December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: crypto technique
by Karl Lui Barrus 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Well, I couldn't resist trying to find A, B, C, D, E, F. You may be on to something, Matt. The equations are underspecified, and have many solutions - here are some I generated (any of them match what you picked? :-) > 103 110 10 1 51 139 > 103 156 251 1 151 19 > 103 169 254 1 157 43 > 103 72 17 1 191 195 > 103 111 5 1 209 99 > 103 1 18 1 237 203 > 103 202 16 1 251 187 > 5 237 10 5 43 139 > 5 201 4 5 99 91 > 5 64 3 5 113 83 > 5 200 23 5 129 243 > 5 62 8 5 173 123 > 5 164 21 5 185 227 > 5 198 12 5 189 155 Maybe you could look at what these alternate solutions are - it could turn out that the mod operation creates extra valid solutions, which would be quite undesirable. But then, without the mod, the equation may be too easy to pick apart. Or maybe there is some other attack I haven't thought of or don't know about. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.3a iQCVAgUBLMXDk4OA7OpLWtYzAQH/YwP/aTP4NwJ257A7GT1iWk7uhCYNEyJGTnkK UrEm0Pw2n1yq3bMwzEem2EPbK+XOIzP1ql0VdgpLOyQ+7quMGWl1+IKY9Ht7wd2J cy0ynJm8N1BZiJjJ2GHza+jAlqsOeVOICyT7f6Jxf/RU79/KSGQ/Jb0j52sHgrEi LfIBPXZueUc= =nzmt -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Photocopying money
by I still don't know your name, stranger. 20-Oct-1993 1925 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>It's true. Canon did indeed create such a chip. It's the same chip >that's used in vending machines to scan dollar bills. They built a >prototype copier which prevented copying money, but I don't know if they >actually decided to install the chip in all their assembly-line >production copiers or not tho. Nope. There is no "chip" that scans dollar bills. Dollar bill scanning is based on the magnetic ink in a few simple stripes, the presence (actually, absence) of UV fluorescent inks, and not on optical recognition per se, and besides, we all know how "reliable" such machines are. NOT! Besides, even if a pattern-match chip existed that could do it fast enough, simply turning the bill a few degrees (say, 45 degrees, across the glass) would render the problem intractable... And how about adding a background of stripes... something to really confuse the chip.... Sorry, no. -Bill

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Re: Paper Shredders
by koontzd＠lrcs.loral.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Having been an AFSC 30670 (Electronic and Cryptographic Equipment Systems Technician), and been assigned in hazardous areas you use document destroyers on paper stuff - glass vials with grenade fuses). Equipment destroyers were 35 lb thermite charges, designed to sit on top of a standard piece of equipment in a 19 inch relay rack. I had orders to Iran but got diverted when the Shah fell. The liquid in the document destroyers was clear, and we got to set one off for demo purposes twice a year (never did get to set off thermite, though). Had a one acre room half filled with crypto, thermite would have brought the roof and lots of airconditioners down. All the key cards were treated with lead acetate, they would burn without leaving anything but a greasy wisp of ash.

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Re: crypto technique
by Karl Lui Barrus 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- I think the modulus operation destroys uniqueness. I don't have a proof, but after working symbolically for a while, I tried an example: f = a x + b g = c f^2 + c f + d where I picked a = 11/2, b = 8, c = 25/2, d = 3. I also pick P = 16 to keep it small. So g = 903 + 4675/4 x + 3025/8 x^2 mod 16 and if I reduce each coefficient mod 16, I get g' = 7 + 3/4 x + 81/8 x^2 mod 16 Great so far. (And I checked to see that g and g' are equal). So let's look at all possible messages and their encryption: x g'(x) x g'(x) - - ----- - ----- 1 15/8 9 15/8 2 1 10 3 3 35/8 11 67/8 4 12 12 2 5 63/8 13 127/8 6 8 14 2 7 99/8 15 67/8 8 5 16 3 There is a serious problem in the above: the messages 10 and 16 encrypt to the same ciphertext; 11 and 15 also; and 12 and 14. The ciphertext 3 decodes to 10 or 16, 67/8 decodes to 11 or 15, 2 decodes to 12 or 14. That's 6 out of 16 messages, a sizeable 37.5%. This behavior may have uses in fair coin flipping or some sort of oblivious transfer (I am not claiming this in the general case, just in the example above!), but not as encryption. Besides, the fact that even messages encrypt to integers and odd messages encrypt to fractions probably isn't good. So Matt, with the numbers you used to generate the challenge problem, see if any messages encrypt to the same ciphertext, just as a check. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.3a iQCVAgUBLMXPfIOA7OpLWtYzAQFoowP/XLN/poS5kB49IdCBxDe5lVUK05XZYNh+ 0vlBCjDwczqeER5SZMRPagyKSP4qbJb+BFPCNIcw0fcDrSlGCrYejzpgnn5N8vsM KmxlUE+1+8SSIsyyz6ctj7tLFp7wArxgVlOjjxQ7Yj92CIX81IShpvqWPu7rdqWN 1cCpphAwzHI= =d0rL -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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subscribe
by Gregory W. Kamen 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

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Re: Paper Shredders
by owen＠autodesk.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> Stanton McCandlish says: > > > Does anyone know of an AFFORDABLE shredder that really destroys documents > > > by cutting them into confetti, rather than the easy-to-reassemble strips > > > that the typical shredder does? > > > > Yeah, it's called fire. > Fire is, of course, an optimal solution, and those of us who live or > work in a building with a fireplace or incinerator would do well to > use it. However, its hard to spend every day burning things, and > besides that, many of us live and work in urban areas where fireplaces > and other places you can burn large numbers of papers are rare. The > question is thus not out of place. brings back ugly memorys of burn detail, back when I was stationed at a SAC command and control post up in the mountains near Westover AFB. Every scrap of paper that was discarded had to be incinerated, and we rotated through a schedule that made sure everybody got their chance to share the experience. > By the way, the standard method for destroying embassy documents in > case of siezure (not done during the Iran hostage crisis) is > reportedly Thermit grenades. (Thermit would likely reduce a filing > cabinet to slag in moments.) Sounds to me like an enterprising pyro could have a nice little operation, contracting with individuals to burn or blow up their sealed bags of trash. I understand that Beavis and Butthead might be looking for a new job, hey the little weinerheads might amount to something after all! :-) LUX ./. owen

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Re: crypto technique
by Karl Lui Barrus 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Another possible problem with the technique is that the multiple solutions are all valid. For example, with two nestings and a = 11/2, b = 8, c = 25/2, d = 3, P = 16 I obtain g = 903 + 4675/4 x + 3025/8 x^2 mod 16 g' = 7 + 3/4 x + 81/8 x^2 mod 16 where the g' is obtained from g by reducing the coefficients mod 16. Solving the resulting equations yields two solutions: a = 11/2, b = 8, c = 25/2, d = 3 (what I chose) a = 31/2, b = 6, c = 17/2, d = 2 Plugging in the second solution: h = 359 + 6851/4 x + 16337/8 x^2 mod 16 h' = 7 + 3/4 x + 81/8 x^2 mod 16 Notice that h' equals g'! So the other solution can be used to form the same polynomial (which we already saw doesn't encrypt uniquely). Can this other solution be used for decryption as well? I'd check but I've REALLY got to go study now :-) -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.3a iQCVAgUBLMXZsYOA7OpLWtYzAQFjMAP/Si1RuZjfnBNjLauB20rXaUXQMQqyiWBU n/ur7ckXSEmWnADYQqZqCy1tb/+vf5zThQD2IpbF5IH8roxYG99nZQBvvtZAQfEO 3EdbM1esMTS/I0DwcLqkuG26GNNWYGZWi8MQ/0+eXfMa9BXZvkDTuuVBzzHBSXxW 84CVKvitZ68= =FeJW -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Clipper Chip report on 700 Club today (Wednesday)
by mlshew＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I hear there will be a report on the Clipper chip on today's (Wednesday, October 20) 700 Club. Sorry for the very late notice. (The 700 Club, for those without benifit of a handy TV schedule, will be on at 10:00 pm eastern on the Family Channel, and then at 2:00 am Thursday morning. I don't know if there are different feeds for the different time zones, so your milage might not vary.)

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Wizardry's Encryption
by Robert J Woodhead 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Matthew writes (about how Wizardry was encrypted): > But, alas, the character files were in plaintext, and > numerous people figured out how to edit them. They were that way for two reasons: performance (they were always being read and written) and reality (it was a known plaintext situation, since the user could change his character in any manner of methods, like simply trading gold around between the characters, and thus map out the database) Encryption in those days wasn't intended to be strong; it was intended to be strong enough to hold off the pirates for the crucial first few months of sales. Given that we were pushing the machines to the limit of their performance envelopes, we couldn't take too much of a hit (time or code-wise) for strong encryption. And I think Sir-tech still replaces Apple II discs, but I am no longer involved in the company, so you'll have to call and ask them. ;^)

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Anon Bank Accounts / Imminent Demise of US Govt (Conclusion)
by Robert J Woodhead 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Stanton McCandlish asks: > If the govt is oppressive at all, why support this? Perry E. Metzger posits: > Who needs to break it [government]? At the current rate, > it will have destroyed itself within a decade. My answer is simple: the alternative is worse. Anarchy is usually very uncomfortable, unless you have more guns and money than anyone else. Also, the current US government is, at it's core, based on sound principles. If it crashes and burns, what is it more likely to be replaced by? Whether you like it or not, you live in and are supported by a society, in a myriad of ways. The maintenance and improve- ment of that society, and the betterment of your fellow human beings, ought to be a primary goal. It is for me. And finally, Sameer Parekh opines: > I'd suggest that the politics discussion be taken to another > forum? A good suggestion. I've made my point, and perhaps infected a few people with a meme or two. Time to shut up. Best, R

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Destroying data
by Philippe_D_Nave 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Hello, data-killers! After reading recent posts about how to keep data (and PC disk drives) out of others' hands (shredders, double-layer encryption schemes for 'revealing' a bogus plaintext while keeping the real data hidden, etc), I had an evil thought.... >:) Thermit grenades are pretty simple; all they do is provide a means of initiating the "thermite reaction." (Look it up in a chemistry text.) Equal parts aluminum powder and iron oxide (rust), finely ground and ignited by (say) a burning magnesium strip, produce the same effect and would quite satisfactorily destroy a disk drive in a matter of seconds. Likewise the PC, desk, floor - quite possibly setting the whole building on fire - "collateral damage," I guess. Don't screw around with this stuff in your basement, people - it is a _very_ fast, _very_ hot reaction that produces a slug of superheated molten metal. For the truly paranoid among you, however, it might be a viable last-ditch ploy to foil the Gestapo. Do be careful. ........................................................................ Philippe D. Nave, Jr. | The person who does not use message encryption pdn(a)dwroll.dw.att.com | will soon be at the mercy of those who DO... Denver, Colorado USA | PGP public key: by arrangement.

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Russian LanCrypto info
by Mike Ingle 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Here is some information about LanCrypto, a Russian public-key encryption program. This one sounds interesting. From: IN%"alex(a)crypto.msk.su" 20-OCT-1993 14:36:24.72 CRYPTO BANK System of programms of encryption (decryption) of files To work all users must have the files: afina.exe - programm for generation of new public and secret keys afinall.exe - programm for creation of a common list of public keys vesta.exe - programm for encryption/decryption of file NNNNN.pbl - file contains a new public key,NNNNN is a number of user secret.new - file contains a new secret key secret.key - file contains an old secret key FIRST stage. Generation of new secret and public keys by user User runs prigramm: afina.exe A message apears on the screen: Press any keys User begins to strike rand set of keys.A new secret key writes to floppy diskette A to file sekret.new. A public key writes to the current directory in the file NNNNNN.pbl (NNNNNN is a number of user). If you want to write your secret key on hard disk in current directory you run: afina.exe /k Then all users of sistem exchange their public keys(files NNNNNN.pbl.).We recommend thate users organise a CENTER .(The CENTER collects all public keys,creates a common list of public keys and sends it to users.) SECOND stage. Creation and sending a list of public keys. After exchanging of the files NNNNNN.pbl, user( CENTER ) has the files, received from his partners: N1.pbl N2.pbl ... NM.pbl To create common list of public keys , user( CENTER ) runs the programm afinall.exe . (dot in the end) if files * .pbl lokate in current directory afinall.exe [path] if files *.pbl lokate in other directory. Programm creates a common list and writes it to the file publall.key. THIRD stage. Encrypting of a file. If user number NNNNN encrypts file for user number LLLLL ,user number NNNNN runs : vesta.exe [path\]file_name LLLLLL [\k] (1) (\k is a parametre, the programm vesta.exe finds a secret key in a current directory, ;if you run vesta.exe [path\]file_name LLLLLL ,the programm vesta.exe finds a secret key in floppy diskette ) During the process of its work vesta.exe takes the secret key of user number NNNNN (from current directory(if you use \k) or from ffloppy diskette), takes the public key of user LLLLL (from file publall.key).Useing a secret key of user NNNNN and a public key of user LLLLL vesta.exe creats a common secret key.Then vesta.exe generates a rand session key,useing it and the comman secret key vesta.exe creats a secret session key and encrypts the file. The rand session key is not secret ant it is added to the file. FORTH stage. Decrypting of a file Encrypted file may be decrypted by two ways: 1. by user NNNNN, if he repeats programm (1); 2. by user LLLLL, if he runs : vesta.exe [path\]file_name NNNNN [\k] EXAMPLE 1 ( We have user 000(CENTER) and user 001): User 001 runs afina.exe \k.User 001 has files secret.new and 001.pbl in the current directory. User 001 sends 001.pbl to user 000(CENTR). User 000 runs afina.exe \k.User 000 has files secret.new and 000.pbl .User 000 receivs a file 001.pbl.He has: afinall.exe 000.pbl 001.pbl User 000 runs afinall.exe . (dot in the end ).He has: afinall.exe 000.pbl 001.pbl publall.key The file publall.key user 000(CENTER) sends to user 001. User 000 has : ! User 001 has : ! vesta.exe ! vesta.exe publall.key ! publall.key 000.pbl ! 001.pbl secret.key ! secret.key secret.new ! secret.new test0.txt User 000 encrypts file test.txt for user 001 .He runs : vesta.exe test0.txt 001 /k User 001 receivs test0.txt and decrypts it : vesta.exe test0.txt 000 /k User 001 encrypts file test1.txt for user 000.He runs : vesta.exe test.txt1 000 /k User 000 receivs test1.txt and decrypts it: vesta.exe test1.txt 001 /k SIGNING AND CHECKING OF ELECTRONIC MESSAGE To sign a message you must do: sign.exe file To check yoy must do: notary.exe file NOTALL.EXE makes men.cat(list of all public keys of signatures ) A F I N A PUBLIC KEY GENERATION SYSTEM AFINA is a unique package of programs for automatic generation of a common private key for a specific commynication session between two users. AFINA canbe used in any data transmission system with cryptographical protection. It rules out the need for a prior distribution of private keys to users. AFINA uses the best methods of public key generation between two users that have been tested and widely aookied by Western governments and commercial ventyres. Oyr original algorithm and programs have a four-fold increase in the speed of generating a public key compared to the best known standards while also improving data protection 100-fold. Having purchased the AFINA program, you will become fully independent of any key supplying service. AFINA automatically generates common private key for communication sessions with any user in several seconds. You can choose the key length. It will take two users less than 3 seconds to generate a common private key of 256 bits useng an AT 286 pc operating at 16 MHg. AFINA uses the disk operating system MS DOS 3.30 + and needs 32K of RAM memory. Any CGA, EGA or VGA graphic adapter can be used. A hard disk is desirable to speed up processing. Delivery: AFINA software on 5.25 DS/DD or installation by LAN-Ctypto. LAN-Cryoto provides guides and after-sales (warranty and post-warranty) service of the installed products as well as uodated versions and supplies them on favourable terms. V E S T A File encryption system VESTA is a package of programs providing the encryption of files on a user's disk. VESTA employs the most secure methods of cryptographic data protection such as the Data Encryption Standart (DES), a universally recognized system endrosed by Western goverments and commercial institutions, GOST 28147-89, national data encryption standards in computer networks as well as two LAN-Crypto algorithms for data encryption providing processing speed of 200 Kbyte/sec. on AT-286 (12 Mhz) PC. This is a record time for encryption programs. VESTA will allow you to assure your PC's data integrity, provide raw a "transparent" mode of exchange with a hard disk without delaying data processing. By choosing the appropriate VESTA encryption algorithm, you will be able to have secure exchange of information with most encryption programm users in this country and abroad. Encryption key input can be carried out both from magnetic mediums or keyboard. The number of keys of VESTA for cryptographic algorithms: 18 - DES 10 77 - GOST 28147-89 10 77 - VESTA 1 10 77 - VESTA 2 10 The low boundary of the encryption security is determined by the DES algoritm. For users of IBM PC , and compatibles, VESTA provides man-machine communicatin through the Disk Operating System MS DOS 3.30+. Program size of VESTA package: DES - 6 Kb GOST 28146-89 - 2 Kb VESTA 1 - 2 Kb VESTA 2 - 2 Kb VESTA provides friendly interface and detailed help. DELIVERY: VESTA software on 5.25 DS/DD or installation by LAN-Crypto, guides. LAN-Crypto provides after-sales (warranty and post-warranty) service of the installed products and information on updated versions of programms and makes them available on favourable terms. The extrended reference services. NOTARY SECURE ELECTRONIC SIGNATURE SYSTEM NOTARY is a system for generating electronic signature for PC files assuring their integrity and providing the ability to verify the identy of the author of the data auhor. You can use Notarius while storing information distributing floppy disks, or transmitting information throw public communication chanel. "Digital (electronic) signature" is a full analogue of a handwritten signature. The NOTARY " digital signature " employs two algorithms: one which produces the signature is kept secret, while the other, which verifies the identity of the author, is disseminated to recipients of of the signed documents. The NOTARY "digital signature" procedure employs the program "SIGNATUR" to "sign" a document file and creates a signature file which impossible to forge. The NOTARY checking programm analysizes the contents of document file and quickly and securely checks that the signature is authentic. NOTARY allows you to quickly and effectively introduce paperless processing into offices, local networks, banking systems, exchanges system, data communication networks, etc. NOTARY employs more advanced method of "electronic signature" than widely recognized RSA Digital Signature, which has been endorsed by commercial and goverment institotions in the United States. NOTARY's original algorithms and programm solutions allow the user to speed up the operation of signing documents four-fold compared with best known standarts. NOTARY employs the Disk Operating System MS DOS 3.30+ on IBM PC, and compatibles with the graphic adapter EGA (VGA). NOTARY needs 15 KB of RAM and offers a friendly interface and detalied help. Delivery: NOTARY software comes on 5.25 DS/DD or can be installed by "LAN Crypto", stuff we also provide documentation. "LAN Crytpo" provides warranty and post-warranty service of the installation products and information on updated versions of programs when avaiilable offers them on favourable terms to current users. Best regards. Alex Smirnov

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Entrapment Defense
by edgar＠spectrx.Saigon.COM 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Carl Ellison posted here: If all you're worried about is entrapment, you need only ask the person in question if s/he works for any law enforcement or surveillance agency. If they lie, then anything after that is entrapment. I'm not a lawyer but I learned this from my masseuse in SLC UT, where mixed-gender massage is considered a "sex act for hire" and she was constantly subject to entrapment. I'm not at all sure if the above is true. This came up on this list a few months ago when I was suggesting that people might put a statement, "I am/am not a Law Enforcement Officer or Agent" as part of a "certificate of identity" they could mail to verify their PGP public key. At that time I think the concensus was that a LE officer could sign (the negative form of) the statement and still observe crimes and give testimony. One example given was undercover narcotics officers who could not answer affirmatively without jeopardizing their lives. One defense attorney on another net told me that the entrapment defense is rarely used anymore; "it's easier just to plead your client guilty." Apparently all the prosecuton has to show is that the defendant had a "pre-existing disposition" to commit the crime. Duncan Frissel, can you shed more light on this??? -- edgar(a)spectrx.saigon.com (Edgar W. Swank) SPECTROX SYSTEMS +1.408.252.1005 Cupertino, Ca

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TEMPEST: Re: Monitor radiation overlooking./DES weakness
by edgar＠spectrx.Saigon.COM 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Victor Borisov posted the following on Oct 15: I read about overlooking of monitor radiation. Introder can scan the electron-beam radiation from electron-gun. He simple transmit this radiation to self electron-gun and sinchronize frequance. This method work with b/w monitor. The overlooking of color-monitor more dificult - introder will see 4 gradation of gray (all guns off, work one, two, three guns). But we can select spesial colors (red-blue or blue-green) and allways will work only one (or two) guns. In this way introder will see dark (or light) gray screen without any information!!! Is it corect? Do now present more improve overlooking system? We in the USA refer to this technology as TEMPEST, which is an acronym for Transient ElectroMagnetic Pulse Emanation STandard or Transient Electromagnetic Pulse Surveillance Technology. Victor, I have a long (58K) document about this which I'll be glad to send you, just ask. I think I got it from this list last August maybe. I haven't seen Victor's idea of adjusting screen colors before. I suspect that it would take some balancing of the colors so the combo for foreground/background would be the same strength to a close tolerance. Certainly I wouldn't trust it without confirmation from an experiment that a state-of-the-art TEMPEST device couldn't resolve any information. Victor, could your friend in the KGB arrange for such an experiment?? TEMPEST defenses considered here involve using metal cabinets and other shielding. One relatively inexpensive approach uses metallic wallpaper! Here are some references: From: szebra!novavax.nova.edu!yanek (Yanek Martinson) Subject: INFO: TEMPEST companies To: toad.com!cypherpunks Date: Wed, 16 Dec 92 20:33:10 EDT X-Mailer: Elm [version 2.1 PL1] Lindgren RF Enclosures 400 Gigh Grove Blvd. Glendale Heights, IL 60139 Contact: Wayne Martin 708-307-7200 FAX: 708-307-7571 "LT" Series Shielding System is a complete line of modular enclosures, equipment cabinets and custom enclosures available in virtually all shielding materials. The system features exclusive Double Electrically Isolated construction for maximum attenuation. All enclosures are fully tested and guaranteed. Aplication assistance available. Secure Systems & Services Div. of The R/H Factor Corp. 13990 Goldmark Dr., Ste.401 Dallas, TX 75240 Contact: Ray Helsop 214-907-9288 FAX: 214-669-9160 TEMPEST Products, Systems & Services are for Military/Industrial firms concerned with threat of information security and protection by [sic] electronic eavesdroppoing; also commercial EMI/RFI, reduced emissions products. We provide TEMPEST service and support, data encryption, F.I.S.A. Facility Information Security Assessment Studies, site planning, installation design, facility upgrades, etc. International Paper Co. Longmeadow Rd. Tuxedo, NU 10987 Contact: Larry Fahy 914-577-7247 SAF'N SHIELDED (tm) International Paper provides a unique wallcovering that prevents electromagnetic interference (EMI), wireless electronic espionage, and other forms of electromagnetic eavesdropping. The new wallcovering, a composite structure that incorporates a nonwoven mat of metallic fibers, has been TEMPEST-tested by the U.S. government and can achieve attenuation levels over 100dB. The material, which eliminates the added costs of "hardening" or adding protective shielding to individual pieces of electronic equipment, is being used both in primary applications and to upgrade facilities to higher levels of protection. It also provides a way to plug EMI leaks quickly and effectively. Unlike woven or sheet metal, which typically require gutting entire rooms, this flexible, lightweight material goes up as quickly as wallpaper. No special tools are needed, and downtime is minimal. Transaction Security, Inc. 21 Industrial Ave. Upper Saddle River, NJ 07458 Contact: O. Mark Hastings 201-573-1150 Steel TEMPEST-type enclosures for any size computer hardware. Subject: New number for Secure Systems & Services The new number for SS&S is (214) 907-9288 Also, Lindgren RF Enclosures informed me that they now have exclusive license to market International Paper Company's SAF'N SHIELDED; and they give free samples ;-)) JPW ==================================================================== Date: Mon, 28 Dec 92 11:57:49 PDT From: szebra!jplpost.Jpl.Nasa.Gov!wendtj (Jeffrey P Wendt) To: toad.com!cypherpunks Subject: TEMPEST companies I have recieved information from Veratec re: the product Safe`n'Shield, and I have to say that for an inf0 packet, they have done a great job. The folder comes with 2 sample squares of the Safe`n' Shield material, and the specs for their product are as follows: >----------------------------------------------------------- > Shielding Effectiveness of SAFE`N'SHIELDED (R) >(in dB Attenuation) >___________________________________________________________ >SAF`N'40 tm 10' x 20' x 8' Room >___________________________________________________________ > 10KHz 1MHz 50MHz 400MHz 1GHz >----------------------------------------------------------- > >100 76 53 57 62 >___________________________________________________________ >___________________________________________________________ >SAF`N'60 tm 8' x 8' x 8' Room >___________________________________________________________ > 10KHz 1MHz 50MHz 400MHz 1GHz >----------------------------------------------------------- > >100 N/T* 67 72 87 >___________________________________________________________ >___________________________________________________________ >SAF`N'80 tm 8' x 8' x 8' Room >___________________________________________________________ > 10KHz 1MHz 50MHz 400MHz 1GHz >----------------------------------------------------------- > >100 >81 100 90 90 >___________________________________________________________ In addition to some general notes and a customer list, they provide a 25 page booklet on construction techniques; both new and existing. The material is very thin, about the same weight and feel as good bond paper. The manufacturer states that this material meets the NSA 65-6 spec using this nonwoven material as the priamary shield. The material is applied just like wall paper, with comercial wallpaper glue, and from a construction point of view this stuff looks like you could do an 8x8x8 romm in a few hours. Alas, I did not recieve a price list on the material, but I am sure it will be a hell-of-a-lot cheaper that buying TEMPEST certified computers, and best of all...you don't have to register a damn thing ;-)). The address is: Veretec Long Meadow Road Tuxedo, New York 10987 (919) 577-7447 Victor Continues: Some words about DES - I spoke with one cryptoanalisyst from KGB and he sow, that for number crypto algotitm c(key, text) (key is keyLength tall) present f(key, text), that for all key1 and key2 present key with length keyLength, that c(key2, c(key1, text))==f(key, text). He also say, that now present f() for c()=des(), more f() wery like des(). That`s why for decrypting of des(k1, des(k2, ... des(kN, text) ... )) we must try 2^56 keys with spetial function. Victor seems to be saying that his friend is saying that DES is a "group" (if I remember my terms correctly), which somebody was supposed to have proven wasn't the case. Although, strictly speaking, a "group" was supposed to be f=des, where Victor just says it's "very like DES." But multiple encryptions as Victor describes are not used. Rather alternating encryptions and DEcryptions. For example triple DES dese(k1, desd(k2, dese(k3, plaintext))) where "dese" is DES encryption and "desd" is DES decryption. What does your friend in the KGB have to say about that, Victor? If triple-DES reduces to any reasonable transformation of (some) 56-bit key then it's almost as easy to break as single-DES which we now know only requires 3 hours on a $1 million specialized machine. Of more interest here, Victor, is what your KGB friend says about the IDEA cipher, RSA Public Key encryption, and the MD5 message digest, all of which are used in PGP. We would also like to know if the KGB has found any weaknesses in PGP or if they've even had occasion to try to find any. -- edgar(a)spectrx.saigon.com (Edgar W. Swank) SPECTROX SYSTEMS +1.408.252.1005 Cupertino, Ca

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Photo copy money
by charliemerritt＠BIX.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Everyone seems to say, no, no pattern recognition in Cannon copiers. This pattern recognition is more than urban legend! I saw it demonstrated on evening news Dollar in Black out. If this is false it is a well orchestrated lie.

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Re: Something Silly, Something Serious
by jamie＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Tim May writes (and then Jamie takes a bend toward CypherRapture): >SOMETHING SERIOUS: > >Seriously, I understand L. Dettweiler has asked to be unsubscribed. > >For the record, I did not send him any e-mail these past several >weeks, either under my normal name or under any other names. I rarely >pseudonyms, and have never--that I recall right now--ever used them in >2-way communication. And never for the purposed Dettweiller/Boxx alleged. > > >But the cake was taken when he claimed I had invented the nym "Jamie >Dinkelacker," whom many of you know personally, to slant arguments! >Done humorously, as several of us have done recently, such a claim >would be funny (no offense meant, Jamie). But LD showed no awareness >of the absurdity of his claim. ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ Tim's got a point. Why would Tim create the nym Jamie Dinkelacker? With so many names to pick from, why pick one that is already in use and is fairly visible in other networks (e.g., extropians, nano)? Perhaps LD didn't check them, but others on the list are aware. Isn't it interesting that when a writer doesn't know that two persons are different individuals, it's easy to presume that when they agree in print or simply discuss similar topics, that this implies nym-hood? Fascinating: This isn't a surface event. The issue here is a root failing of LD's cognizance and scope to simply check things out. Readers in the Bay Area or LA may have seen stuff Jamie Dinkelacker has written in _Microtimes_, or in the _Foresight Update_, or if you read the academic communication and mass media literature, there as well. Plus, I'm a fairly voluble fellow speaking at conferences, trade shows, some local discussion groups and the like. No, Jamie isn't an AI, nor does he play one on the net. (Maybe someday...) I've not used net nym. What struck me about LD's vacuous pleas and S.Boxx's vapid rants was the essential disturbed and juvenile nature they projected, hoping to ensure a cause of CypherRapture (following CryptoAnarchy, natch) warranting true names without ever any spoofing or deception. I have made a standing offer to take S.Boxx to lunch (provided s/he eats with a fork and isn't already out to lunch). But spoofing and deception are not the same: more importantly, neither is an emergent element of pseudonymity, anonymous remailers, or cypherjocks. I found Blacknet to be entertaining. It seemed natural this has been going on for years. As far as deception, it's a matter of degree. It's common in nature, sports, business, ... . I'm not advocating it -- but I accept it as a fact of living in modern times. This has been a good experience for me, and has raised many issues in the big Venn of CryptoAnarchy: who owns their name, for how long, does it matter? ... Who can tell the difference? Which John Smith is that? ... Tim continues ... > >Cypherpunks write code. Cyperpunks write essays. Cypherpunks make puns >and jokes and even spoofs. Cypherpunks have fun. > I don't know if there is a Cypherpunk's cause. I doubt there's a movement, but that's separate from my holding a belief that crypto and nyms and digital cash and privacy and emergent social structures are crucial to a preferable form of human survival. With the net, we have a wonderous tool and opportunity. But the world isn't a safe place. Every time I put a finger or toe into the lovely pacific ocean I'm keenly aware of quickly entering the food chain at a much lower point. These are times of challenge, to develop new tools and fresh perspectives. But many elements of human nature remain the same. I thank the Cypherpunks for writing code. I don't (anymore): I write words, make videos and build organizations. We do need the code. We also need to push at the edges of our understanding of social dynamics. And S.Boxx clearly illustrated that puerile visciousness, wounded animal frenzy, and pathetic behavior are also here in this new world. One of the brave ones, s/he isn't. And Cypherpunks' creations even protect the likes of S.Boxx. Reminiscent of Voltaire, yes? Thanks for the bandwidth. If anyone would like to continue this, perhaps moving it to the Extropians list would be reasonable. James Dinkelacker (True name) -- ................................ Jamie Dinkelacker Palo Alto CA (almost a true name) Jamie(a)netcom.com 415.941.4782

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politics
by moormajb＠vuse.vanderbilt.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

It has been suggested that the politcis discussion be taken to another forum, which I am somewhat in agreement with (though I've enjoyed reading all the messages). I, however, want to take issue with a point made by Robert J. Woodhead: > The maintenance and improvement of [that] society, and the betterment > of your fellow human beings, ought to be a primary goal. Maybe it's your primary goal; it's certainly the goal of every Marxist/ Communist/Fascist regime that has every existed. I'm not accusing you of being any of these, but I wanted to point out that these ideologies all support the idea that one's self-interest is somehow evil and that only actions done for the benefit of society or "fellow human beings" are worthwhile and moral. I contend that one's self-interest should be one's primary goal (it is that one's choice however). This self-interest when combined with honesty and integrity is completely moral. It implies a recognition of others' right to be motivated by their own self-interests. Governments are established in order to make sure that self-interests do not conflict (e.g. my self-interest in having the money in your pocket and your self-interest in keeping it for yourself). The U.S. Government may have initially served such a purpose, but it comes nowhere near that today. I'm not saying there are any better places either; hopefully there will be soon. ---------------------------------------------------------------- | | | Joe Moorman <moormajb(a)vuse.vanderbilt.edu> | | | | To achieve Liberty in my time, | | Ready to relocate to Oceania... | | | ---------------------------------------------------------------- -----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- Version: 2.3a mQCNAizFpXwAAAEEAMSgDF2B19fKu9tjmKPQ8wxmzUFLNLvgHy6UAff6V3zr17g5 Qsg9iE9NPTzhzCmKDPb1r1NcpkcSK+K7K8pVwYU6fqTw+/q81yMZ6Ori305Gbyxt QthNQ+JS5ixqCfzuxZ3h5cqtKXLM/XKTkVRMQGMN7z7+oBdV5AXMccsZHPSxAAUR tCpKb2UgTW9vcm1hbiA8bW9vcm1hamJAdnVzZS52YW5kZXJiaWx0LmVkdT4= =iu34 -----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----

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Paper Shredders
by an41418＠anon.penet.fi 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

What about just burning the paper? ------------------------------------------------------------------------- To find out more about the anon service, send mail to help(a)anon.penet.fi. Due to the double-blind, any mail replies to this message will be anonymized, and an anonymous id will be allocated automatically. You have been warned. Please report any problems, inappropriate use etc. to admin(a)anon.penet.fi.

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double encryption keys
by an41418＠anon.penet.fi 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I would suggest that you use two different hash functions on the pass phrase, and take however many bits you need of what's left over. Wonderer ------------------------------------------------------------------------- To find out more about the anon service, send mail to help(a)anon.penet.fi. Due to the double-blind, any mail replies to this message will be anonymized, and an anonymous id will be allocated automatically. You have been warned. Please report any problems, inappropriate use etc. to admin(a)anon.penet.fi.

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TEMPEST and Public key programs
by blaster＠rd.relcom.msk.su 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> Electromagnetic Pulse Surveillance Technology. Victor, I have a long > (58K) document about this which I'll be glad to send you, just ask. Please, send this paper direct to me. > any information. Victor, could your friend in the KGB arrange for such > an experiment?? Exuse me please, but I don`t see this man about two week! I also can`t ask this man about all (I like fredom :( ). As security men saw: "if smaller know then better sleep". > Victor seems to be saying that his friend is saying that DES is a > "group" (if I remember my terms correctly), which somebody was > supposed to have proven wasn't the case. Although, strictly speaking, > a "group" was supposed to be f=des, where Victor just says it's "very > like DES." DES is`t group - f() only like to DES (I think, that computing dificult of f() like des() one). > But multiple encryptions as Victor describes are not used. Rather > alternating encryptions and DEcryptions. For example triple DES > dese(k1, desd(k2, dese(k3, plaintext))) where "dese" is DES > encryption and "desd" is DES decryption. What does your friend in > the KGB have to say about that, Victor? If triple-DES reduces to > any reasonable transformation of (some) 56-bit key then it's almost > as easy to break as single-DES which we now know only requires 3 hours > on a $1 million specialized machine. I`ll ask he about this. > Of more interest here, Victor, is what your KGB friend says about the > IDEA cipher, RSA Public Key encryption, and the MD5 message digest, > all of which are used in PGP. We would also like to know if the KGB > has found any weaknesses in PGP or if they've even had occasion to try > to find any. He made same program (LanCrypto). That why, I hear only bad words from he. :) You can read about this program in cypherpunks. >From other KGB-men, I hear, that prophesor Sidelnicov (the well known cryptoanalisist from Russia) saw, that PGP has some weak places: - random number is`t "good" random number. - md5 has hole (but here man lapse into salence:( ). - PGP for DOS don`t have any anti-overloking tools. BTW: LanCrypto play on last weakness: thay wrote litle resident DOS program. This program crack PGP and than pgp sign (and check) only part of message. LanCrypto public this resalt in buziness newspaper and show program on the big computer-show. I think this is rough market, but it work well (as all, that KGB made:))!!! Now I know 3 powerful public-key Russian programs. All wrote by exKGB man: - "LanCrypto" has vary fast algorithm, litle sign and several tools for anti- intruding. - "Exelence" has number of anti-intruding tools and powerful cryptographic algorithms. This pakage also has inteligance hardware keys for prevent introding. - "Blitc". The central bank try to use this program, but boys from LanCrypto find rough hole in hash function of this program and compromite this firm. Now I contact with LanCrypto and Elias (autors of "Exelence"). I hope to use thouse programs in my Computer Security Center. If you want I try to write about this programs. --- Victor A. Borisov aka blaster; Relcom R&D; Email: blaster(a)rd.relcom.msk.su; Phone: +7(095)-943-4735; +7(095)-198-9510; === Don`t panic! ===

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double encryption keys
by an41418＠anon.penet.fi 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Oops, please excuse that post, it went to the wrong mailing list. ------------------------------------------------------------------------- To find out more about the anon service, send mail to help(a)anon.penet.fi. Due to the double-blind, any mail replies to this message will be anonymized, and an anonymous id will be allocated automatically. You have been warned. Please report any problems, inappropriate use etc. to admin(a)anon.penet.fi.

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No Subject
by John Farmer 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

signoff cypherpunks

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Re: PRIVACY: Shredded trash doesn't cut it
by George A. Gleason 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Re shredding documents: the best thing I ever found was to tear papers into strips about an inch wide and feed them to an ordinary household blender which is about 3/4 full of water. Turns the paper into mush. Flush the mush and that's that. NOt recommended for hiding evidence of crimes; the perfect crime is an illusion fostered by the media. -gg

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Re: Paper Shredders
by George A. Gleason 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

RE fire: you can still read ashes, it's commonly done. Now as an addendum to my previous about the use of blenders: for larger amounts, the kitchen sink disposall with lots of water running... for really large amounts, soak in a large container full of water for a few days to let it get soft, then mush it up with either an electric cement mixer or a 1/2" electric drill with paint mixing attachment. The key to these operations is lots of water so the paper will essentially be a suspended solid that easily tumbles and shreds. Too much paper in the mix will lead to a soggy mat that won't break up easily. -gg

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Photocopying mnoney
by rees＠cs.bu.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Hi. Could anyone tell me an Online source of information that explains stuff about how money is scanned by machines, etc? Please send e-mail. Thaks. ---Dave (rees(a)cs.bu.edu)

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