December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

"Open Sesame"--MacNeil-Lehrer Report on Clipper
by tcmay＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I just finished watching--and videotaping--the 11.5 minute report by Philip Elmer-Dewitt on Clipper and related topics. The MacNeil-Lehrer Newshour should be in your area several more times today...around the dinner period, later, etc. Here in Bay Area, it comes on at 5, at 6, and as late as 10 and 11. "Check your local listings." An even-handed report, with brief statements from Marc Rotenberg, Lynn McNulty, Dave Banisar, Dorothy Denning, Whit Diffie, Jerry Berman, and a Dept. of Justice guy. "A bad idea" vs. ""Folly to let intercept capabilities be lost." Some nice aerial shots of Fort Meade, NSA. A demo of AT&T's SecurePhone 3600. A brief explanation of Clipper. I won't type in the quotes from the folks above. See the report for yourself. No major surprises. Except perhaps Marc Rotenberg's clear statement that after Clipper and Digital Telephony will come "restrictions on noncomplying cryptography." (Surprising in that it's a bold prediction. One we all have suspected is the case, but a public statement--which the report did not have a refutation of--all the same.) Tim-Bob says "Check it out!" -- .......................................................................... Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)netcom.com | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero 408-688-5409 | knowledge, reputations, information markets, W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA | black markets, collapse of governments. Higher Power: 2^859433 | Public Key: PGP and MailSafe available. "National borders are just speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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NSA security manual
by grady＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I got a call from SDO10 at (301) 688 6911 [NSA Security Duty Officer] this morning asking me where I got the following:

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RE: Pseudonyms and Reputations
by norm＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 9:22 4/7/94 -0700, Blanc Weber wrote: ... >Could I really allow myself to be so prejudiced by what a number of >others have determined is (or is not) a worthwhile contributor to a list? Only those others whose reputation for taste in giving endorsements you have come to trust. ...

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the hh remailer on soda
by Eric Hollander 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

the remailer, hh(a)soda.berkeley.edu, has moved slightly, and is now remailer(a)soda.berkeley.edu. everything will work the same way, and an alias pointing from hh to remailer will exist indefinitely. expect another change some time in a few months: soda itself will move from soda.berkeley.edu to soda.csua.berkeley.edu, and the remailer will move to another machine, perhaps ftp.csua.berkeley.edu or something like that. personal mail to me on soda can be sent to cat@soda. a note to list maintainers: please leave me on the cypherpunks list as hh@soda, not cat@soda. i would like to thank ERic (melhaff@soda) and matt (seidl@soda) and the rest of the soda staff and the csua for creating the dedicated remailer account and for being supportive of the remailer project. as an aside, i am actively working on an encrypted alias remailer, which is currently in testing, and will come on line for public use soon. e

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They can't stop themselves
by Brad Dolan 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

DRUG DEALERS EXPORT BILLIONS OF DOLLARS TO EVADE LAWS ON CURRENCY REPORTING - Wall Street Journal 4/7/94 Washington - Drug smugglers are evading U.S. currency-reporting laws by shipping billions of dollars out of the country, according to a report released by the Senate's Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations. One of the most reliable methods used by the smugglers, according to the report, is the U.S. mail. Over 25 criminal organizations have been found mailing cash through a single, unidentified East Cost airpor. U.S. Customs officials have been wrangling with the U.S. Postal Service for almost two years on ways to get at the money by changing the law so outgoing packages can be randomly inspected. But the issue remains unresolved. [...] ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ The report states that a recent, more agressive search experiment by Customs, using dogs trained to sniff cash and other methods, more than ^^^^^^^^^^^^^ doubled the amount of cash seized during a five month period. [...] "At the very least, the report's findings suggest it is time for all law-enforecement agencies to work together to plan and execute a coordinated, long-range approach to address the money-laundering problem," concluded Sen. Nunn. The report was prepared for his subcommittee by the General Accounting Office. --------------------------------------------------------------------- (1) I don't need to comment on the trend toward random monitoring of all activities of all citizen-units. (2) Re. "other methods" Has anybody tried gamma or neutron activation analysis of currency? bdolan(a)well.sf.ca.us

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Private video on demand
by kadie＠eff.org 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At a "Computers, Freedom, and Privacy" '94 informal meeting, I heard a quick overview of a video-on-demand protocol that would ensure privacy. Does anyone know the details? Here is what I recall (I think): Three parties: A - the information provider has a list of movies (or other material) with prices B - a middleman/net owner C - a customer Some how, C gets her movie, A gets the money, and A doesn't know who her customer was, and B doesn't know which movie C is seeing. Details anyone? - Carl ANNOTATED REFERENCES (All these documents are available on-line. Access information follows.) =================<a href="ftp://ftp.eff.org/pub/CAF/library/confidentiality.2.ala"> library/confidentiality.2.ala =================</a> * Confidentiality -- 2 (ALA) The American Library Association's "Statement Concerning Confidentiality of Personally Identifiable Information about Library Users" ================= ================= If you have gopher, you can browse the CAF archive with the command gopher gopher.eff.org These document(s) are also available by anonymous ftp (the preferred method) and by email. To get the file(s) via ftp, do an anonymous ftp to ftp.eff.org (192.77.172.4), and then: cd /pub/CAF/library get confidentiality.2.ala To get the file(s) by email, send email to ftpmail(a)decwrl.dec.com Include the line(s): connect ftp.eff.org cd /pub/CAF/library get confidentiality.2.ala -- Carl Kadie -- I do not represent EFF; this is just me. =kadie(a)eff.org, kadie(a)cs.uiuc.edu =

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problems with key escrow?
by mike＠EGFABT.ORG 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I was thinking about the problems that people have with escrowed keys and was wondering a few things. For one, things like the clipper chip would not give law enforcement agencies any new abilities or powers - they are currently allowed to tap a phone conversation iff they have a court order to do so. escrowed clipper keys would only be revealed if a court had decided that there was enough evidence against someone to justify a wiretap (and the accompanying keys). so these could only be revealed in the case of criminal activity (or reasonable suspicion thereof), which means that most people wouldn't have anything to worry about. now, is the real problem that the key escrow agency is the weakest link in the chain of security? that people don't trust the government having these things since they could quietly copy the database to the nsa? what about the possibility of having some organization like, but not necessarily the eff hold onto keys so that they would reveal them, or better, decrypt only in the case of a court order, but they would also make it publicly known if the nsa tried to claim they had an inherent right to all of the info. I haven't really thought too much about this one way or the other, but I thought it would be worthwhile to get some others' opinions. -Mike -- Mike Sherwood internet: mike(a)EGFABT.ORG uucp: ...!sgiblab!egfabt!mike

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re: problems with key escrow
by Mark Hittinger 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> Mike Sherwood writes: >I was thinking about the problems that people have with escrowed keys and >was wondering a few things. For one, things like the clipper chip would >not give law enforcement agencies any new abilities or powers - they are >currently allowed to tap a phone conversation iff they have a court order >to do so. escrowed clipper keys would only be revealed if a court had >decided that there was enough evidence against someone to justify a >wiretap (and the accompanying keys). so these could only be revealed in >the case of criminal activity (or reasonable suspicion thereof), which >means that most people wouldn't have anything to worry about. I suppose the most serious issue is the internal abuse of power by government employees. We all know that california DMV operators sell drivers records to anybody for small amounts of cash. We all know that social security people sell employment history on any social security number to anybody for small amounts of cash. We've seen political power blocks abuse their authority by investigating opposition groups. We all know the "posse" would have everybody's keys on a brown bag full of DAT tapes within weeks of going live. Look at what bozo 9-X did with everybody's PIN number in their latest phone card mailing!! They printed people's PIN numbers on the *OUTSIDE* of the envelope!!! Why make it easy for them? Moral: Thou shalt not give power unto the gestapo or the bozo - or thou shalt be sorry in the long run. -------- His system was just roadkill along the information superhighway. -----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- Version: 2.3a mQCNAiz4FWMAAAEEALBCb7HZS7V4gbsp9yJ7Yty49jQ9wcgRhkLjNNgdyJbrJZCq 5/sv4Ljy/4AhVhjlJyZS8L3owS8l0ClZVzWw4/kO3KN7MPz4YPPR7+qIlPQVM0yv gWpJ43EZZ8b8cvAkE9HATCKWktY2ReRSX5DLnScDH/n5jivw+MD/UO8fURCVAAUR tCBNYXJrIEhpdHRpbmdlciA8YnVnc0BuZXRzeXMuY29tPg== =VbKi -----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----

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Grady's NSA Manual
by Jeff Davis 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I don't know about you guys, but if the FBI comes through the front door over this NSA manual, this piece of shit I use for a UNIX terminal goes out the back door and off the roof into the alley >;) We're stripped down to the bare minimum for combat here at Outlaws on the Electronic Frontier. My personal secretary has full run of my accounts- (he writes the shell scripts), but he doesn't know my private key pass phrase. I guess that makes me impossible to impersonate, eh? -- PGP PUBLIC KEY via finger! JAFEFFM Speaking & Thinking For Myself! * eagle(a)deeptht.armory.com email info(a)eff.org * *** O U T L A W S On The E L E C T R O N I C F R O N T I E R **** ***** Committed to Free Public Internet Access for World Peace *****

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MacNeil/Lehrer Clipper Transcript
by Duncan Frissell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

MacNeil-Lehrer - Clipper Segment - Thurs 07APR94 OPEN SESAME MacN: Next tonight, law enforcement vs privacy on the information highway. A tiny piece of silicon, the clipper chip, has raised questions about how to balance individual privacy rights with the needs of law enforcement agencies in the computer age. Time Magazine technology editor, Philip Elmer-Dewitt, reports. PE-D: Today's high tech information highway has a major drawback. For some people it's not private enough. Many of the routine transactions conducted by computer and over phone lines leave a trail of digital fingerprints, messages recording the time and date and nature of the transaction. These are stored on computer disks and can be easily traced. Some consumers simply need absolute security, the assurance that confidential phone calls, faxes, or financial transactions cannot be intercepted. [Two AT&T employees using an AT&T Secure Phone] [Woman] "Good morning, AT&T." [Man] "Good morning, Miss Bishop, this is Mr. McGovern." PE-D: "To keep transactions private, computer experts advise people to talk in code, as these representatives from AT&T demonstrate." [Man] "I'd like to go secure, if we could, please. I'll come to you." PE-D: "They're scrambling their telephone call, just like spies do." [LCD screen on man's set displays, 'secure dE05'] [Man] "Would you please give me the first two numbers, and I will give you the second two." [Woman] "OK, the first two numbers are 'dE'." [Man] "Fine, we're secure now. And now I'd like to discuss some company information with you." [Nerd at keyboard, clicking check box labeled 'DES Encrypt' on screen labeled 'DSS Options Menu']: "OK. I can choose this option to do both signature and encryption." PE-D: "Cryptography is the science of making and breaking codes, of turning plain text into coded text, or cipher. Nerd: "OK. This is our old 1040 form." PE-D: "Like taking this 1040 tax form and changing it into unreadable ciphertext." Nerd: "This is your actual encrypted text of the 1040 form." [Ciphertext scrolls up screen.] Marc Rotenberg [of CPSR] 'Computer Privacy Advocate': "Cryptography is the way you make communication networks secure. It's the way you protect privacy. It's the way you make it possible for banks to send financial information, for businesses to send trade secrets, for individuals to send personal records, medical records, financial data. All of this happens because cryptography is the basic technology of privacy." PE-D: "All modern encryption systems are variations on the secret codes school children use to jumble words. The simplest kind of code is a straight forward letter for letter substitution, for example where A stands for D, B stands for E, C stands for F, and so forth down the alphabet." [WFW screen showing the simple ROT3 substitution cipher mentioned.] "These simple codes have evolved into mathematical formulas of such extraordinary complexity that they're virtually unbreakable. [Scene of a hand pushing a card into a Datakey reader.] In the past few years, a new generation of very powerful encryption tools have entered the marketplace. They are easy to use and easy to get by just about anybody. And they are a matter of concern to law enforcement and national security experts who rely on information gathered from wire taps to do their jobs. [Scene of technician wiring a phone board.] Geoffrey Greiveldinger is Special Counsel for the Justice Department." GG: "There has become available, and there has certainly become available in larger numbers and greater variety, very effective, very user friendly, very high voice quality encryption. And suddenly the prospect of encryption being used regularly in the private sector is one that law enforcement recognizes that it's going to have to grapple with. That really is what brought us up short." PE-D: "Lynn McNulty is with the National Institute of Standards and Technology." LMcN: "Encryption is a double-edged sword. It can be used to protect law abiding citizens and it can also be used to shield criminal activities and also activities that can affect the security of this country." [Aerial shot of Ft. Meade on a workday --- acres and acres of employees' cars.] PE-D: "Secret codes and national security are the bailiwick of the NSA, the top secret branch of government that sucks up international communications traffic like a giant vacuum cleaner in the sky, using the most powerful decryption technology available to tease out its secrets." [Shots of NSA sign and main building entrance.] [Interior shot of NSA museum, with Enigma Machine and Cray in background.] "Cryptographers used to use mechanical devices like this World War II era Enigma Machine, to make and break secret codes. Now they use supercomputers, like this Cray XMP. A cipher from one of these [Enigma] machines could be broken in a matter of minutes. Supercomputers can design secret codes so complex that it would take another supercomputer centuries to crack it. And that's a problem for the National Security Agency which gathers foreign intelligence for the US and runs this cryptologic museum in Ft. Meade, Maryland. The NSA has never met a secret code it couldn't crack. And it wants to keep it that way." [Hand holding Clipper Chip.] "So the NSA developed a new code called 'Skipjack' and put it in this silicon chip, smaller than a fingernail. This is the Clipper Chip, the focus of a fierce technological policy debate among privacy advocates, law enforcement, and the business community. The Clipper Chip [graphic of chip labeled 'MYK78A'] combines a powerful encryption scheme with a back door [skeleton keyhole appears on Clipper graphic], a master key that unlocks the code [Yale key slides into skeleton keyhole] and lets authorized law enforcement agents intercept --- and understand --- coded messages. The NSA wants the National Institute of Standards & Technology and all other government agencies to use Clipper, and only Clipper, when they want to be sure that their phone calls, faxes, and electronic mail can't be intercepted. To encourage its use in business, the US guarantees that the Clipper code is uncrackable and that the master keys that can unlock it are safely stored away. In a plan devised by the NSA and approved by the White House, that master key will be split into two pieces, one held in safe keeping at the Commerce Department, the other at Treasury [the Yale key splits in two on either side of the Clipper Chip]. Law enforcement agencies will need a court order before they can get access to the keys. Unauthorized use of Clipper keys will be a felony, punishable by up to 5 years in jail. LMcN: "There will be no vulnerability there that can be exploited by, say, a rogue law enforcement agency or by a hostile outsider, to compromise the keys that will be ... that will allow authorized people to unlock the key escrow encryption cryptography." PE-D: "But privacy advocates aren't so sure. Like Marc Rotenberg of Computer Scientists [sic] for Social Responsibility, they see Clipper as an attempt by the NSA to block people from using cryptography to keep their affairs to themselves. They're asking people to register their objections by computer." [Screen displaying graph with sharply increasing number of responses (c.38k).] MR: "Here we have on the screen a letter to the President. And we ask them to simply send a message with the words 'I oppose Clipper.'" "Basically, it's a proposal for surveillance. It's a way to make it easier to wiretap the network. And the reason it's such a bad idea is what we need right now is privacy protection. We need more secure networks, not more vulnerable networks." PE-D: "On these networks, people are logging on to argue the pros and cons of the Clipper proposal. David Banisar, one of Rotenberg's colleagues, has been tracking that debate. DB, 'Computer Privacy Advocate': "On the Internet, which is the international network of computers, there's been an incredible amount of discussion. There's been thousands of messages posted, hundreds per day. And it goes on almost forever. [Screen showing message list of alt.privacy.clipper.] The public is going to reject this because, basically, we want a national information infrastructure where people can communicate. We don't want a national surveillance infrastructure, where the main purpose is for the government to be able to control and watch over what we're doing all the time." PE-D: "It may sound like spies vs nerds. But at the heart of the Clipper debate is a fundamental question of Constitutional rights. One side thinks that people have a basic right to use the most powerful encryption tools they can get their hands on to keep their affairs private. The other thinks that that right must be superseded by the legitimate needs of law enforcement. There are cryptographers on both sides of the debate." Dorothy Denning, Georgetown University: "I think it would be folly to let the capability to do electronic surveillance be completely overridden by technology, so that we couldn't do that. I think it's a much safer bet to put it into the system so that we can do it, to make sure that we have good procedural checks and laws and so on to govern the use of that so it's checked. And if it's misused, to make sure that it's properly dealt with." Whitfield Diffie, Sun Microsystems: "If you say to people that they, as a matter of fact, can't protect their conversations, and in particular their political conversations, I think you take a long step toward making a transition from a free society to a totalitarian society." PE-D: "Meanwhile, the Clipper Chip is moving full speed ahead." [Shot of three prototype Clipper chips: (1) (white patch on black) MYK78A MYKOTRONX, INC. #100004A (2) (gold) VLSI 9745TS 383511 VM06222-6 MYKO-MYK78PROTO PROTO A USA (3) (black) VLSI 9312AS401944 VM05413-1 MYKOTRONX MYK78A PROTO ] PE-D: "A company called Mykotronx is making the chips and AT&T is selling a variety of telephones with the chips built in, including this device which it is producing for the government to protect the privacy of phone calls within the Justice Department [shot of AT&T Surity Telephone Device 3600 (crypto brick)]. But it's not at all clear that the devices will find a market outside the government. Some of Clipper's most vocal opponents are the very computer and telecommunications firms the government hopes will adopt it. [The following Logos appear: Apple, IBM, Microsoft, Prodigy, Sun, HP, Digital, Lotus, Oracle]. Their gripe centers on the US export laws that make it illegal to sell encryption systems abroad. To encourage US companies to use the government's system, the administration has lifted those export controls for Clipper, but only for Clipper." Jerry Berman, Electronic Frontier Foundation: "You're going to thwart our foreign markets, because no foreign country and no foreign person is going to use a device that's made by NSA and where the keys are held by a US government agency." PE-D: "As the lines are strung to carry the traffic of the emerging information highway, the greatest fear of privacy advocates is that Clipper may be only the first step down a path that leads to more and more government snooping. They point to a new bill the Administration is circulating on Capitol Hill --- the so-called 'Digital Telephony Bill' --- that would require phone and cable companies to provide the government with systemwide access to even more information." MR: "It is absolutely clear, if you look over the last three to four years of the FBI's proposals and the proposals from the National Security Agency, that there is a plan --- in steps --- to restrict the use of cryptography in the United States. There's a plan to ensure that communication networks are designed to facilitate wire surveillance. And there's every reason to believe after Clipper goes forward, after the Digital Telephony proposal goes forward, that the next step will be to restrict non-compliant cryptography." PE-D: "In real life --- or 'RL', as computer buffs call it --- it's often not clear where to draw the line between the rights of the individual and the needs of society. [Telephoto sidewalk shot showing masses of humanity.] It's no different in cyberspace --- that world of interconnected computers, where messages fly back and forth on video screens [Screens showing US West Community Link Service, Minitel, Medline, American Interactive Technologies, PC Flowers, and Arcade]. Experts say that the new information super highway will have to have some rules of the road. The hard part is deciding where and how to draw them." Dat, dah, de-la, dat, dah! ----- Transcribed by Lois & Duncan Frissell

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Re: Pseudonyms and Reputations
by Hal 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

From: tmp(a)netcom.com > these identification systems ultimately fall back on `real world' > identification systems such as birth certificates, social security > numbers etc. which all can be readily subverted by a determined > adversary. I believe RSA requires a notarized statement, where you have presented the notaries with three forms of ID. I would imagine that notaries have some experience with false ID, but no doubt they can be fooled with sufficient effort. Still, for the kinds of applications we are talking about here (chatting on the net) this is probably adequate. For more security you could require a thumbprint which is compared with others on file. > what, specifically, is problematic about these? does chaum just ignore > them? does he describe them in greater detail? Chaum was writing more about financial relationships with creditors, businesses, etc. My translation of his ideas into the cyberspace author- ship arena was not something he discussed directly. > as for `endorsements for unknown endorsers', it seems to me the reputation > system you refer to is a sort of `reputation web' not unlike the pgp > `web of trust' model. a pseudonymous credential has as much weight as > the pseudonym originating the certification. i.e., if `a' signs `b's > pseudonym, that `edge' in the `reputation graph' has as much weight as > `a' has reputation. that is, it should not be possible to create a whole > bunch of new pseudonyms, have them all sign each other, and then increase > your reputation. In one way it is easier than with pgp. With pgp we are trying to guess whether a person is really who he says he is. This has all sorts of real- world implications, and as tmp points out these are hard to verify. With reputation systems what you really want to know is whether a person's endorsements are valuable. Over time you can basically decide this for yourself, by judging whether those authors recommended by a given person are ones which you consider good. Those endorsers whose opinions match your own would be the ones you pay the most attention to. > this brings up an interesting idea. future cyberspatial citizens may > develop an elaborate netiquette that describes how to maximize one's > advantage through the use of pseudonyms. all kinds of strategies will > ensue. is it better to have a few good pseudonyms, without diluting > reputation, or a whole bunch of pseudonyms but a bit more diluted > reputation? With Chaum's system it should not necessarily dilute your reputation to use a lot of pseudonyms. OTOH, you are right that informal reputations will not carry over, and in practice these will be important. > one of the problems with a positive reputation system is that it would > workd for `d-type people' <g> whose reputation is primarily negative. > a whole lot of people would like to put a negative credential on `d' > so that they would limit his influence in all forums he visits, similar > to the way that one could globally encourage someone else through > `accreditation'. `d' would simply not propagate any negative signatures > to his pseudonyms. Negative endorsements, and negative credentials in general, are difficult to achieve. Chaum's paper has some discussion of these but it is hard to follow. The simple blinded signature model provides a pretty simple way to allow only one pseudonym per True Name in a given forum, if you assume there is some way to distinguish people in the real world. Suppose Cypherwonks wanted only one person per nym. And suppose there was an agency which was able to distinguish people, that is, it could tell when it had seen the same person twice. Now, Cypherwonks asks this agency to give a single blinded signature of a type (exponent) which is unique to that list, to anyone who wants it, but such that nobody gets more than one. To be accepted on the Cypherwonks list, then, somebody would have to show a signature of this particular type, different from everyone else's. Each person could only get one such token, which Chaum has called an is-a-person credential (again, this is a simplification of his idea, I think). Now tmp has what he wants, the ability for a list to have only one nym per person. And in such a situation, negative reputations are important, because you only get one chance and can't start over with a new nym. > could such a negative signature system be constructed? it seems possible > with a centralized `trusted' server, but this is not an ideal solution; > ideally one would like the system to be possible from the independent > interactions of people who trust only themselves. this of course is the > ideal cryptographic model, and the very best and finest algorithms > (e.g. rsa) conform to it. Well, you have to trust that the agency which is verifying uniqueness of identity doesn't cheat. But note that the agency does not get any great privacy-infringing power, as they don't have to know the True Names or identities of the people they are endorsing, and they don't know their pseudonyms (since those are blinded when they are signed). > the problem is similar to preventing double > spending in a cash system. how do you enforce that a person `spends' > a certain amount of information? there are no `laws of the conservation > of information' as their are of e.g. mass as with a paper currency. in > fact maybe the double-spending preventative techniques for cash systems > could be translated to get a negative reputation and prevent people from > not displaying credentials, even negative ones, they have accrued (just > in the way people are forced to reveal if they are `printing money', i.e. > spending spent money) Chaum did, as I said, have some concept about revealing negative credentials, perhaps along the lines you are suggesting. As I followed his ideas (which wasn't very well), you would have to submit an "I'm not a jerk" credential with each posting, and the only way to get another such token would be to get back a response from your posting saying, "OK, you're still not a jerk." But if you posted some trash ("Death to BlackNet") then you wouldn't get back that "OK" token and you'd have lost your "not a jerk" token for good. This would work best in a situation where there was one nym per person, otherwise he could use his other nyms to endorse his worthless trash. (I posted a variation on this idea a couple of weeks ago as a way of handling anonymous remailer complaints without breaking the anonymity of the remailer user. A similar token-and-response system was used, also based closely on the blinded signature system in Magic Money.) > personally i like chaum's emphasis (or recognition) that forums exist > such that restricting pseudonymity in them is natural, fair, > and rational, i.e. a desirable design goal. it seems to me that even > beyond this, people should be able to construct forums where they demand > (or comply, or agree, or whatever) that identity be known, or that it > be totally ignored. given all this inquisitional witchhunting of my > `true identity' (whatever the !@#$%^&* that is), obviously this forum > is in the former category <g> Well, Larry, you have to realize that you caused us enormous hassle several months ago, so it's natural that people will be somewhat hostile. Other pseudonymous posters have not stirred nearly so much interest (with the possible exception of Xenon, who had some of your own tendencies to rant at length). However, in your new incarnation I find your postings much more interesting. > what do you think, cpunks, should you have the right to ignore people > regardless of the pseudonyms they use? again, i ask if it is possible > to construct a system that protects anonymity but at the same time allows > someone to filter all pseudonyms associated with another person. it seems > that we have reached an impasse -- these are two very useful design > criteria but they appear to be contradictory. on one hand we would like > to censor all the `d-type' pseudonyms, but on the other hand we would > want a `clean slate' for all of our own. Chaum has some discussion about how you can go to library A and borrow a book, proving that you have no overdue books at libraries B, C, D, ..., without compromising your anonymity. This sounds analogous to proving that you have no negative credentials from other cyberspace forums. Unfortunately, this is a part of his paper I need to read more times to understand. Hal

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possible FTP site volunteer?
by jdblair＠nextsrv.cas.muohio.EDU 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

This may be a lot to ask, would anyone be willing to volunteer a little space on an ftp site for the 1984 NSA t-shirt gifs? While its easy for me to set up an http page here, its not so easy for me to get the gif onto an anonymous ftp site. The response has been considerably greater than I imagined, and it would be a lot simpler just to get it on an ftp site somewhere, and will provide more prompt turn-around time, than for me to mail it out. You'd get a complimentary shirt out of the deal :) -john. -------------------------------------------------------------------------- John Blair: <jdblair(a)nextsrv.cas.muohio.edu> voice: (513) 529-4877 PGP public key available upon request. KILL YOUR Privacy in the information age is a right, not a privilage. TELEVISION Information = Power = Control. Fight the centralization of information.

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remailer@soda.berkeley.edu supports Ray's pinger
by Sameer 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I have put Ray's pinger onto remailer(a)soda.berkeley.edu. finger remailer(a)soda.berkeley.edu and the list of active remailers will be at the end of the remailer instructions. If there are other remailers that I should add to the list of tested remailers please tell me.

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Re: Pseudonyms and Reputations
by greg＠ideath.goldenbear.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hal Finney writes: > The simple blinded signature model provides a pretty simple way to allow > only one pseudonym per True Name in a given forum, if you assume there is > some way to distinguish people in the real world. Suppose Cypherwonks > wanted only one person per nym. And suppose there was an agency which > was able to distinguish people, that is, it could tell when it had seen the > same person twice. Now, Cypherwonks asks this agency to give a single > blinded signature of a type (exponent) which is unique to that list, to > anyone who wants it, but such that nobody gets more than one. > To be accepted on the Cypherwonks list, then, somebody would have to show > a signature of this particular type, different from everyone else's. Each > person could only get one such token, which Chaum has called an is-a-person > credential (again, this is a simplification of his idea, I think). Real-world application of this protocol still depends on folks not using the credentials of friends/family/dead people, especially where "real name" <-> credential mapping isn't available. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.3a iQCVAgUBLaT/gH3YhjZY3fMNAQFIjwQArXybGzGZnHUugI6mcOn8CwhamKC9KxK7 LmWo0lzEsrK8Iq4n17JB9fLKb8Cb3UYYinvBk1Fadr9OcAOANC1bqjDoJ3Dsvyz3 9/AFY8CfiaH9JqhRK1jAMdg2kuAFdtFBENhhXE9f6v6sedeQvclfwea1u5vMaErJ 0aq5KRAQKH4= =MFNH -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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1984 NSA T-Shirt Access for Lynx Users!
by jdblair＠nextsrv.cas.muohio.EDU 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

To all users w/ access to Lynx, but not Mosaic: I have reconfigured t-shirt.html to support Lynx. Obviously, the gif cannot be displayed on-screen directly by Lynx, but can now be downloaded to your disk by Lynx. At this point, you can use the gif viewer of your choice to look at the images. The URL is the same: http://phoenix.aps.muohio.edu/users/jdblair/t-shirt.html (learning more and more about html) -john. -------------------------------------------------------------------------- John Blair: <jdblair(a)nextsrv.cas.muohio.edu> voice: (513) 529-4877 PGP public key available upon request. KILL YOUR Privacy in the information age is a right, not a privilage. TELEVISION Information = Power = Control. Fight the centralization of information.

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Re: New ID technique: warning of things to come
by wcs＠anchor.ho.att.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> > I have been abroad for the past few weeks. In the course of my travels, I > was given some data about a new program that the US Dept. of State/Customs > and Immigration people are moving into limited testing at JFK and LAX. > > They want to implement a "fast, positive identification system to speed > processing of entrants to the United States by use of biometric data." > The system works by use of a handprint scanner, and a smart card. > Participants would go through an initial hand scan, and then be issued > a smartcard. Upon subsequent entries to the US, instead of going through > the normal passport check, you would place your hand on a scanner and insert > your card in the slot. The system would then positively identify you, and > clear you for entry. This was mentioned in the press a while back; it's not intended for everyone, but frequent travellers, including US subjects and non-US-subjects, would be able to get them to speed going through the border police. Don't know implementation timeframe, and as Lyle said, they weren't real explicit about what they planned to do with the data they collect. Paper passports and border police are already offensive; I've got no plans to get more people-control technology applied to me. # Bill Stewart AT&T Global Information Solutions, aka NCR Corp # 6870 Koll Center Parkway, Pleasanton CA, 94566 Phone 1-510-484-6204 fax-6399 # email bill.stewart(a)pleasantonca.ncr.com billstewart(a)attmail.com # ViaCrypt PGP Key IDs 384/C2AFCD 1024/9D6465

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safety in Numbers ?
by Ed Switalski 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Hi, a recent c-punx posting raised an implicit question about the amount of RSA in use already. Obviously the larger and more international the user base is less likely that Uncle Sam & sidekicks etc can palm off compromised crypto and signature schemes on the rest of us. Two quotes below from the pem-dev (PEM developers) list at tis.com give grounds for optimism. I have blinded the names, as a first line of defence, (those already subscribed to the list can find the original postings by date. Note that: The Public Key scheme mentioned in message 2 may not be full RSA, but indicates the possibilities if slot-in crypto modules were available for interface to standard PC/Mac office software packages PGP has a high profile right now, but needs more users to really damange Clipper. --- Quote 1 --- Date: Thu, 31 Mar 1994 02:43:27 EST Just a data point. There are currently roughly 3,620 PGP keys on the PGP key servers --- despite the fact that use of PGP generally entails violation of RSA DSI's patents. (Note that this number only includes those people who have published their keys; others, due to the patent issue, may not have published their keys on the key servers, and so would not be counted in this figure.) There are also people using RIPEM as well. Meanwhile, we haven't even been able to get our act together to generate a PEM root key; my understanding is that this at least partially related to the liability involved in running a root which *everyone* has to trust, although there may be other show stoppers as well. So there definitely is at least some amount of demand for secure electronic mail using RSA. It's just that by and large, people just aren't using PEM to satisfy their needs. --- end of Quote 1 --- *** Come on PEM-people get yourself a root key ! Then organizations *** ill send more RSA-authenticated mail. --- Quote 2 --- Date: Thu, 17 Mar 1994 12:20:22 EST Recent discussions with a very large software company that I won't name at this time indicates that they have on the order of 750,000 users that are already using an older form of public key cryptography. They are preparing their next release, currently plan to make it PEM compatible (although they are also looking carefully at the Apple AOCE varient), and expect that as many as 1.5 million users might be on this system within a year. This system includes a proprietary directory, and they are also planning to interface that directory to X.500. --- end of Quote 2 --- *** Thinks: the number of retrievals to date of PD crypto would be . useful to know For we are many and our name is Legion .... Regards, Ed Switalski

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RMorality and Ethics (was Pseudonym's and Reputation)
by Jeff Davis 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

From: Blanc Weber <blancw(a)microsoft.com> To: cypherpunks(a)toad.com Subject: Re: Pseudonyms and Reputations Quoting Detwieler(?) " ideally we can develop moral codes where our algorithms fail us. " >Ideally, you would be able to enforce these moral codes. >Ideally, they would reflect not only what is possible in reality, but >what is truly desireable. --------- McCandlish and I discussed morality and ethics early during our initial "handshake". Stanton said there is no morality, only ethics- what do you think? (substantial paraphrase I think serves the purpose of discussion) Here's my reply, and agree that the difference is semantic: *** Morality is the ablility to differentiate between right and wrong, without denotation. Thus, each situation defines an eidetic decision and implementation which would be the application of an ethical standard based on past experience. Therefore, endogenous morality is quite tangible, while exogenous morality is most likely unethical, and detrimental to the purity of being. *** Jeff Leroy Davis <eagle> -- PGP PUBLIC KEY via finger! JAFEFFM Speaking & Thinking For Myself! * eagle(a)deeptht.armory.com email info(a)eff.org * *** O U T L A W S On The E L E C T R O N I C F R O N T I E R **** ***** Committed to Free Public Internet Access for World Peace *****

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NSA security manual
by Jeff Davis 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Well Grady, You already know it's authentic. I'd love to call some of those secure phone #'s and see if my voice print still works. It would be a scream if it did >;) If any of you have tried one of the secure numbers out of curiosity, (and I've been out of the loop since 18 February 1983), you'll get a ring and a pause, then a rapid busy signal. This also lends credibility to my Psychological Warfare Primer, albeit subtely. I stated that the heavyweights in intelligence were the DIA, NSA, and the CIA, in that order. If *green* clearances are mere TS/IS, the DIA feeds them as well on a need-to-know basis. My analysis of the NSA mission is cryptography, (thanks for the hot tip, eh?), and interception. When AT&T broke up, it became possible to intercept transmissions that were previously protected by the monopoly. NSA is privy to all sorts of stuff, open long distance phone calls they can snag off the satellites without a warrent. They're pretty much public domain if one has the technology. Another thing I noticed was the Drug Policy. You note that they leave "authorized" drug use open. Amphetimines are SOP in some combat and combat simulation exercises. Christ, you want to laugh til tears roll down your cheeks, read the FOIA stuff released on the CIA's human experimentation with LSD. True keystone cop stuff. John Barlow and I were drinking some cokes and shooting the breeze here in Laramie a little over a year ago. He predicted an "opening" of the intelligence agencies after Clinton was elected- (This was the second to last weekend in October to be precise). NOW I see what he means. Thanks Grady! So THAT'S what the DoD pogues do. Can't wait to see a Field Manual for DIA intelligence officers. -- PGP PUBLIC KEY via finger! JAFEFFM Speaking & Thinking For Myself! * eagle(a)deeptht.armory.com email info(a)eff.org * *** O U T L A W S On The E L E C T R O N I C F R O N T I E R **** ***** Committed to Free Public Internet Access for World Peace *****

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Re: possible FTP site volunteer?
by Tomaz Borstnar 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

In-reply-to: Your message dated: Fri, 08 Apr 1994 01:33:56 EDT > This may be a lot to ask, would anyone be willing to volunteer a little > space on an ftp site for the 1984 NSA t-shirt gifs? While its easy for Me, me, me! :) > me to mail it out. You'd get a complimentary shirt out of the deal :) Great! ;) I'm taking care of ftp.arnes.si.

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No Subject
by anonymous＠extropia.wimsey.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Subject: NSA Security Manual You realize, of course, that by posting the manual verbatim you have allowed them to discover where the leak was. They have the ability to change the wording slightly on every document, so that when you quote the document they can discover who gave it to you. That is why newspapers no longer report quotes from documents that they have, or never show pictures of secret documents. Then again, for something as simple as a manual, they may not bother to change each one. But the capability exists. user(a)host.domain.site

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Re: NSA Security Manual
by Graham Toal 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

The information itself is not damning but law enforcement tends to frown on the CONCEPT of such releases. If it were seeded, Grady never would have been called. What I found interesting was that it was published in Phrack about a week ago, and nothing happened, but when Grady reposted it, suddenly phone-calls come aflying. Either this means that the NSA read Grady's posts more diligently than everyone else's, or Grady went out of his way to tell them that he'd posted it, which wouldn't surprise me... G

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request
by satan 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

satan(a)ccwf.cc.utexas.edu request for mailing list

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disposable cash VISA
by cort 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

... along the lines of anonymous cash (and contrary to the AntiCash!) ... What does it take to _issue_ bank cards? Can any bank or credit union issue bank cards? What does it take to get the VISA or MasterCard name? It _seems_ that it should be so simple to set up anonymous credit cards. Here is one simple scenario: Mr. Credit Union gets VISA's approval to issue "secure" (prepaid) VISA cards. Mr. Credit Union has a _good_ reputation, and this reputation is important to his business. Mr. Credit Union sets up 1000 accounts with $500 in each account. A bank card is associated with each account. The name on the front of the card is something like "Joe Cash". Miss Customer walks into Mr. Credit Union's place of business and buys one of these cards for cash (the green, paper kind). She chooses one from a fish bowl full of them (ensuring a random acct #). The card would cost something like $505. No exchange of names, no SS #s, no credit checks. Miss Customer uses the card like any other VISA. When the $500 is gone, she "discards". It would be easy for Mr. Credit Union to cheat. Therefore, the reputation is important. Why not? Why can't _I_ sell these sorts of credit cards? Does this truly provide additional privacy? Cort.

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Re: tmp@netcom.com
by Hal 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> Mr. TMP: > > You can easily settle this by attending or meeting with a CP in your area > who can sign your public key based on your Drivers License etc. > > While it might not be fair, it would put an end to the debate... Another way would be for people to get a *blind* signature from someone else saying "I am not Detweiler" (if that is all people care about). Sup- pose some nym were able to exhibit such a signature from a respected list member, ideally one who has given out a great many such signatures. No one would be able to link the nym to his True Name; all anyone would know is that at one time the True Name corresponding to this nym received a blinded signature making this assertion. This allows a nym to keep his anonymity while still responding to accusations like these, if he wishes. Hal

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