MIT Vice-President and Dean for Research; Karen Hersey, MIT Intellectual Property Counsel; and John Preston, MIT Director of Technology Development. *** Q: Are there more questions? A: Certainly. If there are other questions about PGP 2.6 that you think ought to be answered here, please send us to them (at pgp-bugs(a)mit.edu) and we will try to include answers in future versions of this FAQ. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6 iQBVAgUBLfPJx1UFZvpNDE7hAQGA1AH9Hi0A+45X9YwxaSr6KMAVEXaR6JuktgfC rpmt2F5obv352uBU3oKDEpyCJW7wPgLudQ3eEbwZXytXRMeGNkQBgg== =QHEg -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: Applied Cryptography (correction to typo in email address)
by Richard Johnson 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

From the keyboard of: NetSurfer <jdwilson(a)gold.chem.hawaii.edu> > Softpro - softpro(a)csns.com That should be: Softpro - softpro(a)cscns.com ^ The 'cscns' stands for Colorado Springs Community News Service. Richard

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Re: [butthead] and PGP
by D.C. Williams 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> > > > > I would like clarification on [butthead's] contention that PGP violates > > RSA's patents. My understanding is that PGP < 2.4 does not so long as > > its use was private and non-commercial. > > > > In other words, isn't the patent issue a fabrication of [butthead] to > > attack PGP? > > > > Or did he really have a point? > > Can we please can this crapola? The only thing more wasteful of human > effort than listening to the moron is listening to people recount what > he says. If you want to do this, please do it privately. Many of us are > sick and tired of this certified net.wacko, and speaking for myself and > any others of like mind, take it up privately on your own time. Check > out alt.security.pgp and alt.fan.[butthead]. Better yet, find out where > he lives and camp out on his front lawn. > > The only point he has is the one on his head. > > =D.C. Williams > >

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Excerpt from E-d-u-p-a-g-e 06/05/94
by NetSurfer 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

CP's, for your edification: Date: Mon, 6 Jun 1994 00:09:30 -0400 From: E-d-u-p-a-g-e <info(a)ivory.educom.edu> E-MAIL AT THE WHITE HOUSE Both the Bush and Clinton administrations have tried to restrict public access to White House e-mail, but later this year the National Security Agency will publish "White House E-Mail," a book-length collection of e-mail messages. The book includes Iran-Contra affair communications to and from Oliver North, who used e-mail because he thought it could be easily deleted. One message from him reads: "Oh lord. I lost the slip and broke one of the high heels. Forgive please. Will return the wig on Monday." (So who needs the Clipper Chip?) (New York Magazine, 6/6/94 p.20) ----------^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^--------------------------------- I guess the spirit of J. Edgar Hoover lives on at the Whitehouse <hehehe> -NetSurfer #include standard.disclaimer >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> == = = |James D. Wilson |V.PGP 2.4: 512/E12FCD 1994/03/17 > " " " |P. O. Box 15432 |finger for key / Viacrypt Reseller > " " /\ " |Honolulu, HI 96830 |====================================> \" "/ \" |Serendipitous Solutions| Also NetSurfer(a)sersol.com > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>

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No Subject
by nobody＠shell.portal.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Can a registered crypto FTP account at RIPEM.MSU.EDU be accessed via a USA-based FTP-by-mail server, assuming the correct account ID and password are used, and the FTPed file is destined for the original, USA-based email address? Or will the use of the intermediate server cause the request to be rejected because the host ID does not match the original one specified when the account was opened? If so, can PGP 2.6 be FTPed from another anonymous FTP site, either in the USA or abroad? Thanks. ====

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Re: REMAILERS: standard xx-To: line
by ghio＠cmu.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>cp's, >matt just mentioned that remailer@soda doesn't accept "Request-Remailing-To" >header lines (which explains why i thought it was dead) and i note that not >all other remailers accept "Anon-Send-To:". anarchy has it's place in >our lives but, it would be nice to cut down on sode come in remailing and >ping scripts. the three close to standard headers seem to be >"Anon-Send-To:", "Request-Remailing-To:", and "X-Anon-To:". it would be >more convenient :) for all remailers to either allow all three or settle >on one standard (nfl). My remailer (ghio(a)kaiwan.com) supports all three, and also Anon-To. All of the remailers support Request-Remailing-To, except soda. I'm not completely sure which support Anon-To and which use X-Anon-To. Soda.berkeley.edu is the only one which requires Anon-Send-To.

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Tax Free In Cyberspace Only
by Vincent.Cate＠FURMINT.NECTAR.CS.CMU.EDU 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Encryption will have a profound impact on society as we move further into the information age. In particular, some things that are currently taxed will be very hard to tax in the future. Encryption lets non-tangible things move around like the ghosts they are. Since this movement is ininvisible, it will be impossible to tax. So things which can exist in cyberspace will tend to move around tax free. This will include things like: Securities - stocks, bonds, mutual funds Savings - cash Profits - Information - newsletters, magazines, databases Software - This non-taxability comes from the fact that only the parties exchanging something in cyberspace even need to know about the exchange - and they can encrypt everything so that nobody else knows. It also comes from the fact that the entities involved in commerce in cyberspace can be located anyplace in the physical world and there are many places that do not tax companies. Tangible things within the territory of some government will always be taxable by that government. This is especially true for things where it is desirable to have a government issued "title". Major tax categories will still include: Real-estate - land, houses, buildings, factories Vehicles - cars, boats, planes Tangible goods - any objects bought or sold Fuel - gas, diesel, jet fuel People - poll tax Companies - annual registration of corporations Income for self employed information workers will be hard to tax. However, for a number of years yet, most incomes will still be taxed. So governments will have to rework their tax base. National sales taxes or VATs will probably be more common. Taxes on dividends, interest, capital gains, etc., will fade away. This change will be difficult, and probably the technology will move faster than the governments can comfortably react. Instead of adapting to the changes, many governments will probably try to prevent them. These attempts will fail - probably not even slowing things down much. The cyberspace economy will be very close to pure capitalism. Regulation of cyberspace trade will be impossible. It will not be possible to even determine if two parties are doing business, let alone to stop them. Initiation of force in cyberspace should be less and less of a problem as computer systems get more secure. Impersonation is easily prevented with digital signatures. This new tax base may not let governments operate in the manner to which they have become accustomed. Each government will be faced with the choice of either printing more money (causing painful inflation), or making painful cuts in programs. This will no doubt cause some protests and unrest, but certainly need not result in anarchy. -- Vince Cate This file should end up in: ftp://furmint.nectar.cs.cmu.edu/security/cypheressay

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Cyberspace is by nature crime-free
by rishab＠dxm.ernet.in 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

"Bradley W. Dolan" <71431.2564(a)CompuServe.COM>: > [Seabrook's rant against flaming] > project, told me, "You won't have a Waco in Texas, you'll have > a Waco in cyberspace. You could have a cult, speaking to each > other through encryption, that suddenly erupts in society - > well programmed, well organized - and then suddenly disappears > again." Therefore, in an effort to balance the good and bad Excuse me? Will the cyberspace Waco abuse children with paddles in basement 'punishment rooms' - maybe by posting their names to alt.basement.punishment? Will the cyberspace Waco be able to _physically_ intimidate people into acting against their will? The major difference between cyberspace and the world of brick houses is that no _physical_ crime is possible - no matter what anti-porn kooks say, you _can't_ rape with words; or murder, or torture or kidnap. Even the pedophiles (98.3356% of the Net's population, apparently) cannot go beyond _communication_ on the Net... Even if one agrees with the debatable criminality of consensual sex with minors, the act itself has to be _physical_! The crime cannot be in discussing it. What's the FBI going to do? Jail people for _talking_ about murder, or jail _murderers_? ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- Rishab Aiyer Ghosh They came for the Jews, and I was silent because I was not a Jew; rishab(a)dxm.ernet.in They came for the Trade Unionists, and I did not protest, because I did not Voice/Fax/Data +91 11 6853410 belong to a trade union; Voicemail +91 11 3760335 They came for the Catholics, and I said nothing because I was not a Catholic; H 34C Saket And then they came for me. New Delhi There was no one left to say anything... INDIA ----Father Niemoeller

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Tim Merlin's Holy FAQ
by rishab＠dxm.ernet.in 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Tim May said: [ I've re-ordered his para's ] > to invade North Korea for the "sin" of doing what our "friends" like South > Africa, Israel, and even Risha[b]'s own India have been doing for 20 years Actually Uncle Sam frequently makes noises about India's arsenal, and India responds with cries of "hypocrisy! global disarmament!"... > I've stayed out of this thread on what's criminal and what's not, > mainly because I'm spending all my waking hours (and more) trying to > finish up the %&*#$%^$ FAQ, but I perk up when my name is mentioned: > ... > Enough on anarchy for now. Back to the FAQ. Well, we are _really_ expecting a 5 Mb FAQ now! Every week adds another meg ;-) > --Tim May ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- Rishab Aiyer Ghosh They came for the Jews, and I was silent because I was not a Jew; rishab(a)dxm.ernet.in They came for the Trade Unionists, and I did not protest, because I did not Voice/Fax/Data +91 11 6853410 belong to a trade union; Voicemail +91 11 3760335 They came for the Catholics, and I said nothing because I was not a Catholic; H 34C Saket And then they came for me. New Delhi There was no one left to say anything... INDIA ----Father Niemoeller

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(None)
by Jeff Gostin 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

rishab(a)dxm.ernet.in writes: > discussing it. What's the FBI going to do? Jail people for _talking_ about > murder, or jail _murderers_? Actually, United States law has something "Conspiracy". That's where you talk about committing a crime. There are certain limitations to it, but essentially, idly chatting about killing someone might be construed as a Conspiracy to do it. Therefore, yes, you _can_ go to jail for _talking_ about murder. --Jeff -- ====== ====== +----------------jgostin(a)eternal.pha.pa.us----------------+ == == | The new, improved, environmentally safe, bigger, better,| == == -= | faster, hypo-allergenic, AND politically correct .sig. | ==== ====== | Now with a new fresh lemon scent! | PGP Key Available +---------------------------------------------------------+

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CP Criminal & Strong Crypto gphx. and shirts
by Stanton McCandlish 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

1) who designed those graphics, and what redist. requirements if any do you have on them? 2) where are my t-shirts? >:)

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Email security user survey (fwd)
by Stanton McCandlish 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Forwarded message: Subject: Email security user survey Date: Fri, 03 Jun 1994 13:22:32 -0700 From: John Gilmore <gnu(a)cygnus.com> Let's give Dana some data about PGP users. Please spread... John ------- Forwarded Message Subject: Request for info from Dana C. Ellingen Date: Fri, 03 Jun 94 09:33:50 -0400 From: Mark S Feldman <feldman(a)tis.com> - -----BEGIN PRIVACY-ENHANCED MESSAGE----- Proc-Type: 4,MIC-CLEAR Content-Domain: RFC822 Originator-ID-Asymmetric: MFMxCzAJBgNVBAYTAlVTMQswCQYDVQQIEwJNRDE kMCIGA1UEChMbVHJ1c3RlZCBJbmZvcm1hdGlvbiBTeXN0ZW1zMREwDwYDVQQLEwh HbGVud29vZA==,06 MIC-Info: RSA-MD5,RSA,UrO04KAws35IxkK3iROrfIsWLHc5CXq84Wu9fyJBEAc 4rwYiHlmfKYrc6j2FtIxqts+MT/KT4/De/Qr79Bdg4OW33TZ8umY4QqYmVJlWGvf 5y7686g8+EyTEyku15Pi8 Dana C. Ellingen <ellingen(a)netcom.com> is preparing a special issue of the Ferris E-Mail Analyzer on security in electronic mail, and would like to get your input. If any of you would like to respond to him, send him email or get in touch with him as follows: Dana C. Ellingen Electronic Commerce Consultant 415.726.9712 (telephone); 415.726.3093 (FAX); ellingen(a)netcom.com 410 Laurel Ave., Half Moon Bay, CA 94019-1674 Following are his questions. Mark Note that all answers will be "not for attribution," and will be melded into the overall issue. Vendors, I would like the names of several happy users of your product, even if they have just chosen it and it is not yet installed. I am interested in why they chose to make this move now rather than later, as well as how happy they may be with your product. Questions for Email Security users, for Ferris E-Mail Analyzer: A - What form of security does your firm use for electronic mail and messaging? B - Given the state of turmoil in the industry, why did you choose to be an "early adopter," and to put security into your forms and messaging applications? Why now? C - What problems have you had, having added security? D - What compromises have you had to make to add security? E - Product support: Do you currently use (or are you considering) a commercial product for secure EM? Which one? Why? Are you happy with the support you are getting? F - Interoperability: Do you currently or do you want to exchange secure EM with people outside of your organization? How do you deal with the interoperability problem? G - International: Do you have overseas offices, or do you exchange secure EM with persons outside of the US? Are you concerned about having to cut back on your security to do this? H - Certificates: Do you issue certificates to your users? I - Certificates: If someone else issues certificates, how do establish trust with that organization? J - Certificates: How do you verify the authenticity of a digital signature on a document that you receive? K - Policy: Does your firm have a written policy on electronic mail? Can your firm read its employees' EM? L - Escrowed keys: Do you keep copies of the private keys of the individuals in your firm? Do you think that you should, or that you have the right to do so? M - Integration: How important is it that you have a product that is fully integrated with your existing mail system? N - What did I leave out? What else do you want to discuss? - -----END PRIVACY-ENHANCED MESSAGE----- ------- End of Forwarded Message

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NSA LEAKS AGAIN (fwd) ?
by Stanton McCandlish 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Forwarded message: Subject: NSA LEAKS AGAIN Date: Fri, 3 Jun 1994 21:55:24 -0700 (PDT) From: Jeff Davis <eagle(a)deeptht.armory.com> To: eff-activists(a)eff.org (eff-activists mailing list) Thank God for anonymous remailers eff-activists. I snagged this out of cyberspace and can't vouch for the substance of the claim, however, relatives of those with FTS or TS (high) security clearances are the weakest link in the whole secrecy chain. That I know from first hand experience. --------- I have a close relative who is a cryptologist for the NSA. He knows much about skipjack. he couldn't/wouldn't tell me much, of course, mainly because the last word I use to describe him is 'human'... he's more 'asshole'... but he said the last thing he'd trust is skipjack/clipper... he says that the CIA/FBI/NSA/ATF will almost assuradly _NOT_ violate the escrow rules (in other words, they _will_ get a warrant for the key halves_) however, he also said that there are so many back doors that they don't need them. He also said that they are expecting people to find about 60% of these doors, and they will correct them when found (so they have a deck of aces up thier sleves) Damn people. However, he wasn't directly involved in the clipper shit, but he does have high clearance. But he's an asshole, like I said. NSA people, as a generalization, usually are. He'd turn _me_ in if he knew I hacked. -- PGP PUBLIC KEY via finger! JAFEFFM Speaking & Thinking For Myself! * eagle(a)deeptht.armory.com email info(a)eff.org * *** O U T L A W S On The E L E C T R O N I C F R O N T I E R **** ***** Committed to Free Public Internet Access for World Peace ***** -- Stanton McCandlish * mech(a)eff.org * Electronic Frontier Found. OnlineActivist "In a Time/CNN poll of 1,000 Americans conducted last week by Yankelovich Partners, two-thirds said it was more important to protect the privacy of phone calls than to preserve the ability of police to conduct wiretaps. When informed about the Clipper Chip, 80% said they opposed it." - Philip Elmer-Dewitt, "Who Should Keep the Keys", TIME, Mar. 14 1994

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Re: Cyberspace is by nature crime-free [?]
by Anthony Garcia 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

mgream(a)acacia.itd.uts.edu.au (Matthew Gream) writes: I have to disagree with this, especially the title 'is by nature'. Cyberspace as a communications forum still presents many opportunities for crime as are present in physical and related communications media. Good points, I wasn't thinking far enough. The examples you cite can be classified as follows: - Breaking and entering: Yes, an obvious "cyberspace crime" which I unthinkingly missed. Could perhaps be considered fraud: If you give a username/password to gain access, you are falsely asserting that you're an authorized user of that username. - Vilification/slander/libel: Also possibly can be considered as fraud? You're asserting things that are false, and people who rely on your false information will make bad decisions. - Discrimination: I don't think this should be a crime. The interactions/commerce/associations that people engage in should be freely assented to by all parties, even if they have really stupid reasons for deciding to refuse. - Sedition: Not a crime in my book... Yay, Sedition! - Inciting violence: Perhaps even can be covered by fraud, if you stretch it hard enough: You give people false information ("Such and such ethnic group are polluting our precious bodily fluids and should be killed") which they then rely on to make bad choices regarding the perpertration of violence. Of course, the actual physical committing of violence is a much more serious crime. - Transferring funds, tax evasion: Also not a crime in my book. Yay Tax Evasion! - Illegal business activity, false advertising: False advertising is an instance of fraud. I'm not sure what you mean by "illegal business activity." - Contempt of court: Hm. Refusing to provide your decryption key to the judge... Not really a crime *of* cyberspace; more akin to a crime of the courtroom. - Copyright infringment: Ah, theft of Intellectual Property. A tough nut in these modern times. If you had to forge authorization information to get the material, then it would be fraud in the same sense as an unauthorized login: You are fraudulently asserting that you are a paying customer. But if the material is just lying around unprotected for you to pick up? Hm... -Anthony Garcia agarcia(a)sugar.neosoft.com P.S. Larry, if you're still lurking around here: the "Yay Sedition!" and "Yay Tax Evasion!" are especially for *yoooouuu*.

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Re: Cyberspace is by nature crime-free
by jamesd＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Matthew Gream writes > I have to disagree with this, especially the title 'is by > nature'. Cyberspace as a communications forum still > presents many opportunities for crime as are present in > physical and related communications media. To rattle a few > off the top of my head without thinking to broadly: > > - break and enter --> cracking/hacking (whatever you want > to call it) Can be limited to acceptable levels by normal precautions. The owner ultimately has physical control, the cracker does not. > - vilification, discrimination Not a crime. > - sedition Not a crime. > - inciting violence Not a crime. > - fraud (as you've mentioned) There is plenty of fraud, but it can be controlled by common sense and cryptographic precautions. (Gasp - this post is actually slightly relevant to the Cyberpunks list.) > - transfering funds, tax evasion Not a crime. Neither of these are extraditable offenses. > - illegal business activity, false advertising Not a crime, except for fraud, discussed above. > - contempt of court There is plenty of contempt of court. Courts are coming to accept the reality that cyberspace is beyond their power, hence not a crime. Note that contempt of court has never been an extraditable offense. > - copyright infringment There is plenty of copyright infringement, but the old concept of copyright does not fit well on the net, because information is separated from its physical embodiment and is endlessly mutable. The concept of "copyright" has limited usefulness in cyberspace. We are returning to the older concepts of "plagiarism" and "authenticity". Notice how many people were reluctant to accept PGP 2.6 until it was blessed by Zimmerman. > Admittedly by the nature of cyberspace, detecting and > gaining evidence for these crimes can be more complicated > than in a tangible physical medium, but none the less these > actions are still criminal. If a law cannot be enforced, or cannot be enforced except by grossly violating someone's rights, then it is no law. But cyberspace does make new offenses possible. The two new offenses of cyberspace are spamming and spoofing. Both of these seem to be controlled at acceptable levels. Spamming is controlled by vengeance campaigns of the silicon cowboys and the cyber vigilantes. The green card lawyers were run off the net. The Armenian genocide guy is almost within net custom, he pushes the edge but does not obviously exceed it. Serious spoofing seems rare. In every spoofing that I have seen the spoofer has made his true identity fairly obvious, which is why we call it spoofing, not impersonation. If anyone is in real danger of malicious spoofing - for example David Sternlight - then he should PGP sign all his messages, thus eliminating the problem. -- --------------------------------------------------------------------- We have the right to defend ourselves and our | property, because of the kind of animals that we | James A. Donald are. True law derives from this right, not from | the arbitrary power of the omnipotent state. | jamesd(a)netcom.com

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CYBERSPACE IS BY NATURE C
by bmorris＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

To: cypherpunks(a)toad.com RR> sex with minors, the act itself has to be _physical_! The crime cannot RR> discussing it. What's the FBI going to do? Jail people for _talking_ a RR> murder, or jail _murderers_? Uh, I think they can, and do, jail for discussing a crime. It's called conspiracy, and the crime does *not have to have been committed for conspirators to be jailed. It happened here in L.A. recently. Some skinheads were jailed for conspiracy to bomb an synagogue, however the synagogue had not actually been bombed. They went to prison. * RM 1.4 B0037 *

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FTP-by-mail from US sites for accessing crypto archives?
by wcs＠anchor.ho.att.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Nobodu asks if FTP-by-mail from a US site will let outsiders retrieve crypto. Most of the popular crypto sites in the US that support non-exportable materials store them in a directory that's constantly being renamed, and require you to read a readme file with the license material so you've been warned before they'll tell you where it is. Most of the popular ftp-by-email sites have tended to be slow when I've used them :-) So it may not work very well, unless you catch a fast ftp-by-mail site. MIT requires you to telnet to ftp-dist.mit.edu and log on to register for PGP, which is tougher to do by email. BIll

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Windows PGP and remailer list
by an49＠desert.hacktic.nl 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

1. What is the best implementation of a Windows GUI for PGP out there? 2. Where do I 'finger' to get the latest remailer list? thanks, ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- This message was mailed through the remailer anon(a)desert.hacktic.nl Due to the double-blind, any mail replies to this message will be anonymized, and an anonymous id will be allocated automatically. You have been warned. Please report any problems, inappropriate use etc. to kafka(a)desert.hacktic.nl For help, send a message to help(a)desert.hacktic.nl. Send a message ping(a)desert.hacktic.nl to allocate an anonymous account. -----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- Version: 2.3a mQBNAi2+t1EAAAECALUS6KI7WLBB47y5dDIN+vHAW2XLxu+ELJCNkHLKYxhAr6vY Ku1e9oMry+bHizW8wCt0JPWMlnzZOkhZplIGsqkABRG0O0Rlc2VydCBBbm9ueW1v dXMgUmVtYWlsaW5nIFNlcnZpY2UgPGFub25AZGVzZXJ0LmhhY2t0aWMubmw+iQBV AgUQLb63vZRymF15lPcFAQF88AH/TdqfNlZ2uNH/CpQiy6BneDa0+FJTmBFgy5W+ wcpbsljOFFheH3zz5zA2rkpxIBoy/nd4vQ9kaa6fc1TkVMeBfokAlQIFEC2+t6C+ ZjYIMi0DBQEBT4YD/0NK9fCG8JjE0fS/0SlFshWAGSZxUYREKoQiwo8/ZPEbORHa +a6E8mXOjy7XHVH00S8/1aOO+ji89FFY2aVNqVVDfZI53er9pZAeNSQ1mvD7isor B3IOQ+WeKgXL/IvOEaZro0ZA/FWtry0Ty7RZbPwX4j1TkBTxlRI08e2dG7YI =MfIT -----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----

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No Subject
by Anonymous 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> From: Anthony Garcia <agarcia(a)sugar.neosoft.com> > P.S. Larry, if you're still lurking around here: the "Yay Sedition!" and > "Yay Tax Evasion!" are especially for *yoooouuu*. funny think about garcia, his first time ever post on c'punx was about larry too...... strange times indeed when a newbie bursts on the scene knowing all about us Date: Wed, 19 Jan 1994 23:18:22 -0600 From: Anthony Garcia <agarcia(a)sugar.neosoft.com> Message-Id: <199401200518.AA05127(a)sugar.NeoSoft.COM> Cc: agarcia(a)sugar.neosoft.com Subject: Detweiler's SQUISH broadcast: can remailers filter out addressee? I'm not familiar with anonymous remailer internals. Would it be cheap in terms of hack-time to add the capability for an anonymous remailer to maintain a list of addresses (or address regexp's) which do not wish to receive anonymous remailed messages? That way, if Detweiler is sending unwanted msgs to say, "chess-fans(a)foo.bar.com" via an anonymous remailer, and the readers of chess-fans complained to the (hopefully responsive) remailer operator, the remailer operator could add the "chess-fans" address to a "don't- remail-to-these-folks" list so that the nice readers of chess-fans can read mail in peace. However, if the "Don't-mail-to-these-folks" list gets too long, it would probably degrade remailer performance... sigh. (remailer authors: is this a correct assumption?) (Perhaps the "don't-mail" addresses could be tagged with amount of time somebody last attempted them; addresses that no one's attempted to hit in say, a year, could be expired.) -Anthony Garcia agarcia(a)sugar.neosoft.com NeoSoft is a commercial access provider, not my employer. (They didn't demand identity verification when I signed up, either. Yay, capitalism!) P.S. Larry: I didn't make the "tentacle" list in your SQUISH post? I feel slighted! Please correct in the next version.

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Re: Cyberspace is by nature crime-free
by rishab＠dxm.ernet.in 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

f_griffith(a)ccsvax.sfasu.edu: >A correction: there was no evidence that the cult in Waco was abusing >children - that was government propaganda, part of its demonizing of >them to justify its own atrocious actions. The Texas welfare dept. had >previously investigated such allegations of child abuse. Though someone (Time?) published a child's description of the 'punishment room,' that was not my contention. As the author had provided Waco as an example of cult criminality, my response explained why, _assuming_ such a cult _was_ indeed criminal, it's crimes would _in no way_ occur, or be enhanced by, the usage of the Internet. Any crime (apart from white collar financial fraud) has to occur in a physical location, not in cyberspace... Rishab

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Crime and punishment in cyberspace - 1 of 3
by rishab＠dxm.ernet.in 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Uhh. When I started this thread with "Cyberspace is by nature crime-free," I meant crime as what at least _I_ perceive as morally wrong enough to justify the intervention of society as a whole, usually represented by functionaries of the state - police, judiciary, etc.; and NOT what may or not be wrong in the eyes of existing law, which as we all know, is an ass. Unless we want a totally "everyone for him/herself" society (which is contradictory - society is a framework or protocol by which individuals interact with each other), and become like Rwanda, say, we need the intervention of [police/state/society/collective] to ensure that basic social agreements are kept - thou shalt not rape, for instance. Even anarchist Tim May has in previous posts conceded the possible need for a police force to investigate murders. Now to cyberspace... I greatly believe in the Internet as a model for society. While there are incompatibilities between a society on cyberspace and one on the streets, what is needed is an adaption of cybersociety to the "real world" NOT vice versa. Out of all 'crimes' listed in previous posts by Matthew Gream and others, the only one I accept as possibly requiring society intervention in the information age is that of intellectual property. The extent of such intervention is debatable. I will summarize my attitude to the other points with this: saying that cracking an ordinary Unix system is fraud is like saying that walking into a field protected perhaps by a tattered hedge is 'breaking in.' Unless you want a nanny state, you have to protect yourself, and your rights. Unless you want a jungle, you have to accept intervention by agents of the society you live in, when protection is far to difficult for an individual. You expect police help to catch a murderer. You don't expect police help to catch someone who stole money that fell out of your torn pocket. (_I_ don't.) Continued... ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- Rishab Aiyer Ghosh They came for the Jews, and I was silent because I was not a Jew; rishab(a)dxm.ernet.in They came for the Trade Unionists, and I did not protest, because I did not Voice/Fax/Data +91 11 6853410 belong to a trade union; Voicemail +91 11 3760335 They came for the Catholics, and I said nothing because I was not a Catholic; H 34C Saket And then they came for me. New Delhi There was no one left to say anything... INDIA ----Father Niemoeller

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Crime and punishment in cyberspace - 2 of 3
by rishab＠dxm.ernet.in 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

The way police can help protect against murders is to patrol the streets. The way police can help identify fraud on cyberspace is Clipper. If you demand protection from society against cyberspace fraud, you accept society's right to violate someone's privacy. You have to also accept their right to violate _yours_. Just as in brickspace (I'm getting sick of calling it the 'real world') you try to protect yourself, _first_, and when it is socially recognized as not possible or very difficult, the police comes in... Are you going to expect the police to protect you against rude language? No, you protect yourself by ignoring it. Are you going to expect the police to protect you against broken promises? No, it's your own failed judgement, or luck. Or you'd have a formal contract. Are you going to expect the police to protect you against terrorist bombs? I would; that's a full-time job that I'm paying them for. In cyberspace too, where you can protect yourself with available tools - encryption, authentication and the other protocols we discuss here, you should not expect police help. You should _refuse_ it. Alternatively, you should give them the power to help you; the power to listen in to 'criminals'; the power to identify conspiracies through communication route tracing. Sounds familiar? Continued... (so that those who look for interesting matter in the first para don't ignore this ;) ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- Rishab Aiyer Ghosh They came for the Jews, and I was silent because I was not a Jew; rishab(a)dxm.ernet.in They came for the Trade Unionists, and I did not protest, because I did not Voice/Fax/Data +91 11 6853410 belong to a trade union; Voicemail +91 11 3760335 They came for the Catholics, and I said nothing because I was not a Catholic; H 34C Saket And then they came for me. New Delhi There was no one left to say anything... INDIA ----Father Niemoeller

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Crime and punishment in cyberspace - 3 of 3
by rishab＠dxm.ernet.in 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

All this brings us to a related issue - another one hinging on principles: Do cypherpunks accept the need for wiretapping? Wiretapping is necessary to solve many 'crimes'. If we accept that these crimes are important enough to justify wiretapping, than there is little difference between wiretapping analog phones and tapping data. The EFF and other organizations have pursued the laudable goals of extending laws guaranteeing freedom of expression, privacy etc to cyberspace, adapting them, as and where necessary, to the nature and technology of digital networks. It is only to be expected that the FBI, theoretically a socially agreed upon body enforcing laws made by socially agreed upon legislators, to attempt to extend the powers granted to it for wiretapping to cyberspace. _Adapting them, as and where necessary (eg. digital encryption), to the nature and technology of digital networks. If we accept the need for wiretapping, than the only problem is to find a way to make Clipper/DTII as protective of privacy as current analog-tapping laws; as inconvenient as current analog tapping. If we accept the need for wiretapping, we can find such ways. Variants of Micali's fair crypto; an open, publicly available no-trapdoor algorithm; a requirement that, as with primitive exchanges, DTII'd ones would still have to be visited by LEOs to work a tap, etc. We can then respond to the various (non-serious) calls from Freeh, Denning et al for an 'alternative'. Or else, if wiretapping per se does more harm to privacy than it does to crime, call for an end to wiretapping altogether. There is an anecdote about George Bernard Shaw (or Bertrand Russell?): At a social event, he hypothetically asks the lady next to him whether she would sleep with him for a million pounds. For a million pounds, she says, she migh consider it. "Would you sleep with me for sixpence, then?" he asks. Outraged, she replies "What kind of woman do you think I am?" His response: "We have already established what kind of woman you are. We are just haggling about the price." Rishab (ps. no offence intended -- that's an illustratory anecdote, c'est tout) ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- Rishab Aiyer Ghosh They came for the Jews, and I was silent because I was not a Jew; rishab(a)dxm.ernet.in They came for the Trade Unionists, and I did not protest, because I did not Voice/Fax/Data +91 11 6853410 belong to a trade union; Voicemail +91 11 3760335 They came for the Catholics, and I said nothing because I was not a Catholic; H 34C Saket And then they came for me. New Delhi There was no one left to say anything... INDIA ----Father Niemoeller

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LEAF Blower Paper
by Dave Otto daveotto＠acm.org 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Does anyone have an ASCII version of EESPROTO.PS (Matt Blaze's paper)? I browsed soda but couldn't find anything. thanks, daveotto(a)acm.org | the sysadmin on my local domain didn't know what /etc/named was and deleted | it so i have to use a VMS machine until we can rebuild it :-( Dave Otto -- daveotto(a)acm.org -- (dave(a)gershwin.jta.edd.ca.gov) "Pay no attention to the man behind the curtain!" [the Great Oz]

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