December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: Basically F-C-ed
by Alex de Joode 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Anonymous sez: : FBI Probing Planted Explosive : Orlando, Fla., August 20 (AP) -- Two explosives were : planted in a professor's suitcase to test airport : security measures in Amsterdam, The Netherlands, and were : discovered when he arrived in Orlando, officials said : Saturday. [..] : Kensel said such security measures were normal for : Europe. : "Particularly in Europe, there are grave concerns about : security issues," he said. "As a result, they do conduct : various security programs regularly. This was part of a : routine check of their own security systems. : "The bag got away from them basically," he said. Airport police was very quick to point out that such practices were legal, now when they do that ...... -- Alex de Joode Fear Uncertainty Confusion and Kaos, Inc.

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Re: NSA into antigravity?
by Andrew.Spring＠ping.be 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

: >> >>On July 19, Gerald Ollman and Robert Wayne, two researchers from the >>University of Maryland geophysics department were detained in Fort Meade, >>Maryland, apparently by agents of the National Security Agency, whilst >>taking measurements of the Earth's gravitational field. After 18 hours of >>questioning, they were released after being instructed not to discuss the >>incident. Their equipment and results were not returned. >> >>Neither the University nor the NSA has commented on the incident. However, >>it is believed that Ollman and Wayne were investigating a slight anomaly >>in the Earth's gravitational field centered around Fort Meade. No reason has >>been given for their detention. Missile targeting software depends on good models of the earth's gravity for accuracy, both for design and for simulation purposes. Since Ft. Meade was doubtless the target of many nukes during the cold war (and probably still is), that may account for them having a bug up their asses on the subject. 'Course you know the NSA; the world's largest employer of mathematicians, the largest purchaser of computer hardware, and the largest consumer of Thorazine. -- Thank you VERY much! You'll be getting a Handsome Simulfax Copy of your OWN words in the mail soon (and My Reply). <Andrew.Spring(a)ping.be> PGP Print: 0529 C9AF 613E 9E49 378E 54CD E232 DF96 Thank you for question, exit left to Funway.

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Re: Certificates/Anonymity/Policy/True Names
by monty.harder＠famend.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

TC> This happens all the time, though "I am not a lawyer," in disputes about TC> whether a contract was signed properly, about whether the signer had the TC> right authority, etc. And it is apparently not necessary to have the TC> "state" establish itself, for example, as the keeper of signatures. But the state does establish Notaries Public, and courts put special credence in the validity of signatures witnessed by them. Which is to be expected, of course, having the King's X being good in the King's courts. I don't see this as an either/or binary at all. To me, the natural thing to do is for a person who is already a Notary under the laws of a state to offer digital notary services. I would expect the State of California or Commonwealth of Massachussets to have the Secretary of State's office (or whoever is in charge of Notary Credentials there) to digitally sign the public keys of any Notaries commissioned thereby. In fact, I would like to see provision made for a digital signature to have an expiration date included, so that the SoS office could have its signature on a key set to expire along with the Notary's commission. Thus the existing state framework for verification of identity and consent on contracts is extended into the electronic sphere seamlessly. None of which prevents you or I from doing business without the services of the Royal Notary. * ZenCrafters - Total Enlightenment in about an hour --- * Monster(a)FAmend.Com *

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Re: CPAC, XtatiX, and the Censor-State
by Mike Duvos 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

In alt.cypherpunks, Censorship Suck <FBI(a)Sucks.NSA> writes: > That's pretty bad, when there's not even any sex. Yes. Most of these Web pages are not even political or sexual in nature, but cute boys anywhere on the Net these days cause the Fundies to have Grand Mal seizures. > My previous suggestion was to create "virtual" WWW sites > (when necessary, possibly as a stop-gap measure when there > is a censorship attack). I read your earlier post, and find the notion of hosting Web sites on Usenet intriguing. Tim has always pointed out that Usenet already exists as a persistent uncensorable repository of virtually everything, and that applications (eg BlackNet) needing such a facility should simply use the existing one. > By virtual, I mean by posting to USENET, probably encrypted, > with the decryption key following a couple days later. > It involves considerable development for either a newsreader > or preprocessor, but then, the work is implied. A > "gathering" design is necessary. Conceptually, seamlessly extending the Web over Usenet is not complicated. Each document could be posted as a single PGP conventionally encrypted article, with some reasonable convention for encryption keys and message ids that would enable links to be followed. Browsers could be modified to maintain a open connection to an NNTP server, and to fetch and decrypt articles specified by an nntp:<message-id> link in lieu of using http. Suppose I post my favorite banned Web pages to alt.anonymous.messages on a weekly basis, and distribute browser plug-ins and patches to enable Usenet to host Web content. I forsee the following glitches. First, as anyone who has posted a large number of articles to Usenet knows, many servers will only get a subset of them. Second, policy for article expiration is site-specific, and can be made to depend on a number of parameters. Posting once a week may be fine for some servers, and not for others. Third, it is only practical to employ Usenet to host static Web content. This rules out Web-based chat boards, and other such politically interesting content, as well as anything that is cgi-bin based. Fourth, Web content on Usenet will be in an easily identified format and trivial to filter out at local sites. > Because you are exactly right: the ISPs can be attacked, > regardless of the fault-tolerant design of the Internet. > Some version of the above tool WILL route around "damage" > attempts. > Interesting, that this would in part require cryptography. > Would the government go so far as to try and outlaw crypto > posts to USENET? Good luck. Odder things have happened. > Someone should make a complete list of all the > contacts/emails involved in contacting ISPs to get them to > censor. There may be something to learn. (sort of a traffic > analysis deal) It's the "usual suspects." We know who they are, and they are making no attempt to keep their activities secret. -- Mike Duvos $ PGP 2.6 Public Key available $ enoch(a)zipcon.com $ via Finger $ {Free Cypherpunk Political Prisoner Jim Bell}

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NSA cracker - how many TW
by Secret Squirrel 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

iang(a)cs.berkeley.edu > seems also unlikely. (Actually, for all I know, terawatt power sources > may exist; that's out of my field. Please let me know if this is the case. > I just know that at my rates, 7.12 TW for 33 minutes (at about $.10/kWh) I've extracted some figures from an industry publication and arrive at a worldwide electricity generation capacity of 1.6 TW. Assuming that 1% of that power is smuggled into the deep space cracker we're not even close to 33 minutes, and it doesn't matter whether we're looking at a one-off every so often rather than a continuous 40 a day. And that's still on optimistic assumptions including 1) testing keys for free 2a) running on earth at 3 K rather than 300 K or 2b) no bother transmitting power & signals into space (Like if the cracker had been secretly installed on Voyager 2 that'd be your 33 mins gone waiting for the radio.) IBM have published a communications scheme that claims to recover energy normally lost - it was on their website a few months ago. I skipped reading it at the time because it sounded dotty.

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Re: Basically F-C-ed
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Responding to msg by usura(a)replay.com (Alex de Joode) on Mon, 21 Aug 4:28 AM >Airport police was very quick to point out that such >practices were legal, now when they do that ...... What, Alex, FC stands for F*cking Counterterrorists, making work for themselves? Oh my, are those bitter out of work XX-cold warriors heeding X-feebie Liddy, prolonging the 60's blame-the-radicals payoffs.

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Re: (Fwd) 1995 Nanotechnology Conference
by James A. Donald 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 11:45 AM 8/19/95 -0400, John Young wrote: > >Fourth Foresight Conference on Molecular Nanotechnology And what does this have to do with cryptography? --------------------------------------------------------------------- | We have the right to defend ourselves | http://www.jim.com/jamesd/ and our property, because of the kind | of animals that we are. True law | James A. Donald derives from this right, not from the | arbitrary power of the state. | jamesd(a)echeque.com

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Re: A glance at the future of missing child identification
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

September Wired has an "Updata" on this by Simson Garfinkel, "A Chip for Every Child?" A note says the original story was in Wired 1.6. Excuse the W-word.

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Queries from a Cyper-newbie?
by Chris Avery 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Anybody willing to offer a bit of help to a cypher-newbie? I'm trying to sort out a few of the basics: (and if not answers, just a few pointers on where to go for info? ) Thnks. 1. PGP 5.0 -- good software? If not, what problems? Why to use DSS vs/ RSA keys? How is 5.0 different than 2.6.3i ? Which is better? 2. Are emails encrypted using PGP 5.0 decypherable by PGP 2.6.3i (and vice versa?) Using RSA keys? 3. I understand certain encryption s/w cannot be legally exported, I am aware that such s/w is nevertheless being used (and built) abroad. My queries: Is purely domestic use being threatened by the pending legislation? Is it already illegal to send an encrypted msg out of the US? If so, is it illegal to receive an encrypted msg from outside the US? 4. How strong is strong? My MS Explorer has the 128 bit encryption scheme to secure domestic financial transactions (such as credit cards). How "un-encryptable" is this? I read some recent postings here re difficulty of breaking 128 bit keys -- but this had reference to stronger methods of encryption than MS Explorer uses, right? So 128 bits is hard to break (umptyump years, terrawatts, etc.)? Then why does my PGP 5.0 software offer keys that are 768, 1024, etc. up to 4096 bits in length? Are these numbers on the same scale? Any "strength" differences between RSA, DSS, and Diffie-Hellman? IS there some layman-understandable difference between these? 5. Is international data traffic somehow monitored (or monitorable) to detect encrypted traffic? Thanks for any help.

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Third World Man
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

(Wow! I just trimmed 7 of the 8 names cc:ed on this message I'm quoting...I think the auto-quoting software most of use is getting out of hand. The trimmed recipients were; To: bdavis(a)thepoint.net, aba(a)atlas.ex.ac.uk, davby(a)ida.liu.se, Damien.Doligez(a)inria.fr, hfinney(a)shell.portal.com, asb(a)nexor.co.uk) Anyway... At 9:19 PM 8/20/95, Adam Shostack wrote: >| So ... has this proven that the banning of strong crypto is the correct >| way to go, and that, at least to some, credit card transactions using >| weak crypto will be acceptable to most (given the ease of getting CC#s >| other ways)? > > No. Banning strong crypto will not help; those darn furriners >are using it anyway. What it will mean is that the Information >Infrastructure of the future will bypass the United States, as without >strong cryptography, it is impossible to build a secure architechture. > > Should the United States wish to relagate itself to the status >of a third world nation becuase of terrorists, druge dealers, child >pornorgaphers and money launderers, that is indeed unfortunate. The U.S. is not likely to find itself relegated to third world status over this issue. Rhetorically, I wish it were so, but it just ain't. This issue--like the McCarthy hearings in the 1950s, the race issue in the '60s, the Vietnam war in the '60s and '70s, to name a few cases, _sounds_ really serious. And it is, as those cases were, but predicting the imminent collapse of American civilization is usually a lose. There is no way the technologlcal and manufacturing prowess of leading American companies will be substantially crippled. I would like to see export laws relaxed, especially as they are seldom effective, and so on. You know my views. But the likeliest outcome if strong crypto export remains hard, but import is unaffected, is that strong crypto will be imported from Europe and elsewhere. (It does not violate any laws that I am aware of to have a product for sale in the U.S. with "hooks" for arbitrary crypto, so long as that product and the hooks are not _exported_. Naturally, companies like Microsoft, Lotus, Novell, etc., do not want to have a U.S. version and an export version. But if they _have_ to, they can. My point is that this would certainly not relegate the U.S. to Third World status, at least not faster than many other trends are already doing.) Several European companies are strong in crypto, of course. --Tim May ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net (Got net?) | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero 408-728-0152 | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Corralitos, CA | black markets, collapse of governments. Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: PGP and MailSafe available. "National borders are just speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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Re: (Fwd) 1995 Nanotechnology Conference
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Responding to msg by jamesd(a)echeque.com ("James A. Donald") on Sun, 20 Aug 8:17 PM >And what does this have to do with cryptography? The topic has come up here several times in connection with development of molecular computers. It has been suggested that there is a link to Len Adelman's work. But maybe that was just a transparent cover story. Perhaps it's actually a molecular part of the Waco Vince Foster Tom Clancy Pat Robertson Nuclear Weapons Material divulgation. Thanks for provoking. What do you think? Your lively disputations have been missed.

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y2k problem *serious*
by Vladimir Z. Nuri 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

some people have talked about the y2k problem here, the "year 2000 problem". as programmers know, is the name given to the glitches that are caused by software malfunctioning because it only used 2 characters for the date field. I have mentioned that I think government agencies are going to be particularly hard-hit by this situation. I envisioned delays in payments etc. of something like a few weeks or so. however some recent new data and analysis by someone named Gary North causes me to rethink my position. it's somewhat alarmist, but he's got some excellent evidence. he believes the year 2000 problem is vastly more serious than anyone has realized. he thinks it may even lead to bank panics and instabilities in the entire worldwide economic system. he quotes Yourdon, a very respectable software professional, who talks about the domino effect in software such that even if parts of it are fixed, the erroneous sections can cause the system as a whole to fail. I suspect that we will be seeing some major, major news events related to y2k over the next year, all the way up to 2000. more info on this perspective can be found at www.garynorth.com this will be an incredibly important issue for virtually all programmers in the information field. (some cryptoanarchists here might rejoice at the potential here for mass social disruptions. may you live in interesting times.) The Yourdon Report Vol. 1, No. 4, June 1997. © Copyright 1997 by Cutter Information Corp. The Personal Consequences of Year 2000 Dear Colleague, Where will you be on New Year's Eve, 1999? If you're involved in the computer field in any way, there's a high likelihood that you'll be frantically working on the last-minute details of a year-2000 project. Yes, I know, not everything is written in COBOL and not every hotshot Java programmer is interested in the problem. But if you're an application programmer who normally develops business applications in Visual Basic, PowerBuilder, Smalltalk, or COBOL, there's a good chance that your organization will give you a temporary assignment to help out with converting mission-critical systems that are too important to fail. If you're a new-age Java programmer in a Silicon Valley startup company, maybe you'll be able to ignore the whole thing; but for many of the people who write software, 1998 and 1999 will be the years of year-2000 death march projects. I assume that anyone who reads this newsletter is familiar with the basics of the year-2000 problem; I won't bore you with a repetition of the details, or how we managed to get ourselves into this state. What I do want to talk about is the notion that it's our organizations that got themselves into this state, and that we have to make sure we distinguish between the problems and demands of our organizations, versus the problems and demands of our own lives and the lives of our families and friends. First, let's deal with the basic moral issue of culpability and responsibility. As you well know, there are some enormous legacy mainframe systems that will fall over and collapse on January 1, 2000, unless a thorough, expensive, and time-consuming effort is made to make them year-2000 compliant. But it's highly unlikely that you wrote the original code for those systems; indeed, the original programmers are probably long gone, maybe even dead. Or, ironically, those programmers may have been promoted: They may be your boss, or your boss's boss, or the CIO of the whole shop. In the rare case where you actually worked on the applications that now require year-2000 maintenance, chances are that nobody paid attention 15-20 years ago if you recommended that the date be coded with a four-digit year field. You were told how expensive memory was, and that none of these systems would last through the 1970s, or the 1980s, or the 1990s. In other words, with very, very few exceptions, the year-2000 problem is not your fault. Maybe we should have been smarter 20 years ago, and maybe we should have staged a mass revolt when our business users told us that they didn't want to spend the money for an extra two bytes of storage every time a date field was required within an application. Maybe they didn't really understand the significance of the short-term tradeoff that we made on their behalf. But after all, it was their money and their systems. In any case, there's a good chance that you can look at yourself in the mirror and honestly say: It's not my fault. Perhaps you feel that, as a member of a more-or-less professional category of "knowledge" workers, we all share collective responsibility for letting society get itself into the year-2000 dilemma. After all, what if mechanical engineers told us that a flaw in their calculations would lead to bridges and buildings falling over and crashing on January 1, 2000? What if they collectively shrugged their shoulders and said, "Well, it's not our fault. Newton, Galileo, and Einstein made a few miscalculations in their basic laws, and we just realized the problem." From that perspective, none of us really wants the IT community to end up with a huge black eye, or with the blame for having caused a massive economic and social disruption associated with year-2000 software problems. I'm willing to contribute some time and energy to help solve the problem. I'm willing to say, "Well, it doesn t really matter whose fault it is at this point. The most important thing is to fix the problem, and then move on." But what if the problem cannot be fixed? What if January 1, 2000, arrives and half of your company's software has not been converted? What if your organization collapses as a result? At that point, where does your responsibility lie? The interesting thing about this is that almost every organization could have fixed its year-2000 problem if it had begun addressing the problem in 1995 or before. But if the year-2000 conversion team is just forming now, in mid-1997, then the conversion almost certainly won't be finished when New Year's Eve rolls around two years from now. And that part of the problem is the fault of senior management, which was too busy worrying about other issues to focus on the biggest software project of all time. Let me stop for a moment and address a basic point: Many software professionals believe that the year-2000 problem will be somewhat annoying, and somewhat expensive to fix, but they can't bring themselves to believe that it could be a major, fundamental problem. It's like asking the residents of Southern California if they really believe that they're going to wake up one day and find that the San Andreas Fault has finally ruptured, and that California is now an island floating in the general direction of Hawaii. "We've lived with plenty of earthquakes, and some of them have been pretty serious," these folks will tell you. "Someday, the Big One will hit, but I really can't believe it's going to happen this year, or next year, or the year after." So here's the question: Do you believe the year-2000 problem is going to be really serious? Do you think it could shut down telephone service, banking systems, and airline systems for a few days, or a few weeks, or even a few months? I've been thinking about all of this during the last several months, and I'm becoming increasingly worried about the "ripple effect" problems that will be difficult to anticipate, and almost impossible to avoid. It won't be the end of civilization, but the year-2000 problem could indeed trigger a depression on the scale of the Great Depression in the U.S. during the 1930s. For example, consider XYZBank, which has 300 million lines of legacy code. Assume that XYZ has the time and resources to convert 200 million lines, and it has done a triage to ensure that the mission-critical systems are converted. That leaves 100 million lines of unconverted code that won't run at all, or will spew out gibberish. Since this unconverted code is associated with noncritical systems, it won't have a fatal impact on XYZ though it could incur a nontrivial cost. My real concern is that the applications XYZ considers noncritical might be very critical to some of XYZ's customers, partners, suppliers, etc. So it's quite possible that XYZ's failure to convert some of its software will cause little, tiny ABCWidget Company to go bankrupt, which causes slightly larger DEF Corp. to fold, and so on. Meanwhile, XYZ can't operate entirely alone; without electricity, phone service, and water, the offices can't function; without transportation services, none of its employees can come into work, and none of its customers can visit the bank to transact business. Let's assume for a moment that these basic utilities do continue operating properly after January 1. But what if the Federal Reserve Bank, S.W.I.F.T., and all the other banks that XYZ interacts with are having problems? What if XYZ's ability to print monthly bank statements depends on PQRPaper Corp. supplying laser-printing paper on a "just in time" basis? And what if PQR has a staff of three overworked programmers who maintain an ancient legacy system written in assembly language? If PQR stops shipping paper, then XYZ stops sending bank statements. Not forever, perhaps just for a month or two, but that's enough to cause a lot of confusion. There's also going to be a lot of confusion resulting from bugs injected into the converted programs. If XYZBank converts 200 million lines of code between now and December 31, 1999, then there will be an enormous amount of testing, and with that much code it's inevitable that some bugs will slip through. Maybe not fatal bugs that delete the database or shut down the bank's systems, but perhaps the kind of bug that will send incorrect monthly statements to 100,000 of the bank's 3 million customers. A problem like this might not be noticed until January 31, or when the year-end statements are produced on December 31, 2000. The problem with 100,000 incorrect statements is that it will generate 100,000 angry phone calls. Indeed, officials at the Social Security Administration (SSA) are quoted as saying that if the SSA has a 1% error rate in its retirement checks and other benefits, it will lead to somewhere between 43 and 50 million phone calls, starting the day after the checks are mailed. If the problem isn't resolved right away, then those people are likely to call back the next day, and the day after that, and the organization is likely to be in a state of paralysis. Back to the banks again: Do I really think that Citibank, Chase, Chemical, and BankAmerica (along with all the huge Japanese and European banks) are going to shut down on January 1, 2000? No, of course not. But I won't be surprised if the XYZSavings and Loan in South Poobah discovers that it can't process deposits and withdrawals for a week or two. That problem might cause a run on the bank, or an outright bank failure, and similar problems are likely to occur for a number of other small organizations as well. General Motors (GM) won't go bankrupt, but ABCWidget and PQR Paper could. Indeed, if ABCWidget goes bankrupt, it could cause serious problems for large companies like GM. Suppose ABC is one of the 100-odd companies that supply parts for GM cars and the widgets manufactured by ABC are an essential element of the transmission system. Because of the lean manufacturing system used throughout U.S. industry today, there's a good chance that GM doesn't have an inventory of widgets; ABC is supposed to deliver the appropriate number of new widgets to the GM plant every day. To ABC's surprise, its computers fail on January 1, 2000, and its widget production line shuts down. A week later, GM's production line grinds to a halt until it can find a replacement widget manufacturer. Meanwhile, GM's factory workers are furloughed without pay. By now, I'm sure you get the drift of my concerns. The interesting thing is that while software professionals and systems analysts are well-equipped to understand the reasons why the software could fail, and the possible consequences of those failures, they prefer to deny it. I wasn't aware of this until I watched Peter de Jager's year-2000 presentation at our recent Summit 97 conference, which ended with a question to the audience: "How many of you really believe these problems will occur?" To my surprise, a significant number of people raised their hands to indicate they did NOT believe that serious year-2000-related failures would occur. They couldn't disagree with any of the technical points that de Jager raised, just as you probably won't find anything fundamentally wrong with my arguments here. But de Jager's audience, and many of the people reading this newsletter, don't want to believe things could be this bad. "Surely," people will argue, "companies will find a way to solve this problem." Given our track record for normal software projects over the past 30 years, this argument borders on hysterical optimism. More likely, it's cognitive dissonance: If the facts disagree with the conclusions you were hoping for, then ignore the facts. What does all of this have to do with your job? Well, first you need to realize that a "denial of reality" may be taking place within your own organization today. Has your CEO or board of directors made a public commitment that all of the organization's systems will be year-2000 compliant, and that there is a detailed plan for coping with the organization's non-year-2000-compliant vendors, suppliers, customers, etc.? Do some arithmetic: If your company has 100 million lines of code in its application portfolio, then as of June 1, it would need to convert more than 100,000 lines of code per day, every day, in order to finish the job on time. Do you see the plans, the people, the tools, and the management commitment to make that happen? If not, what will be the impact on your job? Chances are that your company will go into panic mode sometime in 1998, halt all of its development work, and assign everyone in the IT department to work on year-2000 conversions. When I say everyone, I mean everyone. Secretaries will be drafted into the testing effort, and the managers will be expected to begin writing COBOL code. Is that the kind of environment, with everyone putting in double overtime, that you want to work in? And if the year-2000 conversion isn't finished on time, who will be blamed? You can be sure there will be lawsuits; are you sure you'll escape the wrath of the lawyers? If your company's year-2000 problems are very severe, what happens if it goes bankrupt? Will you be able to get another job? (An even more interesting question: At that point, will anyone want to admit that he or she is a programmer, or will it be a social stigma after January 1, 2000?) If you're out of work for six months, do you have enough money in the bank to support your family? Speaking of banks, what if your savings account is in XYZSavings and Loan of South Poobah? If depositors begin to worry about XYZ's year-2000 compliance in late 1999, will they begin withdrawing all of their money? If they do, will you be able to withdraw your money on January 3, 2000? Indeed, given the delicate balance of the fractional reserve system used by banks, it doesn't take a very large percentage of panicky customers to cause a bank run. The worst-case scenario in this area is pretty scary -- it might not be just the XYZSavings and Loan that suffers a bank run, but the big banks too. If the banks close for more than a couple of days, then how does the government collect taxes? If the government can't collect taxes, what happens to the value of its bonds, T-bills, and other financial instruments? Meanwhile, how many non-year-2000-compliant railroad and trucking companies will it take to disrupt the transportation infrastructure? While you're thinking about this, keep in mind another aspect of the lean manufacturing system -- the average grocery market, especially in urban areas, has to be restocked every 72 hours. I don't have answers for all of these questions, and I spend a portion of each day wanting to believe that none of these crises will occur. But I can't find a way to deny the possibility that they could occur, not exactly in the way I've described, but as a series of domino-effect problems that ripple through society. And if my software experience allows me to anticipate some of this, then your experience should provide similar insights. Think about this, and try very hard to avoid the cognitive dissonance problem. If the problem is anywhere near as bad as I think it could be, then you have to think very carefully about your loyalties and priorities. Will your employer get first call on your loyalty, or will it be your family and loved ones? On January 1, 2000, will you be at your keyboard, still converting two-digit year fields? Think about this now, while things are still calm. It won't be so easy two years from now. Ciao! Ed Internet: ed(a)yourdon.com Web site: http://www.yourdon.com

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Re: Secure, reliable (Re: Distributed computing)
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 11:59 PM 8/20/95, Nathan Loofbourrow wrote: >A couple of months back, someone (Adam Back, perhaps?) made mention of >work on secure, reliable distributed computing on untrusted networks >of untrusted machines. I seem to remember mention of sending out bogus >computations in order to obscure the actual computation being >performed. > >I was never able to follow the reference, since all the info available >was the name of a Japanese professor, with no mention of the >university or of any publications I could look up. > >Does this work ring a bell with anyone else? Joan Feigenbaum, then of Stanford and now of Bell Labs, has worked for many years on what she calls "computing with encrypted instances." The canonical example is one where one wishes to send a problem, e.g., a routing problems a la the Travelling Salesman Problem, to a service for solving. But one doesn't wish to reveal the cities being considered, perhaps for business reasons. (The extension of this concern to crypto should be clear.) So, one transforms the data set, sends it to the compute services, gets back and answer, and reverses the transformation. I've always thought of her work as a kissing cousing to zero knowledge interactive proof systems, but it evolved along a different path. A check of her published papers should reveal several summaries. I know some of her stuff got published in "Crypto Proceedings." --Tim May ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net (Got net?) | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero 408-728-0152 | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Corralitos, CA | black markets, collapse of governments. Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: PGP and MailSafe available. "National borders are just speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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Re: Sun's buggy MD5?
by Robert A. Rosenberg 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 20:45 8/18/95, michael shiplett wrote: >MD5 test suite: >MD5 ("") = f00001c0effffba8429b59d50529097c >MD5 ("a") = f00003c0effffba8aec5fcf4284a8dbe >MD5 ("abc") = f00005c0effffba896fc8af8ca60a911 >MD5 ("message digest") = f00007c0effffba8f373218f317a9558 >MD5 ("abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz") = f00009c0effffba896b4f24acb3f4738 >MD5 ("ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz0123456789") >= f0000bc0effffba8cef237a614aa457d There certainly is something VERY wrong. I think that the result is being reported from a location that is 8 positions left of where it should be pointing. Position 9 is where the "random" (ie: Probably correct) data starts. The first 8 positions are f0000Xc0effffba8 (where X increments by 2 for each invocation). Thus this looks like some kind of constant or fixed work area.

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Re: Certificates/Anonymity/Policy/True Names
by Rich Salz 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I think there are many people who might be willing to use an "anon CA" should it exist: Whistleblowers, perhaps Deep Throat would have used email People writing letters to the editor who don't want to trust the editor to withhold their info People who desire anonymyity yet don't want to trust the gov't to certify their communications as authentic/forged (Unabomber, Om Shin-rkyo) Any number of writers who have used psuedonyms and now want to get paid in ecash; Mark Twain?

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Basically F-C-ed
by nobody＠REPLAY.COM 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

FBI Probing Planted Explosive Orlando, Fla., August 20 (AP) -- Two explosives were planted in a professor's suitcase to test airport security measures in Amsterdam, The Netherlands, and were discovered when he arrived in Orlando, officials said Saturday. The professor, Paul Holloway of the University of Florida, arrived at Orlando International Airport on Friday afternoon and found his suitcase had been torn, said Brian Kensel, a special agent with the FBI in Tampa. He alerted Northwest Airlines security officials who emptied his bag and found the two devices. No detonators or fuses were with the materials, posing no danger to passengers, Kensel said. "We were satisfied that he was unaware of its presence before it was found at the airport," he added. Holloway had been attending a professional conference in Finland and had traveled through Detroit, Michigan, before arriving in Orlando, Kensel said. He had stopped in Amsterdam on the way, and that was where the device was placed, said Kathleen Bergen, spokeswoman with the Federal Aviation Administration in Atlanta. "It was part of a test," she said. "Basically the bag was inadvertently loaded on board with the explosives still inside." Kensel said such security measures were normal for Europe. "Particularly in Europe, there are grave concerns about security issues," he said. "As a result, they do conduct various security programs regularly. This was part of a routine check of their own security systems. "The bag got away from them basically," he said. -----

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RealAudio website temporary password
by RealAudio Welcome Wagon 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

This is an automatic response to your request for a free user account on the RealAudio site. Welcome to the world of RealAudio. The following temporary password will only be used once, in order to activate the username and password you selected for yourself during signup. To activate your account, please visit our Account Activation page at http://www.RealAudio.com/welcome.html and enter the temporary password in the proper blank. The user name you selected is: cypherpu Your temporary RealAudio password is: Toledo.Francisco If you have trouble with the software, please refer to the RealAudio FAQ and Technical Notes available at http://www.RealAudio.com/help.html You can also contact us through http://www.RealAudio.com/comment.html Thank you for becoming a RealAudio user.

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WhiSSLing in the Dark
by nobody＠REPLAY.COM 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Netscape Encrypted Data Cracked Tokyo, Japan, Aug. 18 (NB) -- Two computer users have managed to break Netscape's Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) encryption code in response to a challenge posted to the Internet. But far from scaring people away from using the system for online purchases, the results could reassure people of the safety. In mid July Hal Finney, a US computer user, posted data in an Internet message that he recorded when he sent an order, containing a fake name and credit card details, to Netscape's own computer. Setting a task for the hacking community, he wrote, "The challenge is to break the encryption and recover the name and address info I entered in the form and sent securely to Netscape." Early this week, news came from Damien Doligez, a French computer user, that he had cracked the code and revealed the contents of the message. Several hours later a message from an American team also claimed the same feat, actually cracking it two hours earlier than Doligez. While the results look damaging on the surface, Netscape, and Doligez, pointed out the amount of computer processing power needed to hack just one message and the difficulty in repeating the process. Roseanne Siino of Netscape told Newsbytes, "The real issue is whether this compromises security on the net. He used 120 computers for 8 days just to crack one message." Siino points out that to break into another message would require another eight days at the same 120 workstations and 2 parallel computers. In home computer terms, Doligez guesses a network of about 80 Intel Pentium-based machines would be equivalent to the system he had access to via his workplace, INRIA in Paris, and computers an Ecole Polytechnique and ENS. Netscape estimates the total cost of this computing time at around $10,000, meaning there are many more economical ways of getting credit cards numbers than hacking into Netscape SSL messages. Doligez agrees, writing on his home page: "The technical implications are almost zero. Everybody who understands the technical details knew perfectly well that this was do-able and even easy. You have to understand what happened exactly. I did not break SSL itself. I did only break one SSL session that used the weakest algorithm available in SSL. If I want to break another session, it will cost another 8 days of all my machines." The vulnerability of the encryption system is shown by its international use. The coding system available via Netscape software from the Internet makes use of a 40-bit encryption key. A stronger version, using a 128-bit key, is available to US citizens but restricted from export outside the United States by government regulations. Netscape's Siino explained the US government allows export of the lower security version "because they can break it." There are some hopes that this demonstration will help persuade the US government to lift export restrictions on some harder-to-crack versions of the code. Netscape is currently developing a new Secure Courier code which just encrypts the financial data in the messages using 56-bit keys. Siino explained, "You can export over 40-bit keys for a specific application." The new system should be available early next year. Many companies working on secure transaction systems hope the much more secure 128-bit code version of the system will be available for export eventually. This is said to be almost unbreakable, requiring a trillion times more processing power to crack than the 40-bit version. Internet users can view a copy of the original challenge, access Doligez's home page with details of his result, get copies of the program used to crack the code and read Netscape's response to the news through a special section at Netscape, http://home.netscape.com/newsref/std/key_challenge.html Press contacts : Roseanne Siino, Netscape, +1-415-528-2619 , Internet email roseanne(a)netscape.com; Damien Doligez, Internet email damien.doligez(a)inria.fr ; Hal Finney, Internet email hfinney(a)shell.portal.com)

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RE: Queries from a Cyper-newbie?
by Chris Avery 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

1. Thanks for the comments. I indeed meant "crackable" when I said "unencryptable", as you surmised. I'll learn. 2. I don't precisely know what it means to "change hashes" on RSA keys, though I get the drift. Where can I go for details? 3. I'll do the www.crypto.com thing, thanks for the pointer. This may be a critical last stand on the privacy of communications issue. What gets me is the blind arrogance with which govt "servants" assume that their (even if legitimate) pursuit of crime somehow excuses or justifies diminishing privacy rights for everyone else. There must be some kind of ratio: 1,000,000 rights diminished for 1 criminal activity detected? Doesn't make sense. Thnks. ---------- From: bennett_t1@popmail.firn.edu[SMTP:bennett_t1@popmail.firn.edu] Sent: Monday, July 28, 1997 5:35 PM To: Chris Avery Cc: cypherpunks(a)toad.com Subject: Re: Queries from a Cyper-newbie? -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- At 03:45 PM 7/28/97 -0700, you wrote: >Anybody willing to offer a bit of help to a cypher-newbie? I'm trying to sort out a few of the basics: Well as long as you ask like that instead of what most newbies do, such as try and subscribe by sending "Add me to the mailing list" to the list. >1. PGP 5.0 -- good software? It's better integrated for Mac Lusers and Windows 95ers. It is, however, flawed in some respects. >If not, what problems? Why to use DSS vs/ RSA keys? How is 5.0 different than 2.6.3i ? Which is better? 2.6.3i cannot use CAST, or (who would want to , it's DES!) Triple- DES. It does however, can use other hashes with RSA, thanks to someone's discovery on PGP-USERS. 2.6.3i is dos native, and complex. A shell integrates nicely, but it's still not the same. >2. Are emails encrypted using PGP 5.0 decypherable by PGP 2.6.3i (and vice versa?) Using RSA keys? ONLY using RSA keys. DSS/Diffie-Hellman support is being added to old PGP's. RSAREF is used in PGP 5.0 . MPILIB, Phil Zimmermann's original PGP RSA algorithm implementation is used in international versions. It's becuase of RSA's patent stuff. >3. I understand certain encryption s/w cannot be legally exported, I am aware that such s/w is nevertheless being used (and built) abroad. My queries: Is purely domestic use being threatened by the pending legislation? Is it already illegal to send an encrypted msg out of the US? If so, is it illegal to receive an encrypted msg from outside the US? Unless it is the "shitty 40 bit" type. It can be built abroad, for example, IDEA was made in switzerland, or something like that..., PGP 2.6.3i was made legally, I think. Domestic use is being threatened by Nazi Motherfuckers like Billy-Bob Clinton [spit], The FBI, and the NSA. Oppose them. Go to www.crypto.com and do some of the stuff there. Sending and recieving mail from the outside of the US *is legal*. >4. How strong is strong? My MS Explorer has the 128 bit encryption scheme to secure domestic financial transactions (such as credit cards). How "un-encryptable" is this? I read some recent postings here re difficulty of breaking 128 bit keys -- but this had reference to stronger methods of encryption than MS Explorer uses, right? So 128 bits is hard to break (umptyump years, terrawatts, etc.)? Then why does my PGP 5.0 software offer keys that are 768, 1024, etc. up to 4096 bits in length? Are these numbers on the same scale? Unencryptable? What the fuck are you talking about? If you mean crackable, let's just say it'd take several time the age of the Universe to crack it. The RSA keys are weaker than symmetric cyphers, unless we're talking about DSS/Diffie-Hellman keys with 4096bits. They are not on the same scale. >Any "strength" differences between RSA, DSS, and Diffie-Hellman? IS there some layman-understandable difference between these? Well, RSA's are patented and RSA is really anal with their patents. DSS/Diffie-Hellman keys are unpatented. You can change hashes on RSA keys (RIPEM160, MD5 [was broken already], and SHA-1). But to use those RSA's with older PGP's, use only MD5. >5. Is international data traffic somehow monitored (or monitorable) to detect encrypted traffic? It can be detected that you're using encryption. Breaking PGP is another thing. If any other cypherpunks want to correct me here, do so. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: PGP for Personal Privacy 5.0 Charset: noconv iQCVAwUBM9065B0+FhmmTrSJAQEdsgQAmRAJR7CxQCy4Wfny8YM6oJ3chLKnJCnA E45EElRsAVS8zyAWy06/ZJFG8XjInjgAzmx+fRvGoN0qHvObyFfrDMPML0w+405s cddgcApc0DfbjP8narKHVBQnbOhwuSjdDbwTbFF9F+EG0OkXewgYKXS/QnS11ov/ ofr4ooPGcr0= =rowH -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: RealAudio website temporary password
by shamrock＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- In article <199508210449.VAA20788(a)www.realaudio.com>, welcome(a)realaudio.com (RealAudio Welcome Wagon) wrote: >This is an automatic response to your request for a free user account >on the RealAudio site. Welcome to the world of RealAudio. > >The following temporary password will only be used once, >in order to activate the username and password you >selected for yourself during signup. >To activate your account, please visit our Account Activation page >at http://www.RealAudio.com/welcome.html >and enter the temporary password in the proper blank. > >The user name you selected is: > >cypherpu The password has been changed to "cypherpunks" - -- - -- Lucky Green <mailto:shamrock@netcom.com> PGP encrypted mail preferred. - --- [This message has been signed by an auto-signing service. A valid signature means only that it has been received at the address corresponding to the signature and forwarded.] -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 Comment: Gratis auto-signing service iQBFAwUBMDgVmCoZzwIn1bdtAQF6IwF+INj+evDl7CrkIKHTpozs+8yMixV9fEh4 FvaTNdx/Jl/kWoyrjFTk+oYm85DmVv91 =xB75 -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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List of P.E.E.L. district managers near you!
by putpeel2＠orbisnet.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Remove yourself from this list by clicking on reply and typing remove in the subject line. This is a list of P.E.E.L. district managers, their city, name, email and phone number. YES! We want to help you build your P.E.E.L. business in person! Please read the purpose of district managers, how they can benefit you as a distributor or factory outlet owner, and company guidelines in the following Email. If you are a distributor or factory outlet owner, feel free to contact anyone below. All the people on this list are willing to help you build your business, at no cost or obligation to you. A district manager is not your boss, they are only here to help you, if you so choose. This is a service provided by P.E.E.L. If you are not on this list but want to be, please contact me. ATTENTION: Would you like to have a free distributorship selling Earth friendly, cruelty free products and earn 50% or more to start? Would you like to have your own store on the internet for only $49.00, never handle product and have weekly commission checks of 25%? We have this and a lot more. Please visit our distributor website at http://www.putpeel.com/distributors To see how to own your very own store, http://www.putpeel.com/factory-outlet ARIZONA DBMcCLURE(a)aol.com David B. McClure Chairman & CEO BetaCom Inc. Tuscon AZ 85710 520-751- 8716 fax 752 CALIFORNIA BAAB-BAKZ CafeDarci(a)aol.com Fountain, Carla T. Ripon CA 95366 (209)599-2970A CONECTICUT AAAAK-BAEH cgunt(a)aol.com Gunther, Claudia Guilford, CT 06437 203-458-8418 FLORIDA Wantom(a)aol.com Probst, William F. (Bill) Jacksonville FL 32225-1888 904 641-0709 Fax: 904 998-9012 AAAA-BAAB frakam(a)ix.netcom.com integrated(a)ix.gen.com Kammerdiener, Francis R. Miami Beach FL 33160 (888) 206-8104 (305) 933-2207 Fax(305) 682-0284 AAAA-BALQ wbroderick(a)hawk.net Broderick, William Ft. Myers FL 33905 (941)693-5161 INDIANA AAAA-BAAK paprwaydtp(a)aol.com Lemler, Kim Bourbon IN 46504 (219)646-2100 AAAAK-BAK3 IrishKenn(a)juno.com McRoden, Kenneth C. Ossian IN 46777 (219) 622-6331 (888)616- 5647 IOWA Riveris4U(a)aol.com Bowers, Kate Prole IA 50229 515 981-1442 MARYLAND BABA-BABS OIS(a)aol.com Wimmer, Karen Baltimore MD 21207 (410)944-7849 MASSACHUSETTS AAAA-AAAB, AWOOD(a)aol.com, Wood, Arthur F. Eddington, MA 04428-9710 (207)843-6020 MINNESOTA AAAB-BAGK karaoke629(a)aol.com Peterson, David Bloomington MN 55438 (612)941-1025 NEBRASKA WigleyK(a)MindSpring.com Wigley, Kathy Bellevue NE 68123 (402) 682-9069 OHIO joneill563(a)aol.com O'Neill Jr, John 2914 Harkie St. Middletown OH 45044 (513) 423-6558 OREGON AAAA-BAJK a-coctoau(a)aol.com Meyer, Angela Portland OR 97214-4026 (503)239-8087 OKLAHOMA AAAA-BAAZ Jump100(a)aol.com Durbin, Julie Oklahoma City OK 73135 Still, Terry Tulsa OK 74135 (918) 744-4048. PENNSYLVANIA BAKT-BAKT-BALV kaloftus(a)epix.net Loftus, Kandis Wilkes-Barre PA 18705 (888)202-1121 LinkArt(a)aol.com Begg, Richard Philadelphia PA19131 215-878-8258 215-878-8268 TEXAS AAAA-BAEP ANT5LEY(a)aol.com Antley, Teresa Dickinson TX 77539 281-534-3279 SNelson140(a)aol.com Nelson, Lloyd San Jaun TX 78589 956-781-2451 CANADA MANITOBA wtsvg(a)mb.sympatico.ca Williams, Sr, Wade Tudor. Winnipeg, Manitoba R3V 1R8 (204) 275 - 7265

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Re: RealAudio website temporary password Re: RealAudio website temporary password
by nobody＠REPLAY.COM 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

The Cypherpunks RealAudio free account is now activated with password "writecode" (case sensitive -- make them letters small). The user name is still "cypherpu". RealAudio.com does not truncate names longer than 8 characters during login (meaning "cypherpunks" fails), but their signup page won't allow entry of more than 8. Silly. Don't have too much fun listening to NPR, now... > Date: Sun, 20 Aug 1995 21:49:23 -0700 > From: RealAudio Welcome Wagon <welcome(a)realaudio.com> > To: cypherpunks(a)toad.com > Reply-To: welcome(a)realaudio.com > Subject: RealAudio website temporary password > Sender: owner-cypherpunks(a)toad.com > Precedence: bulk > > This is an automatic response to your request for a free user account > on the RealAudio site. Welcome to the world of RealAudio. > > The following temporary password will only be used once, > in order to activate the username and password you > selected for yourself during signup. > To activate your account, please visit our Account Activation page > at http://www.RealAudio.com/welcome.html > and enter the temporary password in the proper blank. > > The user name you selected is: > > cypherpu > > Your temporary RealAudio password is: > > Toledo.Francisco > > If you have trouble with the software, please refer to > the RealAudio FAQ and Technical Notes available at > http://www.RealAudio.com/help.html > > You can also contact us through http://www.RealAudio.com/comment.html > > Thank you for becoming a RealAudio user.

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Re: RealAudio website temporary password Re: RealAudio website temporary password
by nobody＠REPLAY.COM 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Lucky Green wrote: >>This is an automatic response to your request for a free user account >>on the RealAudio site. Welcome to the world of RealAudio. >> ... >>The user name you selected is: >> >>cypherpu > >The password has been changed to "cypherpunks" > Oops. Thank you for changing the password. Shall we not use writecode unless the site does not allow "cypherpunks" as the password? I get it now. Crypto relevance: http://www.realaudio.com/rafiles/npr/password/nb081801-4.ram The segment is overly optimistically billed as: "Dan Charles reports the Clinton administration has reached a compromise with the security industry about the export of encryption equipment that will protect personal computer files and allow law enforcement agencies access to them if necessary. (3:30)"

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Will Spam For Food (Not Spam) / Re: Spare DigiCa$h? / Re: AN APPEAL TO THE HUMAN RACE
by nobody＠REPLAY.COM 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I find it interesting that the cynical/sinister/paranoid cypherpunk list members seem to be the ones who are most able to predict the future trends of events on the Internet, particularly in areas which surround very major and very minor issues. The Tim May's and Declan McCullagh's shed interesting light on the future course of major events while the Monger's and Dog Boy's turn their precognitive abilities in the direction of the more mundane aspects of the Internet as a reflection of humanity/society. The "Spare DigiCa$h" post gave me pause to reflect how long it will be before technology is sufficiently developed that when we hit our <Pause> key, "CyberBums" will approach and offer to clean our video monitor with an oily rag. Will we be cursed for offering CyberBums a form of e$pare- change which cannot be spent on email-order wine? Will laws be passed which prevent CyberBums from approaching us for e$pare-change within two relay hops of an eCa$h site? Will CyberBums sort through our killfile dumpsters for eTra$h? Was it Kevin Mitrick whose conditions of probation required him to stay off the Internet and away from computers? Will the future bring laws which permit restraining orders against individuals accessing certain parts of the Internet? Sex offenders/sex sites; burglars/financial sites; pedophiles/children's sites? It seems to me that increasing regulations and laws surrounding the access and use of the Internet will require strict laws requiring the user to be able to show verification of identity/age/criminal history/ financial history/(approved government) reputation capital, and all manner of information to place us all in categories needed to monitor our compliance with laws and regulations. Once browsers are required by law to support a certain rating system and children manage to get around it, there will no doubt be laws passed requiring fascist monitoring of who is actually using the software.(And LEA's who demand that phone companies provide them with the ability to trace/locate cellular phone users will undoubtably want the same capabilities with Internet users, in a war against anonymity.) There will be no shortage of James Love's, Kent Crispin's and Hallam- Baker's to call for "reasonable compromise" in order to facilitate fascist censorship on things which we all "unambiguously" agree on (by _their_ way of thinking, of course). The only way to prevent the atrocities perpetrated upon our rights to freedom and liberty in physical space from becoming the norm in CyberSpace is to fight against the systems, the governments and the individuals who are striving to extend their fascist control by building ElectroMagnetic Curtains in CyberSpace, is to prepare now to fight against Electronic Oppression--to prepare for an Electronic Revolution--now. CyhperDog ~~~~~~~~~ {This post contains an Email Rating System classification of: Redundant Cowardly Anonymity.} (This means than an Anonymous Coward is posting in reference to one of his/her own posts under a second anonymous pseudonym.) -------------------------------- The first Anonymous Coward wrote: > amaninneeeedeer443553444(a)aol.com wrote: > > PLEASE HELP > > What follows is an example of the CyberBums predicted by one of the > list members some time back. This A(ssh)OL(e) is using his spambot to > "Spare change?" millions of people at a time and it turns out that > besides his required, basic tale of woe, that he also has the proverbial > parent who is dying from cancer. > > Don't send him any money. > Send *ME* money. I will use it to buy enough cheap wine to enable me > to throw up on my shoes. > (Wouldn't you rather send your hard-earened money to an honest drunk > than to a lying bum?) > > CyberBum > > ----- > > I WAS A SMALL BUSINESS OWNER IN THE ATLANTA AREA. I RAN THIS > > BUSINESS SUCCESSFULLY UNTIL ABOUT 60 DAYS AGO. AT THAT TIME, 2 > > SEPARATE COMPANIES FILED BANKRUPTCY AGAINST ME FOR A TOTAL OF > > $ 47,000. I COULDN'T SURVIVE THAT. > > > > CONSEQUENTLY, I WAS UNABLE TO PAY MY CREDITORS, MOST OF WHOM > > WERE FRIENDS. THEY HAVE FAMILY AS I DO AND I CAN'T LIVE WITH THE > > THOUGHT OF DOING TO THEM WHAT HAS BEEN DONE TO ME. I'VE SPENT > > MANY SLEEPLESS NIGHTS TRYING TO COME UP WITH A SOLUTION. I HAVE > > NO WHERE TO TURN EXCEPT TO MY FELLOW MAN. MY ONLY FAMILY IS > > MY FATHER. HE IS 74 AND SUFFERING FROM DIABETES AND PROSTATE > > CANCER. > > > > I HAVE SLOD EVERYTHING EXCEPT THE CLOTHES OFF MY BACK AND MY > > COMPUTER. AFTER THIS FINAL ATTEMPT FOR HELP, I WILL BE SELLING > > IT. > > > > I WANT TO BE HONORABLE, BUT I CAN'T DO IT ALONE. I WOULD NEVER DO > > THIS EXCEPT AS A LAST RESORT, BUT I KNOW THAT I WOULD HELP > > SOMEONE IF I COULD. > > > > WILL YOU HELP ME?? ANY AMOUT WOULD BE VERY MUCH APPRECIATED. > > THANK YOU > > > > W.E. HENDERSON > > P.O. BOX 486 > > SMYRNA, GEORGIA 30081

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Re: RealAudio website temporary password
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 6:00 AM 8/21/95, Anonymous wrote: >Oops. Thank you for changing the password. Shall we not use writecode >unless the site does not allow "cypherpunks" as the password? I get it >now. Hey, this business of signing up the "Cypherpunks" list for a bunch of specialized services is getting old. As guerilla ontology, it's fine. The problem is that all of these messages about what the official, public password is are cluttering up the mail here ( "writecode" is not my idea of an obvious public password). And some of these public sign-ups generate reflecting messages back to the list. In terms of scaling, this sucks. And what's being accomplished? (I confess that when I first saw this announcement that we had been signed up with the name "cypherpu" and the temporary passphrase "Toledo.Francisco," I immediately registered under a different set of names. Now I see that Lucky Green has done the same thing. Hmhhhh, which one came first and is recognized by them?) --Tim May ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net (Got net?) | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero 408-728-0152 | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Corralitos, CA | black markets, collapse of governments. Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: PGP and MailSafe available. "National borders are just speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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