December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

The Ultimate Non-MLM Home Based Business:..
by 47173936＠11641.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Me: "Do you own a personal computer?" You: Yes... Me: "Running Windows ver 3.xx or 95?" You: Sure. Why? Me: "Wanna' make $10,000 cash in the next 60 to 90 days?" You: Who wouldn't? Me: "Without leaving home?" You: Really? What's it about? Me: "I own a software program that explains the business? Do you want to download a FREE evaluation copy?" You: Are you going to tell me what it's about? Me: "That's not the way I work. The answers are in the software. Do you want to download it?" You: Looks like I've got nothing to lose. OK! Where is it ? Me: "Just click here: ----> http://207.213.38.77/megaresource/ or if by chance you are unable to download it, just call 714-280-0996 and I will email it to you and if that won't work; I will mail it to you on disk." You: Ok. Works for me. To learn about promoting your product, service or income opportunity with email marketing, please call 714-280-0996. If you are not interested in home business opportunities, you can be removed from my mailing list by sending an email to removemega(a)usa.net No subject line or message is necessary, simply send it and you will be automatically removed from my mailing list.

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Re: Talking to Jim
by anonymous-remailer＠shell.portal.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On Sat, 2 Dec 1995, PeterWiltshire wrote: > Gidday all > > I emailed Jim Clark day before yesterday about his comments re key escrow. Uhhm, what is his email address?? I'd love to ask him one or two questions, not just about key escrow, but about Netscape's future prospects and its current stock valuation. (Netscape now has a market capitalization larger than Apple Computer.) > He responded. As it's not good form to post private email, might I suggest > that one of the 'elders' here put to Jim a list of questions on the proviso > that his answers can be posted to the list. You never know, a lot of > speculation might be confirmed or denied. I've got some questions ... Mathew Ingram, reported in the Investment Reporter that Jim has stock holdings currently worth more than $1 Billion in Netscape, and yet Jim was quoted as saying at a recent technology conference "you could argue there's something of an Internet bubble developing." The article also quoted him as saying that if Netscape made a profit in the next year or two it would only be "because we miscalculated." Miscalculated?? I'll say. If he thinks that GAK will go down with great support, when they want to split their stock, then they're really not quite aware of the mind of the organization that they'll be up against. I wonder what people will have to say about Netscape, then. Right now, brokerage firm Hambrecht & Quist is estimating that in five years the Internet will be a $23 Billion market -- equal to the size of the _entire_ software industry today. And a money manager at Franklin Resources Inc. said, "some people are suggesting the big tech company in the next century could be Netscape." Personally, I don't think so. But then who am I?? Goldman Sachs just put Netscape on its "recommended" list. And some analyst called Michael Parekh was quoted as saying that Netscape could hit $200 in the next two years. That it was going to be the Microsoft of the Internet -- dominating the software side of the World Wide Web. I wonder if Parekh's valuation is a pre or post stock split evaluation. Shoot, if Parekh is talking about $200 post-split ... then Netscape could well become a really big league play in this game far sooner than most people think. I'd love to hear how this fits with Jim's words of a "bubble". The market seems to "think" that it's a better present judge of what Netscape has than he does. It's almost as though the "market" has developed a "mind" of its own. It's own particular neural network. It doesn't seem like the market is paying attention to any of Jim's warnings or words. His "opinion" -- like all corporate officers opinions are strongly discounted and very lightly weighted. It's almost as though there is automated software at work. Some people might think about going short against the box on this one. Although the article talked about a short "squeeze" which would generally mean that this stock is going to go nowhere but up as the short sellers try to cover, personally, I might start to take some money off the table and not add anything to my position. But all this depends on the depth of someone's pockets, I guess. And on some serious trading analysis. Then again, there is that old adage about never fighting the tape. It's compared frequently to whizzing into the wind, I think. Probabilities and such. (Disclaimer: This is not intended as and should not be considerred as investment advice ... or for that matter as whizzing advice, either.) I'd love to hear Jim talk some more about this. For me, all of this Netscape stuff is getting way too surreal. It seems really strange. Some people are arguing that things are getting out of hand, and yet it seems like this one is completely out of Jim's control. No one is listening to ANYTHING from Netscape at all. The market is simply listening to its own internal dialogue. And that certainly is a surprise to this writer. It's a surprise to me, and it's probably a surprise to Netscape. Finance 501 is more complex than Finance 101. Maybe they should read up about the privatization of BP and the involvement of the KIO. Or learn a bit about Li Ka-Shing, or something which adds to their knowledge base. That might give some idea about what is actually going on here. (Not that the Kuwaiti Investment Office or Li-Ka Shing has an interest in this one.) Alice de 'nonymous ... ...just another one of those... P.S. This post is in the public domain. C. S. U. M. O. C. L. U. N. E.

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SHU_tup
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

12-2-95. NYPiper: "Accord Reached For Limiting Smut on Internet." Page One lead. Bowing to a seemingly unstoppable push in Congress to keep sexual material off the Internet, a coalition of commercial on-line services and some civil liberties groups agreed today to accept a number of restrictions they had opposed a few months ago. "Terrorism Bill Plan May Break Deadlock." Tiny article. In a bid to salvage a stalled antiterrorism bill, the chairman of the House Judiciary Committee has agreed to the demands of conservative Republicans to remove proposals expanding the Government's wiretapping authority. SHU_tup (10 kb)

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Re: sooner or later
by Anonymous 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Bill Stewart wrote: >At 10:45 PM 9/18/97 -0700, Wei Dai wrote: >>Many of us believe that a crypto ban is inevitable. The only >>question for us is whether it'll happen sooner or later. Seen in >>this perspective, all that industry and civil liberties lobbies can >>do is delay the ban. But is this necessarily a good thing? >Yes. Later is bad, but sooner is worse. First of all, "Soon" means >"We lost already", while "Later" means "We haven't lost yet, even >though it looks pretty much like we're going to lose later,... Even if we lose a battle legislatively tomorrow, this does not mean we have "lost". In practice, people can still write code and distribute it, the same way people are still making LSD, growing mushrooms, or growing marijuana. Code propagates easily which means that so long as there is any place in the world where it can be safely used, it will be. Even if it is illegal throughout the world, there are going to be places where the local administrators are too corrupt or incompetent to really enforce the law. (The law is more or less impossible to enforce anyway because you have to charge people with possession of random data.) This means that somebody will be using the stuff, and the New Renaissance will still happen, but the benefits will have to propagate back into the United States for a change. The greatest risk is of a major government going "ape" over this issue and randomly persecuting those they suspect of doing illegal arithmetic without real evidence or real trials. The passing of a law may mitigate this because they will feel as if they are doing something, even if the "problem" was not entirely solved. Monty Cantsin Editor in Chief Smile Magazine http://www.neoism.org/squares/smile_index.html http://www.neoism.org/squares/cantsin_10.html -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQEVAwUBNCKgi5aWtjSmRH/5AQF5Bgf/UWVTAU8Mk4g8QMX7ya1OnMPbbQvH14wE Lq2Lr+FKYYjQLRTH3UYMPjl+mxXJWhnIxGrK6SNSE3kh+InRpzX1jPtGBpYVXq/9 fr1YgkzjUilcN5dHRxwAO4ciwFmTu0ZCHORhk90DcnwQOBdckXN5ykjGZ3CTGEQA IXrhnV6sK3Ovuxe73WSuaZ+lOUPCMs4SVvnKIeWb4JWy0L3j4YwsmYu0aVVqNAeg Kd2sXYqaBxnitXFg+KTppcW16k9AqSMbFK5+Go3dIM1wZOI8kJKBTE9+Iw6u/zff tvZGXJWGRHB4e4VRf+OAttaP7Aalqx83AHMXe6WhhDUFqXJ7WmhkQw== =UOyl -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Gibson Warfare
by nobody＠REPLAY.COM 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

URL: http://www.ndu.edu/ndu/inss/strforum/forum28.html Forum, Number 28, May 1995 WHAT IS INFORMATION WARFARE? Martin C. Libicki, National Defense University Is Information War (IW) a nascent, perhaps embryonic art, or simply the newest version of a time-honored feature of warfare? Is it a new form of conflict that owes its existence to the burgeoning global information infrastructure, or an old one whose origin lies in the wetware of the human brain but has been given new life by the information age? Is it a unified field or opportunistic assemblage? Since March 1993, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Memorandum of Policy Number 30 (MOP 30) has set forth definitions and relationships that have guided the joint community in its thinking about the related concepts of information warfare and command and control warfare. As these seminal ideas have evolved, their definitions and relationships have changed as well. MOP 30 is under revision, and both higher level policy documents for the Department of Defense and doctrinal publications of the Joint Staff and Services are either in draft form or under revision. In light of the unformed state of these concepts, alternative definitions and taxonomies for twenty-first century warfare are proposed: 1. command-and-control warfare [C2W]; 2. intelligence-based warfare [IBW]; 3. electronic warfare [EW]; 4. psychological operations [PSYOPS]; 5. hackerwar software-based attacks on information systems; 6. information economic warfare [IEW] war via the control of information trade; and 7. cyberwar [combat in the virtual realm]. ... ------------------ URL: http://www.ndu.edu/ndu/inss/actpubs/act003/a003ch07.html Hacker Warfare The hacker attacks discussed here are attacks on civilian targets (military hacker attacks come under the rubric of C2 warfare). Note 41 Although attacks on civilian and military targets share some characteristics of offense and defense, military systems tend to be more secure than civilian systems, because they are not designed for public access. Critical systems are often disconnected from all others -- "air gapped," as it were, by a physical separation between those system and all others. From an operational point of view, civilian systems can be attacked at physical, syntactic, and semantic levels. Here, the focus is on syntactic attacks, which affect bit movement. Concern for physical attacks (see above, on C2W) is relatively low Note 42 (although some big computers on Wall Street can be disabled by going after the little computers that control their air-conditioning). Semantic attacks (which affect the meaning of what computers receive from elsewhere) are covered below, under cyberwarfare. Hacker warfare can be further differentiated into defensive and offensive operations. The debate on defensive hacker warfare concerns the appropriate role for the DoD in safeguarding nonmilitary computers. The debate on offensive hacker warfare concerns whether it should take place at all. In contrast to, say, proponents of tank or submarine warfare, only a few hackers argue that the best defense against a hacker attack is a hacker attack. Whether hacker warfare is a useful instrument of policy is a question that defense analysts and science fiction writers may be equally well placed to answer. Hacker warfare would, without doubt, be a new form of conflict ... ----------------- URL: http://www.ndu.edu/ndu/inss/actpubs/act003/a003ch09.html Cyberwarfare Of the seven forms of information warfare, cyberwarfare -- a broad category that includes information terrorism, semantic attacks, simula-warfare and Gibson-warfare -- is clearly the least tractable because by far the most fictitious, differing only in degree from information warfare as a whole. The global information infrastructure has yet to evolve to the point where any of these forms of combat is possible; such considerations are akin to discussions in the Victorian era of what air-to-air combat would be. And the infrastructure may never evolve to enable such attacks. The dangers or, better, the pointlessness, of building the infrastructure described below may be visible well before the opportunity to build it will present itself. ... The difference between a semantic attack and hacker warfare is that the latter produces random, or even systematic, failures in systems, and they cease to operate. A system under semantic attack operates and will be perceived as operating correctly (otherwise the semantic attack is a failure), but it will generate answers at variance with reality. The possibility of a semantic attack presumes certain characteristics of the information systems. Systems, for instance, may rely on sensor input to make decisions about the real world (e.g., nuclear power system that monitors seismic activity). If the sensors can be fooled, the systems can be tricked (e.g., shutting down in face of a nonexistent earthquake). Safeguards against failure might lie in, say, sensors redundant by type and distribution, aided by a wise distribution of decisionmaking power among humans and machines. GIBSON-WARFARE The author confesses to having read William Gibson's Neuromancer Note 61 and, worse, to having seen the Disney movie "TRON." In both, heroes and villains are transformed into virtual characters who inhabit the innards of enormous systems and there duel with others equally virtual, if less virtuous. What these heroes and villains are doing inside those systems or, more to the point, why anyone would wish to construct a network that would permit them to wage combat there in the first place is never really clear. Why bring up Gibson's novel and the Disney movie? Because to judge what otherwise sober analysts choose to include as information warfare -- such as hacker warfare or esoteric versions of psychological warfare -- the range of what can be included in its definition is hardly limited by reality. ... Possible? Actually, yes. Relevant to national security? Not soon.

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Re: John Gage's comments at Computer Security Day in Cleveland
by anonymous-remailer＠shell.portal.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On Fri, 1 Dec 1995, Dr. Frederick B. Cohen wrote: > John Gave gave an interesting pitch for Java at the CSSI Computer > Security Day sessions in Cl;evelan yesterday (November 30). Among > his comments were: > > Java is not secure - it is "safe" No comment. > He (John Gage) regularly downloads binary executables from the > Internet and runs them on his workstation at Sun - (connected to > the internal Sun network). He downloads executables and runs them while connected to ... Oops, ... no comment. > Sun has terrible physical security - unknown people roam the halls > at night all by themselves. How do they get in the building in the first place?? Someone should think about a MEMBERS ONLY sign or something ... Oops, ... no comment. > In 2 years, you will be able to buy a computer that does more than > a Sparc now does, in a portable package the size of a cell > phone, with more than 30 million bits per second of mobile > bandwidth direct to the Internet, for less than $30. Now this last one could not pass without a deserved comment. How will John have my fingers connect with the cell-phone sized keyboard?? I guess for LESS than $30, I probably shouldn't be moaning and complaining, though ... especially if its energy-star compliant. > -> See: Info-Sec Heaven at URL http://all.net/ > Management Analytics - 216-686-0090 - PO Box 1480, Hudson, OH 44236 Dr. Fred, as usual ... you're a hoot. Your timing is great. And as luck would have it, I've got a Sun open house to go to this Monday for their pre-Christmas shin-dig. The President of Sun Canada, (I think) is supposed to be in attendance. You just gave me some great material to goad him with. Thanks. Even though these social things aren't usually for shop-talk, I think I might just save some of this stuff for use at the punch bowl. (Naah, I wouldn't do that.)-; But it is great material ... and perfect timing ... Alice de 'nonymous ... ...just another one of those... P.S. This post is in the public domain. C. S. U. M. O. C. L. U. N. E.

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RE: sooner or later
by Fisher Mark 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>3. A ban will eventually be lifted, because of the impracticality of GAK, >abuses, wide-spread security problems caused by added complexity or >hackers stealing the master keys, ineffectiveness, sympathetic courts etc. >The sooner it comes into effect, the sooner it goes away. But eventually could be 2047 (or 2097)... I'm 40 now. I'd like to live to see the day. This situation starts to unpleasantly remind me of Heinlein's "If This Goes On...". ========================================================== Mark Leighton Fisher Thomson Consumer Electronics fisherm(a)indy.tce.com Indianapolis, IN "Their walls are built of cannon balls, their motto is 'Don't Tread on Me'"

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Info Foes
by nobody＠REPLAY.COM 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

URL: http://www.ndu.edu/ndu/inss/strforum/z1106.html Strategic Forum THE REVOLUTION IN MILITARY AFFAIRS Martin Libicki, CDR James Hazlett, et al. [Excerpts] DISCUSSION I: STRATEGIC CHALLENGES Those who assess future strategic challenges tend to look to Asian countries, and to categorize competitors as peer, regional, or niche. Asia and the Nation-State Most conference participants believe that, over the next twenty years, the fulcrum of world politics will continue to shift from Europe and its peripheries to the Asia-Pacific region. The period of European dominance produced innumerable wars as various countries challenged each other for power, resources, and sovereignty. With the formation of the European Union and the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, great power rivalry in particular and the nation-state in general are fading somewhat in importance. The nation-state remains strong in Asia, however. The last fifty years have seen considerable economic progress as various nations have made themselves richer by grasping the secrets of rapid industrialization. This trend, which started in Japan in the 1950s and 1960s, spread to the Tigers in the 1970s, ASEAN countries in the 1980s, and China and perhaps India in the 1990s, has left no Asian country unaffected. Economic growth, however, has not made the nation-state obsolete. To the contrary, the nation-state has been instrumental in creating the internal and external conditions for economic growth. European history suggests that countries, once they taste wealth, will struggle for power. Will Asian countries follow that pattern or demonstrate new models of what the nation-state is capable of? ... Types of Competitors One taxonomy of future threats suggested at the conference is to classify potential competitors as peer, regional, or niche. A peer competitor could challenge our military across the board. A niche competitor would be incapable of doing so, but would strive to inhibit or defeat U.S. intervention by developing capabilities such as primitive weapons of mass destruction, sensor blinders, physical terrorism, information system attacks, psychological operations, or hostage maneuvers. ... DISCUSSION II: OPERATIONAL CHALLENGES Considerable evidence suggests that commercial access to information -- GPS readings, space-based imagery, and Internet data -- could be transformed into military advantage thereby levelling the playing field between ourselves and our potential opponents. Other dual-use technologies, for instance, those that would permit remote piloting of aerial vehicles, permit commercial technologies such as electronic video photography to act as powerful military tools accessible to all (RPVs are made in more than thirty countries). Technologies That Level the Field Does the proliferation in information technologies necessarily negate our current military lead? Information-based warfare creates new vulnerabilities for industrial-age institutions slow to adapt. Because most U.S. logistics facilities and command nodes are not well hidden, they are vulnerable to precision strike. The widespread availability of overhead imagery coupled with GPS integration into weapon systems-- no more than a few years away for countries such as India--poses a serious threat to which our improving defensive measures (e.g., anti-tactical ballistic missiles) will provide only a partial solution . Our own counter-C2 operations are complicated by the rapidly falling cost of bandwidth and redundancy. Even if 90 percent of a bit flow can be interdicted, the remaining 10 percent may suffice for operational uses. Rapid expansion of cellular nodes, particularly through exploitation of commercial space assets, may make targeting and communications denial difficult or impossible. Multiple channels of electronic access will also complicate psychological operations and countermeasures. With the advent of the global information infrastructure, a clever adversary could take advantage of open information systems to enhance its own communications, information, navigation, intelligence, and operational support: examples include GPS, one-meter imagery, weather data, and even CNN. Every year more information with potential military use can be gleaned by anyone from the Internet without leaving fingerprints. How easily can a country's access to the global satellite communications networks be blocked? The coming global information infrastructure will have many points of entry. It will also be difficult to curtail certain services (e.g., global navigation) without denying them to U.S. users or even our own national security establishment. Technologies that Keep Us Ahead The United States, nevertheless, retains an edge in two important areas: space and systems integration. Space systems are relatively difficult to build and although many potential middle-income adversaries can borrow space services from third parties, fewer can own satellites, and far fewer can launch them. Thus the United States will retain a clear edge in the size and sophistication (timeliness and interpretation) of space capabilities, in their adoption and adaptation for military uses, in their augmentation or adaptation for the particulars of future contingencies, and in the assurance of their continuity. The distinctions between data and information, and between information and knowing could also favor U.S. forces. There are vast differences between, for instance, access to meteorological imagery and determining, for instance, that a locus of operations is likely to be fogged in 24 hours hence (a distinction relevant to the Falklands campaign). The art of operational planning is not acquired automatically with the acquisition of computers. Similarly, as sensors proliferate in type as well as numbers, data fusion is likely to become more decisive in future conflicts. ... POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS Two conference threads merit further examination: * U.S. defense policies that make it more difficult for potential competitors to threaten their neighbors and hold off the United States at the same time may be worth pursuing for that fact alone. * If militarily relevant information technologies are everywhere, sophistication at using them may be a better predictor of how challenging a competitor may become for the United States. Therefore, in addition to worrying about how large future foes are (and sizing our own forces accordingly), we should also focus on the potential sophistication of our foes (and develop doctrine accordingly).

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re: SKIP source release is out
by markson＠osmosys.incog.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> Doug Hughes writes: [ Perry Metzger writes: ] > > >SKIP is a non-standard being pushed by Sun. > > > > Correct me if I'm wrong, but isn't sun trying to make it a standard > > (in competetion with Photuris) ? Doug, you are correct. SKIP is an IPSEC internet draft. Photuris is an IPSEC internet draft. Perry is incorrect in saying that SKIP is a non-standard. Both of the chairs of the IPSEC group have said SKIP is part of the IPSEC working group. Phil Karn (author of Photuris) has also said this. Both SKIP and Photuris are on the standards track. They are, as you indicated, "competing" protocols. > The IETF has many sorts of standards. It explicitly has a way to > standardize things that the IETF doesn't think are a good idea but > which should have the ability to interoperate if you do them. That's true, but SKIP is not in that category. I believe neither SKIP nor Photuris have been declared "mandatory" as of this point. They both have the same status in IPSEC. > My opinion is that it is fairly clear that Photuris is the key > management system people will be using, although it is going to have > to evolve to work with a real network wide certificate database > infrastructure. SKIP isn't going to be the standard. Again, in *your* opinion. No determination has been made that I know of. --tom

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Re: A newsgroup for exposing Usenet pedophiles
by dlv＠bwalk.dm.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>From nelson(a)crynwr.com Fri Sep 19 08:41:11 1997 Received: by bwalk.dm.com (1.65/waf) via UUCP; Fri, 19 Sep 97 11:08:25 EDT for dlv Received: from ns.crynwr.com by uu.psi.com (5.65b/4.0.061193-PSI/PSINet) via SMTP; id AA24849 for dlv(a)bwalk.dm.com; Fri, 19 Sep 97 08:41:11 -0400 Received: (qmail 31458 invoked by uid 0); 19 Sep 1997 12:43:53 -0000 Received: from desk.crynwr.com (128.153.44.67) by ns.crynwr.com with SMTP; 19 Sep 1997 12:43:53 -0000 Received: (qmail 12012 invoked by uid 501); 19 Sep 1997 12:51:04 -0000 Date: 19 Sep 1997 12:51:04 -0000 Message-Id: <19970919125104.12011.qmail(a)desk.crynwr.com> From: Russell Nelson <nelson(a)crynwr.com> To: dlv(a)bwalk.dm.com (Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM) Cc: steering-committee(a)usenet2.org, freedom-knights(a)jetcafe.org Subject: Re: A newsgroup for exposing Usenet pedophiles In-Reply-To: <suy0ce21w165w(a)bwalk.dm.com> References: <suy0ce21w165w(a)bwalk.dm.com> Dimitri Vulis KOTM writes: I am now filtering out any mail with the word ``vulis'' in it. You were warned. -- -russ <nelson(a)crynwr.com> http://www.crynwr.com/~nelson Crynwr Software supports freed software | PGPok | Freedom causes peace. 521 Pleasant Valley Rd. | +1 315 268 1925 voice | Taxes feed the naked Potsdam, NY 13676-3213 | +1 315 268 9201 FAX | and clothe the hungry.

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Re: DigiCash releases protocol specs!
by Adam Shostack 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

| By popular request, DigiCash is releasing the protocol specs. | | The specs are available at | http://www.digicash.com/ecash/protocol.html | | Please be aware that the doccument is work in progess. More | specifications, including byte level descriptions of the message | format will be added throughout the weekend. And of course, you'll be including a description of how you generate random numbers for use in keys and blindings? I ask only because I didn't see a place for it on the Digicash site. Adam -- "It is seldom that liberty of any kind is lost all at once." -Hume

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A challenge ...
by jmhayes＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I've been challenged to try to find a bank account; I win the challenge if I can wire in $100 to the hidden account. Anyone have any good ideas about how to find an ABA number?

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Re: ALERT: On Monday, call Congress to stop Big Brother amendment!
by Shabbir J. Safdar 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 12:27 PM -0400 9/19/97, Carl Ellison wrote: > -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- > > At 02:47 PM 9/18/97 -0400, you wrote: > >3. Say that you're calling to urge the Congressman to pass SAFE (HR695) > > without amendments. > > Does that mean Goodlatte's original bill, or the bill as amended already by > the National Security Subcommittee? > > I believe you should be more specific in your instructions -- suggesting > that people ask for the bill to be voted against unless it is exactly as it > was prior to the Natl Sec involvement. As each committee gets their hands on the bill, they do their own changes to versions and then they are all merged later before going to the floor. So, no, we're not asking people to urge passage of the SAFE bill with all the awful National Security amendments. It's a good suggestion, which we'll make clearer next time. -S

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Barring access to Netscape
by Ed Carp 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

If you want to bar access to your site from a Netscape browser, such can easily be accomplished. If memory serves, every browser, when connecting to a site, exchanges certain information about the client with the server. One can gain access easily to that information. I believe that Netscape uses "Mozilla" as their keyword when exchanging browser-specific information.

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Re: "Got a subpoena?"
by Alan Olsen 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 11:50 AM 11/30/95 -0500, you wrote: >To use the most obvious example, different remailer operators turn >different levels of logging on. So one operator will say "Yes, I am >obligated to fully comply with your subpoena, officer. Here are the >full logs for the last six months." And another will say "Yes, I am >obligated to fully comply with your subpoena, officer. However, I >keep no logs at all of the mail sent through my remailer. Drag, huh?" Sounds like we need a version of Mixmaster for the logs... | Its Log! Its Log! Its big, its heavy, its erased| alano(a)teleport.com | |"The moral PGP Diffie taught Zimmerman unites all| Disclaimer: | | mankind free in one-key-steganography-privacy!" | Ignore the man | |`finger -l alano(a)teleport.com` for PGP 2.6.2 key | behind the keyboard.| | http://www.teleport.com/~alano/ | <fnord> |

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Re: sooner or later
by David Downey 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>Bill Stewart wrote: >>At 10:45 PM 9/18/97 -0700, Wei Dai wrote: >>>Many of us believe that a crypto ban is inevitable. The only >>>question for us is whether it'll happen sooner or later. Seen in >>>this perspective, all that industry and civil liberties lobbies can >>>do is delay the ban. But is this necessarily a good thing? > >>Yes. Later is bad, but sooner is worse. First of all, "Soon" means >>"We lost already", while "Later" means "We haven't lost yet, even >>though it looks pretty much like we're going to lose later,... > The only way I see us losing is if we do not stand together. I do see that we will need to go underground ofr awhile, but when they see that they will always have a problem with us, they will eventually have to deal with us. That is unless they want to turn the US into a real life version of the movie Red Dawn! ______________________________________________________ Get Your Private, Free Email at http://www.hotmail.com

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Re: Netscape gives in to key escrow
by Ed Carp 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> Date: Fri, 1 Dec 1995 04:40:23 -36000 > From: Matt Miszewski <crypto(a)midex.com> > Subject: Re: Netscape gives in to key escrow > To: sameer <sameer(a)c2.org> > Cc: Jeff Weinstein <jsw(a)netscape.com>, cypherpunks(a)toad.com, > jsw(a)tera.netscape.com > On Thu, 30 Nov 1995, sameer wrote: > > > Jeff: If Netscape comes out in favor of GAK, will you leave? > > (Wait until February, at least, of course..) You don't have to answer > > that to me, or the list, just think about it, and answer it for > > yourself. Do you think "anyone else" there would leave, as you say > > below that they don't want to go down history, etc... > > > > While this would go over well in the press if handled right please let > everyone remember that Jeff is a real person with bills to pay and food > to put on at least his own table. Now if someone out there with their > own business is willing to match his politics with his purse and offer > Jeff a job at the same level if he *decides* to leave in the midst of GAK > flak... If Jeff decided to leave, I don't think he'd have much trouble getting something else - I'd be surprised if he wasn't employed the next day. Of course, if Jeff's got any stock in Netscape, he'd be nuts to leave - unless he values his principles more than he values his stock. No insult intended.

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Add to List
by traye＠ix.netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I would like to be added to your mailing list for the cypherpunks. Thank you very much.

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Costs of Mandatory Key Recovery
by Robert Hettinga 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

--- begin forwarded text X-Sender: fred(a)stilton.cisco.com Mime-Version: 1.0 Date: Fri, 19 Sep 1997 07:54:35 -0700 To: ipsec(a)tis.com From: Fred Baker <fred(a)cisco.com> Subject: Costs of Mandatory Key Recovery Sender: owner-ipsec(a)ex.tis.com Precedence: bulk If you could email any hard numbers as to expected costs to Don Heath <heath(a)isoc.org>, it would be helpful. >>Date: Wed, 17 Sep 1997 10:55:55 -0400 >>From: Philip Webre <philipw.nrd(a)cbo.gov> >>To: heath(a)isoc.org >>Subject: Costs of Mandatory Key Recovery >>Content-Disposition: inline >> >>As I explained over the telephone, we are trying to estimate >>the private sector costs associated with mandatory key >>recovery in the US. Thursday the House Intelligence >>Committees passed an amended version of HR 695 that >>would mandate immediate key recovery in all encryption >>products sold, imported or distributed in the US after >>January 31, 2000. It further imposes this requirement >>on Internet service providers who provide encryption >>services when presented by a warrant from a duly authorized >>law enforcement official. >> >>We expect that within an organization like a corporate >>LAN, key recovery can be mandated in a straight forward >>manner. But since the relationship between an ISP >>and its client is more distant, very different mechanisms >>and cost structure would surface. I would be very >>interested in any information you could provide regarding >>the costs associated with such a mandate. >> >>Address: >>Philip Webre >>Congressional Budget Office >>Natural Resources and Commerce Division >>495 Ford House Office Bldg. >>Washington, D.C. 20515 >>Fax Number: 202-226-0207 >>Voice: 202-226-2940 >>Internet: Philipw(a)CBO.GOV > =-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-= "Planning is bringing the future into the present so that you can do something about it now." Alan Lakein --- end forwarded text ----------------- Robert Hettinga (rah(a)shipwright.com) Philodox e$, 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity, [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire' The e$ Home Page: http://www.shipwright.com/

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Four Info Threats
by nobody＠REPLAY.COM 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

URL: http://www.ndu.edu/ndu/inss/strforum/forum35.html Forum, Number 35, July 1995 THE NEXT ENEMY Martin C. Libicki, National Defense University [Excerpts] The Cold War offered military planners considerable strategic clarity the threat was known, and the problem was generating a force structure of sufficient size and sophistication to counter it. Today's military threats are varied and, for the most part, well below the level that even a shrinking U.S. force can handle comfortably. Threats ten to twenty years out, however, must be taken seriously because of the long time required to complete a major systems acquisition; to develop, test, and institutionalize new doctrine; and to accomplish the organizational innovations necessary to use both effectively. Future threats may be divided into four categories: peers, bullies, terrorism, and chaos. ... Peers Few planners think it likely that the next twenty years will see a reemergence of a nation that can pose a challenge to U.S. military power as broadly as the Soviet Union did. However, at least two countries (Russia and China) could conceivably be peer adversaries at the strategic level of nuclear weapons, space, and information systems. ... Another avenue of future competition may be information warfare. Can or should the United States hold other nations' participation in the world economy at risk? The United States might be able to shut down another nation's banking system but not without risk of collateral damage to the global banking system. Can physical war be replaced by a survival contest among rival information systems under attack? Perhaps the United States should concentrate on developing defensive systems. The United States has the biggest stones, but also the most glass in its house. ... A world of peer strategic competition would drive the military in familiar directions towards: nuclear forces, satellites and other long-range warning systems; tactical ballistic missile defense systems (including for allies); perhaps strategic defense systems and space attack systems; air defense in general; information warfare and security; and robust command-and-control. Bullies If the circumstances and logic of the Bottom Up Review hold true for two more decades, U.S. armed forces will be sized and structured primarily to engage in two simultaneous major regional contingencies (MRCs). The usual suspects in such MRCs (e.g., Iran, Iraq, North Korea) are presently unsophisticated rogue states that aspire to nuclear weapons and delivery systems. Conference participants believe that U.S. forces could cope with the challenges of future conventional warfare, even if force levels continue to diminish. However, two events would make the United States rethink its strategy nuclear weapons proliferation, and the sophisticated exploitation of world technology markets. ... Alternatively, an MRC opponent may be able to avoid going to the nuclear threshold by a strategy which uses smart munitions, commercial command-and-control, and a variety of surveillance technologies (e.g., unmanned aerial vehicles, third-party satellite surveillance) to exact damaging casualties on U.S. forces. ... Against a sophisticated regional foe, the United States might not want to use platforms at all but rely on a combination of stand-off attack forces, and information-based warfare assets (for giving targeting data to local coalition partners), coupled with special operations forces used for liaison and other tasks. Terrorism Largely because of the limited capability that classical military instruments have in coping with terrorism, conference participants kept returning to the threat that it may pose to U.S. national security. Incidents may range from the use of conventional explosives (e.g., what if the van in the World Trade Center explosion had been parked in a more vulnerable spot), to nuclear or chemical weapons, biological agents, and their analogue in cyberspace information warfare. Devices that can cause terror are getting easier to manufacture and transport and harder to detect. The equipment for replicating biological agents is inexpensive; the equipment for replicating computer agents is even cheaper. Many otherwise third-world Asian nations have very large computer-literate cohorts that make them potential information warfare powers. ... Chaos Over the next two decades, states will continue to fail. Some failures may create circumstances (e.g., refugees, malcontents, and environmental damage) which topple other states. To cope, the United States may need a robust capability to conduct peace and relief operations. ... A concentration on peace operations may also be a good reason to expand foreign military interactions. Improving interoperability with future coalition partners carries many advantages. Yet, above a certain technological level of integration, the risk of exposing information on U.S. capabilities to what may be temporary allies has to be carefully managed. If countering chaos were the primary mission of the U.S. armed forces, then they would have to become lighter and more mobile (because states often fail with little warning, and the United States usually responds only in extremis). The Army and Marine Corps would have larger roles, while the Navy and Air Force would focus on lift. As emergency operations become the norm, some functions assigned to reserve units may have to be shifted to active ones (e.g., to allow civil affairs assets to be used more frequently).

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Applied Cryptography MPLS Book Release
by Charles Gimon 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Did I mention that Bruce Schneier and Ms. Cooper are charming hosts with an excellent caterer? Probably not, with all the Netscape/GAK hoo-hah going on. Well, if you'll excuse me for posting thanks a couple of days late, thanks for an excellent time. It was good to see some of the local folks in person again.

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FW: websurfer 4.6 (fwd)
by Michael Froomkin 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

so much for compatibility....guess I'm sticking with netscape for now. A. Michael Froomkin | +1 (305) 284-4285; +1 (305) 284-6506 (fax) Associate Professor of Law | U. Miami School of Law | froomkin(a)law.miami.edu P.O. Box 248087 | http://www.law.miami.edu/~froomkin Coral Gables, FL 33124 USA | It's warm here. ---------- Forwarded message ---------- Date: Fri, 1 Dec 95 16:49:34 PST >From: Netmanage Technical Support <Support(a)netmanage.com> To: Michael Froomkin <froomkin(a)law.miami.edu> Subject: FW: websurfer 4.6 Hello, Thank you for emailing NetManage Technical Support. WebSurfer 4.6 was designed to work on Winsock 1.1 compliant systems. Since you are running Winsock version 2.0 this may be the reason for the application not working. We will report this to Engineering so hopefully in a future release WebSurfer might be able to support this new Winsock version. Thank you for considering Chameleon WebSurfer, Support(a)netmange.com == [earlier, I had said:] won't start on my pentium 100 w/ 20Mb running qemm 7.04, windows 3.11, winsock 2.0 rev B on a novell 3.x LAN. Netscape runs fine. This might help: Trumpet Winsock Version 2.0 Revision B Copyright (c) 1993,1994 by Peter R. Tattam All Rights Reserved. THIS IS AN UNREGISTERED SHAREWARE VERSION FOR EVALUATION ONLY. Ethernet address = 00:00:F4:D2:64:D3 WINPKT packet driver located on vector $66 IP buffers = 32 Performing bootp...Bootp successful My IP = 129.171.188.92 netmask = 255.255.255.0 gateway = 129.171.188.1 Task WEBSURF(22E7) did not call WSACleanup. Task WEBSURF(38EF) did not call WSACleanup. -----------------End of Original Message----------------- If responding to a previous message please include the original for our reference. To ensure a faster reply be sure to reply to 'support(a)netmanage.com' and not to individual sender of messages. -- /\ **********/@@\ ********************************* \__/ NetManage Inc. W AA W Home of Chameleon TCPIP for Windows |__AYA__/ TCPIP Apps for Windows and NT AXXV VXXV W VUV W Technical Support (408)973-8181 |_/ V \_/ __ Fax (408)973-8272 \ [_ \ \_____/ MIME enclosures are OK gopher server: gopher.netmanage.com www: http:/www.netmanage.com For a list of current NetManage products use WebSurfer and go to: http://www.netmanage.com:80/netmanage/products/upgrade.html Serendipity 11/20/95 10:36:42 AM This message was sent by Chameleon

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lance's netscape-gak page
by sameer 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Lance asked me to announce his page to the list, if he fell asleep. Looks like he hasn't announced it, so here's the announcement. Lance's netscape-GAK page is available from his homepage at http://www.obscura.com/~loki/ the graphic is nice. ;-) -- sameer Voice: 510-601-9777 Community ConneXion FAX: 510-601-9734 The Internet Privacy Provider Dialin: 510-658-6376 http://www.c2.org/ (or login as "guest") sameer(a)c2.org

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Info on Netscape's key escrow position
by Jeff Weinstein 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I had lunch with Jim Clark today, and explained the furor that was currently going on in cypherpunks and elsewhere. After lunch he sent me the e-mail that I've attached below to pass along. I think the gist of it is that if governments require key escrow, we will have to do it in order to sell our products with encryption into those countries. We've actively lobbied against the government's proposal through our participation and support of industry efforts by the ITAA, BSA, SPA and others. Next week we will be sending two representatives to the NIST key escrow conference in DC. In preparation for that meeting we have been formulating an official company position on key escrow and export restrictions. Phil, myself, and other folks with cypherpunk leanings are involved in writing the policy statement. We are planning on taking a firm position against the government's key escrow proposals. Some time next week we will be posting our statement publicly, and will welcome your comments on it then. After the NIST meeting we will also be talking to folks in congress and the white house about our position, looking for help in getting the current export limitations removed. We will also be looking for help in getting the government's position on export controlled FTP sites clarified so that we can make the US version of the Navigator with 128-bit crypto available for download by those people who are legally allowed to use it. We don't have any plans to stop doing separate US and export versions of our software. As long as our customers want strong crypto and the government lets us sell it, I think we will keep doing it. --Jeff Jim Clark wrote: > > I made some pragmatic comments. > > I said that if we are to use this encryption technology in business, we must > have a better solution than to limit keylength or put keys in escrow. All > governments of the world have a valid concern about terrorism and other > activities of concern to the security of their nations. All of them will > continue to restrict our ability to provide products to their markets unless > we build in some mechanism that allows them to legally access > information that is in the interest of their national security. (We obviously > cannot be involved in determining what is legal by the laws of that country.) > This is not just a US government problem. Until recently, France did not even > allow us to sell products with 40-bit keys, much less 128-bit keys. > > A lot of ordinary citizens are rightly concerned about their own privacy. I > am one of them. I do not want the government to snoop on me, but in fact the > government, through the FBI, can now tap my phone without my knowing it by > simply getting sufficient evidence that I am conducting illegal activities, > then presenting this evidence to a court to get permission. I have no say in > the matter. > > If we as a company were to take the position that in no case will we allow > a government to get access to our encrypted messages, or refuse to allow > key escrow with our products, the governments of the world will quickly put > us out of business by outlawing the sale of our products in their countries. > The fundamental issue is how do we accommodate the requirements of governments, > while protecting our rights as citizens. > > None of this represents the position of Netscape with respect to what we > will do. But if we do not come up with a solution to this problem that is > acceptable to each government, we will not be able to export our products, > except with a short key length (e.g. 40 bit keys), and that will not be > acceptable to corporate customers in other countries. They will create their > own solution, and we will not be able to sell to a larger world market. In > fact, we could even be ordered by our own government to establish a key > escrow system for its use inside the US. > > Ironically, anyone in the US may import unbreakable encryption technology from > another country -- we just cannot sell it back to them. No one ever accused the > government of being rational. > > I chair an industry group called the "Global Internet Project", with members > from almost twenty companies, including companies from Asia and Europe. This > was the central issue we all agreed upon this morning, and we are putting > together a policy statement whose purpose is to educate lawmakers on the > importance of quick resolution of this matter. > > Thanks for your concern. Let me know what you like and don't like. Jeff Weinstein - Electronic Munitions Specialist Netscape Communication Corporation jsw(a)netscape.com - http://home.netscape.com/people/jsw Any opinions expressed above are mine.

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FutureNet Registration
by FutureNet Server 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Congratulations, you have just sucessfully registered for FutureNet, Europe's most popular e-zine. Your registration details are: Username: cypherpunks Password: cypherpunk You should bookmark a page within FutureNet so that you can revisit the site without having to type in your username and password again. The URL for the FutureNet homepage is: http://www.futurenet.co.uk/,cypherpunks,cypherpunk,/menu.html Keep this message somewhere safe, it contains your FutureNet reader identification details. If you have any problems accessing FutureNet, send mail to webmaster(a)futurenet.co.uk.

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