December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

HP48 Crypto
by Dan McGuirk 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I'm interested in finding out what cryptographic tools, if any, are available for the HP48 calculator. I think someone mentioned that they were developing a challenge authentication system using the HP48 to ameliorate the problem of sending cleartext passwords during telnet sessions. Is this project still being worked on? Also, are there any multiple-precision math libraries available for the 48? Thanks for any information...

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signing nyms
by wcs＠anchor.ho.att.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Under the conditions Deadbeat described (long tradition of posting from anon-server with pgp signatures/keys, keys on the key server, etc., I might be willing to sign such a key. I wouldn't use my regular key to do it - I'd create one or more nym-signing keys, so people could tell that I know I'm signing a nym's key and it's less reliable than signing a physically-known person's key. To do it right, though, I'd have to have been saving keys for a while from that nym, since it's really hard to tell if a set of postings have really been from the same source, or if it's just a recent impersonation. I'd certainly need to send mail to the nym through the anon-server. I'd be a lot more comfortable, though, with a signature from the anon-server runners, since they at least know the real-side email address, and since they could also do something like automatic collection of signatures. It's still tappable, though, unless the anon-server only accepts encrypted mail on the non-anonymous side. Bill

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CP-austin addresses?
by Stanton McCandlish 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Anyone know the subscribe addresses for the Austin cypherpunks lists? -- Stanton McCandlish mech(a)eff.org 1:109/1103 EFF Online Activist & SysOp O P E N P L A T F O R M C R Y P T O P O L I C Y O N L I N E R I G H T S N E T W O R K I N G V I R T U A L C U L T U R E I N F O : M E M B E R S H I P @ E F F . O R G

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No Subject
by archie＠phantom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Help with encryption needed Can someone point me towards a set of C functions along the lines of: char *encrypt (cleartext_string, key); char *decrypt (encrypted_string, key); Where encrypt would return the encrypted string and decrypt would return the decrypted string. The stronger the encryption the better. Thanks.

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mix
by jon＠balder.us.dell.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Does anybody have source code to Istvan Mohos "mix" programs? I have the binaries but I lost the source a while back. It's kind-of a fun encryption algorithm because it's a transposition cypher rather than a stream cypher -- the result set contains exactly the same characters as the input set. Jon

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Re: Two items from recent magazines...
by pierre＠shell.portal.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> From: Jonathan Corbet <corbet(a)stout.atd.ucar.EDU> > > > W.R.T. using "fake" inventors. It's illegal to file a patent application > > without the true original inventor's name on it. If it can be proven that a > > company did this, it is liable for treble damages and the lawyer who filed > > the application can be disbarred. > > It's not the inventors who are faked, according to the article -- it's the > companies for whom they work. > [...] so as to make it hard for their > competitors to see what they are up to. Just a remark, that for large companies (I'd call them "groups"), the groups are formed of so many differently named entities that even insiders can't figure it out. This is because these large (usually older) groups have formed by buying and selling other companies, branches and divisions of companies. After each purchase, pride, economic interests (brand names), or traditions are such that the old names survive, or are munged into new names. I would expect it is very rare when an old name simply disappears. So, what was a company name, may become a division name in two different holdings that bought each half of the company. And if that same name was used for, say light bulbs and TVs before the split, then after the split, it is still used for the same items. Except they now come from two different companies... still following? The result is that even insiders in large groups have a hard time figuring out which part of the company is working on what, or even which brand names are produced by your company. Let alone which patent belongs to whom, or has been licensed from whom, or which non-disclosure agreements exist between which project and which project. All this simply to point out that at least some of this "hide and seek" game in patents is probably not even voluntary. From working for one of these groups (in several differently named "entities"), I think an external company could actually have an easier time piecing it all together than any insider (including at the top levels). (Thus a business idea, (although I think that is an extropians thread :-) A business that makes contacts with individual projects of a large "holding" or multinational, setting up non-disclosure agreements with each, then constantly cross references this data to put in contact groups of the holding that could benefit from knowing about each other. Individual projects (and their hierarchy) usually do not have enough short term incentive to devote much man-power to keeping in touch) Pierre. pierre(a)shell.portal.com

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Key Escrow a *GAD* thing
by Black Unicorn 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- From: an4914(a)anon.penet.fi (Nitch) Date: Thu, 2 Dec 1993 12:48:19 UTC Subject: The Key Escrow is a *GOOD* thing. I see the introduction of common, publicly promoted cryptography as a *GOOD* thing... even if it's insecure. Yes, even if the government can read every toggled bit of it. If the public uses cryptography of even the simplest sort as a matter of routine then the *REAL* cryptography, the really *SECURE* stuff, will pass through unnoticed. Why would *I* care if some super-secret agency could read my clipper'd data? I'd be using PGP on top of it! only then my messages wouldn't stand out like so many lights in a dark night... ...more like just a few more stars in the sky. +++ No insult intended "Nitch," but it is obvious that you haven't been much involved in politics. What you want is security by obscurity. The problem is that such security is illusory. I don't care what the administration says about the program being voluntary. The centralization of encryption, which is what this program is, is a *BAD* thing. (to use your emphasis) It is NOT a standardization in the strict sense and the only thing that makes me think otherwise in the slightest degree is the fact that AT&T is doing the manufacturing (read: there is nothing that makes me think the other way). The easiest way for a large organization to take away major rights, or to curb the development of major rights is to attack them slowly. Right after everyone "adopts" this "voluntary" standard, it will be that much easier to require compliance. Where will private crypto development be? You will indeed be using PGP2.x on top of Clipper, even 50 years from now when it is entirely behind the times. Why? Because Clipper will close the valve on private development. I hope I'm being overly paranoid. I really do. Consider the administrations real stated purpose. (This is my wording, but _their_ goal.) To harmonize the needs of law enforcement with the (cryptographic) privacy of citizens. (We want to read your mail) Not mentioned the thefact that this is like trying to harmonize sodium and water. If (when) they find they can't read your mail, they are going to be as upset as a spoiled child on christmas morning in a recession. You really think they are going to invest so much time and effort in a program that is so easily and plainly circumvented. [Begin political rant here] I suppose now is the time to harp on the trend against individual rights. Call me a formalist, I just think most people want to live, conduct business, relax, recreate, procreate and exist in general while being generally _left alone_. I expect government to provide infrastructure and support private development of infrastructure where it is most efficient (the so called data highway in particular). I do not expect, or want government to legislate morality, unreasonably impose a majority (which is almost always an oligarchy, and not a majority) on the remainder, gege nerally intervene in my private and legimate a affairs. Clipper is simply invasionary. - -uni- (Dark) -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.3 iQCVAgUBLP4cdRibHbaiMfO5AQHHPQP+KrNPS+NIA51t60tmNwIXpD5ruN/fAzqf eXXWL9359lqEoFaRY0k7nqfG9qmbVCliHS882r4g5mqlWrw8F1ivIRUDnQVpLFda I3RLiYO+/Y79hiC9EyFG4C0t7bp6nCxTkC3aXFdg5Hqy67DvRihwWmegK5PEF++y Cy04OkTkxFA= =4G3W -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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2nd midwest meeting attempt
by jdblair＠nextsrv.cas.muohio.EDU 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Are there any Cypherpunks in the Midwest Region that would like to hold a meeting? I'd like to interact face-to-face for once. I'm located just north of Cincinatti in Oxford, OH, and would probably be able to host something. Unfortunately, this probably isn't very central. I've brought this up before, but didn't get enough response to put a meeting togethor, so... I'm trying again. Please e-mail me directly if you are interested, with a clear, loud subject so I can differentiate you from the noise. hanging in Ohio, - -john. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.3 iQBVAgUBLP0UAKNqtARNqVmxAQGP6QH+Ino8UhNLBycReXJxx82OzHW8JSI/nKwL i1ZXoywUBgccK/WM7w3s1tVnW8kTX5RWLEKzgsFmOgzd/yCR2U49AQ== =SsPD -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: A study of National Cryptography Policy
by Herb Lin 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

As the broadcast message noted, the ground rules regarding classification were not established by the CSTB, but rather by the U.S. Congress. Note also that the final report is intended to be unclassified, though classified annexes may be necessary for completeness. Regarding the two-year time frame of the study: the premise of the study is that there are many perspectives on the issue and that the appropriate policy balance has not yet been established; surely you would acknowledge that both these statements are true. Thus, a serious study of the issue requires time to reflect, especially if different perspectives are to be reconciled. So, let me invite you folks to submit whatever materials you would like the study committee to consider (e.g., printed articles, written statements, etc), and what opportunity, if any, you would like to have to testify before the committee or its staff. Herb Lin **** >As part of the Defense Authorization Bill for FY 1994, the U.S. Congress >has asked the Computer Science and Telecommunications Board >(CSTB) of the National Research Council (NRC) to undertake a study of >national policy with respect to the use and regulation of cryptography. [...] A *two year*, *classified* study of national cryptography policy?? I suppose it's just as well. The closest thing we currently have to a "national cryptography policy" are some ineffective and pointless export controls that, if proposed legislation is adopted, may go away in a few months anyway. That would leave civilian cryptography pretty much unregulated -- exactly as it should be. So sure, take all the time you like to "study" the issue. The longer the better. The "cryptography genie" is already well out of its bottle; in two years, it will be everywhere. And yes, by all means, require security clearances of all the participants and classify all of the proceedings. That will exclude many of the biggest names in civilian cryptography -- those who are not US citizens, who will not submit themselves to government censorship, and who do not wish to lend any legitimacy to a government effort that will inevitably try to regulate what will (and should) be left alone. And it will stifle any embarassing public debates on minor issues like free speech, freedom of association and personal privacy, all of which are just annoying technicalities that keep law enforcement and intelligence agencies from doing their jobs more efficiently. Better yet, restrict membership to these loyal law enforcement and intelligence agencies, the same ones responsible for the silly current state of export controls on cryptography. That should eliminate what few shreds of credibility might remain in the Board's final report. Phil

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N-Gram
by James Hicks 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Business Week, Nov. 29, 1993, p. 99 "BUT WILL IT REMEMBER WHERE THE CAR KEYS ARE?" Joseph M. Bugajsky quit Ford Motor Co. in 1985 to pursue his dream of inventing a computer formula that would analyze and store data the same way the human brain does. This September, his efforts paid off with a U.S. patent on a system that spots patterns in data and compresses the data into "memories." These memories, Bugajsky says, take up only one-half of 1% of the original space. That could make them a boon to banks, libraries, and laboratories flooded with data. The key to Bugajsky's software for supercomputers, called N-Gram, is that it not only finds patterns in data but also patterns within the patterns, as human memory does. The layers of patterns are linked, so "recalling" something consists of working back down from the abstract to the specific. The original can be reconstructed down to the last bit. Bugajsky's company, Triada Ltd., in Ann Arbor, Mich., is planning tests with, among others, NASA and the National Institutes of Health. ------------------------------------------------------------ Any comments? >James<

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Secure Drive Use/Distribution ?'s
by Mike Ingle 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

To those who have requested Secure Drive: How's it working? How widely is it being distributed? How many people outside the Cypherpunks, if any, are using it? Please let me know how the program is doing. Any serious bugs? (Note: I do not have a list of people who've received it.) To those who haven't: Big Brother is watching you! Any ideas on better ways to distribute it? I'm thinking about posting the ad to some newsgroups, since there haven't been any reports of major bugs as of yet. --- MikeIngle(a)delphi.com

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Steganography and noise
by W. Kinney 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

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ACE Introduction
by L. Detweiler 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

===cut=here=== Date: Thu, 2 Dec 93 01:09:03 EST Subject: Your Request From: Americans Communicating Electronically(a)ra.esusda.gov. (info(a)ace.esusda.gov) - -------------------------------------------------------------------- AMERICANS COMMUNICATING ELECTRONICALLY (ACE) Thank you for your electronic mail message. This note acknowledges receipt of your message to info(a)ace.esusda.gov. WELCOME Welcome to ACE--Americans Communicating Electronically! ACE is a team of volunteer citizens, from inside and outside federal government, dedicated to open access to information and learning from every home and community across the Nation. Your initial message to us signals your interest in making this exciting experiment a reality for all Americans. Your participation is vital to the success of this project! WHO ARE ACE MEMBERS? Who are the pioneers in launching ACE? They include: the White House, the Department of Agriculture, National Archives, Commerce, Defense, Education, Energy, Environmental Protection Agency, Government Printing Office, General Services Administration, Health and Human Services, House of Representatives, Interior, Justice, Labor, National Science Foundation, Small Business Administration, U.S. Senate, State, Transportation and numerous associations and organizations. Several states, including many universities and colleges, are also part of the ACE team. WHAT KIND OF INFORMATION IS AVAILABLE FROM ACE? The ACE Experiment is coming on line in stages. During Stage One, selected agencies in the Departments listed above will participate. A single electronic mail address will be used to receive incoming messages from citizens. These messages will be forwarded electronically to the appropriate ACE agency contact for action. Citizens will receive responses, either electronically or through conventional means within "48 hours" of their request. During Stage Two, a directory of U.S. Government agencies and online databases that can be accessed directly by electronic mail will be accessible by citizens. Also, available on line, will be frequently asked questions, policy and issue papers, and speeches. You will be able to browse this information at your leisure. Future stages will build on what we learn! ACE is already finalizing plans to pilot test "Interactive Citizen Participation Centers" in local communities where people can electronically access U.S. government information when they grocery shop or visit the local library. Your feedback as we roll out these stages will be critical in helping us learn to improve this exciting, interactive communications. Working together, we can make it happen! HOW CAN I, MY NEIGHBORS, MY COMMUNITY, MY ORGANIZATION-- JOIN ACE? To join ACE, send an electronic mail message to: letters(a)ace.esusda.gov Describe how you would like to volunteer. Can you help others learn how to use the network? Can you provide a facility where citizens can come to access the network? Can you help form a group of citizens that would like to establish an interactive participation center? WHAT HAPPENS NEXT? We expect to receive a large volume of electronic mail. You, and your message, are important to us. So important, we'd like some additional information about you. Please provide us your conventional address (name, street address, city, state, zip, phone and fax) as well as your electronic mail address. HOW CAN YOU GET ADDITIONAL INFORMATION FROM ACE? Send your query to the Internet Electronic Mail Address listed below: - - Information request for a specific item (This notice): info(a)ace.esusda.gov - - Letter of inquiry of a more general nature: letters(a)ace.esusda.gov. INFORMATION AVAILABLE FROM THE ACE SERVER We currently have information on the National Initatives available for access in various ways. To find out more on what is available, Send a message to the following addresses. NAFTA nafta(a)ace.esusda.gov Health Security Act health(a)ace.esusda.gov National Performance Review npr(a)ace.esusda.gov National Information Infrastructure nii(a)ace.esusda.gov Each one of these has information on how to access the documents for your areas of interest. The ACE project is an exciting one! It's an opportunity for people, inside and outside government, to become involved. Involved,--not just in re-inventing today's government, but in charting tomorrow's future together! AMERICANS COMMUNICATING ELECTRONICALLY [You will receive this message only once a day] ------- End of Forwarded Message

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The Key Escrow is a *GOOD* thing.
by an4914＠anon.penet.fi 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I see the introduction of common, publicly promoted cryptography as a *GOOD* thing... even if it's insecure. Yes, even if the government can read every toggled bit of it. If the public uses cryptography of even the simplest sort as a matter of routine then the *REAL* cryptography, the really *SECURE* stuff, will pass through unnoticed. Why would *I* care if some super-secret agency could read my clipper'd data? I'd be using PGP on top of it! only then my messages wouldn't stand out like so many lights in a dark night... ...more like just a few more stars in the sky. ------------------------------------------------------------------------- To find out more about the anon service, send mail to help(a)anon.penet.fi. Due to the double-blind, any mail replies to this message will be anonymized, and an anonymous id will be allocated automatically. You have been warned. Please report any problems, inappropriate use etc. to admin(a)anon.penet.fi.

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REMAIL: list 12/2/93
by Karl Lui Barrus 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Unless I missed more, the changes are chaos.bsu.edu can be looked up, so no more remailer%chaos remailer at cdodhner(a)indirect.com is down also, I got some anon mail about changing the dos scripts to include more redirection to nul; apparently 4dos is more verbose. I will update this over the break, promise! -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Cypherpunk anonymous remailers, 12/2/93 Q1: What are the anonymous remailers? A1: 1: remailer(a)chaos.bsu.edu 2: nowhere(a)bsu-cs.bsu.edu 3: hh(a)cicada.berkeley.edu 4: hh(a)pmantis.berkeley.edu 5: hh(a)soda.berkeley.edu 6: 00x(a)uclink.berkeley.edu 7: hal(a)alumni.caltech.edu 8: cs60a-qu(a)cory.eecs.berkeley.edu 9: ebrandt(a)jarthur.claremont.edu 10: catalyst(a)netcom.com 11: sameer(a)netcom.com 12: remailer(a)rebma.mn.org 13: elee6ue(a)rosebud.ee.uh.edu 14: elee7h5(a)rosebud.ee.uh.edu 15: hfinney(a)shell.portal.com 16: sameer(a)soda.berkeley.edu 17: remail(a)tamsun.tamu.edu 18: remail(a)tamaix.tamu.edu 19: remailer(a)utter.dis.org 20: remailer(a)entropy.linet.org 21: elee9sf(a)menudo.uh.edu 22: remail(a)extropia.wimsey.com NOTES: 1-6 no encryption of remailing requests 7-21 support encrypted remailing requests 22 special - header and message must be encrypted together 12,19,20,22 introduce larger than average delay (not direct connect) 12,19,22 running on privately owned machines 13 requires "cash" payment for remailing 21 supports RIPEM encryption, caches remailing requests ====================================================================== Q2: What help is available? A2: Check out the pub/cypherpunks/remailer directory at soda.berkeley.edu (128.32.149.19). chain.zip - program that helps with using remailers dosbat.zip - MSDOS batch files that help with using remailers hal's.instructions.gz - in depth instruction on how to use hal's.remailer.gz - remailer code pubkeys.tar.gz - public keys of remailers which support encryption pubkeys.zip - MSDOS zip file of public keys scripts.tar.gz - scripts that help with using remailers For MAC's, at 129.82.156.104 in /pub/pgpc/ are two files: pgpc22.tar.gz, pgpc22.tar.Z which assist in using the anonymous remailers, including anon.penet.fi. Mail to me (klbarrus(a)owlnet.rice.edu) for further help and/or questions. ====================================================================== Q3. Email-to-Usenet gateways? A3. 1: group-name(a)cs.utexas.edu 2: group.name.usenet(a)decwrl.dec.com 3: group.name(a)news.demon.co.uk 4: group.name(a)news.cs.indiana.edu 5: group-name(a)pws.bull.com 6: group-name(a)ucbvax.berkeley.edu NOTES: * This does not include ones that work for single groups, like twwells.com. #6 blocks from non-berkeley sites (so use the berkeley remailers :-) -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.3a iQCVAgUBLP5f44OA7OpLWtYzAQGzUQP/ewQIHSB4DNjAMabfcpvIiggpE/uuliyG RpmbqROIRQr7YQ6NaCuYxXFLO5v4nJeMeGOpVCzdGNoyFyX8BlUlAyZVjnNh+ymT Hmg8v18xEuH6OaMDRRiACUA1zfiU1Ia/iTDl8Z8fUxXAUzuuBkbYYofORBMWa1Rg iVxCj5IS+8w= =veYO -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- -- Karl L. Barrus: klbarrus(a)owlnet.rice.edu keyID: 5AD633 hash: D1 59 9D 48 72 E9 19 D5 3D F3 93 7E 81 B5 CC 32 "One man's mnemonic is another man's cryptography" - my compilers prof discussing file naming in public directories

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CYPHERPUNKS CRIMINAL T-SHIRTS
by cvoid＠albemuth.tatertot.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I will be sorting through the t-shirt requests and compiling a list. It will be done in a few days. As soon as I finish this, I will mail everyone on the list, and we can start hashing out a design. I have a screening company I work with, and am currently working out the details with them. Any questions can be directed to me at <albemuth.tatertot.com> or <netcom.com>. Thanks. Christian Void /T71 | "I don't like it, and I'm sorry I | V/M/Research, Inc. cvoid(a)netcom.COM | ever had anything to do with it." | P.O. Box 170213 Tel. 1+415-807-5491 | -Erwin Schrodinger (1887-1961) | SF, CA 94117-0213 * PGP v2.3a Public Key Available Via Finger *

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Re: NSA Insecure Remailers
by hfinney＠shell.portal.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

As Tim says, it is no secret on this list that the remailers are not presently secure. I posted a long message a few months ago outlining possible attacks on the remailers. It's worth noting that Karl Barrus' remailer does batch up messages and send them out once a day. If enough people use it that will help mix them up. There is still the message size to match them up, though (and, believe it or not, the Subject: line!). Karl is working on padding code. Really, fixing these problems is not hard. There will be some penalties in terms of usability of the systems. Subject lines will have to be embedded in the encrypted message blocks, so the software which sets up cascaded message commands will need to do this. More intrusively, I think all messages will have to be padded to be the same size everywhre in the remailer network. We need to pick a size large enough to accomodate most messages yet not so large that padding all messages to that size will be too expensive or wasteful. Then messages bigger than that size will either be rejected or at least some warning given to the user that his message will be trackable. The traffic volume problem should be solved by having a source of random messages which traverse the network, mixing in with user messages. This will help, but you still have the problem that only user messages will leave the network. The biggest problem is that many remailers are on unsecure systems. The PGP keys and passwords for these remailers are on the disk IN THE CLEAR. Anyone who can get privileges on these systems (many hackers, these days, not to mention the NSA) can get the remailer's keys and decrypt any messages sent to those remailers. Karl's monthly posting shows which remailers are on private machines; those are the only ones which have any hope of being secure against the NSA. As I said, I think most of these problems are fixable, or at least can be significantly improved. Perhaps after the holidays interested parties can set up a sub-list to discuss "Mark II" remailers which will more closely approximate Chaum's vision. Hal Finney hfinney(a)shell.portal.com

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Two Articles FYI
by jdwilson＠gold.chem.hawaii.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

CP's: Two articles you might find interesting: November 15, 1993 InfoWorld, p. 57, "From the Editor": Article titled "Top 10 Reasons the Feds Shouldn't Build the Data Highway" Also PC Week November 1, 1993 Special Report p. 86 "Hitch a ride on the digital highway." Aloha no -Jim

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Re: EFF Op-Ed from the NY Tim
by trestrab＠GVSU.EDU 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Perry Metzger writes: > Matthew J Ghio says: >> If you're not enrolled at a major university, or employed >> at a computer-related company, and don't subscribe to an expensive >> online service, getting an internet account is NOT easy or cheap. > >To most of the nations population, which lives in cities, it costs >under $25 a month total variable cost including phone costs. It is >likely far more expensive in rural areas. > >Perry Indeed. My account at Delphi costs $20/ month for the first 20 hours and $1.80/hr thereafter (plus $3/mo surcharge for Internet access other than e-mail). The total cost is not signifigantly more than the cost of the daily paper (yet its far more informative...). There is a $9/hr charge for access 6am-7pm, though, so I use my wife's account to read this and other lists (and you probably thought I was psuedospoofing :-)) Jeff

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N-Gram
by an4914＠anon.penet.fi 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> > Joseph M. Bugajsky quit Ford Motor Co. in 1985 to pursue his dream of >inventing a computer formula that would analyze and store data the same way >the human brain does. This September, his efforts paid off with a U.S. patent >on a system that spots patterns in data and compresses the data into >"memories." These memories, Bugajsky says, take up only one-half of 1% of the >original space. That could make them a boon to banks, libraries, and >laboratories flooded with data. [...] >Any comments? Compression down to 0.5% ?!? HA! Try saying that on comp.compression!!! Let's see... That's half a typed page of data crunched down into five bytes. Give me a break. That guy ought to be sued for false advertising. ------------------------------------------------------------------------- To find out more about the anon service, send mail to help(a)anon.penet.fi. Due to the double-blind, any mail replies to this message will be anonymized, and an anonymous id will be allocated automatically. You have been warned. Please report any problems, inappropriate use etc. to admin(a)anon.penet.fi.

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Re: N-Gram
by peb＠PROCASE.COM 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Sounds like Bugajsky creates a generative grammar and then stores list of productions that specifies a walk on the tree to extract data. This is a form of Kolmogorov Complexity compression, which has been expanded upon most notably by Chaitin. In the general case, the program could be for a Turing complete machine: e.g., if I want to compress 3.14159265..., the compression algorithm could recognize the sequence and give an essentially infinite compression if you want an infinite number of digits (that's right, my patented algorithm can compress your data, as found inside pi, to 0.0000000000000% of original size! Oops, pi can't be patented, well, then I'll have to use the mumble secret sequence which can be patented! ;^) I wonder whether Bugajsky includes the size of his grammar in the compressed size...if he doesn't then his 0.5% non-lossy compression is overstated. Barnsley fractal compression achieves very high compression rates like this, but it could take days to compress one picture (of course, faster compression algorithms exist that don't compress as much). JPEG can get very high compression rates if loss of exact data is okay (which it is for pictures). And yet another lossy compression example is Sony's MiniDisc which biases to the loss of data to areas that are difficult for most humans to recognize. Paul E. Baclace peb(a)procase.com Bib: Chaitin. "Algorithmic Information Theory", Cambridge University Press, 1987. Kolmogorov. "Three Approaches to the Quantitative Definition of Information", Problems of Information Transmission 1, 1-7 [1965]. Kolmogorov. "On the Logical Foundations of Information Theory", Problems of Information Transmission 5, 3-7 [1969].

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Re: N-Gram
by collins＠newton.apple.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>[algorithm to] store data the same way the human brain does. >[stored data would] take up only [0.5%] of the original space. Whoever said the human brain stores data compressed to 0.5% of its original size, and what is its original size anyway. Paul Baclace says: >Sounds like Bugajsky creates a generative grammar and then stores list >of productions that specifies a walk on the tree to extract data. This >is a form of Kolmogorov Complexity compression, which has been expanded >upon most notably by Chaitin. I agree. The description sounds more like this than anything else I'm familiar with. Paul Baclace goes on to say: >I wonder whether [he] includes the size of his grammar in [the claim] 0.5% is a questionable claim. If it includes the grammar, then the grammar must be very simple, and the data of very low entropy with respect to it -- in which case 0.5% would be an uninteresting experimental result. If the claim does _not_ include the size of the grammar, then the claim is useless for evaluating this scheme. Scott Collins | "Few people realize what tremendous power there | is in one of these things." -- Willy Wonka ......................|................................................ BUSINESS. voice:408.862.0540 fax:974.6094 collins(a)newton.apple.com Apple Computer, Inc. 5 Infinite Loop, MS 305-2B Cupertino, CA 95014 ....................................................................... PERSONAL. voice/fax:408.257.1746 1024:669687 catalyst(a)netcom.com

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Re: NSA CAN BREAK PGP ENCRYPTION
by rxt109＠psu.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

check out this load of bull that I pulled off of alt.privacy today. Reminds me of those chain letters.... > > > A lot of people think that PGP encryption is unbreakable and that the >NSA/FBI/CIA/MJ12 cannot read their mail. This is wrong, and it can be a deadly >mistake. In Idaho, a left-wing activist by the name of Craig Steingold was >arrested _one day_ before he and others wee to stage a protest at government >buildings; the police had a copy of a message sent by Steingold to another >activist, a message which had been encrypted with PGP and sent through E-mail. > > Since version 2.1, PGP ("Pretty Good Privacy") has been rigged to >allow the NSA to easily break encoded messages. Early in 1992, the author, >Paul Zimmerman, was arrested by Government agents. He was told that he >would be set up for trafficking narcotics unless he complied. The Government >agency's demands were simple: He was to put a virtually undetectable >trapdoor, designed by the NSA, into all future releases of PGP, and to >tell no-one. > > After reading this, you may think of using an earlier version of >PGP. However, any version found on an FTP site or bulletin board has been >doctored. Only use copies acquired before 1992, and do NOT use a recent >compiler to compile them. Virtually ALL popular compilers have been >modified to insert the trapdoor (consisting of a few trivial changes) into >any version of PGP prior to 2.1. Members of the boards of Novell, Microsoft, >Borland, AT&T and other companies were persuaded into giving the order for the >modification (each ot these companies' boards contains at least one Trilateral >Commission member or Bilderberg Committee attendant). > > It took the agency more to modify GNU C, but eventually they did it. >The Free Software Foundation was threatened with "an IRS investigation", >in other words, with being forced out of business, unless they complied. The >result is that all versions of GCC on the FTP sites and all versions above >2.2.3, contain code to modify PGP and insert the trapdoor. Recompiling GCC >with itself will not help; the code is inserted by the compiler into >itself. Recompiling with another compiler may help, as long as the compiler >is older than from 1992. > >Distribute and reproduce this information freely. Do not alter it. >------------------------------------------------------------------------- >To find out more about the anon service, send mail to help(a)anon.penet.fi. >Due to the double-blind, any mail replies to this message will be anonymized, >and an anonymous id will be allocated automatically. You have been warned. >Please report any problems, inappropriate use etc. to admin(a)anon.penet.fi. > > --**--**-- R X T 1 0 9 @ E M A I L . P S U . E D U --**--**-- Bob Torres | "I don't know what I'm writing about: plato(a)phantom.com | I'm obscure even to myself." PGP PUB KEY AVAILABLE ** | -C. Lispector, _The Stream of Life_

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Re: NSA CAN BREAK PGP ENCRYPTION
by jazz＠hal.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Major-league guffaws. > A lot of people think that PGP encryption is unbreakable and >that the NSA/FBI/CIA/MJ12 cannot read their mail. This is wrong, and it >can be a deadly mistake. In Idaho, a left-wing activist by the name of >Craig Steingold was arrested _one day_ before he and others wee to stage >a protest at government buildings; the police had a copy of a message >sent by Steingold to another activist, a message which had been >encrypted with PGP and sent through E-mail. Craig Steingold indeed. Looks so much like Craig Shergold, of infamous dying-boy-wants-Guiness-record fame, that I had to read it twice. > Since version 2.1, PGP ("Pretty Good Privacy") has been rigged >to allow the NSA to easily break encoded messages. Early in 1992, the >author, Paul Zimmerman, was arrested by Government agents. He was told >that he would be set up for trafficking narcotics unless he >complied. The Government agency's demands were simple: He was to put a >virtually undetectable trapdoor, designed by the NSA, into all future >releases of PGP, and to tell no-one. Paul, not Phil (his actual name). > After reading this, you may think of using an earlier version of >PGP. However, any version found on an FTP site or bulletin board has >been doctored. Only use copies acquired before 1992, and do NOT use a >recent compiler to compile them. Virtually ALL popular compilers have >been modified to insert the trapdoor (consisting of a few trivial >changes) into any version of PGP prior to 2.1. Members of the boards of >Novell, Microsoft, Borland, AT&T and other companies were persuaded into >giving the order for the modification (each ot these companies' boards >contains at least one Trilateral Commission member or Bilderberg >Committee attendant). Oh, no, not the Trilateral Commission again! > It took the agency more to modify GNU C, but eventually they did >it. The Free Software Foundation was threatened with "an IRS >investigation", in other words, with being forced out of business, >unless they complied. The result is that all versions of GCC on the FTP >sites and all versions above 2.2.3, contain code to modify PGP and >insert the trapdoor. Recompiling GCC with itself will not help; the code >is inserted by the compiler into itself. Recompiling with another >compiler may help, as long as the compiler is older than from 1992. Right. Every commercial compiler has code that recognizes every version of GCC source since 2.2.3 and inserts into the generated object code some new stuff that makes the freshly compiled GCC recognize every version of PGP released since 1992 and inserts into *its* object code magic breakage that creates an NSA trapdoor. I hereby nominate this message for the Cypherpunk's Paul Bunyan award, 1993, in the category of "Biggest Whopper". (Oh, yeah. While I'm at it - Detweiller's Medusa theories, in conjunction with his pseudospoofed distribution techniques, are hereby nominated for the Goebel's Memorial award for "Best Big Lie" of '93.) Jason Zions "Wish I really were Eric Hughes or Tim May, or at least that sharp"

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An Occupied Nitch?
by an4914＠anon.penet.fi 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- >From: jimn8(a)netcom.com (Jim Nitchals) >Date: Thu, 2 Dec 93 10:08:08 PST > >Because the spelling of my last name is fairly uncommon, and someone >used a pseudonym that happens to be a good part of said name, I just >wanted to make it clear that an4914(a)anon.penet.fi is not me, and I >have no idea who "Nitch" actually is. > Terribly sorry to frighten you, Jim. Nitch is a (very) little-known nickname of mine from quite some time ago. There are probably only five people who ever knew that it had been given to me. Funny name collision. I never expected it. Hope you don't get fired. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.3a iQCVAgUBLP451+yu9liBvjrdAQH34wP+OK+BV+iiC9B1CUQquVwpvcxzGgMZiwej lfFtc+PXPqOHx4vEkWfzbKCoQrRElbBg3Iy6F7m73w+lTe57sggd0HKp9V7U75r6 hXzuuKhDSbNfgSy4OVVjVIGcpDImcpfJSsRQFeE3fch2CWne0VpxzJdVjE12iL5o lv9F3KNdxFw= =cXBb -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- ------------------------------------------------------------------------- To find out more about the anon service, send mail to help(a)anon.penet.fi. Due to the double-blind, any mail replies to this message will be anonymized, and an anonymous id will be allocated automatically. You have been warned. Please report any problems, inappropriate use etc. to admin(a)anon.penet.fi.

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