December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Crypto and new computing strategies
by Hal 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

British physicist David Deutsch has been writing for several years on the theoretical properties of computers which would exploit quantum mechanics. Here is the abstract from his paper in Proc. R. Soc. Lond. A, v 400, p97-117, 1985: Quantum Theory, the Church-Turing Principle and the Universal Quantum Computer "It is argued that underlying the Church-Turing hypothesis there is an implicit physical assertion. Here, this assertion is presented explicitly as a physical principle: 'every finitely realizable physical system can be perfectly simulated by a universal model computing machine operating by finite means.' Classical physics and the universal Turing machine, because the former is continuous and the latter discrete, do not obey the principle, at least in the strong form above. A class of model computing machines that is the quantum generalization of the class of Turing machines is described, and it is shown that quantum theory and the 'universal quantum computer' are compatible with the principle. Computing machines resembling the universal quantum computer could, in principle, be built and would have many remarkable properties not reproducible by any Turing machine. These do not include the computation of non-recursive functions, but they do include 'quantum parallelism,' a method by which certain probabilistic tasks can be performed faster by a universal quantum computer than by any classical restriction of it. The intuitive explanation of these properties places an intolerable strain on all interpretations of quantum theory other than Everett's. Some of the numerous connections between the quantum theory of computation and the rest of physics are explored. Quantum complexity theory allows a physically more reasonable definition of the 'complexity' or 'knowledge' in a physical system than does classical complexity theory."

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Bekenstein Bound (was: Crypto and new computing strategies)
by Hal 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

The Deutsch paper I quoted before was where I first heard of the Bekenstein Bound which Eric Hughes mentioned. According to Deutsch: "If the theory of the thermodynamics of black holes is trustworthy, no system enclosed by a surface with an appropriately defined area A can have more than a finite number N(A) = exp(A c^3 / 4 hbar G) of distinguishable accessible states (hbar is the Planck reduced constant, G is the gravitational constant, and c is the speed of light.)" The reference he gives is: Bekenstein, J.D. 1981 Phys Rev D v23, p287 For those with calculators, c is approximately 3.00*10^10 cm/s, G is 6.67*10^-8 cm^3/g s^2, and hbar is 1.05*10^-27 g cm^2/s. N comes out to be pretty darn big by our standards! Hal

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New MacPGP, but only in German?
by qwerty＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Forward from Usenet. If anybody knows where to get the English version please let me know; I'd like to make it available. I checked, and this new version has a fix of MacPGP2.3's worst bug, which is a System Crash when you don't have the public key needed to check a signature, and you are using the Clipboard feature. I started translating it with Resedit, but decided it wasn't a half-hour job afterall, especially since I don't know any German. alt.security.pgp #10674 (0 + 13 more) [1] From: andreas.elbert(a)gmd.de (A.Elbert) [1] MacPGP2.3a V1.1 Date: Tue Mar 29 08:09:03 EST 1994 Followup-To: alt.security.pgp Organization: GMD Lines: 6 i recently purchased "Mausefalle", a UA for the MausNet, which came with a AppleScript-able version of MacPGP. You can find it a copy (of MacPGP2.3V1.1) in ftp://ftp.darmstadt.gmd.de/incoming/MacPGP not sources, so far, but some ReadMe's and signatures. The author can be reached as Christoph_Pagalies(a)hh2.maus.de I posted this, and that's all there is of the thread so far: -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- I fetched that file (slowwwww). The readme file says, >This archive contains: >1. MacPGP 2.3a V1.1 German version (including international language.txt >and German readme) >2. MacPGP 2.3a V1.1 English (including the English readme for V1.1) >3. Documentation (English only) Each of the three folders has been signed so you can check for any manipulations (if you already have a previous PGP version). Yet all I saw was a folder with the German program: MacPGP 2.3a V1.1 Q dt. All the menus and buttons are in German, but the message window is English. Where's the English version? And what's the date of origin of this program? It seems to be an independent MacPGP2.3, as it only mentions changes since MacPGP2.2, not since MacPGP2.3v.1.0.5, which is what everybody is using now, otherwise known as just "MacPGP2.3". No mention of fixes for bugs that were in MacPGP2.3v.1.0.5, such as crashing during decryption using the Clipboard feature, if you don't have the right public key to check a signature with. We shall see (once I can read the damn menus) :-) ! -=Xenon=- P.S. If you want to know what version you have (which will turn out to be 1.0.5 if you have "MacPGP2.3"), open the program with ResEdit and look in the "Version" resource. P.S.S. The source code for MacPGP2.3 has always only been labeled as version 1.0.4! Does this mean the version I'm using has no source code available? I guess the NSA didn't want us to know what they put in there? -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.3 iQCVAgUBLZmT6gSzG6zrQn1RAQEKbAQAjiNGnwprYEz0uGTSvMkGzb5Bk4oFKuUR Si0pJJ6n+ebiOvcs8G3cycH54Mb43ULJFegqlg+k3fyxz0ijtRjqe4zFgIuFEXsn QGEUdtPZ2cRWmeVaATNJuQk8dEJixy+QSBA2GI3MRcoHoKJ73nU9ToPTYunSAcfT /Ea8czh4ygo= =UomE -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Sternlight update
by Matt Thomlinson 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I know this isn't immediately pertinent, but I wanted to offer a pointer to sci.crypt. Currently a discussion of key lengths ("how long do {RSA|IDEA} keys have to be to be `safe'?") is going on; pretty interesting. Funny, I noticed a familiar name contributing (well, asking questions) and then _this_ post: ---------- Forwarded message ---------- From: strnlght(a)netcom.com (David Sternlight) Subject: Re: I concede the key length/cracking point. [...](matt) Finally, it's been suggested to me that the Clipper issue isn't about today, but about tomorrow,and that rich, smart cryptologic organizations may have no trouble today, but it's hoped that by the time tomorrow comes along, Clipper will be so widespread that non-Clipper can be handled by "other" means. In conclusion, I have to give a nod to the folks who are afraid non-Clipper might be banned some day: If in a few years widely available cheap machines (after all the roughly $1500 Power Mac is what, about 50 MHz?) make much longer keys easily feasible with short encryption/decryption times, then in a few years the government MIGHT actually want to ban non-escrowed crypto very badly. It would probably happen after the current Administration leaves office, making the current White House statements the literal truth for THIS administration. Alternatively, if the NSA has approaches we don't know about which mean that such longer keys are still vulnerable, then we might never see such a ban in the U.S. Note that it's possible to state the above carefully, non-hysterically, and without being offensive. Having taken a few hesitant steps down that path, a few things become clearer. For example the current effort in the Netherlands to ban non-escrowed crypto, and all crypto without permission, perhaps suggests that in the Netherlands they are there already--that is that their cryptologic capabilites aren't of an order comparable to some others and thus they have to face the "banning" decision now. Perhaps the same has been true for France for a while. We do have good reason to believe GCHQ is very advanced--we Americans have learned a thing or three from them, from what I read in the open literature. Thus it's possible the issue hasn't yet become critical in the U.K. Dunno about the Germans. It's possible that they got more from Hitler's former crypto experts than anyone knows and they are very advanced, or it's possible they have "special" relations with the U.S. or maybe even (this would be interesting) the U.K. of a kind that gives them capabilities the Dutch don't have. Given their forward position in the old Cold War days, it wouldn't surprise me. David -----------End Forwarded Message---------- Whoa! blew my mind. I think we finally got through to him. Now we'll have to finish brainwashing him (ready, tentacles?) and put him in a suit and tie. He can be our new spokesman. By the way, this isn't a fake mail -- he's been waltzing around like this for a week or so. matt Matt Thomlinson University of Washington, Seattle, Washington. phone: (206) 548-9804 Check my home page -- ftp://ftp.u.washington.edu/public/phantom/home.html PGP 2.2 key available via email, or finger phantom(a)hardy.u.washington.edu

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Re: crypto software/papers/docs CD -- is there any interest?
by GERSTEIN＠SCSUD.CTSTATEU.EDU 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Tim May writes: >Mark Henderson writes: > >> Forgive the somewhat commercial nature of this message, but I think >> it is well within the lines of the cypherpunks mission of getting >> code out to people. >> >> I'm considering the possibility of producing a CD (for distribution >> in North America only) of crypto source code, information/papers and >> binaries for common platforms. >>...[BUNCH OF STUFF DELETED]...... > >You'll have to be real careful here, as charging money means >copyrights have to be more scrupulously watched than when sites just >"informally" contain copyrighted material. (I'm not arguing for these >laws, just noting them.) ...[ANOTHER BUNCH OF STUFF DELETED]...... >(There are lots of issues here, which get debated over and over again >in various forums. All I'm saying is that charging $50 for a >compilation of articles, FAQs, scanned items, etc. is likely to >trigger a lot of things. Just a heads up.) > ...[STILL MORE DELETED]...... >--Tim May -=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=- Wouldn't doing something like this be like distributing shareware on a CD-Rom? Most of the Rom's I've seen have programs and the like, but a few have had source code, papers, hypercard stacks, etc. that were all copyrighted but still pushed out on the Rom. I think the only problem would be if you were charging more money than a "reasonable duplication fee". Most people will agree that this would be the cost of the media and maybe a little something for your time. Just another of my 0.02¢... Adam Gerstein "After this, nothing will shock me." ---------- "In a Time/CNN poll of 1,000 Americans conducted last week by Yankelovich Partners, two-thirds said it was more important to protect the privacy of phone calls than to preserve the ability of police to conduct wiretaps. When informed about the Clipper Chip, 80% said they opposed it." - Philip Elmer-Dewitt, "Who Should Keep the Keys", TIME, Mar. 4, 1994 -=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=- To sign on to the letter, send a message to: Clipper.petition(a)cpsr.org with the message "I oppose Clipper" (no quotes). You will receive a return message confirming your vote.

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Bekenstein Bound
by Hal 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

From: Jim choate <ravage(a)bga.com> > The problem I see with this is that there is no connection between a black holes > mass and surface area (it doesn't have one). In reference to the 'A' in the > above, is it the event horizon? A funny thing about black holes is that as the > mass increases the event horizon gets larger not smaller (ie gravitational > contraction). Actually black holes do have a defined surface area, which is basically, as you suggest, the area of the event horizon. And of course this is larger for more massive black holes, as you say. I believe the Bekenstein bound is based on reasoning that suggests that if the state density of a region exceeds that bound, it will essentially collapse into a black hole and be inaccessible to the rest of the universe. The surface area in that context can be the conventionally defined area. To bring this back to crypto a bit, the point of this discussion was that there can be only a finite amount of processing done in finite time by a finite-sized machine, even when QM is taken into consideration. Note, though, that this result appears to require bringing in quantum gravitation, a very poorly understood theory at present. Hal

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Clipper/Capstone/Skipjack excerpts from Cud 6.28
by paul＠hawksbill.sprintmrn.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

A couple of interesting articles on Clipper/Capstone/Skipjack which were included in the latest CuD, for those who haven't already seen it... - paul 8<-------------------- cut here ------------------------------- Date: Wed, 30 Mar 1994 22:03:00 CST Sender: CU-DIGEST list <CUDIGEST(a)vmd.cso.uiuc.edu> From: "(Jim Thomas)" <TK0JUT2(a)NIU.BITNET> Subject: Cu Digest, #6.28 ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Date: Sun, 27 Mar 94 17:35:00 -0700 From: walter.scott(a)HOTLINE.COM(Walter Scott) Subject: File 1--Downs Down On Clipper The Clipper Chip proposal from the Clinton Administration -- which would essentially have government broker individual electronic privacy rights -- is collecting still more opposition. One of the most recent opponents to Clipper is media icon Hugh Downs. Downs is well known for his days as a co-host of the Today Show, host of the game show Concentration, and his current position as co-host of ABC-TV's 20/20. Downs is also a respected advocate for "mature" adults. Downs delivered his "perspective" as to Clipper on the 03-27-94 edition of ABC radio's "PERSPECTIVES." In Downs' segment, much cryptography history -- as it relates to radio -- was explained while Downs laid the foundation for expression of his opinion on Clipper. The following text is a direct transcript of Downs' summation: ------------- TRANSCRIPT BEGINS ------------------------ It's not designed to stop criminals from sending encrypted messages because criminals will always be able to do that. If the NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY puts a spy chip on American computers, then the criminals will simply avoid the chip and use other computers that don't spy on them. But, it wouldn't be just criminals who would buy foreign made computers. Anyone who wants a private life would have to buy foreign, too. According to John Perry Barlow, who's co-founder and Vice-chair of the Electronic Frontier Foundation, Vice President Gore says he wants the Clipper Chip installed in all American-made computers designed for export. Now, you don't have to be a computer whiz to realize that -- if American computers were forced to have a spy chip built into them -- then fewer people would buy American computers. The computer owes an enormous debt to cryptologists because cryptologists needed machines to disguise radio messages. The information highway is certainly as wide open as radio. Indeed, much of it is already radio. Cellular phones and cellular FAX will quickly expand to cellular modem and satellite communications. As it is, most of this information goes out unprotected. The time has arrived for individuals to have high levels of security. The information superhighway will eventually contain every scrap of information we could possibly imagine. And that means there will be all sorts of unscrupulous people out there trying to hack into our lives. Information-highwaymen are bad enough when they're fourteen years old. But now, adults -- who work for the government -- want to play hacker, too. The Clipper spy chip is bad business for everyone. Information-highway-safety should be a top priority for all of us. ------------ TRANSCRIPT ENDS -------------------- The Hotline/Seattle ~ (206) 450-0948 ------------------------------ Date: Tue, 22 Mar 1994 15:47:00 GMT From: chris.hind(a)MAVERICKBBS.COM(Chris Hind) Subject: File 2--Reply to "Clipper Paranoia" (CuD #6.26) This is my reply to: shadow(a)VORTEX.ITHACA.NY.US(bruce edwards) Subject--Opposing Clipper is "paranoia" with good Reason (Cu Digest, #6.26) >Its existence will make no difference at all. The very smart ones >may use PGP or something else, and again, clipper will be meaningless. We could easily build it into the net, making it impossible for the government to stop us. Sound like a good plan? >Because it will probably prove constitutionally impossible >to outlaw widespread private encryption -- something big brother finds >hard to swallow -- the clipper/encryption push seems to me to be about >another kettle of sharks. Completely true, encryption cannot be outlawed. The government is ripping itself off by giving us powerful encryption for personal use. But for the dark personal secrets, are we really gonna use the clip chip? Not me! I'll use PGP or something else. Criminals aren't going to use the chip unless they're really ignorant or blatantly idiotic. So the government is really spending lots of money to making our lines more secure from illegal phone tappers and such but not doing a thing for them. I believe we're getting the better part of the deal! Do they really want to listen in on phone calls to our relatives? I don't think so. I promote the Clipper Chip! Thanks for the free gift! T> In my opinion (and this I am sure is obvious to most everyone) the >encryption, bugging-port, e-mail reading agenda pursued by government >is no more than the first icy finger of the Empire, encircling the >throat of cyberspace. A little dramatic here? They might win the battle but they haven't won the war. The final battle will be when we establish a global Interactive Television system. Then it will pit the public against the US government and the allies it has in this dispute (if any). Nobody wants a video camera normally used for video conferencing to be watching them in their own living room without them even knowing it. By this time, people will know a lot more about this scheme and most likely the public will win this battle unless the majority of the population is as ignorant as a two year old child to the world around them. ------------------------------ Date: Wed, 30 Mar 94 13:24:38 PST From: dave(a)PCE1.HAC.COM(Dave Fandel) Subject: File 9--How Clipper Actually Works In all the anti-Clipper flaming that has been occuring I haven't seen anything about how Clipper actually works. I generated the following based on a lecture in a secure computer systems class I am taking. +---------------------------------------------------- Clipper Operations: Chip +----------------+ | | Message (M) -->| Algorithm (E) |--> Encrypted Message (B) = E [M] | Chip ID (ID) | K | Chip Key (U) | User Key (K) -->| Family Key (F) |--> Encrypted ID and Key (A) = | | E [ID | E [K]] +----------------+ F U Note: E [Q] means Encrypt Q with key R R +----------------------------------------------------------- The User Key is a session key that is generated by the two ends in the following manner: Side A Side B Generate a, X Generate Y a, X and Y are random # Send a and a^X ------> Receive a and a^X <------ Send a^Y Receive a^Y Generate K=(a^Y)^X Generate K=(a^X)^Y ie key K=a^(XY) So a, a^X, and a^Y can all be intercepted without giving away key. +---------------------------------------------------------------- So where does the government and the Key Escrow come into it? Note the 2nd output from the clipper chip - it is the ID of the chip and an encrypted version of the session key. The government will know the family key and can extract the ID. Then they go to the two escrow agencies (NIST and the Treasury Dept.) and get the two components of the chip key U. This allows the session key to be extracted and the message to be decrypted. Agency 1: ID and U(A) U(A) --+ OR --> U Agency 2: ID and U(B) U(B) --+ +------------------------------------------------------ General comments: 1. The Algorithm for the clipper chip is an NSA Type II algorithm called Skipjack. Type II is for unclassified, but sensitive. 2. If you could reprogram the Chip Key (U) or block the transmission of the encrypted ID and key this concept wouldn't be to bad. 3. The other point of vulnerability is at the manufacturing location where the Chip Key is originally generated. All 3 pieces of info (ID, U(A), and U(B)) have to be in the same place to generate the key. Dave Fandel dave(a)pce2.hac.com 3/30/94 If there is anything incorrect in this document please let me know. ------------------------------ 8<--------------------------- cut here ------------------------------ Cheers, _______________________________________________________________________________ Paul Ferguson US Sprint Enterprise Internet Engineering tel: 703.904.2437 Herndon, Virginia USA internet: paul(a)hawk.sprintmrn.com

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Re: Is this list alive?
by Carl Ellison 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>>> Is this mailing list still alive? >>> I do not get any message for about one week. >> >>Well, technically it's working. Just doesn't seem to be much traffic... >> >> Julf >> >> >es scheint, ich bin nicht der einzige der Probleme hat. Es kommen zwar rund >fuenfzig mail taeglich :-) hier an, aber manchmal fehlen Mails, zu denen >ich replys sehe. Hat wahrscheinlich mit der Umstellung der >Mailreflectorsoftware zu tun. Andreas, ich habe das auch gesehen. Aber, manchmal kommen die urspruengliche Mails *nach* den Replien (sp? :-). Vielleicht ist das immer das Problem. - Carl

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[mccon@erim.org (Joe McConnell): Latest Headlines ]
by emv＠mail.msen.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

+===========================================================================+ | Copyright 1994 by Wood-Charles Associates. All rights reserved. | | WCA News is available on the Msen Gopher. | | gopher://gopher.msen.com/11/vendor/wca | +===========================================================================+ HEADLINES FROM THE NATION'S NEWS COMPILED BY DISINFORMATION SYSTEMS EDITOR, FAIRLY N. COHERENT BATF JUMPS ON ENCRYPTION BANDWAGON WASHINGTON: THE BUREAU OF ALCOHOL, TOBACCO, AND FIREARMS (THE ONLY FEDERAL AGENCY WHOSE NAME SOUNDS LIKE A SUPPLIES LIST FOR A HIGH SCHOOL PROM) IS GETTING INTO THE ENCRYPTION MANDATE GAME WITH ITS OWN VERSION OF A TAPPABLE-MESSAGE-MANGLER. BATF IS PUSHING FOR A DESIGN CALLED THE "WACO" CHIP WHICH WOULD ALLOW ATF AGENTS TO SMASH IN THE FRONT DOOR OF YOUR SYSTEM, ERASE ALL YOUR FILES, REFORMAT YOUR DRIVES, AND SEND ABUSIVE EMAIL TO YOUR CAT. THE ADMINISTRATION'S OFFICE OF CAVING IN TO LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES ISSUED A STATEMENT SUPPORTING THE PROGRAM. NEW INTERNET PUBLICATIONS ON SHELVES ANN ARBOR: THE OUTPOURING OF PUBLIC INTEREST IN CONNECTIVITY HAS, PREDICTABLY, RESULTED IN A SPATE OF INTERNET BOOKS. AS YOU MIGHT EXPECT, THE FIRST CROP WERE MOSTLY INTRODUCTORY AND AIMED AT GENERAL AUDIENCES. NOW, HOWEVER, THE TITLES ARE BECOMING MORE NICHE-ORIENTED, WITH THE FOLLOWING NEW VOLUMES HITTING THE STORES NOW. THE INTERNET GUIDE FOR CATS: INCLUDES CHAPTERS ON "HOW TO SEND ONE OF YOUR OWNERS MAIL DENYING THAT THE OTHER ONE HAS REMEMBERED TO FEED YOU," "WALLOWING AROUND ON THE KEYBOARD: THE ULTIMATE ENCRYPTION SYSTEM?" AND "HOW TO TELL IF SOMEONE ON THE INTERNET REALLY _IS_ A DOG." EVERYTHING THE GOVERNOR OF MICHIGAN NEEDS TO KNOW ABOUT THE INTERNET: A LANDMARK IN NICHE MARKETING -- A BOOK AIMED AT ONE INDIVIDUAL READER. FEATURES: "GET RICH FAST! 1001 SCHEMES FOR FUNDING YOUR SCHOOL SYSTEM," AND "EVEN ON THE INTERNET, EVERYONE CAN TELL YOU'RE A MORON." LOCAL FIRM OFFERS ELECTRONIC DECOR ANN ARBOR: "SO YOU GOT THIS INFO HIGHWAY THING. SO YOU GOT PEOPLE DRIVING BY ON IT. SO WHAT YOU NEED IS SOMETHING FOR 'EM TO LOOK AT." SO SAYS THE PRESIDENT OF ZASTRONICS, INC., MAKERS OF ELECTRONIC LAWN ORNAMENTS. THE ZASTRONICS LINE FEATURES LITTLE KISSING EECS UNDERGRADS, BIG CONCRETE PARENT PROCESSES WITH A WHOLE STRING OF LITTLE CHILD PROCESSES FOLLOWING THEM AROUND, AND A LINE OF COY, PLYWOOD HOME PAGE BUTTS. "ON THE INTERNET, NO ONE CAN TELL THAT YOU'VE EATEN A TEMPEH BURGER," SAID AN OLD TOWN WAITPERSONAGE WHO CHARACTERIZED HIS PLACE OF EMPLOYMENT AS "KIND OF A SEA SHELL CITY ON THE INFO SUPERHIGHWAY." -30- ------- End of Forwarded Message

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Cryptography banned in the Netherlands....
by mrs＠tinac.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I wrote: > >But now the government is proposing a law that totally outlaws the use > >of encryption methods. > > >Any comments???? And hughes(a)ah.com (Eric Hughes) replied: > Yes. Find the coalition that has repeatedly prevented the imposition > of national identity cards, and educate them about cryptography. It's > much the same issue. Well, first of all, it seems that the identification requirement seems to have passed anyway. But it's not as strict as it was proposed. But you do have a point, it's the same issue, although I believe that completely banning the use of cryptography is an even bigger violation of civil rights than requiring the people that they should be able to show some ID at any time of the day. It's exactly the same coalition that argued against national identity cards that now just says that banning cryptography is not an interesting matter so they will not even join the debates. It looks like the biggest hope comes from the industry. Companies in the Netherlands really feel threatened by this ban on cryptography and I hope that they will be powerfull enough to stop this law. For once, the corporate lobby seems to be on the side of the people! Mike

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Data on clipper phones
by koontzd＠lrcs.loral.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>Subject: Another view of the CFP >From: Eric Blossom <eb(a)sr.hp.com> > >Wow, I'm pretty sure I have some 4100 data sheets I got ~9 months ago >that said the 4100 did not use clipper, but used some "proprietary" >algorithm. The 3600 sheets I rcvd at the same time did make reference >to clipper. I'll have to dig them out and check. > >> Security features >> >> - Clipper encryption algorithm - Display window for (sp) >> - Secure Access Control authentification identification >> System (SACS) - Information to create a call > >Anybody know what SACS is? > >Eric Blossom The data sheet is labeled 5/93. I received in in July 1993. I just called up a marketing guy at AT&T and asked. The 4100 is not available with clipper now, but should be available in late summer. It is unclear whether 4100s will be able to interoperate in clipper mode with other 4100s or just talk to 3600s in clipper mode. The clipper systems delivered to date are 3600s. The 4100 is currently available with one of two proprietary encryption algorithms, one for export. SACS is a screening mechanism to prevent you from going secure, except with expected callers. It also provides user and security level authentication. By definition, data transmission is not available on clipper phones now. From the FIPS Pub it is permissible (see the following). You'll have to wait to see if AT&T will produce a product that can this summer. The reason would not be that it is forbidden (its not), rather muddying of product definitions and competition between products. >From FIPS PUB 185: ... The SKIPJACK encryption/decryption algorithm has been approved for government applications requiring encryption of sensitive but unclassified data telecommunications as defined herein. The specific operations of the SKIPJACK algorithm and the LEAF creation method are classified and hence are referenced, but not specified, in this standard. Data for purposes of this standard includes voice, facsimile and computer information communicated in a telephone system. A telephone system for purposes of this standard is limited to a system which is circuit switched and operating at data rates of standard commercial modems over analog voice circuits or which uses basic-rate ISDN or a similar grade wireless service.

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FW: Our Tax dollars at work! (NOT a sick joke)
by Ophir Ronen 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

---------- From: Setheni Davidson (CompuCom) Trust Congress? Not With This Unbelieveable Lair of Slop PC Computing, April 1994, page 88. By John C. Dvorak When Vice President Gore began talking about the Information Highway, we all knew the bureaucrats would get involved more than we might like. In fact, it may already be too late to stop a horrible Senate bill from becoming law. The moniker -- Information Highway -- itself seems to be responsible for SB #040194. Introduced by Senator Patrick Leahy, it's designed to prohibit anyone from using a public computer network (Information Highway) while the computer user is intoxicated. I know how silly this sounds, but Congress apparently thinks that being drunk on a highway is bad no matter what kind of highway it is. The bill is expected to pass this month. There already are rampant arguments as to how this proposed law can possibly be enforced. The FBI hopes to use it as an excuse to do routine wiretaps on any computer if there is any evidence that the owner "uses or abuses alcohol and has access to a modem." Note how it slips in the word 'uses'. This means if you've been seen drinking one lone beer, you can have your line tapped. Because this law would be so difficult to enforce, police officials are drooling over the prospect of easily obtaining permits to do wiretaps. Ask enforcement officials in Washington and they'll tell you the proposed law is idiotic, but none will oppose it. Check the classified ads in the "Washington Post" and you'll find the FBI, National Security Agency, and something called the Online Enforcement Agency (when did they set that up?) all soliciting experts in phone technology, specifically wiretapping. It gets worse. The Congressional Record of February 19, 1994, has a report that outlines the use of computerized BBSes, Internet, Inter-Relay Chat, and CompuServe CB as "propagating illicit sexual encounters and meetings between couples -- any of whom are underage... Even people purporting to routinely have sex with animals are present on these systems to foster their odd beliefs on the public-at-large." A rider on SB #040194 makes it a felony to discuss sexual matters on any public-access network, including the Internet, America Online, and CompuServe. I wondered how private companies such as America Online can be considered public-access networks, so I called Senator Barbara Boxer's office and talked to an aide, a woman named Felicia. She said the use of promotional cards that give away a free hour or two of service constitues public access. You know, like the ones found in the back of books or in modem boxes. She also told me most BBS systems fall under this proposed statute. When asked how they propose to enforce this law, she said it's not Congress's problem. "Enforcement works itself out over time," she said. The group fighting this moronic law is led by Jerome Bernstein of the Washington law firm of Bernstein, Bernstein and Knowles (the firm that first took Ollie North as a client). I couldn't get in touch with any of the co-sponsors of the bill (including Senator Ted Kennedy, if you can believe it!), but Bernstein was glad to talk. "These people have no clue about the Information Highway or what it does. The whole thing got started last Christmas during an antidrinking campaign in the Washington D.C., metro area," Bernstein said, "I'm convinced someone jokingly told Leahy's office about drunk driving on the Information High and the idea snowballed. These senators actually think there is a physical highway. Seriously, Senator Pat Moynihan asked me if you needed a driving permit to 'drive' a modem on the Information Highway! He has no clue what a modem is, and neither does the rest of Congress." According to Bernstein, the antisexual wording in the bill was attributed to Kennedy's office. "Kennedy thought that technology was leaving him behind, and he wanted to be perceived as more up-to-date technologically. He also though this would make amends for his alleged philandering." Unfortunately, the public is not much better informed than the Senate. The Gallup Organization, at the behest of Congress, is polling the public regarding intoxication while using a computer and online "hot chatting." The results are chilling. More than half of the public thinks that using a computer while intoxicated should be illegal! The results of the sexuality poll are not available. But one question, "Should a teenage boy be encouraged to pretend he is a girl while chatting with another person online?" has civil rights activists alarmed. According to Kevin Avril of the ACLU, "This activity doesn't even qualify as virtual cross-dressing. Who cares about this stuff? What are we going to do? Legislate an anti-boys-will-be-boys law? It sets a bad precedent." I could go on and on with quotes and complaints from people regarding this bill. But most of the complaints are getting nowhere. Pressure groups, such as one led by Baptist ministers from De Kalb County, Georgia, are supporting the law with such vehemence that they've managed to derail an effort by modem manufacturers (the biggest being Georgia-based Hayes) to lobby against the law. "Who wants to come out and support drunkenness and computer sex?" asked a congressman who requested anonymity. So, except for Bernstein, Bernstein, and Knowles, and a few members of the ACLU, there is nothing to stop this bill from becoming law. You can register your protests with your congressperson or Ms. Lirpa Sloof in the Senate Legislative Analysts Office. Her name spelled backward says it all.

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RE: Our Tax dollars at work! (NOT a sick joke)
by Jeff Gross 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Get real! Lirpa Sloof spelled backwards is April Fools. You're right, it's not a sick joke, it's an April Fools joke. ---------- > From: Ophir Ronen (Rho) > To: Eric Geyser (Computer People); cypherpunks(a)toad.com; Jeff Gross; Ofer Bar; > Greg Malinski (Apex PC Solutions) > Subject: FW: Our Tax dollars at work! (NOT a sick joke) > Date: Thursday, March 31, 1994 1:56PM > > > > > ---------- > From: Setheni Davidson (CompuCom) > > Trust Congress? Not With This Unbelieveable Lair of Slop > PC Computing, April 1994, page 88. > By John C. Dvorak > > When Vice President Gore began talking about the Information Highway, we > all knew the bureaucrats would get involved more than we might like. In > fact, it may already be too late to stop a horrible Senate bill from > becoming law. > > The moniker -- Information Highway -- itself seems to be responsible for SB > #040194. Introduced by Senator Patrick Leahy, it's designed to prohibit > anyone from using a public computer network (Information Highway) while the > computer user is intoxicated. I know how silly this sounds, but Congress > apparently thinks that being drunk on a highway is bad no matter what kind > of highway it is. The bill is expected to pass this month. > > There already are rampant arguments as to how this proposed law can > possibly be enforced. The FBI hopes to use it as an excuse to do routine > wiretaps on any computer if there is any evidence that the owner "uses or > abuses alcohol and has access to a modem." Note how it slips in the word > 'uses'. This means if you've been seen drinking one lone beer, you can have > your line tapped. > > Because this law would be so difficult to enforce, police officials are > drooling over the prospect of easily obtaining permits to do wiretaps. Ask > enforcement officials in Washington and they'll tell you the proposed law is > idiotic, but none will oppose it. Check the classified ads in the > "Washington Post" and you'll find the FBI, National Security Agency, and > something called the Online Enforcement Agency (when did they set that up?) > all soliciting experts in phone technology, specifically wiretapping. > > It gets worse. The Congressional Record of February 19, 1994, has a report > that outlines the use of computerized BBSes, Internet, Inter-Relay Chat, and > CompuServe CB as "propagating illicit sexual encounters and meetings > between couples -- any of whom are underage... Even people purporting to > routinely have sex with animals are present on these systems to foster their > odd beliefs on the public-at-large." A rider on SB #040194 makes it a felony > to discuss sexual matters on any public-access network, including the > Internet, America Online, and CompuServe. > > I wondered how private companies such as America Online can be considered > public-access networks, so I called Senator Barbara Boxer's office and > talked to an aide, a woman named Felicia. She said the use of promotional > cards that give away a free hour or two of service constitues public access. > You know, like the ones found in the back of books or in modem boxes. She > also told me most BBS systems fall under this proposed statute. When asked > how they propose to enforce this law, she said it's not Congress's problem. > "Enforcement works itself out over time," she said. > > The group fighting this moronic law is led by Jerome Bernstein of the > Washington law firm of Bernstein, Bernstein and Knowles (the firm that > first took Ollie North as a client). I couldn't get in touch with any > of the co-sponsors of the bill (including Senator Ted Kennedy, if you > can believe it!), but Bernstein was glad to talk. "These people have no > clue about the Information Highway or what it does. The whole thing got > started last Christmas during an antidrinking campaign in the Washington > D.C., metro area," Bernstein said, "I'm convinced someone jokingly told > Leahy's office about drunk driving on the Information High and the idea > snowballed. These senators actually think there is a physical highway. > Seriously, Senator Pat Moynihan asked me if you needed a driving permit > to 'drive' a modem on the Information Highway! He has no clue what a > modem is, and neither does the rest of Congress." > > According to Bernstein, the antisexual wording in the bill was attributed > to Kennedy's office. "Kennedy thought that technology was leaving him > behind, and he wanted to be perceived as more up-to-date technologically. > He also though this would make amends for his alleged philandering." > > Unfortunately, the public is not much better informed than the Senate. > The Gallup Organization, at the behest of Congress, is polling the > public regarding intoxication while using a computer and online "hot > chatting." The results are chilling. More than half of the public thinks > that using a computer while intoxicated should be illegal! The results > of the sexuality poll are not available. But one question, "Should a > teenage boy be encouraged to pretend he is a girl while chatting with > another person online?" has civil rights activists alarmed. According > to Kevin Avril of the ACLU, "This activity doesn't even qualify as > virtual cross-dressing. Who cares about this stuff? What are we going > to do? Legislate an anti-boys-will-be-boys law? It sets a bad > precedent." > > I could go on and on with quotes and complaints from people regarding > this bill. But most of the complaints are getting nowhere. Pressure > groups, such as one led by Baptist ministers from De Kalb County, > Georgia, are supporting the law with such vehemence that they've managed > to derail an effort by modem manufacturers (the biggest being > Georgia-based Hayes) to lobby against the law. "Who wants to come out > and support drunkenness and computer sex?" asked a congressman who > requested anonymity. > > So, except for Bernstein, Bernstein, and Knowles, and a few members of > the ACLU, there is nothing to stop this bill from becoming law. You can > register your protests with your congressperson or Ms. Lirpa Sloof in > the Senate Legislative Analysts Office. Her name spelled backward says > it all. > > >

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Re: The President's Analyst
by Jef Poskanzer 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Indeed, President's Analyst was an instant classic and ahead of its time. The tpc.org domain is a reference to it. See .sigquote below for another prescient James Coburn meme. --- Jef Jef Poskanzer jef(a)netcom.com jef(a)well.sf.ca.us "An *actor* as President??" -- In Like Flint, 1967

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RE: Our Tax dollars at work! (NOT a sick joke)
by gtoal＠an-teallach.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

:Get real! Lirpa Sloof spelled backwards is April Fools. You're right, :it's not a sick joke, it's an April Fools joke. :> Trust Congress? Not With This Unbelieveable Lair of Slop |||||||||||| :> The moniker -- Information Highway -- itself seems to be responsible for SB :> #040194. Introduced by Senator Patrick Leahy, it's designed to prohibit ||||||| :> to Kevin Avril of the ACLU, "This activity doesn't even qualify as ||||| :> register your protests with your congressperson or Ms. Lirpa Sloof in ||||||||||| Gosh, we're slow today kids... G

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Update to finger keyserver at wasabi.io.com
by pgpkeys＠wasabi.io.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Following suggestions on the net, the wasabi.io.com keyserver has been upgraded to allow arbitrary comments to be attached to public keys in the archive. This is primarily for the benefit of people who lost their master keyring and had not prepared a revocation certificate in advance. For an example of how this might be used, try finger 0x445051(a)wasabi.io.com finger 0xbdfe4d(a)wasabi.io.com As you see, the key is still returned. It is up to you to read the attached comments and to decide not to use the key. This solution to the lost key problem was chosen in order to prevent a denial of service attack on the keyservers. Anyone who wishes their key to be revoked in this way, please post publicly to alt.security.pgp The Mgt.

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Re: Quantum Physics
by Blanc Weber 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

So, Jim, I figured the whole thing out and just had to share with you the fact that apparently, This doesn't have anything to do with That Here doesn't have anything to do with There and neither does These with Those I think it's a Principle of some kind. :>) :>) :>) :>) :>) :>) :>) :>) :>) :>) :>) :>) :>) :>) :>) :>) Blanc

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Re: Collapse of the Wave Function Predicted, Timing Uncertain
by wcs＠anchor.ho.att.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> - Writing software while on drugs, apparently a longstanding practice > amongst some segments of the hacker community, is banned. As Professor > Denning puts it: "Drugs and code don't mix. This is what got us into > this whole crypto mess in the first place." Wait - they're not including *caffeine* are they? No way! It's a Commie Plot to decaffeinate our Precious Bodily Fluids, and down-right Un-American! (Or un-Colombian, or un-something!) Mr. Coffee

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Re: the rest of the key
by wcs＠anchor.ho.att.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> Oh yes, and the guy who is asking the spooks about the technical stuff - > be sure to find out where this 80-bit random number comes from and > where it goes when it's been used... Anyone who knows the split-pattern > only needs to subvert *one* of the escrow agencies. The Key Generation Bureau plans which Dorothy Denning originally broadcast (the NSA has since said they've changed, but not said what to) worked somewhere along the lines of: - the two keymaster agencies each bring some keying material to the vault. - the NSA guy puts them into his laptop, and runs a bunch of calculations like serialno += 1 string = SkipjackE(K1, SkipjackD(K2, SkipjackE(K1, serialno))) E1 = scroungebits1(string) E2 = scroungebits2(string) Key = E1 XOR E2 Burn Key into chip, store En on Keymastern's floppy repeat for entire batch nuke the laptop pay no attention to the man behind the curtain.

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Re: Collapse of the Wave Function Predicted, Timing Uncertain
by ub075＠freenet.victoria.bc.ca 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>- Encrypting while drunk is specifically forbidden. Apparently recent >work in the Cryptologic Science Section of the Agency, and since >confirmed by noted Russian quantum theorist Dmitri Jokovich, is that >careless use of RSA and other NP-confusing algorithms could produce >superluminal effect-before-cause cryptoquantum fluctuations. Based on >the Choate Effect, these fluctuations could cause the collapse of the >universal wave function! The other problem with encrypting while drunk, is that the cleartext is impossible to decrypt, because it doesn't make any sense in the first place... even with the right key, it looks something like this: Esopbew rje sruha ro,,peiw. :) -- Ryan Perkins - 1:340/13 | I feel that suicide jumpers see a glimpse of ub075(a)freenet.victoria.bc.ca | sanity as they throw themselves from the ledge. Ask for PGP 2.3 public key | That's why they scream all the way down. 8C5357 : 9F FF BA 93 54 D5 18 78 4B 1E DA GC E3 4E

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anon-mail article in LA Times
by Eli Brandt 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Today's L.A. Times had an article, on the front page of the Business section, on the hazards and benefits of anonymous e-mail. It opened with a narrative concerning a fictional ("composite") company whose internal cover-up of project failures was blown by anonymous mail. There are some quotes saying that it bypasses hierarchical stupidity, and some saying that it's for gutless harassers. The article mentions the situation on the Internet, including the basics of remailer mechanics (no addresses, though). Pretty good article, with less than the usual amount of confusion. Is the author on the list? Eli ebrandt(a)hmc.edu

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Traceable Digicash?
by Hal 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

The Magic Money digital cash system, which is based on one of the earliest papers on electronic cash, is traceable. That is, the payer can collude with the bank and together they can recognize when the payed-out cash is turned in. In some situations, this could be beneficial. If people have bank accounts in their True Names, or are otherwise physically traceable when they turn in money, then if someone steals cash or otherwise uses coercion to acquire it, then they will not be able to turn it in without being caught. Virtually all of the digital cash proposals that I am aware of have this property. They protect the payer's privacy very strongly, but they don't offer much protection to the payee. Technically it is difficult to protect the payee because the cash would have to be changed while in his hands so that it is not recognizable to either the bank or the payer. This would require two re-blinding operations, one by the payer and one by the payee, and it is hard to have a system which could do this and still detect double- spending. People might want to think about the pros and cons of traceable cash. It could limit some possible applications. On the other hand, it may be good to help prevent coercion. One of the cash papers (I can't remember which one) mentioned this as an explicit advantage of the cash that was proposed. Does anyone know of any cash systems which protect the payee's privacy? Hal

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Re: anon-mail article in LA Times
by catalyst-remailer＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

The Los Angeles Times Thursday, March 31, 1994, p.B1, Business Innovation Pros and Cons of Anonymous Corporate E-Mail By Michael Schrage XYZ Corp. (not its real name) has a problem that's driving top management crazy. A rogue piece of software has appeared that lets employees send electronic mail messages anonymously. There's been a rash of sexually suggestive -- and even obscene -- e-mail sent to several female employees. Unpopular managers have received insulting e-mail appraisals of their style and performance. More ominously, several messages have been broadcast detailing serious problems with several of XYZ's key projects. These were setbacks that had previously been the secret of top management but, thanks to XYZ's global network, have now been instantly distributed worldwide to launch hundreds of e-mail queries and thousands of water- cooler conversations. Like kerosene poured on a fire, this act of e-mail anonymity has ignited once-smoldering resentments into openly burning issues. While half the company is thrilled that anonymity has caused these problems to surface for corporate-wide discussion, the other half is furious that the leakers can't be found and punished. Ultimately, XYZ's top management pulled the plug on its global e- mail system, rewrote the network software to assure that all messages can be tracked at least two ways and issued an edict that absolutely forbids anonymous messages. The traffic that now flows on XYZ's network is excruciatingly polite. This XYZ Corp. example is hardly fictitious; it's an unhappy composite of real-world confrontations that recently occurred in several Fortune 1,000 companies. More than any other e-mail issue, the anonymity option provokes the most heated debate in organizational network design. The right to e-mail anonymity strikes at the very heart of values that organizations either cherish or try to suppress. Some organizations see anonymity as a healthy, essential part of their internal dialogue, a mechanism that promotes free and unfettered comment. Others see anonymity as a sleazy virtual mask that lets corporate mischief makers and malcontents get away with cheap shots at people who have the guts to sign their names to their messages. At one giant aerospace manufacturer, for example, managers are positively grateful that their brainstorming software encourages anonymous contributions. "If we had to attach our names to our suggestions, I think people would be less forthcoming," insists one engineer there who, yes, asks no to be identified. The culture of the company, he argues, makes it difficult for younger engineers to publicly make comments critical of senior engineering decisions. The fact that software anonymity effectively subsidizes the existing culture rather than encouraging a more open and honest exchange of ideas is dismissed as politically unrealistic. "Have you lost your mind?" the engineer asks. The anonymity issue becomes even more intense when one considers the speed at which organizations are linking their e-mail networks together in hopes of creating "virtual" corporations and accelerating the flow of vital data. Companies are hooking up with key customers and suppliers. Suppose at the customer network, anonymous messages are permitted and even encouraged; at the supplier, they're strictly forbidden. When these two companies collaborate on a project, whose e-mail protocol should win? Ironically, the ability to communicate via e- mail may lead more to a hostile clash of values than to the desired goal of better communications. Privacy is relative; anonymity is an absolute. So how does the Internet, the world's biggest and best e-mail network, handle this thorny issue? In fact, it is "illegal" and technically impossible to send an Internet message without a "return address," i.e., without some sort of identifying header. Nevertheless, the Internet has become a hotbed of detailed, intimate and absolutely anonymous communications. Indeed, there is a whistle-blowers Usenet group on the Internet -- a kind of forum -- as well as a support group for victims of sexual abuse. Is it in the best interests of these participants to be readily identifiable? These groups depend on anonymous communications. Market forces have created innovations for anonymity. Because there is a demand for anonymity on the Internet, there is now a supply of anonymity on the Internet. Individuals can send their messages to "remailers" that can strip out the headers containing the authentic return address. These remailers, in turn, can send the messages on to other remailers. In other words, Internet remailers can "launder" messages on the road to their intended destinations in ways that completely obliterate their origins. A company that's on the Internet could use remailers to send e- mail or post messages anonymously, but there are no known Fortune 500 companies that provide such remailers internally. Essentially, the rise of e-mail is forcing companies to decide explicitly what kind of values they want their networks to embody. Should employees be allowed or encouraged to send anonymous e-mail? Or should it be strictly forbidden? Or is there a middle way that creates bulletin boards or other e-mail "Democracy Walls" where individuals can safely post their comments? Whatever the answer to these questions, more and more organizations are painfully becoming aware that their new networks can raise cultural tensions just as easily as they create economic efficiencies. +------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | Michael Schrage is a writer, consultant and research associate at the | | Massachusetts Institute of Technology. He writes this column | | independently for The Times. He can be reached at schrage(a)latimes.com | | by electronic mail via the Internet. | +------------------------------------------------------------------------+

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(fwd) Russians Break RSA?
by tcmay＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Friends, I just grabbed this of the ClariNet news feed on Netcom...I'm not supposed to forward anything from this service (so don't tell Brad Templeton!), but this appeared to be too important not to pass on as quickly as possible. Apparently those rumors that the Russians, always topnotch mathematicians, had developed public key crypto in the 1950s or early 60s are true--my hero Kolmogorov developed this when he was technical director at Kryptogorodok, the secret city of Soviet cryptographers hidden in the Urals (and first visited by an outsider, Stephen Wolfram, only a couple of years ago). Here's the report on a news conference announcing the cracking of their Kolmogorov system, which is equivalent to our own RSA. I haven't had a chance to talk to John Markoff, who was at the press conference, to get his comments. --Tim > Xref: netcom.com clari.world.europe.eastern:2783 > clari.news.hot.ussr:3792 > clari. > news.trouble:3258 clari.science.crypto > Path: netcom.com!bass!clarinews > Approved: doug(a)clarinet.com > From: clarinews(a)clarinet.com (AP) > Newsgroups: > clari.world.europe.eastern,clari.news.hot.ussr,clari.news.trouble,clari.sc > ience.crypto > Distribution: clari.apo > Subject: Russian Mathematicians Announce Breakthrough > Keywords: Europe Cryptography RSA > Copyright: 1994 by The Associated Press, R > Message-ID: <russia-cryptoUR7f0_4ME(a)clarinet.com> > Date: Fri, 1 Apr 94 10:40:19 PST > Expires: Mon, 18 Apr 94 12:40:19 PDT > ACategory: international > Slugword: Russia-Crypto > Priority: regular > ANPA: Wc: 116/0; Id: V0255; Src: ap; Sel: -----; Adate: 03-14-N/A > Codes: APO-1103 > > > MOSCOW (AP) -- At a press conference held minutes ago in a > crowded hall, Russian mathematicians announced that a breakthrough had > been made nearly a decade ago in the arcane branch of mathematics > known as "cryptography," the science of making messages that are > unreadable to others. > Leonid Vladwylski, Director of the prestigious Moscow Academy > of Sciences, called the press conference yesterday, after rumors began > circulating that noted Russian-American reporter John Markoff was in > Russia to interview academicians at the previously secret city of > Soviet cryptographers, Kryptogorodok. The existence of Kryptogorodok, > sister city to Akademogorodok, Magnetogorsk, and to the rocket cities > of Kazhakstan, had been shrouded in secrecy since its establishment in > 1954 by Chief of Secret Police L. Beria. Its first scientific > director, A. Kolmogorov, developed in 1960 what is called in the West > "public key cryptography." The existence of Kryptogorodok was unknown > to the West until 1991, when Stephen Wolfram disclosed its existence. > American cryptographers initially scoffed at the rumors that > the Russians had developed public-key cryptography as early as 1960, > some 15 years prior to the first American discovery. After interviews > last year at Kryptogorodok, noted American cryptographers Professor > D. Denning and D. Bowdark admitted that it did seem to be > confirmed. Professor Denning was quoted at the time saying that she > did not think this meant the Russians could actually break the > Kolmogorov system, known in the West as RSA, because she had spent > more than a full weekend trying to do this and had not > succeeded. "Believe me, RSA is still unbreakable," she said in her > evaluation report. > Russia's top mathematicians set out to break Kolmogorov's new > coding system. This required them to determine that "P = NP" (see > accompanying article). Details are to be published next month in the > journal "Doklady.Krypto," but a few details are emerging. > The Kolmogorov system is broken by computing the prime numbers > which form what is called the modulus. This is done by randomly > guessing the constituent primes and then detonating all of the > stockpiled nuclear weapons in the former Soviet Union for each "wrong > guess." In the Many Worlds Interpretation of quantum mechanics, > invented in 1949 by Lev Landau (and later, independently by Everett > and Wheeler in the U.S.), all possible outcomes of a quantum > experiment are realized. > As Academician Leonid Vladwylski explained, "In all the > universes in which we guessed the wrong factors, we were destroyed > completely. But since we are obviously here, talking to you at this > press conference, in this universe we have an unbroken record of > successfully factoring even the largest of imaginable numbers. Since > we are so optimistic about this method, we say the computation runs in > "Nondeterministic Pollyanna Time." Allow me to demonstrate..." > > [Press Conference will be continued if the experiment is a success.] > > MOSCOW (AP), ITAR-Tass, 1 April 1994 > > > -- .......................................................................... Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)netcom.com | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero 408-688-5409 | knowledge, reputations, information markets, W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA | black markets, collapse of governments. Higher Power: 2^859433 | Public Key: PGP and MailSafe available. "National borders are just speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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RE: anon-mail article in LA Times
by Pat Farrell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Eli Brandt <ebrandt(a)jarthur.cs.hmc.edu> writes: > Today's L.A. Times had an article, > [stuff elided] > Pretty good article, > with less than the usual amount of confusion. Today's Washington Post's Business section (page F2) has the same article by Michael Schrage. He is acknowledged as a LA Times columnist. Pat Pat Farrell Grad Student pfarrell(a)gmu.edu Department of Computer Science George Mason University, Fairfax, VA Public key availble via finger #include <standard.disclaimer>

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