Re: Windows for Workgroups 3.11
Perry says: | | Mike Markley says: | > The 129 digit key was broken in 8 calendar months and not 8 CPU months, | > correct? If so then for most purposes a 129 digit key is more than | > adequate. If you are faxing a contract to someone then if the deal | > isn't signed in 8 months the odds are that information about it will | > leak from a different source than your fax. | | This isn't true. If you are signing the contract digitally, for | instance, you would want to be sure that no one could forge your | signature to change the terms after the fact -- a few months isn't | enough for such purposes, only something that will last for fifteen or | twenty years is okay. | | Perry | I'll definitely agree that for something as binding as a signature that I would want to have a very large key. For daily communication it seems that fairly weak keys should be more than adequate as long as they can't be broken in a reasonable amount of time. I'm interested in what most of the people on this list would consider a reasonable amount of time though. It seems that the average person doesn't have adversaries with the know-how and computing power to break even a 64 digit key let alone a 129 digit key. Consider the group of people that broke the RSA key, they would not fit the profile of the average person, let alone the average computer user. I doubt if the local police department here could convince the NSA that they need to crack my e-mail because I might be conspiring to commit some illegal act and I doubt that they could put my e-mail out on the net saying, "here's some encoded data, does anybody know what it says?" Right now that's the only two ways that I could think of for someone to get some encrypted data unencrypted. Mike ===================================================== Mike Markley <mmarkley@microsoft.com> I'm not a Microsoft spokesperson. All opinions expressed here are mine. =====================================================
Mike Markley says:
I'll definitely agree that for something as binding as a signature that I would want to have a very large key. For daily communication it seems that fairly weak keys should be more than adequate as long as they can't be broken in a reasonable amount of time.
Historical traffic only a few months old is way too interesting for me to accept that. One of the real advantages of Diffie-Hellman style systems is, by the way, the protection they provide against breaking historical traffic. Perry
Mike Markley wrote: | I'll definitely agree that for something as binding as a signature that | I would want to have a very large key. For daily communication it seems | that fairly weak keys should be more than adequate as long as they | can't be broken in a reasonable amount of time. I'm interested in what | most of the people on this list would consider a reasonable amount of | time though. It seems that the average person doesn't have adversaries Depends on whats going to be protected. Medical records, trade secrets, stuff like that, you want to stay private for at least 150-200 years, until all the participants are dead. Most stuff I encrypt? 50-100 years would cover it, but I expect the cost of decrypting will drop durring that time due to algorithmic improvements. I prefer to waste a few seconds encrypting well, rather than encrypting poorly. My time is not so valuable that I gain much from the seconds saved in a 384 bit key. Adam -- Adam Shostack adam@bwh.harvard.edu Politics. From the greek "poly," meaning many, and ticks, a small, annoying bloodsucker.
participants (4)
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Adam Shostack -
Mike Markley -
Perry E. Metzger -
Roger Bryner