December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

NOTS posted to alt.religion.scientology
by hendersn＠zeta.org.au 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Maybe this is about something else (the NOTS materials), or >maybe the threat of legal action was enough to do Hacktic in, despite what >would seem to be a favorable precedent. It wasn't the Fishman Affidavit that was posted - it was the NOTS materials. The Affidavit material has been in a public court record for some years now, and was an important factor in the favourable Dutch ruling. The NOTS have never been subject to public scrutiny. In fact, the Church claims them as trade secrets as well as copyrighted materials. That may or may not have changed now that the NOTS have been viewed by who knows how many people. >It's not clear to me that Scientology is only concerned about copyrighted >material. That's what they claim, but then Hubbard said, "The purpose of >the suit is to harass..." Copyrights became the issue, IMHO, because they >have some legal ground to stand on there. Damn right! > >I think their goal is to make all their Net critics come out into the >open, and they're willing to use the legal system as a pawn towards that >goal. You can't threaten or intimidate anon posters as easily. You can't >send your private investigators to harass them and their families. The Church dislikes anonymous remailers intensely, despite exploiting their advantages themselves. The few comments that their PR reps have made indicate that the Church wants some way of stripping someone's anonymity away if they "abuse" this anonymity. I dislike that idea intensely. Everyone remember anon.penet.fi? >I appreciate the incredibly difficult position that all of this puts >remailer operators in, but I don't think CoS will be statisfied with just >stopping anon Usenet posts. IMHO, they more likely want the remailers gone, >altogether. Don't believe that this is about copyrights, just because >they say it is. Like it or not, posting the NOTS _is_ a violation of copyright. While many people think the Church of $cientology is abusing Intellectual Property laws in order to keep their secret materials secret, the remailers have the ability to violate _anyone's_ copyrights. I can imagine a scenario in which the NSA starts spamming wholesale copyrighted works anonymously in order to give the Government a compelling reason to legislate against anonymous remailers. >Rich Zed(hendersn(a)zeta.org.au) "Don't hate the media, become the media" - Jello Biafra PGP key on request

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Re: anonymous companies
by jamesd＠echeque.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>> At 06:42 PM 5/16/96 -0700, Wei Dai wrote: >> > I'll just give one problem: the principal-agent problem. How do owners of >> > the company make sure the managers operate the company in their best >> > interest? >On Fri, 17 May 1996 jamesd(a)echeque.com wrote: >> Actually looting of companies happens a lot right now today, and very >> seldom leads to criminal charges. Twice I have lost a job because the >> company I worked for went under, apparently due to looting. At 08:37 AM 5/18/96 -0400, Black Unicorn wrote: > Be careful to distingiush "owner" from "employee." All to common a > mistake I fear. > Until someone passes a constitutional right to not be fired, well, you're > employeed at the will and by the good grace of the owners and your boss. I was of course referring to looting by the management, not the shareholders, as should have been obvious from context. >> In others, such as net startups, >> I see no solution other than increased reliance on personal individual >> capital. >Still, vulnerable to last round problems. Reread: Your above statement makes no sense in context. --------------------------------------------------------------------- | We have the right to defend ourselves | http://www.jim.com/jamesd/ and our property, because of the kind | of animals that we are. True law | James A. Donald derives from this right, not from the | arbitrary power of the state. | jamesd(a)echeque.com

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two people
by bryce＠digicash.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

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Re: CDT Policy Post 2.19 - 27 Reps Urge President to Abandon Key-Escrow Encryption Policy
by jim bell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 03:35 PM 5/17/96 -0400, Bob Palacios wrote: > CDT POLICY POST Volume 2, Number 19 May 17, 1996 > >The bi-partisan call to President Clinton to abandon the Administration's >key escrow policy is yet another encouraging sign of increasingly strong >Congressional support for reform of US encryption policy. Congress is >currently considering several bills designed to encourage the widespread >availability privacy-protecting technologies for the Internet by lifting >export controls on strong encryption: > >* HR 3011, the "Security and Freedom Through Encryption (SAFE) Act of > 1996", sponsored by over 30 members including Reps Goodlatte (R-VA), > Campbell (R-CA), Eshoo (D-CA), Boucher (D-VA). > >* S. 1726, the "Promotion of Commerce On-Line in the Digital Era (Pro- > CODE) act of 1996, sponsored by Senators Burns (R-MT), Leahy (D-VT), > Pressler (R-SD), Dole (R-KS), Wyden (D-OR), and Murray (D-WA) > >* S. 1587, the "Encrypted Communications Privacy Act of 1996", also > sponsored by Senators Burns and Leahy. > >Hearings on HR 3011 (Rep Goodlatte's bill) and the Burns/Leahy S. 1726 >(Pro-CODE) are expected in June. You know, I really would appriciate it if CDT didn't present S1587 as if it is just another "relax restrictions on encryption" bill. We raked that bill over the coals, found it seriously flawed, and generally pro-encryption people don't seem to be defending it at all. It contained many aspects which have the prospect of future danger to the use of encryption. And, S. 1726 seems to contain most of the desireable aspects of S.1587, and few of the negatives. Add to that the fact that Leahy (as described above) seems to be supporting S. 1726, there is no need to make it appear to an uninformed person that S. 1587 that it is anything other than a mistake. Jim Bell jimbell(a)pacifier.com

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Crypto-News: Congress tells Clinton "Dump key escrow/Clipper schemes" (5/17/96)
by Voters Telecommunications Watch 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

============================================================================= ____ _ _ _ / ___|_ __ _ _ _ __ | |_ ___ | \ | | _____ _____ | | | '__| | | | '_ \| __/ _ \ _____| \| |/ _ \ \ /\ / / __| | |___| | | |_| | |_) | || (_) |_____| |\ | __/\ V V /\__ \ \____|_| \__, | .__/ \__\___/ |_| \_|\___| \_/\_/ |___/ |___/|_| TWENTY-SEVEN MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES URGE CLINTON TO ABANDON KEY ESCOW AND "IMMEDIATELY LIBERALIZE EXPORT CONTROLS ON ENCRYPTION PROGRAMS AND PRODUCTS" Date: May 17, 1996 URL:http://www.crypto.com/ crypto-news(a)panix.com If you redistribute this, please do so in its entirety, with the banner intact. ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- Table of Contents News Text of letter from House members to President Clinton Text of press release from Rep. Goodlatte How to receive crypto-news ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- NEWS Today a band of twenty-seven House members signed a letter to President Clinton urging him to abandon key escrow schemes, and immediately liberalize export controls on encryption programs and products. The letter argues that "a key escrow approach will not adequately address security concerns", citing security as a "prerequisite to exploiting the potential of the Global Information Infrastructure." Rep. Goodlatte led many of the signatories on the letter to introduce and cosponsor H.R. 3011, the Security and Freedom through Encryption (SAFE) Act" earlier this year, which liberalizes export controls on encryption products. Copies of the letter to the President, the press release, and H.R. 3011 can be found on the Encryption Policy Resource Page at http://www.crypto.com/ ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- TEXT OF LETTER FROM HOUSE MEMBERS TO PRESIDENT CLINTON Congress of the United States Washington, DC 20515 May 15, 1996 The Honorable William J. Clinton The White House Washington, D.C. 20500 Dear Mr. President: We are writing to ask you not to proceed with your Administration's key escrow encryption policy proposal and instead to immediately liberalize export controls on non-key escrow encryption programs and products. Many of us have sponsored H.R. 3011, the "Security and Freedom Though Encryption (SAFE) Act" which would ensure the continued ability of Americans to use and sell good encryption and would permit the export of generally available software with encryption capabilities and other such software and hardware under license when certain conditions are met. We understand that the Administration has developed a key escrow encryption proposal and is not at this time willing to ease export restrictions on encryption programs and products which are widely available from domestic and foreign companies and the Internet. We share the concerns of a wide range of businesses and privacy interests that a key escrow approach will not adequately address security concerns. The ability of companies and individuals to ensure that the information they send over communications and computer networks is secure is a prerequisite to exploiting the potential of the Global Information Infrastructure. For example, U.S. small businesses are beginning to harness the Internet to enter foreign markets. The Internet in effect lowers the barriers to entry for these companies. But they will not be able to rely on the Internet if their information is not secure. We also have serious concerns about the impact of the Administration's policy on the U.S. economy and job creation. (Indeed, it is our strong belief the U.S. economic interests must be a primary consideration in encryption policy discussions with other countries, the OECD, and in other forums. It is not clear that this has been the case in the discussions held up to this point). A recent report entitled "A Study of the International Market for Computer Software With Encryption" prepared by the U.S. Department of Commerce and the National Security Agency indicated that U.S. companies will lose market share given the availability of stronger encryption products overseas. The Computer Systems Policy Project estimates that unless the U.S. relaxes out-of-date export controls, the U.S. technology industry will lose $60 billion in revenues and 200,000 jobs by the year 2000. As Congress begins to consider H.R. 3011 we would greatly appreciate knowing whether the Administration plans to publish a final rule implementing a key escrow encryption proposal or, alternatively, will relax export controls on encryption programs and products which do not have a key escrow feature. Sincerely, Tom Campbell Bob Goodlatte Anna Eshoo Eliot Engel Zoe Lofgren Bob Barr Carlos Moorhead Patricia Schroeder Barney Frank Sam Gejdenson Howard Coble Rick Boucher Fred Heineman Sonny Bono Vernon Ehlers Randy Cunningham Charlie Norwood Randy Tate Donald Manzullo Helen Chenoweth Thomas Davis Roscoe Bartlett Sam Farr Ken Calvert Linda Smith Joseph Moakley Lynn Woolsey ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- TEXT OF PRESS RELEASE FROM REP. GOODLATTE NEWS FROM: Congressman Bob Goodlatte Virginia's 6th District 123 Cannon HOB Washington, D.C. 25515 Phone: (202) 225-5431 DATE: May 16, 1996 CONTACT: Doug Clark 202-225-5431 REP. GOODLATTE ASKS PRESIDENT NOT TO PROCEED WITH ENCRYPTION POLICY Congressman Bob Goodlatte (R-VA), lead sponsor of S.A.F.E., the Security and Freedom Through Encryption Act, was joined by Tom Campbell (R-CA), Zoe Lofgren (D-CA), Anne Eshoo (D-CA), Bob Barr (R-GA), Eliot Engle (D-NY), and a bipartisan group of 21 of their colleagues in the House in writing President Clinton asking him not to proceed with his Administration's key escrow encryption policy proposal and instead to immediately liberalize export controls on non-key escrow encryption programs and products. "I have received recent information that the Administration is circulating yet another version of a key escrow proposal for comments from selected individuals. In my opinion this proposal is a non-starter and will not do. It's just a back door approach for more big government intrusion into every American's privacy," said Goodlatte. ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- HOW TO RECEIVE CRYPTO-NEWS To subscribe to crypto-news, sign up from our WWW page (http://www.crypto.com) or send mail to majordomo(a)panix.com with "subscribe crypto-news" in the body of the message. ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- End crypto-news =============================================================================

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Re: Senator, your public key please?
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 8:10 AM 5/18/96, t byfield wrote: > There's no reason that webs of trust of well-signed keys couldn't be >very fluidly incorporated into patronage networks, for example, or that >their incorporation would affect network dynamics in any notable way. One Keys, key signings, and webs of trust can be used in all sorts of ways. And I expect the "burrowcrats" will try to regulate the use. Imagine, for example, if I use a "web of trust" to help me decide who's trustworthy enough to negotiate the sale of my house to. Further imagine that I want to see keys signed by Tom Metzger, my buddy from the Aryan Nations. Guess what? No blacks will have their keys signed, and hence I'll have to tell them, "Sorry, you're just not in my web of trust." (Now, this is a hypothetical, meant to show that use of a web of trust can trigger such decisions, and could thus trigger legal challenges.) The web of trust may not be transitive, but the "web of taint" may be more so. New forms of blackballing, blacklisting, redlining, etc. And I fully expect that who signs one's keys, and whose signatures are found on one's keys, may become a political and legal issue in the coming years. What if, for example, Sen. Leahy _did_ end up in the web of trust for Aryan Nation? Even if he never intended it, this could have some severe PR repercussions. An exciting new world we're entering. --Tim May Boycott "Big Brother Inside" software! We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, we know that that ain't allowed. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Licensed Ontologist | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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Re: SEVERE undercapacity, we need more remailer servers FAST
by jim bell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 06:44 PM 5/17/96 -0500, snow wrote: > How about this as an idea: > > Get a few (3 to 5) accounts in a high density market (i.e. lots of >ISP's locally) set up a unix machine on a cheap machine. Have the anon >messages get sent to the pop accounts. Once an hour (or less depending on >budget) have the unix box poll the different pop accounts mix the messages >and resend them the next hour. > This could be further obfuscated by batching the messages up and >posting a whole chunk of messages to a different similar remailer else >where, or by just plopping an encrypted tar'd file on a ftp site where >another remailer grabs them and splits and remails them. It seems to me that if we consider that there are two separate functions remailers provide: 1. Anonymization. 2. Jurisdiction swapping Then perhaps one way to improve the robustness of remailers against copyright-type legal attacks is to provide remailers with temporary (1-2 week) remail-only sites. All material would be processed by the front end, then delivered in bulk to the other site. This sounds similar to the idea you described. That way, the remailer's "front end" can stay around for years, developing reputation. Any attack on copyright would simply be an attack on the back end, which wouldn't last anyway. Jim Bell jimbell(a)pacifier.com

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(Fwd) Mail Delivery Failure.
by Jean-Francois Avon 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On 15 May 96 at 19:01, Mark M. wrote: > > . What if a company does not pay as expected - > > A company could not afford to have such a loss of reputation. > Nobody is going to work for a company that doesn't pay its > employees. Yes, but anonymity would prevent the easy build-up of reputation too: If Joe Anon9876 say: "company ANON1234 Inc screwed me, how peoples will know that it is not a unscrupulous competitor trying to damage their reputation? Now, if Joe Anon9876 decides to disclose to the public that his real name is John Doe to give more weight to his denounciation, and depending on wether or not his bosses *are* or are not crooks, he might very well get some sort of "prediction" on his head. Now, Jim Bell's servers don't have to be completely public. Suppose some servers were built so that the donation address would be known but the list of donation would be kept secret: Such server could thrive. Most "donation" here would not be 2 bucks but rather 20,000 bucks to ensure that the contract would get taken up promptly. And since the targets would not be published, there would be not even a hint that company ANON1234 *might* have put a contract on John Doe (Now, aka Joe Anon9876) . The fact that an open AP server exists makes the later possibility also possible. To have access to the target list would require to be member of a *very* close circle, or maybe, actually, just en employee of ANON_KILLERS4567_Inc. Reputation is standing on the fact that an entity disclose it's existence, accepts to act in full view of significant others, and is prepared to show evidence of good conduct to said significant others. And also on the fact that a challenger to the reputation have to put his own on the opposite platter of the balance. Anonymity makes it hard to do. JFA DePompadour, Societe d'Importation Ltee; Limoges porcelain, silverware and crystal JFA Technologies, R&D consultants; physists, technologists and engineers. PGP keys at: http://w3.citenet.net/users/jf_avon ID# C58ADD0D : 529645E8205A8A5E F87CC86FAEFEF891 Unsollicited commercial e-mail will be proofread at US165 $/h Any sender of such material will be considered as to have ac- cepted the above mentionned terms.

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Netscape 128-bit
by zalchgar＠juno.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Do you have to buy the 128 domestic version of Netscape? They used to make it available on their FTP sites, but now they are all 40-bit exportable versions. If you don't have to buy it what is the procedure to get it? -Erinn L.T

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Remailers vs Nyms - conflicting assumptions?
by Bruce Baugh 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I've been enjoying the discussion of "disposable" remailers, but I note a problem. If this has been addressed before, well, now it's being noted again. In my (admittedly limited) experience with nym servers, the reply path is fixed - it goes through specified hops. This creates A Problem when any one of the remailers involved goes down. There's no way for the mail to get through. There's not even a way for the nym holder to verify that there is a site down, as opposed to some more transitory problem, without information from an external source. This seems to me a fairly serious weakness, given prevailing governmental attitudes. What would it take to create a nym server that could route around the death or disability of any given mailer? -- Bruce Baugh bruce(a)aracnet.com http://www.aracnet.com/~bruce

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Re: The Crisis with Remailers
by loki＠infonex.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 8:37 PM 5/15/96, Timothy C. May wrote: >We used to discuss remailer architecture, topology, functionality, and >"ideal behavior" quite a bit a few years ago, but seldom do here on the >Cypherpunks list anymore. Various reasons: same old discussions, >commercialization of Mixmaster-type remailers (so I hear, and Lance >Cottrell can clarify this if this is indeed a factor) may be inhibiting >free discussion of planned features, and perhaps the discussion is going on >elsewhere (on remailerpunks, or the remailer operator's list). > The commercialization of Mixmaster fell through some time ago. It is back to being completely free of encumberments. A second implementation is also in the works (by a better programmer than I). -Lance ---------------------------------------------------------- Lance Cottrell loki(a)obscura.com PGP 2.6 key available by finger or server. Mixmaster, the next generation remailer, is now available! http://www.obscura.com/~loki/Welcome.html or FTP to obscura.com "Love is a snowmobile racing across the tundra. Suddenly it flips over, pinning you underneath. At night the ice weasels come." --Nietzsche ----------------------------------------------------------

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Re: Why does the state still stand:
by Nathan Syfrig 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I normally don't read or post to this list, so I'm hoping e$pam will pick up any relevant replies or people Cc: me personally (information overload). My ignorance is probably showing, but it seems that we have a real fundamental problem here. IP numbers of re-mailers, whether free or commercial, are easily identified and therefore become easy sniffing targets. This means that the choke points currently used to censor and otherwise restrict information can easily come into play - i.e. ISP's (we've already seen censorship being applied to at the ISP level, so we have sufficient aggregation to filter and sniff). Therefore, in the abscence of roving remailer destinations that change quick enough to evade some sniffing (notice, I didn't say avoid), it seems that there really is no anonymity. Even if we could randomize destinations (a la Pirate Radio with roving dial locations), that would defeat the purpose - the ability to allow anybody to use anonymous remailers. So, if we feel this capability is important (and I do), how do we solve the problem? Nathan (usual "views are my own" diatribe here) On Sat, 18 May 1996, e$pam wrote: > Forwarded by Robert Hettinga > > ----------------------------------------------------------------------- > Date: Thu, 16 May 1996 07:19:39 -0700 > From: Hal <hfinney(a)shell.portal.com> > To: EALLENSMITH(a)ocelot.Rutgers.EDU > Subject: Re: Why does the state still stand: > Cc: cypherpunks(a)toad.com > Sender: owner-cypherpunks(a)toad.com > Precedence: bulk > > > From: "E. ALLEN SMITH" <EALLENSMITH(a)ocelot.Rutgers.EDU> > > I did not > > include offshore.com.ai in Anguilla due to its high cost; I consider anything > > over 25$ a month to be impractical. > > > > _Country/Area_ _Name_ _Email_ > > Anguilla Cable & Wireless webmaster(a)candw.com.ai > > [...] > > Thanks very much for making this list. However I would not be so quick > to reject http://offshore.com.ai. It is run by long-time Cypherpunk > Vince Cate, apparently specifically for the kinds of purposes we are > discussing. His project was discussed in a recent issue of Wired, I > think the May issue. (I have no contact with Cate, and have never met > him as far as I can recall.) > > For doing something like running a remailer which will post material > which is illegal and/or copyrighted in the U.S., you are going to need a > service which can stand up to pressure. Presumably some monetary > incentive is going to be a necessity. Of course by this standard $25 a > month is pretty inconsequential. > > One issue is whether these banking-secrecy countries like Anguilla are > followers of the Berne convention or other international copyright > regulations. Banking secrecy and software piracy don't necessarily go > hand in hand. I hear a lot about copyright violations in China but not > in the Caribbean. So actually it isn't clear that this country is the > right location for a remailer that can post arbitrary material. > > As for the costs to the remailer operator, he simply passes those on to > his customers. I think in the long run onshore remailers will be forced > to take measures to restrict copyright-violating posts. So if your > choice is between paying nothing and not getting your whistle-blowing > message posted, or paying $10 and getting it out on the nets, then > hopefully it is worth that much to you. > > We have discussed for-pay remailers and the consensus has been that no > one would use them when others run for free. However now I think the > false premise is being exposed, that free remailers simply will not be > able to run in the current mode for much longer. Once a single remailer > operator has been fined thousands of dollars because somebody posted some > copyrighted message, I don't think you will find many people eager to > sign up as operators. So this dream of a volatile collection of > remailers popping up and going away just doesn't work in my view. Why > would anyone offer a service knowing that he was exposing himself to > liability like this? It would be just a game of Russian roulette, > waiting to see whether it is your remailer which gets the bullet in the > form of a post which violates the copyright of someone with deep > pockets. > > Hal > > > > -------------------------------------------------- > The e$ lists are brought to you by: > > Take Your Business Online with Intertrader Ltd, Edinburgh, U.K. > Visit http://www.intertrader.com or email info(a)intertrader.com > > Making Commerce Convenient (tm) - Oki Advanced Products - Marlboro, MA > Value-Checker(tm) smart card reader= http://www.oki.com/products/vc.html > > Where people, networks and money come together: Consult Hyperion > http://www.hyperion.co.uk info(a)hyperion.co.uk > > See your name here. Be a charter sponsor for e$pam, e$, and Ne$ws! > See http://thumper.vmeng.com/pub/rah/ or e-mail rah(a)shipwright.com > for details... > ------------------------------------------------- >

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Re: SEVERE undercapacity, we need more remailer servers FAST
by loki＠infonex.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

They are not very hard to set up and run. I think any blinding is likely to be simple header faking. Totally insignificant security compared to something like Mixmaster. I proposed a system some time back based on message pools, but it attracted little interest. The down side of the proposal is the large amount of bandwidth required. Each remailer has to receive all messages for all remailers in the pool. The upside of the proposal was that it allowed secure reply blocks (ones that can't simply be tracked forward). -Lance >I would really like to see a remailer that is somehow blinded. > >I don't know enough about how mail paths are generatered, but is it >impossible to conceal the origin of remailer postings? > >Postings made to remailernym(a)alpha.c2.org would be spit out somewhere but >without accountability? > >Impossible? Would do wonders defeating traffic analysis. > >I'd consider running a remailer, but after listening to the response to >the anonymous poster a while back, it sounds like there are few if any >simple options which do not require major time and effort to setup and >run. > >--- >My preferred and soon to be permanent e-mail address:unicorn@schloss.li >"In fact, had Bancroft not existed, potestas scientiae in usu est >Franklin might have had to invent him." in nihilum nil posse reverti >00B9289C28DC0E55 E16D5378B81E1C96 - Finger for Current Key Information >Opp. Counsel: For all your expert testimony needs: jimbell(a)pacifier.com ---------------------------------------------------------- Lance Cottrell loki(a)obscura.com PGP 2.6 key available by finger or server. Mixmaster, the next generation remailer, is now available! http://www.obscura.com/~loki/Welcome.html or FTP to obscura.com "Love is a snowmobile racing across the tundra. Suddenly it flips over, pinning you underneath. At night the ice weasels come." --Nietzsche ----------------------------------------------------------

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Re: marginal cost of ecash transaction
by Frank O. Trotter, III 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Ecash Marginal Costs Ecash transaction costs are a cost-accountants brain tease. Here's my take on the topic (this will likely display why I trade currency and bonds and market payment systems and don't do cost accounting, but since I do have overall responsibility for the cost and revenue of ecash it does matter quite a lot to me directly). Hardware - We own and have paid for boxes to run the system. Once we run out of space or CPU power we have to buy more. Thus we have a step function that could be allocated across the transactions being done at a particular time, but is in fact not really marginal. Our experience suggests that the steps are quite high. Telco - Same as above to a degree - we pay for telco and a variety of connection "items". If the volume goes off scale we have to upgrade, making this another step function. It is a periodic bill, and can change, so it is not strictly a "sunk" cost like hardware. People - Here is the likely marginal cost. Bryce correctly notes that when we have to hire a variety of people to take care of more volume we have what can look like a marginal cost. But this is not marginal by transaction, it is marginal by manual or semi-manual item like account set up, money transfer, email or phone conversations, etc. It is entirely concievable that the one penny transactions described in previous posts create no need for additional people, and conversely a high dollar corporate transaction book might suggest a lot of hand holding and manual costs. You should look at most of this cost / benefit stuff on an account basis, not on a transaction basis. The regular banking costs of mailing statements (still required), collecting desposits, producing payments outside of ecash, etc are in fact the bigger parts of the cost. There are also asssociated costs on accounts of holding reserves with the Fed, paying FDIC insurance where appropriate, and explaining the system and its implications to our own executive staff, regulators, and accountants. In all the system and the attending transactions are not considered marginal at this time by me. In time, interbank clearing and currency stuff will generate genuine marginal costs. We have sunk and ongoing hard costs, and perhaps someday some revenue and balances to offset the costs. To my analysis the marginal costs revolve around the manual functions that could become a huge factor depending on the profile of customer that becomes the main user. If they are substantially inactive in manual operations, we may have low marginal costs, if they all need a lot of handholding and manual transactions then each account will cost a lot to handle. Hardware needs, of course, vary with the style of transaction. Marcel made a quick pass at this in a recent post to the ecash list. Just a start off the top of my head. FOT Frank O. Trotter, III - fotiii(a)crl.com www.marktwain.com - Fax: +1 314 569-4906 --------------------------------------------

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Re: Is Chaum's System Traceable or Untraceable?
by bryce＠digicash.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- You know, even though current ecash uses on-line clearing, it is only necessary for the _payee_ to be on-line at that time. Thus it is entirely possible with current ecash for a payer to load his portable computer up at home with e-coins and then make a purchase a convenience store on the way to work _without_ having a networkable computer. Well-- I mean the computer needs to communicate with the convenience store, but it doesn't need full-scale Internet access. Does anyone on cpunks or ecash have an Apple Newton? I know that they come with infrared-- what are the specs on that communications device? And about the Newton itself: can it compile ANSI C code? How much RAM? Permanent storage? Speed of crypto operations? Thanks, Bryce #include <stddisclaimer.h> /* I don't speak for anyone but myself. */ - -----BEGIN GOODTIMES VIRUS INNOCULATION----- Copy me into your .sig for added protection! - ----- END GOODTIMES VIRUS INNOCULATION----- -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2i Comment: Auto-signed under Unix with 'BAP' Easy-PGP v1.1b2 iQB1AwUBMZ4wY0jbHy8sKZitAQG/TAMAlF1WftbM8UT1+AUvZJBuX7BimZUOtRqg 2vWYVW2ADuKvntXdsDV0NqSq05/sqDZmhh/iOUmB6bWl22FUrwBbzk2gedUbB1w2 330B6pa1IU1Q5IluNIE2IKFkMZ/KHJ9m =5W5l -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: Netscape 128-bit
by Sean A. Walberg 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Unfortunately, you have to buy it. I got a email from their Customer service department about that yesterday. Sean > Do you have to buy the 128 domestic version of Netscape? They used to > make it available on their FTP sites, but now they are all 40-bit > exportable versions. If you don't have to buy it what is the procedure > to get it? > > -Erinn L.T > > =================] Will work for RAM [================== | Sean A. Walberg | PGP key | C programmers | | Computer Engineering ][ | on | do it in | | umwalber(a)cc.umanitoba.ca | servers | libraries! | =============] http://www.escape.ca/~sean [=============

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Re: SEVERE undercapacity, we need more remailer servers FAST
by loki＠infonex.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

It seems very reasonable to allow posting only through nym-servers. That gives a point at which payment can be received, and an account which can be removed for abuse. Since the nym is password protected, it also help build the reputation of the nym. -Lance At 5:46 PM 5/15/96, E. ALLEN SMITH wrote: >From: IN%"hfinney(a)shell.portal.com" "Hal" 15-MAY-1996 19:23:06.71 > >>Maybe the operators can try to plead that they are like "common carriers" >>and should not be blamed for what people post. Still it is going to take >>deep pockets at best to prevail in this dispute, and it isn't even clear >>that the remailer will win. Maybe the lawyers on the list could comment >>on legal liability of a remailer used to repeatedly post copyrighted >>material, whether Scientology scriptures or Microsoft Word binaries. I >>don't see how it can happen. > > Part of this problem may be solved through the proper decisions on >the liability of ISPs for material on them. The concept would seem to be >extensible. If a country has A. good laws on the subject and B. a pretty good >court system - e.g., one in which it's difficult to sue and easy to defend - >that country would seem to be suitable for setting up a remailer front end. >Other remailers can just be used for chaining, and can't be proven to have >carried a message (even unknowingly) without defeat of the remailer system >via traffic analysis. (A reason for remailer operators to run automatic >mailing scripts, BTW.) > >>This was the basis for my suggestion that remailers may have to stop >>supporting posting of messages, and instead be used for private mail >>between consenting individuals. Granted, this would probably eliminate >>99% of non-cover remailer traffic. But I would argue that as long as the >>core functionality is there of letting people communicate with each other >>anonymously and consensually, we would still offer an important service. > > In other words, a remailer that would only forward mail to someone if >the email address in question gave consent? Mailing lists and mail-to-news >gateways can still be signed up by their operators under such a system, and >it's possible the remailer might be charged along with the operator if >copyrighted material was posted. > >>Encryption hides the contents of the messages you send from >>eavesdroppers. But they can still see who you are communicating with. >>Remailers extend privacy protection beyond "what you say" to "who you say >>it to". When used with pseudonym servers and some of the extensions we >>have discussed here over the years (maildrops, etc.), they can allow the >>anonymous two-way communication that is needed for real privacy. > > How much use is a pseudonym if you can't practically use it for >building reputation capital? It's hard to do that when you can't send to anyone >but individuals, instead of to publically available sources. > One idea would be bonded pseudonyms. If you put up an adequate bond to >the remailer front end operator (to A. pay fines and B. cover any legal fees), >then you get to send to public fora. This would also be profitable for the >remailer operator, if he/she got to keep the interest (assuming deposit into >some investment). > -Allen ---------------------------------------------------------- Lance Cottrell loki(a)obscura.com PGP 2.6 key available by finger or server. Mixmaster, the next generation remailer, is now available! http://www.obscura.com/~loki/Welcome.html or FTP to obscura.com "Love is a snowmobile racing across the tundra. Suddenly it flips over, pinning you underneath. At night the ice weasels come." --Nietzsche ----------------------------------------------------------

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Interactive Week exclusive - White House to launch "Clipper III"
by rodger＠interramp.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

The White House is about to answer recent attempts to liberalize encryption exports with a proposal of its own. Documents obtained by Interactive Week show the Ciinton Administration has been lobbying key Republican committee members to compromise on encryption through a policy that looks very much like previous commerical key escrow efforts. This time, however, the administration has proposed a new, licensed network of certification authorities and escrow agents to control access to strong encryption abroad. The newest proposal is contained in a 24-page White Paper, a draft of which hit Capitol Hill earlier this week. Much of the administration's "key management infrastructure" assumes a similar network of certification authorities abroad. CAs would link public keys to their owners, and could serve as escrow agents for users' private keys, as well. The two would not have to be under the same roof, however. An overarching "Policy Approving Authority" would supervise all subordinate CAs and escrow agents. Since US escrow of exported products pose well-known problems for privacy and business concerns, the US is proposing foreign governments get into the act as well. If other governments acted as escrow agents, the Clinton White House argues, interlocking agreements among governments would protect all their common security concerns while giving non-US citiczens access to US encryption products. The ultimate goal, the White House says, is to allow export of anything at all, so long as keys are escrowed with an agent of its approval. The White House is evidenty relying on OECD initiatives for much of this to happen. Specifically, the "Clipper III" paper says that: U.S. companies can export software programs that use keys that are 64 bits of data long, if they agree to escrow keys that unlock the encryption in the U.S. or with an appropriate agency abroad. Manufacturers can export hardware that use 80-bit keys to encrypt data, if keys are escrowed. Large U.S. companies can escrow keys and not rely on third parties. Reaction is as before. Civil libertarians are already denouncing the White Paper, while pro-escrow forces are praising it. Staffers to Commerce and Judiciary committee call it the same old proposal, but with a large bureaucracy behind it. Quoted in the Interactive Week article: David Sobel of Electronic Privacy Information Center, Dorothy Denning og Georgetown U. and Stewart Baker, former NSA counsel. Hill staffers also quoted on background. The URL for the complete article is: http://www.zdnet.com/intweek/daily/960518y.html Will Rodger Washington Bureau Chief Interactive Week

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Re: The Crisis with Remailers
by loki＠infonex.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- At 9:00 AM 5/18/96, Dr. Dimitri Vulis wrote: >"Vladimir Z. Nuri" <vznuri(a)netcom.com> writes: >> 1. there is no economic incentive. > >So, add the code to mixmaster (and even the old style remailers) to >collect e-cash as it passes on the anonymous message. Then this will >be a good way to accumulate some e-cash, and a number of people will >try running remailers for this very purpose. Witness the recent >Usenet spam by someone advertizing a for-pay remailer. > I was invited to the digicash API design meeting precisely to make sure it could be used in remailers. It will not be using the current API. The problem is that Mixmaster requires exact knowledge of the size of every object in the message, to maintain constant message size. I could set aside room for one, two, three coins, but there is no guarantee that the payment will be made with only that many coins. The current API is going to be high level. It will does not allow the program to know anything about the internals of the payment. I need to be able to specify payment of amount X using no more than N coins. As soon as I have that level of control, you will see postage in Mixmaster. -Lance -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQEVAwUBMZ40x/Pzr81BVjMVAQFdTQf/VtRl3MEm+YfIYxsJdEhnv9lsL26S00oG RTvJiVbzyriGmWBhQY14ITQjnPrNNnRYfrmxVT2nRAEpfC8a63TqD5BN2eeUOSWU g/eagI3mWqlQssjCpeOEq6pzBcvKCTu2nECfAWCVN87MA7thq4Xj3haFjv+NP2K6 i8Bq/JRz6oaq35Bz0lqskBemiUOLXJOUK93LXFpw3VlTces+vDMSCWXwtkhAOLLO yav12MbRJRt/heUotsl6wzp2tdEV4xlsciedUOfk8fQVDSvh31J2xyvaupepHosC UUCz3sc8f4icWXCtBkimLyzgp/pNg7E9rN//Ps8ZzQquKPcr/7GtAQ== =BC1f -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- ---------------------------------------------------------- Lance Cottrell loki(a)obscura.com PGP 2.6 key available by finger or server. Mixmaster, the next generation remailer, is now available! http://www.obscura.com/~loki/Welcome.html or FTP to obscura.com "Love is a snowmobile racing across the tundra. Suddenly it flips over, pinning you underneath. At night the ice weasels come." --Nietzsche ----------------------------------------------------------

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PLEASE HELP ME GO OUT OF THIS LIST!!!!!!
by Marc Escalier 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

how to go out of this list. please help me, it would be VERY NICE.

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Re: "Too cheap to meter"
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 8:03 PM 5/18/96, Brad Dolan wrote: >On Fri, 17 May 1996, Timothy C. May wrote: > >> Alan's irony is well-placed. The most egregious repetition of the "too >> cheap to meter" nonsense is George Gilder's "dark fiber" vision...a vision >> of "infinite bandwidth" to all users. >> >> Guess what? If Gilder's "dark fiber" is ever built, there are a lot of >> folks who will "fill it" rather quickly. Canter and Siegel were just the >> beginning. "Too cheap to meter" goes away pretty quickly. >> >> --Tim May > > >The same George Gilder that is Newt's buddy? And part-owner of Valujet? I don't know about the ValuJet part, but the Newt part is right. George Gilder is an interesting thinker, and has written a bunch of books and articles on the implications of technology, microcircuitry, and networks. One of his books was, for example, "Microcosm." I'm sure a search of his name will produce an abundance of information. My criticism of his "dark fiber" advocacy is that it smacks of the typical "techno-Rapture" point of view, epitomized by the "too cheap too meter!" gushings of the 1950s and the "nanotechnology will rebuild our bodies out of diamond and we'll live forever" gushings of today. Fiber optics is a Big Deal, make no mistake about it. But the notion that the bandwidth will be so high that everyone can be hooked up to the same "party line" (the core idea of the "dark fiber" thesis) and just drop stuff in and pull stuff out...well, think of how such a channel can be flooded. (So, is it really "free" or not? Obviously it can't be. If it is, I can think of many who will choose to flood it, for their own reasons.) --Tim May Boycott "Big Brother Inside" software! We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, we know that that ain't allowed. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Licensed Ontologist | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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Re: Senator, your public key please?
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 8:38 PM 5/18/96, bryce(a)digicash.com wrote: ...(my points elided)... >All of these are products of misconceptions between using the >WoT to certify identities, versus using it to certify how much >you trust a person to certify someone else's identify, versus >using it to certify arbitrary other qualities about a person. Bryce, we've differed several times before about the web of trust, especially "man-in-the-middle" issues. This looks to be the same sort of issue. I personally don't see key-signings as mainly useful for verifying the "true name" of someone whose key I sign. (I don't check birth certificates, passports, driver's licenses, etc.) Rather, I view _my_ key signings as forms of vouching, or endorsement. Not of all views, naturally, but as a statement that the person whose key I am signing is someone I know and "trust" (in the sense that the key belongs to the person I "know." Thus, I know Eric Hughes, even though he may actually be Fritz Kacynski, drop-out math student. > >For example, there is no reason why the hypothetical racist "Tom >Metzger" would sign no black people's keys. A key signature >(PGP style) is just an assertion about the identity of someone. >Haven't racists engraved markings on people's clothes, >buildings, land, bodies and other belongings in order to >identify the owners? So why not do the same for keys. Sure, he could do it. I'm saying that there's also a significant chance he has no black friends or no blacks he deals with on a regular enough basis to even be _asked_ to "vouch" for them, much less _agree_ to sign their keys. (This is the way it really does work in the real world, at least for many of us. People who ask me to sign their keys from afar will get no response from me. I don't even care if they fax me their birth certificates, etc. Only people I have met or interacted with directly, or who seem to be known by enough of my friends, get their keys signed.) Now I can certainly see other folks signing keys on a different basis: upon presentation of a valid passport, comparison of footprint with that on birth certificate, etc. Such "credentialling agencies" will be valuable players (to some) in the ecosystem of key-signers. I'm just saying that I'm certainly not in the business of checking credentials for free, and hence only sign keys for people I know fairly well, or who know my own friends fairly well. >This is illustrative of how much confusion reigns about keys, >certs, nyms, signatures and cetera right now. > > >I hope that TCMay is pointing out how _most_ people lack a >proper understanding of the differences, rather than reflecting >his own lack of understanding. Bryce, I respect your views on this and MITM issues, but the fact that we view things differently (and that Phil Z. views things differently from you, and perhaps from me) should not always be ascribed by you as "reflecting lack of understanding." >Phil Zimmermann was confused about this, I think, when he wrote >"Trust is not transitive.". Some kinds of trust _are_ >transitive (with a coefficient, of course). Hm. I wonder if >there are kinds of trust whose transitivity coefficient is 1? Well, I wrote up my thoughts on how work on "belief networks" is less confusing that the term "web of trust." I believe different agents will use these belief networks in different ways. Some will be focused on the issue of True Names and will calculate beliefs on the basis of how much they think the key-signers are being diligent enough in checking identities. Others will use belief networks to convey trust that one is not a government agent (a practical example being the use of PGP and webs of trust in the jungles of Burma, where I am quite sure the "keyrings" did not deliberately include government agents, regardless of how well they "proved" their identity! There is no single ontological interpretation of belief networks. --Tim May Boycott "Big Brother Inside" software! We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, we know that that ain't allowed. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Licensed Ontologist | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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Re: Senator, your public key please?
by frantz＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 10:44 AM 5/18/96 -0700, Timothy C. May wrote: >What if, for example, Sen. Leahy _did_ end up in the web of trust for Aryan >Nation? Even if he never intended it, this could have some severe PR >repercussions. It could happen today. All anyone has to do is down-load his key, sign it, and then up-load it again. This is exactly analogous to slanderous attack on someone's reputation. As soon as people realize that the mere fact that a key has a signature does not mean that the key-owner solicited the signature, the problem goes away. ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Bill Frantz | The CDA means | Periwinkle -- Computer Consulting (408)356-8506 | lost jobs and | 16345 Englewood Ave. frantz(a)netcom.com | dead teenagers | Los Gatos, CA 95032, USA

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Re: crosspost re remailers
by frantz＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 7:07 AM 5/18/96 +0200, Benjamin Brochet wrote: >WHO IS THE MODERATOR OF THIS LIST ? > >I've been victim of a spoofing from a german.... he suscribed me to 2200 >mailing list... also I'd to be unsuscribed from your list ! > There is no moderator. I am just a subscriber like yourself (except I asked for it.) Did you get a welcome message which included information like the following? >If you ever want to remove yourself from this mailing list, >you can send mail to "Majordomo(a)toad.com" with the following command >in the body of your email message: > > unsubscribe cypherpunks ben(a)bb-soft.com (Benjamin Brochet) > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Bill Frantz | The CDA means | Periwinkle -- Computer Consulting (408)356-8506 | lost jobs and | 16345 Englewood Ave. frantz(a)netcom.com | dead teenagers | Los Gatos, CA 95032, USA

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Rumor: DSS Broken?
by Robert Hettinga 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

This is a rumor. It is only a rumor. If you don't want to read a rumor, please hit your "d" key now... A wierd thing happened to me today. I was talking to someone who was talking to someone (have I said this is a rumor yet?) who was solicited for comment by a Very Famous Reporter about the fact that DSS, the Digital Signature Standard, promulgated by NIST, I believe, had been broken. I seem to remember people scoffing about it here when it came out, so news of it's breaking is probably not a big deal to some of us. However, I understand that people are shipping product and offering consulting services based on DSS, and if the rumor is in fact true, there may be more fun and games in the press about it... Cheers, Bob Hettinga ----------------- Robert Hettinga (rah(a)shipwright.com) e$, 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "If they could 'just pass a few more laws', we would all be criminals." --Vinnie Moscaritolo The e$ Home Page: http://thumper.vmeng.com/pub/rah/

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