December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: (fwd) Going to a Computer Conference? Don't use your real name!
by gtoal＠an-teallach.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

[Excerpted from MicroTimes April 18, 1994 Issue #122] I could forgive the crosspost but the story is over four months old! Sheesh, comp.risks must have really gone downhill a lot. You'd expect the editor of something like that to try to keep up to date. CuD is just the same. G

1 0

Kevin Mitnik
by Mats Bergstrom 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>From Edupage: ******************* FBI HUNT FOR HACKER Kevin Mitnick is wanted by the FBI for suspicion of software and data theft from leading telecom manufacturers and service providers. Among his victims have been MCI and Digital Equipment. An ex-convict, Mitnick was described by one judge as having an "addiction problem" with computers, similar to a drug or gambling addiction. During a six-month treatment program he was prohibited from touching a computer or a modem, but the treatment seems to have failed, and one detective says: "I've always considered him dangerous. I had to go underground. If he targets you, he can make your life miserable." (New York Times 7/4/94 A1) ************************** Years ago I read a 'hacker-book' that had a long section about the activities of Mr Mitnick in the 80's ('Zero' something?). I no nothing of his present doings. Some questions: Is Mr Mitnick a dangerous selfish criminal egomaniac whom every good guy immediately should turn over to the FBI if identified? Or/and is Mr Mitnick the closest live equivalent of the hero in 'Shockwave Rider'? Mats Bergstrom

3 2

Wall Street e-mail
by rishab＠dxm.ernet.in 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Dave Hart <davehart(a)eskimo.com> > > > The drumbeat against all those anonymous pedophiles continues.... > > > _Wall Street Journal_, 6/30/94 > > > PERSONAL TECHNOLOGY by Walter S. Mossberg > > > "Keeping Your Kids Away From Creeps As They Play Online" > > Does anyone have Mossberg's email address? I tried to guess a hostname, > but wsj.com, dowjones.com and dj.com all do not exist. According to netfind, eng.dowjones.com and dowjones.com are DJ's sites, and wsj.com is WSJ's. They aren't real hosts; they are registered domains, so mail should reach. IAC Walter Mossberg is at 360-2227(a)mcimail.com, according to KIS. I'd have thought that members of this list are more net-aware than most; able at least to use netfind and the KnowBot... ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- Rishab Aiyer Ghosh "Clean the air! clean the sky! wash the wind! rishab(a)dxm.ernet.in take stone from stone and wash them..." Voice/Fax/Data +91 11 6853410 Voicemail +91 11 3760335 H 34C Saket, New Delhi 110017, INDIA

1 0

Re: Windows for Workgroups 3.11
by Mike Markley 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

---------- | From: Derek Atkins <warlord(a)MIT.EDU> | To: Andrzej Bursztynski <psee(a)sam.nask.com.pl> | Cc: <cypherpunks(a)toad.com> | Subject: Re: Windows for Workgroups 3.11 | Date: Wednesday, July 06, 1994 7:19AM | | > Just wonder if anyone had a closer look at the "Advanced security" option | > built in the Microsoft Windows for Workgroups 3.11. You can use a soft | > of a public/private key when sending a mail via fax (Class 1) driver | > Micrsoft Fax at Work. The key seems to be quite short and I wonder if that's | > a real secure solution comparing eg. to PGP? | | If it really is public key, and if the keys really are quite short, | then its probably really *not* secure. Remember than a 129-digit | (~425 bit) RSA key was broken in 8 months! A 384-bit RSA key is | therefore not secure! | | -derek | The 129 digit key was broken in 8 calendar months and not 8 CPU months, correct? If so then for most purposes a 129 digit key is more than adequate. If you are faxing a contract to someone then if the deal isn't signed in 8 months the odds are that information about it will leak from a different source than your fax. If I had information that I wanted to be secure for several years than I would consider using many more digits than 129. As to Windows for Workgroups 3.11, I don't know anything about the security features that are included. Mike. ===================================================== Mike Markley <mmarkley(a)microsoft.com> I'm not a Microsoft spokesperson. All opinions expressed here are mine. =====================================================

2 1

FW: Windows for Workgroups 3.11
by Blanc Weber 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Mike Ingle sent out an inquiry in May about public-key encryption in WinFax 4.0 in Microsoft at Work. This is the reply which I received from someone here: We don't use D-H (Diffie Hellman is what I assume you were referring to) at all. We pick a 64 bit random number to RC4 with and send the number encrypted with an RSA key... I have made an inquiry specifically about WfW 3.11, but it may be a few days before I get a reply. Blanc

1 0

stream ciphers and realtime communications?
by Jonathan Rochkind 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Well, I finally did my duty and picked up a copy of Applied Cryptography. :) I've only given it a cursory browing so far, but I have a question. When I first saw reference to stream ciphers in the book, I imagined that they would be ideal for realtime encrypted communications, like voice (in cellular phones, perhaps). But after reading further, it appears that stream ciphers aren't being used much in this manner, or much at all. Is this correct? I know that there are plenty of encryption protocols and methods for realtime communications (clipper chip, for one), but do they just use block ciphers with relatively small blocks? (Is the security of such things as RSA and IDEA effected by size of block? There's got to be a minimum block that works; you can't do IDEA on a single byte, or can you?) Can anyone outline what kinds of methods are used for voice encryption and other realtime methods, as contrasted with email and delayed transfer methods?

2 1

Re: Windows for Workgroups 3.11
by Mike Markley 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Perry says: | | Mike Markley says: | > The 129 digit key was broken in 8 calendar months and not 8 CPU months, | > correct? If so then for most purposes a 129 digit key is more than | > adequate. If you are faxing a contract to someone then if the deal | > isn't signed in 8 months the odds are that information about it will | > leak from a different source than your fax. | | This isn't true. If you are signing the contract digitally, for | instance, you would want to be sure that no one could forge your | signature to change the terms after the fact -- a few months isn't | enough for such purposes, only something that will last for fifteen or | twenty years is okay. | | Perry | I'll definitely agree that for something as binding as a signature that I would want to have a very large key. For daily communication it seems that fairly weak keys should be more than adequate as long as they can't be broken in a reasonable amount of time. I'm interested in what most of the people on this list would consider a reasonable amount of time though. It seems that the average person doesn't have adversaries with the know-how and computing power to break even a 64 digit key let alone a 129 digit key. Consider the group of people that broke the RSA key, they would not fit the profile of the average person, let alone the average computer user. I doubt if the local police department here could convince the NSA that they need to crack my e-mail because I might be conspiring to commit some illegal act and I doubt that they could put my e-mail out on the net saying, "here's some encoded data, does anybody know what it says?" Right now that's the only two ways that I could think of for someone to get some encrypted data unencrypted. Mike ===================================================== Mike Markley <mmarkley(a)microsoft.com> I'm not a Microsoft spokesperson. All opinions expressed here are mine. =====================================================

4 3

FW: FW: A third voice re: science and spirit
by Blanc Weber 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

From: <nobody(a)shell.portal.com> "Ingore"? Is that anything like an "AlGore"? Is that a verb to describe the state of the country, as in "we've just been INGOREd"? ........................................ Could be, if you want it to be. But it could also be part of some shocking, nonsensical AlGoreYTHM. Blanc

1 0

No Subject
by trollins＠debbie.telos.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On Wed, 6 Jul 1994, Mike Markley wrote: > can't be broken in a reasonable amount of time. I'm interested in what > most of the people on this list would consider a reasonable amount of > time though. NEVER is what I consider a reasonable amount of time. I don't want my secure thoughts broken for public display in my lifetime. Or any of my children's lifetime. Or there children's lifetime. .......... -tom

1 0

Re: MAIL: chained remailing strategy
by an104090＠anon.penet.fi 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I was curious about the pros and cons of anonymous remailers holding and randomly sending outgoing mail. It seems to me that the risk of a third party determining the original sender of an anonymous piece of mail through the use of timestamps is less pressing than the risk presented by the physical storage of that mail on someone's machine for extended periods of time. Of course, with chained remailing, these risks dramatically decrease, but would I rather have the first remailer in a chain storing my mail until midnight or immediately bouncing it to another anonymous remailer? Gedeon Edwards ------------------------------------------------------------------------- To find out more about the anon service, send mail to help(a)anon.penet.fi. Due to the double-blind, any mail replies to this message will be anonymized, and an anonymous id will be allocated automatically. You have been warned. Please report any problems, inappropriate use etc. to admin(a)anon.penet.fi.

1 0

Re: Kevin Mitnik
by kentborg＠world.std.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I am under the impression that I would not like Mitnik personally, but I have never personaly met him... Would I turn him in? Well, put it this way: I would not harbor him but neither would I work very hard to figure out where he is or whether a particular "nobody" on this list be him. I see two values in him being on the lam: 1) His activities point out the need for more secure computer systems--the fact that he mostly relies on "Social Engineering" is lost on most people. 2) He is a romantic outlaw who is not a pedophile, nuclear terrorist, or murderer--his existance distracts from those totems. (Whether he actually *fits* this romantic image is beside the point, I am talking images here.) Mr. Mitnik (if you are listening): keep your sense of humor, try to be "mostly harmless", don't get caught molesting small boys--or anyone else, try to confine your public exploits to "honorable pranks"--things the man on the street will admire and not recoil from. Be wise. -kb, the Kent who keeps his nose clean -- Kent Borg +1 (617) 776-6899 kentborg(a)world.std.com kentborg(a)aol.com Proud to claim 31:15 hours of TV viewing so far in 1994!

1 0

First Monthly Meeting July 10th
by sameer 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Community ConneXion: The NEXUS-Berkeley is having its first public monthly meeting on July 10th, 12pm, the Sunday after the cypherpunks meeting. It will be upstairs at Kip's in Berkeley. It will be very informal. We'll be able to snag a table to fit all of us, I think, and from my experience at Kips on Sunday afternoons it should be quiet enough. We'll probably have to get some food so they don't kick us out. Shouldn't be a problem. Items on the agenda: (not yet formalized/finalized.. suggestions welcomed) Privacy Privacy services Privacy emphasis Community building a local discussion group forum moo Organization Need to get more organized Find someone to help with that Issue of investors? NexusBucks Scheme goals Directions: From I-80: Take the University Exit, go East on University until you reach Shattuck. Turn right onto Shattuck. 3-4 blocks south turn left onto Durant. Continue on Durant about 4-5 blocks, Kips is on the left the block before Telegraph. Find parking. (It shouldn't be very tough.. not like there will be an actual *lot*, but not tough..) Summary: Nexus-Berkeley Meeting July 10th 12pm-? (maybe 4-5?) Kips in Berkeley I'd like to make this a regular thing, to have a meeting every month the sunday after the cypherpunks meeting. -- sameer Voice: 510-841-2014 Network Administrator Pager: 510-321-1014 Community ConneXion: The NEXUS-Berkeley Dialin: 510-841-0909 http://www.c2.org (or login as "guest") sameer(a)c2.org

1 0

Tempest: It'll Receed
by kentborg＠world.std.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

The trends are in our favor. Micros are getting more complicated OS's (a Tempest attack on world.std.com is going to be a mess, I guess) making for more complicated emissions, wimpy batteries and Energy Star stickers will slowly drive down all emissions (why waste the power?), and so many appliances are now emitting from their embedded CPUs--which is another thing that will drive emissions, the FCC. But let's not get cocky: mostly we are sitting ducks for anyone who wants to build a fancy radio, it is only the trend which good. -kb -- Kent Borg +1 (617) 776-6899 kentborg(a)world.std.com kentborg(a)aol.com Proud to claim 31:15 hours of TV viewing so far in 1994!

1 0

No Subject
by eternal!jgostin＠bts.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

for cypherpunks(a)toad.com From: Jeff Gostin<jgostin(a)eternal.pha.pa.us> Reply-To: jgostin(a)eternal.pha.pa.us Subject:Re: How long is reasonable? To: cypherpunks(a)toad.com Message-ID: <940706151140E9Djgostin(a)eternal.pha.pa.us> Date: Wed, 6 Jul 1994 15:11:40 EST X-Original-Article-From: Mike Markley <mmarkley(a)microsoft.com> X-Mailer: winn v1.00a Mike Markley <mmarkley(a)microsoft.com> writes: > can't be broken in a reasonable amount of time. I'm interested in what > most of the people on this list would consider a reasonable amount of > time though. For me, "reasonable amount of time" translates into "the minimum amount of time neccessary to elapse before the information gained loses its sensitive or critical value." In other words, if I encrypted some rather embarrassing letters that I wanted to keep, but also wanted to keep safe, the "reasonable amount of time" would be as long as it takes for me to die, plus one day. If it's a "state secret", it might be 100 years. --Jeff -- ====== ====== +----------------jgostin(a)eternal.pha.pa.us----------------+ == == | The new, improved, environmentally safe, bigger, better,| == == -= | faster, hypo-allergenic, AND politically correct .sig. | ==== ====== | Now with a new fresh lemon scent! | PGP Key Available +---------------------------------------------------------+

1 0

Re: Please post your article
by schneier＠chinet.chinet.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Bruce Schneier 730 Fair Oaks Ave Oak Park, IL 60302 (708) 524-9461 750 words IDEA - THE INTERNATIONAL DATA ENCRYPTION ALGORITHM For the past fifteen years, most of us have relied on the Data Encryption Standard, or DES, for encryption. It's a good algorithm, and very secure against the mid-1970s technology is was designed for. Advances in computing power and new discoveries in cryptanalysis have made the algorithm vulnerable. DES is no longer secure against the world's most powerful adversaries. Cryptographers are looking for alternatives to serve their needs well into the 21st century. IDEA may be the current best choice. IDEA is the International Data Encryption Algorithm, and it was invented in 1991 by James Massey and Xuejia Lai of ETH Zurich in Switzerland. An earlier variant of the algorithm was called PES: Proposed Encryption Standard. After strengthening the algorithm against differential cryptanalysis, they changed its name to IPES, for Improved Proposed Encryption Standard, and then to IDEA. The algorithm is structured along the same general lines of DES. It is an iterated block cipher, with a 64-bit block size and a 128-bit key size. "Iterated" means that the algorithm uses a simple encryption function multiple times. "Block cipher" means that the algorithm encrypts data in blocks: 64 bits of plaintext go in one end, and 64 bits of ciphertext come out the other. And the algorithm accepts a 128-bit key. This means that IDEA can be a plug-in replacement for DES, only with a longer key length. IDEA can be used in all the different modes of operation--electronic codebook, cipher block chaining, output feedback, and cipher feedback-- specified for DES in FIPS PUB 81 or ANSI X3.106. The design philosophy behind IDEA is one of "mixing operations from different algebraic groups." The operations are XOR, modular addition, and modular multiplication. All operations are based on 16-bit words, and hence are efficiently implemented in software. (DES has numerous bit twiddling operations, making it very inefficient in software.) IDEA only has eight iterations, compared with DES's 16, but each IDEA iteration can be thought of as a double DES iteration. IDEA is also faster than DES when implemented in software. IDEA's 128-bit key length over twice that of DES; its key length is even longer than triple-DES. And it is much faster than triple-DES. A brute-force attack against IDEA would have to try 2^128, or 3*10^38, possible keys. Michael Wiener's brute-force DES-cracking machine, which could find a DES key in an average of 3.5 hours would require 10^18 years to break IDEA. A machine a million times faster would still require 10^12, or one trillion, years to break IDEA. Does this mean that IDEA is secure? Is there a more efficient way to break IDEA than brute force? No one knows. IDEA is a very new algorithm. Remember that it took cryptographers fifteen years of studying DES to invent differential cryptanalysis, something that the NSA knew about all along. Who knows what tricks the NSA knows about now that allows them to break IDEA. Maybe they know none. Maybe they know something that we will discover for ourselves around the year 2006. There are no assurances in the cryptography business. Several academic groups have tried to cryptanalyze IDEA with no success. Yet. Several military intelligence agencies have tried to cryptanalyze IDEA; they're not talking about what they found. IDEA is a good-looking algorithm, but it is also a new algorithm. Ten years from now we will all consider it an amazing feat of security or an impressive failure. I would bet on the former, but recognize that it is a bet. The most widespread product that uses IDEA is PGP: Pretty Good Privacy. PGP uses IDEA in cipher feedback mode for data encryption. Several other security companies offer the algorithm as an optional alternative to DES. It is available both in software and as a custom ASIC. Details of the algorithm (with source code) can be found in: X. Lai, J. Massey, and S. Murphy, "Markov Ciphers and Differential Cryptanalysis," Advances in Cryptology-- EUROCRYPT '91 Proceedings, Berlin: Springer-Verlag, 1991, pp. 17-38. B. Schneier, "The IDEA Encryption Algorithm." Dr. Dobbs Journal, Dec 93, pp. 50-56. B. Schneier, Applied Cryptography, New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1994. IDEA is patented in the United States (J.L. Massey and X. Lai, "Device for the Conversion of a Digital Block and the Use of Same," U.S. Patent #5,214,703, 25 May 1993) and in Europe. The patents are held by Ascom-Tech AG. There is no license fee required for noncommercial use. Commercial users interested in licensing the algorithm should contact: Dr. Peter Profos, Ascom Tech AG, Solothurn Lab, Postfach 151, 4502 Solothurn, Switzerland; telephone +41 65 242 885; facsimile +41 65 235 761.

1 0

Detwiler's Crypto Mailing List
by Peterwheat＠aol.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I found this by doing a keyword search (cryptography) in America Online's database of mailing lists. I thought it might be of interest to the cypherpunks mailing list: CYPHERWONKS: The Development of Cyberspace List Title: CYPHERWONKS: The Development of Cyberspace List Owner or Contact: L. Detwiler, LD231782(a)longs.lance.colostate.edu To subscribe to this list, send e-mail to Majordomo(a)lists.eunet.fi; in the body of the message, type SUBSCRIBE CYPHERWONKS. To unsubscribe from this list, send e-mail to Majordomo(a)lists.eunet.fi; in the body of the message, type UNSUBSCRIBE CYPHERWONKS. Send all other list-related commands to Majordomo(a)lists.eunet.fi. For assistance, send the command HELP. Send all articles to CYPHERWONKS(a)lists.eunet.fi. Keywords: cyberspace, technology Description: The brand new cypherwonks list on Majordomo(a)lists.eunet.fi is for ambitious, energetic, can-do, hands-on individuals interested in general cutting-edge `cyberspatial development' projects such as in cryptography, digital cash, and `electronic democracy'. (A `wonk' is slang for a `meticulous detail person'.) The list is both an informal gathering place for the technically adept and also a focal point for branching off into serious project coordination. We place a premium on membership by technical professionals and try to hone our posts to accommodate the busy (who, according to the adage, are those who get all the serious work done). We are inspired by the Internet but don't see it as ideal yet and are particularly interested in cooperation, building prototypes, forging standards, and `long-term incremental evolution' in our designs and goals. We're also intensely interested in following and influencing the technological and political developments of the emerging `national cyberspatial infrastructure.' The list is not for political diatribes in the `radical libertarian' agenda, e.g. rants against all forms of government as oppressive, corrupt, or evil, or promoting the use of cryptographic technologies for subversive activities like tax evasion, black marketeering, or evading law enforcement. The list is not for discussions of how to manipulate the honest through the use of software technologies. The list is not for unconstructive negativism against other's proposals. Above all, we are interested in forging a `civilized cyberspace' out of the current `Internet wilderness'. Historical note: the list was formed as a less ornery, more moderate splinter group from the Cypherpunks by J.Helsingius (creator of the popular anon.penet.fi anonymizing service) and L.Detweiler (author of many FAQs including `Privacy & Anonymity on the Internet). Transmitted: 94-06-28 09:51:08 EDT

4 3

No Subject
by Anonymous 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Can anyone tell me if one can use PGP 2.6 with an online service [America Online]. From what the FAQ says, I need an actual UNIX account rather than just an E-Mail Gateway. Is this true? If not, then how do I encrypt without attaching the pgp file [which goes only to other AOL users] or without using BinHex and inserting THAT into my message body? Not all of my peers use AOl or possess BinHex.

1 0

Re: "Cypherpunk" vs. "Cryptorebel"
by lefty＠apple.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>I like the label "cryptorebel" better than "cypherpunk". The word >"punk" just does not seem right, while "rebel" does. I do have a >certain attachment to "cypherpunk". Comments? If it weren't for nitpickers, we'd all be knee-deep in nits. -- Lefty (lefty(a)apple.com) C:.M:.C:., D:.O:.D:.

3 2

entropy of data....?
by Claborne, Chris at SanDiegoCA 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

---------- From: Jeff Gostin<jgostin(a)eternal.pha.pa.us> > can't be broken in a reasonable amount of time. I'm interested in what > most of the people on this list would consider a reasonable amount of > time though. Hasn't someone come up with a name for this like "Entropy of the data is 30 days" or... "the half-life of the data is 15 days". This is a critical value when looking at it from a military point of view. If you can't decode enemy plan for attack before a certain date/time then the info is useless.... 2 -- C -- ... __o .. -\<, chris.claborne(a)sandiegoca.ncr.com ...(*)/(*). CI$: 76340.2422 PGP Pub Key fingerprint = A8 FA 55 92 23 20 72 69 52 AB 64 CC C7 D9 4F CA Avail on Pub Key server.

1 0

elm and pine patched for a preprocessor
by sameer 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I have hacked on elm and pine so that they will work with Raph Levien's "premail" package easily. It allows the use of a preprocessor to sendmail through the use of the PRESENDMAIL environment variable. -- I made the following changes to src/mailmsg2.c to allow use of setenv PRESENDMAIL "program" to allow an alternate sendmail. This is in elm 2.4 pl20. 95,97d94 < #define PRESENDMAIL /* Uncomment this if you don't want to allow users */ < /* to run a 'replacement sendmail' with the PRESENDMAIL */ < /* environment variable */ 209,211d205 < #ifdef PRESENDMAIL /* Hack to allow 'replacement sendmails' */ < char *pre_sendmail; < #endif 571,585d564 < < #ifdef PRESENDMAIL /* Hack to allow replacement sendmails */ < if(pre_sendmail = getenv("PRESENDMAIL")) < { < sprintf(very_long_buffer,"( (%s %s %s ; %s %s) & ) < %s", < pre_sendmail, mailerflags, expanded_to, < remove_cmd, whole_msg_file, whole_msg_file); < } < else < { < sprintf(very_long_buffer,"( (%s %s %s ; %s %s) & ) < %s", < mailer, mailerflags, expanded_to, < remove_cmd, whole_msg_file, whole_msg_file); < } < #else 589,591c568 < #endif < < } --- > } -- I made the following changes to pine/send.c to allow use of setenv PRESENDMAIL "program" to allow an alternate sendmail This is in pine 3.89. 63,64d62 < #define PRESENDMAIL /* Allow users to specify an alternate sendmail */ < 1512,1514d1509 < #ifdef PRESENDMAIL /* If we want an alternate sendmail to be specified */ < char *pre_sendmail; < #endif 1527,1539d1521 < < #ifdef PRESENDMAIL < if(pre_sendmail = getenv("PRESENDMAIL")) < { < sprintf(mail_cmd, "( ( %s %s ; /bin/rm -f %s ) < %s & )", < pre_sendmail, SENDMAILFLAGS, tmpfile, tmpfile); < } < else < { < sprintf(mail_cmd, "( ( %s %s ; /bin/rm -f %s ) < %s & )", < SENDMAIL, SENDMAILFLAGS, tmpfile, tmpfile); < } < #else 1542d1523 < #endif -- sameer Voice: 510-841-2014 Network Administrator Pager: 510-321-1014 Community ConneXion: The NEXUS-Berkeley Dialin: 510-549-1383 http://www.c2.org (or login as "guest") sameer(a)c2.org

1 0

using PGP or RIPEM on AOL
by Carl Ellison 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I've only used RIPEM on AOL -- but it should be the same. I run on a Mac, generating the armored file, and then use AOL's "paste from file" option in the File menu to include the encrypted file in the body of my message. In the other direction, I have to use Select All and Copy to get it out of AOL mail, Paste to get it into an editor. From there I can file it and give that file to PGP or RIPEM. BBEDIT on the Mac has good support for RIPEM. I wish I knew how to write BBEDIT extensions for Mac PGP as well. Anyone know if it's hard? - Carl -- Carl M. Ellison cme(a)acm.org RIPEM MD5OfPublicKey: 39D9860686A9F075A9A83D49589C677A PGP 2.4 Key fingerprint = E0 41 4C 79 B5 AF 36 75 02 17 BC 1A 57 38 64 78 PGP 2.6 Key fingerprint = 61 E2 DE 7F CB 9D 79 84 E9 C8 04 8B A6 32 21 A2

1 0

Business Week on Crypto
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

There is a brief article on commercial crypto in Business Week of July 4, p. 13, by Stephen H. Wildstrom <techandu(a)mgh.com>. It sets out need for crypto; describes use of private and public keys; key management services by Northern Telecom Ltd. and National Semiconductor Corp.; future crypto by Lotus and Microsoft; war of RSA and NIST and resulting standoff.

1 0

Re: PC Expo summary!!
by rarachel＠prism.poly.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> You wrote: > > Lately, my reading of the list has been rather sporadic (too much work). > What's on the disks? PGP 2.6, PGS.99b, WinPGP1.0, SecureDevice 13b, White Noise 2.10, and tons of articles on the cypherpunks (some from Wired, some from EFF, CFP, Epic, Rishab's articles, the Cypherpunks Feb 17 Crypto-Anarchy speech transcript and other assorted goodies.) The .ZIP file also contains the DIM14A.ZIP program which is needed to restore the disk and is useful for making many copies of the disk, a README file that briefly describes how to use the disk at an expo such as PC Expo, and a post-script file for printing labels for the disks. It's basically a one stop Expo duplication package. :-) Incase you're just tuning in, I had this great idea (aren't all "my" ideas great?) that we as cypherpunks should distribute diskettes at PC Expo and other computer trade shows as an awareness raising campaign and a way to spread PGP, weaken Clipper's impact, etc.

1 0

Re: "Cypherpunk" vs. "Cryptorebel"
by rah＠shipwright.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 8:26 PM 7/6/94 +0100, Robert A. Hayden wrote: [snippeta, snippeta] >Cypher was an interesting play on words to describe this fight. > >Somehow, it seems far more appropriate than 'cryptorebel', which sounds a >whole lot like new-age PC crap designed to make us sound more appetizing >to the popular media. Yeah. What he said. "Cryptorebel" reminds me of "cryptofascist", which reminds me of "Myra Breckenridge", for some reason. ":-o Bob ----------------- Robert Hettinga (rah(a)shipwright.com) "There is no difference between someone Shipwright Development Corporation who eats too little and sees Heaven and 44 Farquhar Street someone who drinks too much and sees Boston, MA 02331 USA snakes." -- Bertrand Russell (617) 323-7923

1 0

Electronic business
by L. Todd Masco 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Pardon me if I sound a little excited, but: tonight, Bibliobytes made it's first customer transaction! As far as I know, this makes us the first business in history (to be melodramatic about it) to conduct business *entirely* over the public networks -- the order w/ CC num was encrypted w/ RSA, we did the verification electronically on our node (true, through a modem to a third party -- we need infrastructure for e$!), and mailed the result back to the customer, all in about 15 minutes. (It'll get faster as I write the automation code.) Am I correct? Are we the first? (And we issued a PGP-signed receipt, too!) -- Todd [BTW, I acknowledge that I snagged the T. Jefferson quote from someone here on C'punks. It's just too appropriate -- thanks!] -- L. Todd Masco | Bibliobytes books on computer, on any UNIX host with e-mail. cactus(a)bb.com | info(a)bb.com | "Information is the currency of democracy."

2 1