December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

medusa & xsplit
by Arsen Ray Arachelian 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Please forgive the delay, I've been busy restoring my files due to a nasty hard drive failure. Not to worry, I haven't lost the sources to Medusa nor Xsplit, and yes I do have a fix for xsplit.... =============================================================================== | + ^ + || ' . . . . . . . Ray (Arsen) Arachelian || | \|/ || . . . ' . ' . : . . rarachel(a)photon.poly.edu || |<--+-->||. . . |' '| .' . . ... ___ sunder(a)intercom.com || | /|\ || . . \___/ . . . : .... __[R] || | + v + || . oOOo /o.O\ oOOo :. : .. |A|"And disks to fix before I sleep" =========/---vvvv-------VVVV------------|I|----------------------------------/ / . : . ' : ' |D| This signature pannel is / / The Next Bug to kill(tm) --- now open. / /___________________________________________________________________/

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Would you guys object to a posting of source code?
by Arsen Ray Arachelian 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Would you guys object if I posted Medusa on here in compressed/uuencoded form? (I won't include the Detweiler fuzzybase, nor the executables to save bandwidth..) Since Medusa isn't crypto software it shouldn't pinch ITAR's ass too hard... =============================================================================== | + ^ + || ' . . . . . . . Ray (Arsen) Arachelian || | \|/ || . . . ' . ' . : . . rarachel(a)photon.poly.edu || |<--+-->||. . . |' '| .' . . ... ___ sunder(a)intercom.com || | /|\ || . . \___/ . . . : .... __[R] || | + v + || . oOOo /o.O\ oOOo :. : .. |A| "And bugs to kill before I sleep"|| =========/---vvvv-------VVVV------------|I|----------------------------------/ / . : . ' : ' |D| This signature pannel is / / The Next Bug to kill(tm) --- now open. / /___________________________________________________________________/

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Re: Are \\"they\\" really the enemy? (Systems commentary)
by blancw＠pylon.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

We have met the enemy, and it is not the system. Responding to msg by jdd(a)aiki.demon.co.uk (the real Jim Dixon): Regardless of how this discussion began originally, the only part that I was commenting on had to do with John's remark that since governments & societies are both beastly, composed of people of that sort of character, what is it that we think we are going to do if the governing system of operations is overthrown? From this I read: what difference does it make if the present system (the best in the world) is removed, since the objections to it are not also resolved by that action, seeing as how the character of its parts (the people) remains the same; and what is thereby left, if it is successfully un-done? (anticipation: more of the same, but worse, and more difficult for the individual to deal with the consequences)? This was said in the context of a discussion of systems, with reference to what the system which we are governed by (controlled) offers, and how this compares to the feasibility & success of systems per se to accomplish desired ends. It is true that systems are of different kinds & types: from the non-conscious physical which existed prior to the presence of humans on the planet, to fully conscious, reasoned plans of action (as you said: designed). A family may be conceived (by some people) as a system of operations and sometimes it functions that way, although lately they seem to be mostly dis-functional. Families are started whether anyone is fully self-aware, or in control of, their nature; it's usually the result of other motivations unrelated to wanting to control mankind so that it can be morally improved and will function cooperatively as a harmonious whole. But a system designed for the purpose of corralling the disparate energies of a large group of diverse individuals (who are not necessarily in the family) cannot (should not) merely "bumble along" in a mindless sort of way, supposing that everyone is going to agree to and abide by every decree which is delivered to them, for the satisfaction of a purpose which they may not fully appreciate. Human beings are pretty adaptable, but if the governors blithely promulgate measures for living which grates on the sensibilties of the constituency, this is the time when surprising aspects of 'human nature' rears a heretofore invisible head. This is when they begin to 'raise hell'. This is when you realize that it would have been better for someone to know a little more about the facts & the truth & the real nature of mental beings, so that these problems could have been prevented (but nooooooooooooo, there have to be loud, angry debates and arguments and fights and wars, etc.) Apparently, SomeBody didn't know what to expect, didn't plan on it, or didn't care. I don't just propose that a person exercise, develop, and use their own judgement: I recommend it. One may be caught in a system which they were just born into and seems to be 'just there'. But exceptional people, like Thomas Aquinas, might decide to devote their life to reason and seek to know what lies beyond the immediate given. A system is useful for coordinating efforts towards a particular goal, if all of those who participate in the activities are rewarded by the results. Whether it was there when you first became conscious of being alive or whether it is a recently bright idea, if it does not bring satisfactory results & returns, what could it make sense to suffer it? You may not have a choice initially about the system within which you find yourself, but you will be led to the felt need to make alternative choices by your unhappiness with it; you will have to decide what to do about it - stay or go, improve or tear down? You will have to think about what you depend upon (or whom) for the realization of your requirements or desires (something the Bengalis realized subconsciously), and you will have to take a measure of your happiness/disatisfaction and try to determine what will work better. Covertly or otherwise. Blanc I really don't mean to prolong a discussion which lies so far away from the list topics; I do think, however, that there are reasons for the way things are & the way things work, and the better grasp that one has of these reasons, the better that one can compute regarding the right actions to take or the judgements which one will bring to bear upon the actions of others as they affect oneself.

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"Agents Spy Internet Data"
by NetSurfer 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

A little birdy sent this my way, and I thought you might find it of interest. And this article is "scanned, not shaken or stirred." ;-) COMPUTERWORLD AUGUST 1, 1994 Agents spy Internet data By Mitch Betts Langley, VA After decades of viewing public information as practically useless, U.S. intelligence agencies are planning to exploit the wild and ultrapublic Internet in search of cheap but useful nuggets of information. By summer's end, the Central Intelligence Agency and five other intelligence units will hook up to the Internet to collect and share "opensource," or unclassified, information, CIA official Joseph Markowitz confirmed. "The six-node Internet link will give intelligence analysts an access point to the Internet at large, including access to electronic mail by subject-matter experts across the globe,"Markowitz said in a recent interview. He is director of the CIA's Community Open Source Program Office, which opened March 1. "The Internet will be a gateway to commercial on-line information services, he added, as well as a vehicle for sharing open-source intelligence with sister agencies such as the National Security Agency and the Defense Intelligence Agency." Naturally, the spy agencies are keenly aware of the danger of security breaches from Internet hackers. Markowitz said they are installing a commercial-grade "firewall"--essentially a server with access-control software--to protect internal computer networks from Internet intrusions. In addition, a special, undisclosed hardware device will allow analysts to transfer Internet files to their high-security workstations while preventing file transfers in the opposite direction, Markowitz said. These days the Internet is getting crowded with investigators of all sorts. Many private-sector researchers already use the Internet to supplement their heavy-duty use of online vendors such as Dialog Information Services, lnc. For example, John F. Quinn, a business intelligence professional in Vienna, Va., and former CIA analyst in Japan, recently used the Internet's Gopher navigation tool to collect information on foreign reaction to the death of North Korea's leader. James Cook, a California-based business investigator, runs an Internet-based discussion group called InfoPro, where information professionals swap advice and establish far-flung contacts. But using the Internet for intelligence has a downside. For example, queries posted on public news groups or mailing lists may alert the world to the research topic unless the query is artfully phrased. "There is a danger of tipping your hand," Quinn said. "I use the lnternet to contact a colleague [directly], but I am loathe to post something publicly." Another problem is information overload and the urgent need to filter incoming Internet messages. "The information will be affordable and accessible, but electronic filtering hasn't progressed as far as we'd like," Markowitz said. Furthermore, private-sector researchers warned there are no quality-control police on the Internet. The danger of getting outdated or bad information is quite real. On-line researcher Helen Burwell in Houston put it this way: "The Internet is a great big closet full of junk and treasures, so you have to go in there judiciously." "You may get to know 100 to 500 new contacts, including ones in Italy and Russia, but the next question is how competent and reliable are they?" said Cook, a due diligence consultant for business investors. "You need to build a circle of trusted people." Markowitz agreed that it takes a lot of mining to get a few nuggets from the Internet. "With open sources, there's lots more information available, but it has a poor signal-to-noise ratio," he said. A big challenge is getting the clandestine service to accept open-source intelligence as being valuable, Quinn said, because the spy culture figures that "if it's not secret, it' s not worthwhile . " One reason for the new interest in on-line resources is they are low-risk and cheap when compared with billion-dollar spy satellites at a time of shrinking budgets. Further, the spy agencies are being asked to provide unclassified reports about more diverse topics, Markowitz said. "The reality is that open sources are now superior in many cases to existing classified sources, such as in dealing with African crises, where the intelligence community has mediocre to nonexistent capabilities," said Robert D. Steele, president of Oakton, Va.-based Open Source Solutions, Inc., a non-profit organization that promotes the broader use of open-source intelligence. "The creation of our office is a recognition that open sources are a valuable resource. As we draw back in some parts of the world, our office provides an information safety net," Markowitz said. --------------------------------------------- Watering holes in cyberspace Intelligence analysts are likely to be poking around in these Internet nooks and crannies: Open Source Intelligence Resources: Gopher: gopher oss.net Somalia News Update: Usenet newsgroup: alt.current-events.somalia China Headline News Service: E-mail: info(a)asiainfo.com Reports by Voice of America Correspondence: Gopher: gopher.voa.gov Slovakia Document Store: World Wide Web: http://www/eunet.sk Gopher: gopher.eunet.sk E-mail: sds(a)slovakia.eu.net Gateway Japan E-mail: gwjapan(a)hamlet.umd.edu -NetSurfer #include standard.disclaimer >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> == = = |James D. Wilson |V.PGP 2.7: 512/E12FCD 1994/03/17 > " " " |P. O. Box 15432 | finger for full PGP key > " " /\ " |Honolulu, HI 96830 |====================================> \" "/ \" |Serendipitous Solutions| Also NetSurfer(a)sersol.com > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>

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trusted time stamping
by weidai＠eskimo.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

To: cypherpunks(a)toad.com -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- I thought my idea about having trusted entities digitally sign a document in order to establish its existence at a particular time was a new idea, but I just read about it in _Applied Cryptography_. Anyway, I wrote some C code to do automatic time stamping with PGP (source code is in the next e-mail). If you just want to try it, simply send an e-mail to weidai(a)eskimo.com with the subject "Time Stamp This Mail". The body of the mail will be signed with a PGP private key (public key is at the end of this message) and returned to the sender. E-mail with any other subject will be piped to my regular mailbox. What's the use of this? Well, here is an interesting application of time stamping that wasn't covered in _Applied Cryptography_. Let's say Alice would like to publish an article anonymously but retain the ability to claim authorship some time later. She can follow this protocol: 1. Alice signs her article with RSA 2. She encrypts her signed article with IDEA 3. She sends the encrypted article to several trusted time stamping servers 4. She places the signatures she gets back along with the encrypted article in a safe place 5. She waits a random length of time 6. She posts the plain article (without encryption or signature) anonymously 7. When Alice wants to claim authorship, she publishes the encrypted article, the IDEA key, and the signatures she got back from the time servers Now, people can be reasonably sure that Alice actually wrote the original article because the time server signatures prove that she signed the article before it was made public. One problem here is that at least one of the time servers she used must have remained secure until step 7. Comments? Wei Dai PGP Public Key avaliable -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.3a iQCVAgUBLlRtiTl0sXKgdnV5AQFr+gQAsymOrN/Zd3C94NebWZOVFcl2tCkd/cSW EehvHxJMD1qO5fmmsDelhA+YKqqjLz8Dyp94pIqZXtWSu+kx/p5OUjB173PdAyN0 TSNaVMyZX266B/JIRqHI6+/5F2EWysFTXXH23v0mEH/us82Dvdb8rcqyKwQvjGZf mOvhObHf8Fo= =w0Q+ -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- -----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- Version: 2.3a mQBNAi5UWcgAAAECALp+QU9dtN2N4BjVr8OSxRPXtZ6UX4bLGq8PxpXru6WpsBD/ SJUl6jK4YcnatNJmjkl9oEHC6fjTpwMbZVOWJE0ABRG0MFdlaSdzIFBHUCBUaW1l IFN0YW1wIFNlcnZpY2UgPHdlaWRhaUBlc2tpbW8uY29tPokAVQIFEC5UWpenAxtl U5YkTQEBzDQB/3+eNgnW22sRaZFpBY3Wfzj4uEVXXcYU4vrdS1fsSRixJSEKta/N uyvmkeiB4GyyahhtHTtybywrRzD1y9IlwMmJAJUCBRAuVFmZOXSxcqB2dXkBAYNZ A/4/KHOQ1gjPEkdLhdPJ/yaXyQilqWV+MWiHblrqcDOrsFu1dKizJrBdWa5+vuIX nCu5DSq9cd3/cGrMOYK3OJGQC8JkPc6LNw7siuRGuVn413JBlM3wnCEXnFsAUhpG hDLTPUC2JqmiCwQP6OpxwqlTxPmZk8wKE0Sh/iaGRwZnBg== =vpgO -----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- PGP Public Key available

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timestamp.c
by weidai＠eskimo.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

To: cypherpunks(a)toad.com -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- /* timestamp.c - Automatic PGP Time Stamper v0.1 * by * Wei Dai <weidai(a)eskimo.com> * * Put the line "|timestamp" in your .forward file, and this * program will automaticly scan all your mail for a certain subject heading * and if found, will sign the body of that mail with PGP, and send it back. * Otherwise, the mail goes to your regular mailbox. * This is probably most useful as a "trusted" time stamping service. * * Use for experimental purposes only. Feel free to modify it, but please * send me some e-mail if you do more than change the #defines. */ #include <stdio.h> #include <string.h> #include <stdlib.h> #include <sys/types.h> #include <fcntl.h> #define MAILBOX "/usr/spool/mail/weidai" #define MAILLOCK "/usr/spool/mail/weidai.lock" #define PGPPATH "/u/w/weidai/.pgp" #define LOG "/u/w/weidai/.timestamp.log" #define COMMAND "Time Stamp This Mail" #define MAXLINE 1024 #define FROM "From " #define SUBJECT "Subject: " void Remove_nl (char *); main() { char sLine[MAXLINE], sFrom[255], sFile[255], sTmp[255]; char *p; FILE *fOut, *fMail, *fLog; int bDoIt, fd; fLog = fopen(LOG, "a"); sprintf(sFile, "/tmp/pts_%d", getpid()); fOut = fopen(sFile, "w"); sFrom[0]=0; while (fgets(sLine, MAXLINE, stdin) != NULL) { fputs(sLine, fOut); if (strncmp(sLine, FROM, strlen(FROM)) == 0) { fputs(sLine, fLog); for (p = sLine + strlen(FROM); *p && *p != ' '; ++p); *p = '\0'; strcpy(sFrom, sLine+strlen(FROM)); Remove_nl(sFrom); } else if (strncmp(sLine, SUBJECT, strlen(SUBJECT)) == 0) { fputs(sLine, fLog); bDoIt = (strncasecmp(sLine+strlen(SUBJECT), COMMAND, str } else if (strlen(sLine) <= 1) break; } if (sFrom[0]==0) bDoIt=0; if (bDoIt) { fclose(fOut); fOut = fopen(sFile, "w"); while (fgets(sLine, MAXLINE, stdin) != NULL) fputs(sLine, fOut); fclose(fOut); sprisFile); system(sTmp); fputs(sTmp, fLog); fputs("\n", fLog); unlink(sFile); sprintf(sTmp, "/usr/ucb/mail -s 'Time Stamp Output' '%s' < %s.as system(sTmp); fputs(sTmp, fLog); fputs("\n", fLog); sprintf(sTmp, "%s.asc", sFile); unlink(sTmp); fputs("*** time stamped ***********\n\n", fLog); } else { while (fgets(sLine, MAXLINE, stdin) != NULL) fputs(sLine, fOut); fclose(fOut); while ( (fd=open(MAILLOCK, 0)) != -1) { close(fd); sleep(5); } fd=creat(MAILLOCK, 0600); close(fd); fOut=fopen(MAILBOX, "a"); fMail=fopen(sFile, "r"); while (fgets(sLine, MAXLINE, fMail) != NULL) fputs(sLine, fOut); fputs("\n", fOut); fclose(fMail); fclose(fOut); unlink(MAILLOCK); unlink(sFile); fputs("--- personal mail -----------\n\n", fLog); } fclose(fLog); return(0); } void Remove_nl (char *string) { int i=0; while(string[i]!='\n' && string[i]!=0) i++; string[i]=0; } -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.3a iQCVAgUBLlRcjjl0sXKgdnV5AQEv2AQAid9urvFjtaQjPYvpqcwhWLy8CCH2OI+O 9mWNnubDZuReH97upNvFYWbDQkFew2Gjfbsj7RwrYSe85gQm+RV0F+/ud64lTCe1 eoPuFrBy2kXugbtJVtp+HB2BGSNc2GtgxIfc61Z3x3E6F4eDagZxtAn2m3ht9Vib n41IQtRk1uA= =ojFS -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- PGP Public Key available

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15 years!
by Mats Bergstrom 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

About the EFF Wiretap Bill: ----------------- The bill makes it a crime to possess or use an altered telecommunications instrument (such as a cellular telephone or scanning receiver) to obtain unauthorized access to telecommunications services (Sec. 9). This provision is intended to prevent the illegal use of cellular and other wireless communications services. Violations under this section face imprisonment for up to 15 years and a fine of up to $50,000. ----------------- I commented on this before but feel like repeating myself: So an alt.2600 tec-addict makes some hardware hacks on his cellular - and gets 15 years in the slammer for catching some airwaves. A punishment scale suggestive of a very repressive state! And why outlawing it in the first place? What is crypto for? Mats

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Re: Are "they" really the enemy?
by jdd＠aiki.demon.co.uk 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

In message <199408182230.PAA15298(a)netcom7.netcom.com> "James A. Donald" writes: > Jim Dixon writes > > You won't tear down the government without replacing it. > > We can certainly drastically weaken and seriously impair > and obstruct government without replacing it. Can you prove this? Or at least show some historical example? In France, the monarchy was replaced by a republic which quickly descended into the Reign of Terror. There was no gap. Orderly rule drifted into terror, which was succeeded by Napoleon's iron rule. Napoleon took over in part because people wanted order. In the American South after the Civil War, the Union smashed local government and replaced it with something acceptable to them. This did not have the consent of the white population. The Ku Klux Klan developed as a way for the whites to enforce their rules. The Ku Klux Klan was in its way an instrument of democracy. In Russia, the monarchy was replaced by a republic which was destroyed by the Bolsheviks. There was widespread civil war. But there whenever there was a governmental vacuum, people filled it. Russia was full of bands of armed men. People needed governments to protect them from the marauders. Stalin was an expression of the people's will. There have been cases where government was torn down and replaced by something else which was not called the government. The Ku Klux Klan was not part of the formal government of the South. But it functioned as part of the apparatus of government. The US government is a large and powerful organization. Let us say that somehow you contrive to successfully weaken, impair, and obstruct it. How will you do this? Not by yourself. One person cannot defeat millions. You need a group of some size, at the very least of thousands. This group must have a set of common goals and some sort of administrative structure to effect those goals... I could continue, but you must understand what I am going to say: governments can only be defeated by organizations with the attributes of governments. The alternative is to take over the government to some degree. But then in time you will find that there are people out there who regard you as part of the government, and set out to drastically weaken, seriously impair, and obstruct your government. -- Jim Dixon

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Re: NSA Spy Machine and DES
by jdd＠aiki.demon.co.uk 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

In message <9408190809.ZM4528(a)simple.sydney.sgi.com> Ian Farquhar writes: > Actually, I would be surprised if the "SIMD" processors were not a huge > array of reprogrammable FPGA's, quite possibly Xilinx's. The possibilities > of a large array of these chips, each with local memory, is quite > interesting. I have personally seen an array of 64 Xilinx chips in a DEC PeRL > box doing RSA, at speeds similar or better to almost all available custom > hardware implementations of the cipher. The delays in getting data on and off the chip are too large and the amount of space wasted in redundant functions is too great. You might prototype it using FPGAs, but even this is unlikely. Why not just buy one of the existing SIMD processors and simulate your target system? People used to build fast processors out of separate chips (bit slices). They don't do that any more because it's too slow and too expensive if you are building in volume. -- +-----------------------------------+--------------------------------------+ | Jim Dixon<jdd(a)aiki.demon.co.uk> | Compuserve: 100114,1027 | |AIKI Parallel Systems Ltd + parallel processing hardware & software design| | voice +44 272 291 316 | fax +44 272 272 015 | +-----------------------------------+--------------------------------------+

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Re: NSA Spy Machine and DES
by jdd＠aiki.demon.co.uk 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

In message <9408182235.AA07044(a)snark.imsi.com> perry(a)imsi.com writes: > > Actually, I would be surprised if the "SIMD" processors were not a huge > > array of reprogrammable FPGA's, quite possibly Xilinx's. > > Since SIMD implies array processing, this makes much more sense than > general purpose 64 bit processors. What would make even more sense is an array of special purpose 64 bit processors. This is how most people who build real SIMD machines do it. -- +-----------------------------------+--------------------------------------+ | Jim Dixon<jdd(a)aiki.demon.co.uk> | Compuserve: 100114,1027 | |AIKI Parallel Systems Ltd + parallel processing hardware & software design| | voice +44 272 291 316 | fax +44 272 272 015 | +-----------------------------------+--------------------------------------+

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Re: Are \"they\" really the enemy?
by jdd＠aiki.demon.co.uk 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

In message <199408182252.SAA26632(a)pipe3.pipeline.com> John Young writes: > >Personally, I find these statements very disturbing, > >because they are so empty. > > Might be applied to your own later comments: > > >You won't tear down the government without replacing > >it. And I would argue that the more violent the means > >used to tear down the government, the more repressive > >its successor. Governments exist in part because we > >are such dangerous animals. I do not think that these statements are empty. Do I really need to prove that people are dangerous? One of the main functions of government is to stop us from harming one another. If you replace government with something else which has the same function (and works), you may call it something else, but it is acting in the same role as a government. Cases of violent replaces of governments from within: the French Revolution, the Bolshevik Revolution, the victory of the Chinese communists, Pol Pot -- in all of the cases that I can think of, the violence of the revolution was a good predictor of the repressiveness of the government that followed. The revolutions in Eastern Europe over the last few years have almost gone unnoticed, because they have been so peaceful. But they are genuine revolutions. I have seen no one claim that the new governments are repressive, except possibly for Rumania, where the revolution was violent. > This rhetorical ploy comes across as an apology for the status > quo and seems to offer counter-revolutionary cant instead of > your best arguments for making rational, evolutional > improvements to our inheritance. I am not justifying some status quo. My observation is pretty much equivalent to saying that accidents at high speeds tend to be fatal. If you drive a little more slowly and look where you are going, you are more likely to get to your destination in one piece. -- Jim Dixon

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Re: Are \"they\" really the enemy? (Systems commentary)
by jdd＠aiki.demon.co.uk 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

In message <199408181927.MAA00813(a)sleepy.retix.com> joshua geller writes: > > > > When a system is designed to organize human behavior (as in > > > "governing" it) it has the inherent mistake of being based on > > > the presumption of complete knowledge of human nature (yet who > > > agrees on what that comprises). > > > Only a philosopher could make such a statement. Only a philosopher could believe that it is necessary to presume complete knowledge to design a system. > > A family is such a system, but it is based on no such presumption. > > Families begin in what is usually a completely mindless activity. > > And any honest parent of teenage children will admit that he or > > she is almost totally ignorant of human nature. If the parent > > doesn't admit it, the child will let the parent know. > > only a rhetor could make such a statement. ? I don't teach rhetoric. > families are not designed. Many people think that they are. But my point is that we all take part in the creation of systems, and we usually do not think about what we are doing when we do it. Blanc said, esssentially, that systems are designed rationally. Most aren't. -- Jim Dixon

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Attention Shoppers: Internet Is Open (NYT, 12Aug94)
by an5877＠anon.penet.fi 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- New York Times, 12 August 1994, Page C1. [Photograph of five young men standing around a decorated office.] A system from the Net Market Company allows credit card shopping on the Internet in total privacy. Net Market's chief executive, Daniel M. Kohn, foreground, worked at the company's office in Nashua, N.H., yesterday. Behind him, from left, were the president, Roger Lee; program developer, Mark Birmingham; senior program developer, Guy H.T. Haskin, and chief information officer, Eiji Hirai. ATTENTION SHOPPERS: INTERNET IS OPEN By PETER H. LEWIS At noon yesterday, Phil Brandenberger of Philadelphia went shopping for a compact audio disk, paid for it with his credit card and made history. Moments later, the champagne corks were popping in a small two-story frame house in Nashua, N.H. There, a team of young cyberspace entrepreneurs celebrated what was apparently the first retail transaction on the Internet using a readily available version of powerful data encryption software designed to guarantee privacy. Experts have long seen such ironclad security as a necessary first step before commercial transactions can become common on the Internet, the global computer network. - From his work station in Philadelphia, Mr. Brandenburger logged onto the computer in Nashua, and used a secret code to send his Visa credit card number to pay $12.48, plus shipping costs, for the compact disk "Ten Summoners' Tales" by the rock musician Sting. "Even if the N.S.A. was listening in, they couldn't get his credit card number," said Daniel M. Kohn, the 21-year-old chief executive of the Net Market Company of Nashua, N.H., a new venture that is the equivalent of a shopping mall in cyberspace. Mr. Kohn was referring to the National Security Agency, the arm of the Pentagon that develops and breaks the complex algorithms that are used to keep the most secret electronic secrets secret. Even bigger organizations working on rival systems yesterday called the achievement by the tiny Net Market a welcome first step. "It's really clear that most companies want the security prior to doing major commitments to significant electronic commerce on the Internet," said Cathy Medich, executive director of Commercenet, a Government and industry organization based in Menlo Park, Calif., that hopes to establish standards for commercial transactions on the Internet and other networks. The idea is to make such data communications immune to wiretaps, electronic eavesdropping and theft by scrambling the transmissions with a secret code security technique known as data encryption. While Commercenet and other organizations have been working to develop a standard for the automated data encryption of commercial transactions, the small band of recent college graduates who formed the Net Market Company in New Hampshire appear to be the first to implement such technology successfully. Tests of Commercenet's encryption system, which is based on algorithms - - mathematical formulas - developed by RSA Data Security Inc. of Redwood City, Calif., are expected to begin this fall. Commercenet hopes to create an easy-to-use industry standard for protecting Internet transactions. For now, Net Market's approach is available to the limited number of computer users who have work stations running the Unix software operating system and a sophisticated Internet navigational program called X-Mosaic. The data encryption program is called PGP, for Pretty Good Privacy, which is based on the same RSA algorithms used by Commercenet. PGP is available free, but it requires technical expertise to download it from the Internet. But within a few months commercial versions of PGP are expected to be available for personal computers using the Windows and Macintosh operating systems, which comprise the vast majority of computers in North America. Security Breaches Reported The widespread adoption of standard data encryption tools cannot come too quickly for many Internet entrepreneurs, who hope to foster new levels of commerce on the rapidly growing network. Alarmed by increasing reports of security breaches on the Internet many people and businesses are reluctant to transmit sensitive information, including credit cards numbers, sales information or private electronic mail messages, on the network. But the use of standard data encryption software, which scrambles messages so they can be read only by someone with the proper software "key," has been hindered by a combination of Government regulations and software patent disputes. Experts say the PGP encryption software used by Net Market is at least as robust as the so-called Clipper encryption technology that the Clinton Administration has been pushing as a national standard. But unlike the Clipper system, the software keys for opening and reading PGP-encrypted documents is not controlled by the Government. A version of PGP for individuals is available free through the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, but users must retrieve it from an M.I.T. computer through the Internet. Organizations wanting to use PGP for commercial purposes must obtain it on the Internet from a company in Phoenix called Viacrypt, a maker of [bold inset A system offers on-line credit card shopping in total privacy. end inset] computer security software and hardware tools. Prices for PGP begin at $100 a copy. A Browsing Feature One achievement of the young programmers at Net Market was to incorporate PGP into X-Mosaic, the software that many Internet users rely on for browsing through the global network. X-Mosaic is a software tool that allows the users of Unix computers to browse a service of the Internet called the World Wide Web, where companies can post the electronic equivalent of a glossy color brochure with supporting sales or marketing documents. In the case of Noteworthy Music the record retailer that leases a "store front" in Net Market's Internet computer, a shopper can look at color pictures of CD album covers. Mr. Kohn, a 1994 honors graduate in economics from Swarthmore College, came up with the idea for Net Market during his junior year abroad, at the London School of Economics. There, he persuaded an American classmate, Roger Lee, to join his venture. Mr. Lee, who graduated from Yale this past spring with a degree in political science, is president of the company. For technical expertise, they recruited two other partners from Swarthmore, Guy H.T. Haskin and Eiji Hirai. The four men live upstairs in the house in Nashua, commuting downstairs each morning to run the business. Because of the pressures of running the system and debugging the software, they rarely venture outside, even though they have a backyard swimming pool. "We don't get much sun," Mr. Kohn said, "but we're down to a case of Coke a day." 'An Important Step' Although Net Market has been selling various products like CD's, flowers and books for several months on behalf of various merchants, yesterday was the first time they had offered digitally secure transactions. "I think it's an important step in pioneering this work, but later on we'll probably see more exciting things in the way of digital cash," said Philip R. Zimmermann, a computer security consultant in Boulder, Colo., who created the PGP program. Digital cash, Mr. Zimmermann explained, is "a combination of cryptographic protocols that behave the way real dollars behave but are untraceable." In other words, they are packets of worth that have value in cyberspace, the same way dollars have value in the real world, except that they have the properties of anonymity, privacy and untraceability. Many details remain to be worked out, Mr. Zimmermann said. For now Mr. Brandenberger, despite his historic transaction yesterday, will be paying with plain old dollars, when he gets his credit card bill. And sometime today, the Sting CD will arrive by fairly conventional means shipped FedEx from the Noteworthy Music warehouse in Nashua. DEADBEAT <na5877(a)anon.penet.fi> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.4 iQBFAgUBLkt5+/FZTpBW/B35AQGp/QF9E7xzIivWavE6oZw/OyJBKpBEMh+Ded5d btGwA62La30MMk/7JkwFt01o1DIM581u =sUm+ -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- ------------------------------------------------------------------------- To find out more about the anon service, send mail to help(a)anon.penet.fi. Due to the double-blind, any mail replies to this message will be anonymized, and an anonymous id will be allocated automatically. You have been warned. Please report any problems, inappropriate use etc. to admin(a)anon.penet.fi.

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EFF Analysis of Leahy/Edwards Digital Telephony Bill
by dance＠cicero.spc.uchicago.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I hope this is helpful (and not too out-of-date, 9 days ago!). It's the EFF's justification.... --------------------------Begin Message----------------------------- Date: 10 Aug 1994 16:58:23 -0500 From: mech(a)eff.org (Stanton McCandlish) Subject: EFF Analysis of Leahy/Edwards Digital Telephony Bill EFF SUMMARY OF THE EDWARDS/LEAHY DIGITAL TELEPHONY BILL ======================================================= OVERVIEW -------- The Edwards/Leahy Digital Telephony bill places functional requirements on telecommunications carriers in order to enable law enforcement to continue to conduct authorized electronic surveillance. It allows a court to impose fines on carriers that violate the requirements, and mandates that the processes for determining capacity requirements and technical standards be open and public. The bill also contains significant new privacy protections; including an increased standard for government access to transactional data (such as addressing information contained in electronic mail logs), a requirement that information acquired through the use of pen registers or trap and trace devices not disclose the physical location of an individual, and an expansion of current law to protect the radio portion of cordless telephone conversations from unauthorized surveillance. SCOPE OF THE BILL. WHO IS COVERED? ----------------------------------- The requirements of the bill apply to "telecommunications carriers", which are defined as any person or entity engaged in the transmission or switching of wire or electronic communications as a common carrier for hire (as defined by section 3 (h) of the Communications Act of 1934), including commercial mobile services (cellular, PCS, etc.). The bill also applies to those persons or entities engaged in providing wire or electronic communication switching or transmission service to the extent that the FCC finds that such service is a replacement for a substantial portion of the local telephone exchange. The bill does not apply to online communication and information services such as Internet providers, Compuserve, AOL, Prodigy, and BBS's. It also excludes private networks, PBX's, and facilities which only interconnect telecommunications carriers or private networks (such as most long distance service). REQUIREMENTS IMPOSED ON CARRIERS -------------------------------- Telecommunications carriers would be required to ensure that they possess sufficient capability and capacity to accommodate law enforcement's needs. The bill distinguishes between capability and capacity requirements, and ensures that the determination of such requirements occur in an open and public process. CAPABILITY REQUIREMENTS ----------------------- A telecommunications carrier is required to ensure that, within four years from the date of enactment, it has the capability to: 1. expeditiously isolate the content of a targeted communication within its service area; 2. isolate call-identifying information about the origin and destination of a targeted communication; 3. enable the government to access isolated communications at a point away from the carrier's premises and on facilities procured by the government, and; 4. to do so unobtrusively and in such a way that protects the privacy and security of communications not authorized to be intercepted (Sec. 2601). However, the bill does not permit law enforcement agencies or officers to require the specific design of features or services, nor does it prohibit a carrier from deploying any feature or service which does not meet the requirements outlined above. CAPACITY REQUIREMENTS --------------------- Within 1 year of enactment of the bill, the Attorney General must determine the maximum number of intercepts, pen register, and trap and trace devices that law enforcement will require four years from the date of enactment. Notices of capacity requirements must be published in the Federal Register (Sec. 2603). Carriers have 4 years to comply with capacity requirements. PROCESS FOR DETERMINING TECH. STANDARDS TO IMPLEMENT CAPABILITY REQUIREMENTS ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- Telecommunications carriers, through trade associations or standards setting bodies and in consultation with the Attorney General, must determine the technical specifications necessary to implement the capability requirements (Sec. 2606). The bill contains a 'safe harbor' provision, which allows a carrier to meet its obligations under the legislation if it is in compliance with publicly available standards set through this process. A carrier may deploy a feature or service in the absence of technical standards, although in such a case the carrier would not be covered by the safe harbor provision and may be found in violation. Furthermore, the legislation allows any one to file a motion at the FCC in the event that a standard violates the privacy and security of telecommunications networks or does not meet the requirements of the bill (Sec. 2606). If petitioned under this section, the FCC may establish technical requirements or standards that: 1) meet the capability requirements (in Sec. 2602); 2) protect the privacy and security of communications not authorized to be intercepted, and; 3) encourage the provision of new technologies and services to the public. ENFORCEMENT AND PENALTIES ------------------------- In the event that a court or the FCC deems a technical standard to be insufficient, or if law enforcement finds that it is unable to conduct authorized surveillance because a carrier has not met the requirements of this legislation, the Attorney General can request that a court issue an enforcement order (an order directing a carrier to comply), and/or a fine of up to $10,000 per day for each day in violation (Sec. 2607). However, a court can issue an enforcement order or fine a carrier only if it can be determined that no other reasonable alternatives are available to law enforcement. This provision allows carriers to deploy features and services which may not meet the requirements of the bill. Furthermore, this legislation does not permit the government to block the adoption or use of any feature or service by a telecommunications carrier which does not meet the requirements. The bill requires the government to reimburse carriers for all reasonable costs associated with complying with the capacity requirements. In other words, the government will pay for upgrades of current features or services, as well as any future upgrades which may be necessary, pursuant to published notices of capacity requirements (Sec. 2608). There is $500,000,000 authorized for appropriation to cover the costs of government reimbursements to carriers. In the event that a smaller sum is actually appropriated, the bill allows a court to determine whether a carrier must comply (Sec. 2608 (d)). This section recognizes that telecommunications carriers may not be responsible for meeting the requirements if the government does not cover reasonable costs. The government is also required to submit a report to congress within four years describing all costs paid to carriers for upgrades (Sec. 4). ENHANCED PRIVACY PROTECTIONS ---------------------------- The legislation contains enhanced privacy protections for transactional information (such as telephone toll records and electronic mail logs) generated in the course of completing a communication. Current law permits law enforcement to gain access to transactional information through a subpoena. The bill establishes a higher standard for law enforcement access to transactional data contained electronic mail logs and other online records. Telephone toll records would still be available through a subpoena. Under the new standard, law enforcement is required to obtain a court order by demonstrating specific and articulable facts that electronic mail logs and other online transactional records are relevant and material to an ongoing criminal investigation (Sec. 10). Law enforcement is also prohibited from remotely activating any surveillance capability. All intercepts must be conducted with the affirmative consent of a telecommunications carrier and activated by a designated employee of the carrier within the carrier's facilities (Sec. 2604). The bill further requires that, when using pen registers and trap and trace devices, law enforcement will use, when reasonably available, devices which only provide call set up and dialed number information (Sec. 10). This provision will ensure that as law enforcement employs new technologies in pen register and trap and trace devices, it will not gain access to additional call setup information beyond its current authority. Finally, the bill extends the Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA) protections against interception of wireless communications to cordless telephones, making illegal the intentional interception of the radio portion of a cordless telephone (the transmission between the handset and the base unit). CELLULAR SCANNERS ----------------- The bill makes it a crime to possess or use an altered telecommunications instrument (such as a cellular telephone or scanning receiver) to obtain unauthorized access to telecommunications services (Sec. 9). This provision is intended to prevent the illegal use of cellular and other wireless communications services. Violations under this section face imprisonment for up to 15 years and a fine of up to $50,000. IMPROVEMENTS OF THE EDWARDS/LEAHY BILL OVER PREVIOUS FBI PROPOSALS ------------------------------------------------------------------ The Digital Telephony legislative proposal was first offered in 1992 by the Bush Administration. The 1992 version of the bill: * applied to all providers of wire or electronic communications services (no exemptions for information services, interexchange carriers or private networks); * gave the government the explicit authority to block or enjoin a feature or service that did not meet the requirements; * contained no privacy protections; * contained no public process for determining the capacity requirements; * contained no government reimbursement (carriers were responsible for meeting all costs); * would have allowed remote access to communications by law enforcement, and; * granted telecommunications carriers only 18 months to comply. The Bush Administration proposal was offered on capitol hill for almost a year, but did attract any congressional sponsors. The proposal was again offered under the Clinton Administration's FBI in March of 1993. The Clinton Administration's bill was a moderated version of the original 1992 proposal: * It required the government to pay all reasonable costs incurred by telecommunications carriers in retrofitting their facilities in order to correct existing problems; * It encouraged (but did not require), the Attorney General to consult with telecommunications industry representatives and standards bodies to facilitate compliance, * It narrowed the scope of the legislation to common carriers, rather than all providers of electronic communications services. Although the Clinton Administration version was an improvement over the Bush Administration proposal, it did not address the larger concerns of public interest organizations or the telecommunications industry. The Clinton Administration version: * did not contain any protections for access to transactional information; * did not contain any public process for determining the capability requirements or public notice of law enforcement's capacity needs; * would have allowed law enforcement to dictate system design and bar the introduction of features and services which did not meet the requirements, and; * would have allowed law enforcement to use pen registers and trap and trace devices to obtain tracking or physical location information. * * * Locating Relevant Documents =========================== ** Original 1992 Bush-era draft ** ftp.eff.org, /pub/EFF/Policy/FBI/Old/digtel92_old_bill.draft gopher.eff.org, 1/EFF/Policy/FBI/Old, digtel92_old_bill.draft http://www.eff.org/pub/EFF/Policy/FBI/Old/digtel92_old_bill.draft bbs: +1 202 638 6120 (8N1, 300-14400bps), file area: Privacy - Digital Telephony; file: digtel92.old ** 1993/1994 Clinton-era draft ** ftp.eff.org, /pub/EFF/Policy/FBI/digtel94_bill.draft gopher.eff.org, 1/EFF/Policy/FBI, digtel94_bill.draft http://www.eff.org/pub/EFF/Policy/FBI/digtel94_bill.draft bbs: +1 202 638 6120 (8N1, 300-14400bps), file area: Privacy - Digital Telephony; file: digtel94.dft ** 1994 final draft, as sponsored ** ftp.eff.org, /pub/EFF/Policy/FBI/digtel94.bill gopher.eff.org, 1/EFF/Policy/FBI, digtel94.bill http://www.eff.org/pub/EFF/Policy/FBI/digtel94.bill bbs: +1 202 638 6120 (8N1, 300-14400bps), file area: Privacy - Digital Telephony; file: digtel94.bil ** EFF Statement on sponsored version ** ftp.eff.org, /pub/EFF/Policy/FBI/digtel94_statement.eff gopher.eff.org, 1/EFF/Policy/FBI, digtel94_statement.eff http://www.eff.org/pub/EFF/Policy/FBI/digtel94_statement.eff bbs: +1 202 638 6120 (8N1, 300-14400bps), file area: Privacy - Digital Telephony; file: digtel94.eff --------------------------End of Message----------------------------- _/_/_/ _/_/_/ _/_/_/ _/ _/ The strongest reason for the _/ _/ _/ _/ _/_/ _/ people to retain their right to _/_/_/ _/ _/ _/_/_/ _/ _/ _/ keep and bear arms is, as a last _/ _/ _/ _/ _/_/_/_/ _/ resort, to protect themselves _/_/_/ _/_/_/ _/_/_/ _/ _/ _/_/_/ against tyranny in government. _/ --Thomas Jefferson

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No Subject
by mogsie＠VNET.IBM.COM 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Hi, guys| I just received my T-shirt as a birthday-gift from my brother| Or is this just a fraud...? -mogsie- finger <erikmo at oslonett.no> for PGP key

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Re: cypherpunks-digest V1 #18
by smb＠research.att.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Date: Fri, 19 Aug 1994 11:54:45 +0200 (METDST) Subject: 15 years! About the EFF Wiretap Bill: The bill makes it a crime to possess or use an altered telecommunications instrument (such as a cellular telephone or scanning receiver) to obtain unauthorized access to telecommunications services (Sec. 9). This provision is intended to prevent the illegal use of cellular and other wireless communications services. Violations under this section face imprisonment for up to 15 years and a fine of up to $50,000. I commented on this before but feel like repeating myself: So an alt.2600 tec-addict makes some hardware hacks on his cellular - and gets 15 years in the slammer for catching some airwaves. A punishment scale suggestive of a very repressive state! And why outlawing it in the first place? What is crypto for? I'm not defending a 15 year sentence; it's far too harsh. But I strongly disagree with ``why outlawing it in the first place? What is crypto for?'' By analogy, why outlaw burglary? After all, what are safes and alarms for? The purpose of a civilized society is precisely to avoid this sort of ``arms race'' between bandits and those who pay for services. Even libertarians generally agree that theft is wrong, and theft of service is just as wrong as theft of tangible objects; otherwise, there is no way to recover the cost of the capital investment necessary to provide the service. That is, the marginal cost -- the electricity, wear and tear on the ICs, etc., to make a cellular phone call -- is obviously very low. But someone had to pay for all the cellular switches out there, to say nothing of the R&D that went into them, and a large part of the charges for a call go towards repaying that investment. Now, a prudent service provider may wish to invest in crypto as a way to prevent fraud, just as many homeowners invest in alarm systems. But failure to do so doesn't make either sort of theft correct. --Steve Bellovin

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\"they\" and Real Bullets
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

The c'punks vote on continuing the "they" topic: 1 yes 1 maybe 1 no 2^512,000 plonks The "plonks" have it, but to hell with them. ----------------------------------- Responding to msg by wcs(a)anchor.ho.att.com (bill.stewart(a)pleasantonca.ncr.com +1-510-484-6204) on Thu, 18 Aug 8:46 PM >> From: Hal >> What does it mean to speak of a government in >cyberspace? It is the >> government in physical space I fear. Its agents >carry physical guns >> which shoot real bullets. >> >........................................................ >Without cryptography, all you've got left is security >by obscurity, the main technique used by the hackers in >the book; even cryptographic systems need strong >enough implementations built around the >mathematically-strong parts to be truly safe. Bill's suggestion about obscurity through strong crypto as a defense against real bullets is a provocative version of "the pen is mightier than the sword" homily. That rephrasing of the topic seems to be a good way to mix software and hardware issues that originated the "they" topic. Is it possible for mind stuff and its gadgets to beat the tools of physical violence? It seems that is what this list is about. Jim Dixon's elegant disquisition (and that of other respondents) on the rise and fall of governments is less persuasive than his (and others') remarks, say, on the NSA spy machine where he (and they) shows nitty-gritty expertise. I vote for the nit-grit as more pertinent to Hal's "real bullets" problem. Sorry, but geo-political bullshit apologizes for real killers of all political bent, in power or out. Geo-pol is overdone by talking heads who sound numbingly alike. The distincitive sound of crypto and techno stuff is what charms here, because it's rarely heard in public venues. We got to take responsibility for our individual actions, day by day, and resist the delusionary temptation of hallucinating on great problems to mask our daily marginalization. Ahem. John

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Zimmermann/NSA debate
by Loren Fleckenstein 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

For those who haven't heard, Philip Zimmermann and Dr. Clinton Brooks of the National Security Agency will debate the national encryption and privacy policies Thursday Aug. 25 at the Thousand Oaks Inn, 75 West Thousand Oaks. Blvd. in Thousand Oaks, Calif. A cocktail hour will start at 5:45 p.m. The debate will start at 6:30 p.m. If there is anyone in the Moreno Valley-to-Riverside, Calif., area who is interesting in carpooling with me to Thousand Oaks., contact me by private e-mail. We'd return that night. -- Loren

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Re: 15 years!
by frissell＠panix.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 08:29 AM 8/19/94 -0600, Brad Huntting wrote: >In America cops often use armored battering rams to execute knock >warrants. Similarly, they can use court orders to obtain keys to >decode encrypted transmissions or files. If a person is ordered >to turn over their password to unlock their documents, they can be >held in contempt if they don't, and they can demand their right to >not have any of the documents used against them if they do. > >In America at least, there are no new civil liberties to be found >in the use of strong crypto. The legitimate, constitutional use >of police power cannot be thwarted by using this new technology. Brad -- perhaps you haven't grasped the full range of possibilities arising from the deployment of modern crypto technology. By the use of Stego and anonymous networking and operating system software, it will be possible to block the authorities from even identifying you as the target of an investigation. While it is true that they may be able to try and force you to reveal the contents of a "secret message", they can succeed only if: 1) They know that a secret message exists 2) They know that you exist 3) They know (and can prove) that you possess the key material necessary to decode the message. 4) You are capable of being coerced -- i.e. you are a human being and not a software agent or an institutional entity controlled by humans outside of the jurisdiction. 5) You are within their jurisdiction. 6) You have not used an encoding scheme that kicks out two alternative plaintexts (the 'real message' and the 'duress message') depending on what key material you use. 7) You decide not to take advantage of their offer of one or two years of free room and board rather than submit to their demands. Modern crypto techniques can make it very difficult in practice to extract any useful information from people's computer files or communication streams. At the least, crypto can make "fishing expeditions" impossible. When you combine crypto with the fact that on a network, people inside and outside the "jurisdiction" are equal, enforcement capabilities are reduced. DCF ************************************************************************* ATMs, Contracting Out, Digital Switching, Downsizing, EDI, Fax, Fedex, Home Workers, Internet, Just In Time, Leasing, Mail Receiving, Phone Cards, Quants, Securitization, Temping, Voice Mail.

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Re: Are "they" really the enemy?
by jdd＠aiki.demon.co.uk 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

In message <9408191418.AA26762(a)sten.lehman.com> stanton(a)acm.org writes: > > did not have the consent of the white population. The Ku Klux Klan > > developed as a way for the whites to enforce their rules. > > It also had the more-than-tacit support of the government. > > > The Ku Klux Klan was in its way an instrument of democracy. > > Instrument of oligarchy might be closer. Many poor whites were 'kept in > line' by it, as well as the blacks. Most of these remarks follow from a simplistic definition of government. My point was that the government may in some cases consist of some overt and recognized elements and some unofficial but nonetheless real elements. In societies in which there is a significant level of internal dissent quasi-governmental groups spring up. In Ireland the IRA is such a group in many areas. The UK government sends car thieves to prison; the IRA kneecaps them (smashes their knees with sledgehammers or a gunshot). > > In Russia, the monarchy was replaced by a republic which was destroyed > > by the Bolsheviks. There was widespread civil war. But there whenever > > there was a governmental vacuum, people filled it. Russia was full of > > bands of armed men. People needed governments to protect them from > > the marauders. > > How can you distinguish the marauders and the government? The difference is only one of degree. Either brigands smash your door down and steal everything you have, or the IRS sends in their auditors. On the whole, people prefer the lesser evil, the IRS, to the greater evil, bandits. > There was an > anarchic transition period. Some areas/groups did well (such as the Coassaks, > and parts of the Caucasus) some did very badly. Does this signify anything? Not as far as this discussion is concerned. In a chaotic situation, the fate of areas and groups will vary. In part this will reflect differing levels of chaos. > > Stalin was an expression of the people's will. > > I think that you are confusing 'the people' and 'the government.' Trotsky > was much more the choice of 'the people.' That's why he was charged with > 'bonapartism.' Even now you find many old people who regret Stalin's absence. What I was saying was that there was a widespread desire for peace and stability. [There are also differences in meaning between the English word 'people' and the Russian word usually used to translate it, 'narod'. I was thinking of the term 'narodnaya volya'. Email me if you want to discuss this further! In-depth discussions of Russian culture seem irrelevant to this list.] > > The US government is a large and powerful organization. Let us say > > that somehow you contrive to successfully weaken, impair, and > > obstruct it. How will you do this? Not by yourself. One person > > cannot defeat millions. You need a group of some size, at the very > > least of thousands. This group must have a set of common goals and > > some sort of administrative structure to effect those goals... > > You seem to be hooked on organized conflict. I am aware of organized conflict. If you want to radically change the US government in a short period of time, it will resist you. If you are to succeed, you must apply a commensurate amount of force. > I think you vastly underestimate > the power of incompetence, corruption, and bureaucracy. ? I don't think so, and in any case I don't see what you mean. > > I could continue, but you must understand what I am going to say: > > governments can only be defeated by organizations with the > > attributes of governments. > > Tell that to the Afghans. The Afghan tribes have a long history of defeating > governments with only a lose tribal and clan system. I have spent around six months in Afghanistan. Most of this was in Kabul, but I also visited Mazar-i-sharif, Herat, Kandahar, Ghazni, Jelallabad, and smaller places. The 'loose' tribal systems are in fact very tight. You are talking as though only national governments were governments. In Afghanistan the central government has normally been very weak. When I was there the king controlled the cities but the chiefs controlled the villages. The chiefs and mullahs were very powerful indeed. Afghanistan is a very conservative society. Along certain lines men are encouraged to be extreme individualists. But the group is very powerful. A friend of mine lived in a village. Families live in small compounds with high walls around them. The women cultivate the land inside the walls. A young man from the village was walking along a high hill near the village and saw an unveiled woman working her fields. Someone from her family saw him and naturally took a shot at him, because he was looking upon a woman in his family without a veil. For several weeks no one could step outside in that village without being shot at, because everyone was in or related to one of the two families involved. This is not a loose society. -- Jim Dixon

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Re: NSA Spy Machine and DES
by Peter Wayner 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

It is entirely possible that the Cray SIMD machine will use Xilinxs. The folks at the Supercomputing Research Center in Bowie are also building machines with these Xilinxs. They're known under the name "Splash" and they've built at least two generations. One of the architects told me that the machine was only good for "deeply pipelined" processes. There is one preprint, for instance, that describes how to do text searching with the machine. (Surprise.) Much of this should be public because the folks from the SRC often go to conferences and present information. Two names on the Splash project that I can think of are Buell and Arnold. If anyone can dig up papers on this topic, I would be intrested to read them. That being said, I still don't really see the advantages of Xilinx. But this really could be because I've never programmed the machines nor have I used them for anything. It just seems unlikely to me that DES can be done that much faster. But like I said, what do I know? I would be intrigued if someone could run a back of the envelope calculation on building a machine with Xilinx. How many processes can you do with it? How many testing circuits can you fit on a chip? How fast will these circuits go? What is the big win from pipelining the process? Sure you can build a sixteen stage pipeline, but will you need to put copies of the SBOXes at each stage? How much space will this take? How deep will the gates be? What is the gate delay at each stage? What will be resultant speed? The fact is that for all of DES's bitwise 6-to-4 sboxes and other weird stuff, it isn't that hard to implement in a RISC processor that has XOR, AND, shifts and fast table lookup. Any answers out there? -Peter

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RE: \"they\" and Real Bullets
by Blanc Weber 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

From: John Young The c'punks vote on continuing the "they" topic: 1 yes 1 maybe 1 no 2^512,000 plonks The "plonks" have it, but to hell with them. ........................................................................... For continuing the System: 1.0 NSA 2.0 Rest of the Gvmt 0.5 various & sundry Citizens ------ 3.5 Against it: 0.5 c'punks The ayes have it, but who cares about 'them'. Or their system. Blanc

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Re: Outlawing the overhearing of conversations
by smb＠research.att.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

- I find a number which looks to be compressed or encrypted. I fiddle around with it and manage to decrypt it, and it turns out to be a useful to me (and possibly harmful to others). What law have I broken, plausibly? With the possible exception of this point, I suspect that we agree more than we disagree. My note included the following excerpt from the original: The bill makes it a crime to possess or use an altered telecommunications instrument (such as a cellular telephone or scanning receiver) to obtain unauthorized access to telecommunications services (Sec. 9). This provision is intended to prevent the illegal use of cellular and other wireless communications services. Violations under this section face imprisonment for up to 15 years and a fine of up to $50,000. My reply was keyed to the phrase ``unauthorized access to telecommunications services''. As I read it -- and you may differ -- the action that's being prohibited here is picking up things like ESNs, credit card numbers, etc., and using those to obtain fraudulent access to the phone network. I'm hard put to justify such behavior as ethical, and I have no problem with declaring it illegal. (Again, though, prudent folks and/or their insurance companies and/or the government may choose to use/mandate crypto. Banks started using DES authentication for EFT transfers because the Fed insisted -- they didn't see the problem.) As for decrypting numbers picked up over the air -- although I'm going to be vague, I suspect that there is a real issue here. Suppose that you run a pay TV service that you genuinely attempt to protect -- that is, you use DES or stronger. Am I *entitled* to watch for free because I happen to be smart enough and/or rich enough to crack DES? Can I legally or ethically give away or sell recovered keys? The point I'm making here is that you're making a reasonable effort to protect something, and thus implicitly declare it private and worthy of protection. This is in distiction to unencrypted transmissions (i.e., today's cellular stuff), security through obscurity (today's digital cellular), or marginally encrypted (frequency inversion). To be sure, I don't know where to draw the line here, and I don't think I want a judge (state-appointed or freely agreed upon) drawing it for me. Maybe we should take a leaf from NSA's book and say that 40 bits or less of key amounts to a welcome mat... --Steve Bellovin

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Re: SSS attachment - is that Splash II?
by nobody＠kaiwan.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

------- Forwarded Message Date: Fri, 19 Aug 1994 13:30:42 -0400 (EDT) From: Ronald G Minnich <rminnich(a)descartes.super.org> Subject: Re: SSS attachment - is that Splash II? The WSJ article on the Cray-3 deal involves a chip/system designed here called TeraSys. Maya [Minnich djf] has a forthcoming article in IEEE Computer about it. The basic idea is to embed bit-serial processors in the sram chips, one processor per bit in the memory row register. It's a simple processor with an ALU and three registers. The memory "words" can now be thought of as running vertically up the columns, rather than horizontally along the rows. Every time you fetch a row, you are in fact fetching 64 bits from 64 different words to be operated on in the ALUs.This gives you roughly a 100-fold increase in memory bandwidth, since you no longer mux the data down from 64 bits to 1 or 4 bits to bring it off-chip. The key contribution of the Cray (this idea due to Ken Iobst of SRC, who also was the architect of the chips) came from Ken's realization that the Cray vector scatter/gather hardware could push the bits around BETWEEN the chips as fast as the hardware networks on, e.g., the CM-2. Thus the Cray-3, a vector supercomputer, can function as a very high-performance SIMD system as well. You don't need to build the additional network found on so many SIMD machines, e.g. maspar or cm-2. You also can have phases of a program, wherein it runs SIMD for a while, then vector, then SMP mode, etc. The TeraSys processors built here at src cost about $80K each, and for several problems could easily outrun our $6M CM-2. The chips are National Semi SRAMS, with mods done here by Mark Norder and Jennifer Schrader. Ken Iobst is the architect of the chips. The programming environment was basically Maya Gokhale's DBC language, which also runs on Splash-2, the CM-2, and clusters. Cray has reimplemented the chips for the Cray-3. In keeping with the NSAs new plans for SRC, this project was terminated at SRC last January. The systems are gradually being turned off and the cabinets put to other uses. No further work is occurring at SRC in this area. Feel free to forward this article to people who may ask you. There was some good work done by people here. ron rminnich(a)super.org | Error message of the week: (301)-805-7451 or 7312 | NFS server localhost not responding still trying ------- End of Forwarded Message

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timestamp.c mangled
by weidai＠eskimo.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

To: cypherpunks(a)toad.com timestamp.c was partially mangled, so I am sending it again, this time using PGP ascii-armor. -----BEGIN PGP MESSAGE----- Version: 2.3a owHNVl1oHFUUbi1aNhjpixQR6umUdGf/N7UVNJnSND9tdNOEJsFCEsrszJ3NNbNz h7l3sl3a6pOi1kdbtUgt+KTQh6Ig9M0+iSjUB0UREakWf54LPkj13Dszm9lN0iqI OCyzM/ec853vnDn3nPvKlvP33b+1PL/jyJPianB5NWxv3frj9m1/Otc/Kr/56rlf d/3289GR2+++t3/k030zP731wK07X18aGx68vcd423u9eKkyfujMziuXPxBfXdz+ R+m7vS/cufbZ6IvW9Zdv7ZyfzD1/7bVHly+8czO4+tjjC2MDt+hDR9/44vy2Xfvf D76pnLm5Y+nzvoufzJx6RP/2h9/JhzfO2V8uvvT9g9WHf7lx4Ur/x2K7oE3Cy9YW vCp5UG/CbPplC0owEgrWNAW1YObIDMyhDGalkASwWi0P9vflAept9fcsoTBmUhhu EWqb9BDhK7TJyhZrHkS5UsnMhALEMgGXegS0Mx1fGlAP2iwMoOywoGUGNjjUJUUw PRsNKFfmfsAagdmEFnVdMBNmbhu4ZXpg4qKCaJrUBYQBEywSCBOheVh/jlgClolp U6+h0CQ0dVAx9OxihMlpw1P86sxuA3Pw2RQRXouKZZmDiBIn0lhA3bRWygptGs2C FuXIWQIomwYjHASLWAWkEbpmxK7OTkVWcxga4A8jq5t1jKTJuICQEyfECDlGoIkg 5ILYmvowoLKFESCDYJVapJykdp4TFTM5hd8GNT1huuCHgc84kmCe2y4DTBCCmQkI kayazKZOG6MoQh0/i+8SkxOFpaKTzhjeSEnFgpnCMMCWdgGRifHAwluDqHj32MTB b8oln0p/X3/fHupZbmgTGObCpqy8fLB7LcAg1i3aLq33LrZ5RbR9RO5edyxPuGoN VyPnMDUyWTs8fQK0SsiDCvcZcyuSfCWqSK1bszY9+sxmqmWXWSspffzwMyNzR6V6 pRXrVMp+w0/p1KaP9MjXtpLLGlqa6ej01NTIsTHQ1nZUVAtTyKGL54na5LFxGKzu 27+2OnF8egq0iYA1IaU7O3/46fHROdBmo2J/CpTLVUZtOE6abJWc9FzQ8aMFkM8N SRlG7Om5/r7T/X0Ztc5riLQQe10qApdOFvYdOKCecUcmz3NNXz0OJZZ5Xz5OTNbG Ie9Mh1hUeUcGI/9rrCGF1MMNM8YmUebYyn9GisDAwvWJp2MCi6CZWsQtw32sEeHo yi8KKqLpV3zBTw7YWhEaRPjU1nNSGeJL+u2gJWatDp6KpbpkVKP31jIqgO4gEtdV 4MUk3xggFq2Xg90GHJuv1TBFGZmjjOOHa8rSncTOZHBz6FjSntX0E6H8RhImcJGL fMnlwDCgKqEirB4wzEQElpHbWPcxECWCQhfKEGYa9u6VdySXhewQFAp+bJmXVtnF ajZ6RTvLb+sq8GKEVuhiFKl1iiPSjFbPyhtxsatsEFxcap344ve/H6IqA+QaAWPf 6YAXeiCLyV7pOIvfE2cJW+i50tylmULPwbABg7mIQ0DMFWl9VpaDrE+pnBSJIcPo xVS04/pJ1qSVWk/pn15v6lgudmI9qZl14ruVbq/yP6tc2OTasJbvQXu9QmeXYkdA ynGjNAZ41DNnZ40WzlDK5RCnNvPEisdaMMAr2DyhxHG8FuqmsJZxGmGpY+lb+LdK gjq6NapQsHAsBTiXDeY4aIY7P3aRelD52og9Dg9BmorbhsFFGVDMk+LcWEdb9LTN dUIPzzMreofGPbOkhk5o1dXIwSxANjUHMNXoE3f2AM/CMMZcNrmlxb04FSzu7/8m vB7yKUKbpD3JR8xrU6/5fD51qiE25NeuRa+Lk+pHcktHnbgX8P+0I2IuyMY21HZO DhtF7FaKRmkw1SJjODvujNwlxNcPbNrWENTCxiXSqE9U4zaYxlLjCkkaTocEno06 AxaFcjwb3R0niGV3zacy/Pfyma7AzkRNsqxcda108p7JxHWWZCLSu/dmjD2WSiXA szJnHp6Uo424dm1UfgmDZC0gIgw8XeU+niEbH7ai0258zpKnINp1BtEj+QJd2m1k F72sHO+ppWie0kIhPsYkEoWBfv8C =8h/W -----END PGP MESSAGE----- PGP Public Key available

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