December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

C.I.D.
by anonymous-remailer＠shell.portal.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

How can we defeat caller I.D.? It used to be that if you wanted to have anonymous e-mail, you could sign on to a BBS. But I am scared by the new modems that are equipped to log caller I.D. The general public believes that if they want to remain anonymous, they can defeat caller ID by dialling *67 before making a call, that way making sure that their number is not revealed. Ha! This is true, but not the full truth ... because Big Brother still has the number: The calling number is sent between switches always, regardless of whether or not *67 (Caller ID Block) is dialed. It just sends along a privacy indicator if you dial *67, and then the final switch in the path will send a "P" instead of the calling number to the Caller ID box. (But it will still store the actual number - *69 will work whether or not the caller dialed *67). What the final switch along the path does with the calling number depends on how the switch is configured. If you are not paying for Caller ID service, the switch is configured so that it will not transmit the Caller ID data. Before this, if you wanted to make sure a system didn't trace you back, you could call through a few diverters, PABXs, etc. However, today with Caller ID, your call information will be routed from diverter to PABX to system instead of stopping at the first diverter. The effect call forwarding has on the various services is interesting... Say I have my home telephone forwarded to Lunatic Labs, and it has Caller ID. If you call me, the call will forward to Lunatic Labs, and its Caller ID box will show YOUR number, not mine (since your line is the actual one making the call). Does this get you thinking? Anybody knows of a way to *really* defeat caller I.D.? Or, absent that, a more appropriate mailing list than this for such questions? |[]|[]|[]|[]|[]| "The Happy Fool"© []|[]|[]|[]|[]|[ PS: I did not want to participate in the great logo debate a while back, but if you want my 2C's, I think a simple padlock would be a great symbol, especially for an icon to do unbreakable encryption: Click it and seal. Elaborate? Then just put it on a red wax-seal.

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Pentium bug and CRYPTO
by Claborne, Chris 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Will the following error (Re Pentium Floating Point Bug Date: 15 Nov 1994) cause problems with PGP key generation or any other normal operations with PGP or other crypto. I'm not a math mathmatics nerd but I know we generally deal with big numbers. For all of you paranoids out there, YES this is a plot by NSA to weeken our crypto capabilities, this is the only bug that we KNOW about :) NOTE: I'm currently not receiving cypherpunks mailing for some reason. I'm not sure why, so please copy me on your posts. (Hughes, have you had a chance to look at this?) Thanks! ... __o .. -\<, chris.claborne(a)sandiegoca.ncr.com ...(*)/(*). CI$: 76340.2422 PGP Pub Key fingerprint = A8 FA 55 92 23 20 72 69 52 AB 64 CC C7 D9 4F CA Avail on Pub Key server. PGP-encrypted e-mail welcome! - ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- -- > >>> > > >>> > Subject: Pentium Floating Point Bug Date: 15 Nov 1994 > >>> > Summary: Divisions might give incorrect results on Pentium > >>> > > >>> > Pentium Floating Point Division Bug > >>> > > >>> > There has been a flurry of activity the last fews days on the > >>> > Internet news group, comp.sys.intel, that should interest MATLAB > >>> > users. A serious design flaw has been discovered in the floating > >>> > point unit on Intel's Pentium chip. Double precision divisions > >>> > involving operands with certain bit patterns can produce incorrect > >>> > results. > >>> > > >>> > The most dramatic example seen so far can be extracted from a > >>> > posting last night by Tim Coe of Vitesse Semiconductor. In MATLAB, > >>> > his example becomes > >>> > > >>> > x = 4195835 > >>> > y = 3145727 > >>> > z = x - (x/y)*y > >>> > > >>> > With exact computation, z would be zero. In fact, we get zero on > >>> > most machines, including those using Intel 286, 386 and 486 chips. > >>> > Even with roundoff error, z should not be much larger than eps*x, > >>> > which is about 9.3e-10. But, on the Pentium, > >>> > > >>> > z = 256 > >>> > > >>> > The relative error, z/x, is about 2^(-14) or 6.1e-5. The computed > >>> > quotient, x/y, is accurate to only 14 bits. > >>> > > >>> > An article in last week's edition of Electronic Engineering Times > >>> > credits Prof. Thomas Nicely, a mathematics professor at Lynchburg > >>> > College in Virginia, with the first public announcement of the > >>> > Pentium division bug. One of Nicely's examples involves > >>> > > >>> > p = 824633702441 > >>> > > >>> > With exact computation > >>> > > >>> > q = 1 - (1/p)*p > >>> > > >>> > would be zero. With floating point computation, q should be on > >>> > the order of eps. On most machines, we find that > >>> > > >>> > q = eps/2 = 2^(-53) ~= 1.11e-16 > >>> > > >>> > But on the Pentium > >>> > > >>> > q = 2^(-28) ~= 3.72e-09 > >>> > > >>> > This is roughly single precision accuracy and is typical of the > >>> > most of the examples that had been posted before Coe's analysis. > >>> > > >>> > The bit patterns of the operands involved in these examples > >>> > are very special. The denominator in Coe's example is > >>> > > >>> > y = 3*2^20 - 1 > >>> > > >>> > Nicely's research involves a theorem about sums of reciprocals > >>> > of prime numbers. His example involves a prime of the form > >>> > > >>> > p = 3*2^38 - 18391 > >>> > > >>> > We're not sure yet how many operands cause the Pentium's floating > >>> > point division to fail, or even what operands produce the largest > >>> > relative error. It is certainly true that failures are very rare. > >>> > But, as far as we are concerned, the real difficulty is having to > >>> > worry about this at all. There are so many other things than can > >>> > go wrong with computer hardware, and software, that, at least, we > >>> > ought to be able to rely on the basic arithmetic. > >>> > > >>> > The bug is definitely in the Pentium chip. It occurs at all clock > >>> > rates. The bug does not affect other arithmetic operations, or the > >>> > built-in transcendental functions. Intel has recently made changes > >>> > to the on-chip Program Logic Array that fix the bug and is now > >>> > believed to be producing error free CPUs. It remains to be seen > >>> > how long it will take for these to reach users. > >>> > > >>> > An unnamed Intel spokesman is quoted in the EE Times article as > >>> > saying "If customers are concerned, they can call and we'll replace > >>> > any of the parts that contain the bug." But, at the MathWorks, > >>> > we have our own friends and contacts at Intel and we're unable > >>> > to confirm this policy. We'll let you know when we hear anything > >>> > more definite. In the meantime, the phone number for Customer > >>> > Service at Intel is 800-628-8686. > >>> > > >>> > -- Cleve Moler moler(a)mathworks.com > >>> > Chairman and Chief Scientist, The MathWorks, Inc. > >>> > > >>> > >> > >> > >>-- > >>Steve > >> > >> > >>-------------------------------------------------------------------------- > >>----- > >>- > >> I am in the field on the Outer Banks of North Carolina until 27 November. > >> From 28 Nov - 4 Dec I will be on the Dream Cruise in the Atlantic. > >> After the cruise I will go to AGU, and finally to Pullman about 8 Dec. > >> > >> > >> Steve Elgar FAX : (919) 261-4432 > >> Army Research Pier ATT : (919) 261-1706 > >> 1261 Duck Road OMNET: s.elgar > >> Kitty Hawk, NC 27949 internet: elgar(a)eecs.wsu.edu > >> > >> > >> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.7 iQCVAwUBLtCzSlzvpSsKhLftAQEvLgQApXWCmyqkp2gh66Kpfk7EQk0XQL9aqb3b i18QnfYFYYtzvK+wZHEtB+AR3ksZGDJ7RgNkRlB3JF1sFF1HnRhUOnjppJGCMqhY f0ZzrwEN+k0jHg6K3sfXdKCmbZ/CKdypc+eZW69Nh2WVtO/RPwIrKo/GlAVSzeK1 1pVXULR+qxE= =SUYe -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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New remailer concept.
by Jim Pinson 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

It occurs to me that most people have more to fear from their neighbors, than they do from the powerful TLA's. Knowing that you are hunting for a new job is not important to the world at large, but could be embarrassing if your current employer found out. Likewise, the people most interested in knowing about that sex list you subscribe to are your coworkers. The answer of course is encryption, but that is a problem when you are writing to your, well... , "crypto challenged" friends. Also, two way encrypted messages to most discussion lists is not possible (to my knowledge). To address these problems I suggest the creation of "crypto remailers". They would work like this: You subscribe to the remailer by sending a request including the account name you wish. This could be either a real name (jpinson) or a pseudonym (lizard). You would also include in the subscription request a copy of your public key. Assuming there are no name collisions with existing users, you would get back a message of acceptance, and a copy of the remailers public key. To use the remailer, you would create a message containing as the first line a "request remail to: USERNAME" , followed by your message. You then encrypt the message with the remailers public key and send it to the "remail" account at the remailer. The remailer then decodes the message you sent, and sends it to its destination as plain text. It sets the "from" field to your account name on the remailer. The recipient of your message can then reply to your remail account in plain text, with no need for any "remail to " commands or special processing. A .forward pipe on your remailer account would run a Perl script to encode the message to you with your public key, and send it to your real address. (for security it could set the "from" field to something other than your remail account name) The advantage is that you have total protection at your end. All mail to and from the remail account is encrypted. You could now subscribe to lists, and receive mail from lists, without your local administrator knowing anything about them. This last feature could be useful for students at universities that limit access. Is there anything like this out there already? Jim Pinson Charles Darwin Research Station, Galapagos

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C.I.D.
by anonymous-remailer＠shell.portal.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Multiple recipients of list <cypherpunks>: Some Happy Fool asked how we could defeat caller ID 'cause the *67 still sends along the calling number between switches (it just doesn't display it, but that is not the same as it not being available to the bad guys - *69 will still work, regardless). The discussion should probably be taken off the list, so please direct replies to me personally (or better: let us know of a more appropriate forum. I am disappointed in alt.hackers and 2600 really sucks, are there better places to go with this kind of stuff? Anybody?) To Happy Fool et al: I've got the specs for a program to use with your modem to generate what'll resemble a full CID. So with the computer set up to dial, even standard voice calls too and faxes, too, can be equipped with a fake field (or "header" if you will), displaying a homemade caller ID. Since it uses the exact same structure as the real caller ID, no telco along the entire system will ever doubt it. I can send the full specifications if you are seriously interested in doing the code in full or in part. Sorry, I can't implement it myself (lack of skills). If we get the thing running, it will dial any number and send the counterfeit header along with the call, making the telco switch believe it is dealing with a forwarded call. The beauty of it all is that this way, it will not insert its own header (it only does so when no previous CID header is detected). This is not just for use on the U-S Signaling System 7, because SS7 is now an international standard. Many countries are far more computerized than the U-S. In parts of Europe, some 95% of all areas now have digital switches. Caller ID is probably the most anticipated and feared part of these systems. This service, only available in digital areas, keeps track of the last 10 numbers that called and the time and date they did so. Example: Let's say you are in a digital area. You call a friend with a caller ID device (costing ~=$40). Between the first and second ring, they have your number. It's as easy as that. He doesn't even have to pick up the phone. Even busy calls or calls where no-one is home are registered! WARNING: When whole nations are digitalized, ANY system you call pegs you within 5 seconds of your call. What about diverters, call forwarders and stuff like that? They won't work. To cheat them, you need to produce fake headers. So if the software is not already written, let's write it. Volunteers? @@@@ This message has been brought to you by @ .. @ PETE "THE WIMP" WATKINS...BASICALLY SPINELESS(tm) | __ | \__/ <---Digitized representation of Pete Watkins My e-mail address is <mg5n+alias!wimp(a)andrew.cmu.edu>

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Re: Admiral Inman
by wcs＠anchor.ho.att.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Peter Wayner writes: > I've always assumed that the excitement behind the Digital Telephony > bill was to go after VoicePGP. Not really - Digital Telephony goes after the phone companies, not the end users, which makes it easier for the government to impose. Among other people it *is* going after are cellphone companies which are getting a lot of pressure to include encryption on their radio links (some people are pressuring them to use *real* encryption, the NSA has been pressuring them to use at most wimpy encryption, and some people have been pressuring them to put in _anything_, even rot-13, just so there's _some_ vague privacy protection out there.) It's also, of course, going after carriers who have the _gall_ to use more powerful telephone systems than the FBI can afford to crack :-) Now, VoicePGP may be the next step in banning things - after all, they could declare use of cryptography to be Probable Cause that you're conspiring about something, which would let them confiscate your computer equipment and make you sue to get it back. Bill

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Re: New Opportunity for Anonymous Reamilers
by jgrubs＠voxbox.norden1.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- alex <cp(a)omaha.com> writes: > > I guess this should mean some more business to my friends at > > Pagesat, which broadcasts a completely uncensored real time feed of the > > USENET over a small dish Ku band satellite link to all of North America. > > And they are a real licensed common carrier (their principle business is > > wide area paging services) so they can't be held responsible for the > > contents of the traffic either. > > Do you need to be licensed to be a common carrier? If so, who grants the > licenses, and what qualifications does a business need to meet in order > to qualify? The FCC regulates interstate common carriers (plus radio licensing of the microwave/satellite uplinks). State public utility commissions also control certain aspects of intrastate service. I don't know if they have any say in satellite service to intrastate customers. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBLtFJgd74r4kaz3mVAQGmbQQAhitU7vGX9OAsEm/grTDWciBf1MlEhV2L +sBf3OcB/GjYuiIuWftH+Qn7E46nzIRC4gTNz+Ibo5ouwkjyggcuVtNyXhFgvXZm hJH+EHz0X1MqqwTkF7fQPv7QPxGwqHI4vbQANeCBnM0eKDAe+r9/wnGPIn2ODdu8 gzLHBQuQlVo= =zac0 -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- ... "The greatest dangers to liberty lurk in the insidious encroachment of men of zeal, well meaning but without understanding." - Justice Louis Brandeis -- jgrubs(a)voxbox.norden1.com (James C. Grubs, W8GRT) Voxbox Enterprises, 6817 Maplewood Ave., Sylvania, Ohio 43560-1956 Tel.: 419/882-2697

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Re: Admiral Inman
by jgrubs＠voxbox.norden1.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- jamiel(a)sybase.com (Jamie Lawrence) writes: > >replied that the governmental concern about wiretaps was and is primarily > >and unambiguously about narcotics. > > and > > >Back to Narcotics. He gave the statistic that 90% of the narcotics leads > >related to money laundering come from domestic wiretaps. > > Wow, this is easy then: legalize drugs and wiretaps are practically > unessessary. Buy a copy of High Times today! ;) > > It does amaze me that what can be a victimless activity is such > a hotbutton. Drugs are victimless? What about crack babies, which cost a million dollars EACH in medical care, btw. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBLtFKT974r4kaz3mVAQGRFQP7BTRsuovvI8ZEb7mty/5as+ranbCph3ix 7XxFyuL7p8O209RKWfH7X1thvO8fmURaWHdEawBLtCorgLWYSe6T8uumVZHFfLXt clyScxRYacEVuI59P0/9Xi1x8ggecQt3s0ckv8IKSA1DfR5C0e/O8bap7wysCxd8 Q5cDTSC1lKs= =IEwo -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- ... "The greatest dangers to liberty lurk in the insidious encroachment of men of zeal, well meaning but without understanding." - Justice Louis Brandeis -- jgrubs(a)voxbox.norden1.com (James C. Grubs, W8GRT) Voxbox Enterprises, 6817 Maplewood Ave., Sylvania, Ohio 43560-1956 Tel.: 419/882-2697

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usenet -> mail gateway
by skaplin＠skypoint.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- In view of the situation at CMU and McGill a stray idea crossed my mind. If someone were to set up some mailing lists which routed the content of the particular usenet group to the subscribers, this would stymie big brother to a certain extent. The problem would be that they could possibly block certain domains from incoming e-mail to thwart this. A solution would be to dummy up the from address. Daily the address would or could change, thus frustrating the powers that be. An additional solution would be to throw encryption into the list software so that each message would be encrypted to it's recipient, further frustrating the powers. Another concept would be to daily blast an encrypted packet (SOUP or whatever) to the subscribers of the list. They could then post replies or follow ups through a mail -> usenet gateway. ============================================================================== Doing easily what others find difficult is talent; doing what is impossible for talent is genius. - Henri-Frdric Amiel, "Journal", 1883 ============================================================================== skaplin(a)skypoint.com | "...vidi vici veni" - Overheard | outside a Roman brothel. PGP encrypted mail is accepted and | preferred. | Change is the only constant in the | Universe..."Four quarters, please." E-mail key(a)four11.com for PGP Key or | Finger skaplin(a)mirage.skypoint.com | Smile!! Big brother is watching. ============================================================================== -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBLtFh7gpnimeWAf3FAQFXdAP7ByfEkiuGGzcBYiu7zyT63l4sHYKjiQkl 2Xv4yD0cEh/84QqPZzFayhCBCaSi7prrUWP19QjmJfZPqwIIE2t9mU0QGOvelID2 Qxeg9rYEJtTFRroFDfS6at0GbkfBeNwqyI61St1sZucFXfJx/LJxsC1Z2oylzJMO 7/OAdSG5Xqo= =AXTD -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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(Fwd) electronic signatures for CAD
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Forwarding <alt.architecture> message by tommy(a)Fateepee.CAM.ORG -------------------- From: tommy(a)Fateepee.CAM.ORG (Tommy Petrogiannis) Subject: Re: electronic signatures Date: Mon, 21 Nov 94 17:08:06 -0500 Organization: SILANIS TECHNOLOGY >On 5 Nov 1994 18:44:14 GMT, >Aaron Rumple, AIA <rcet035.slvaxa.umsl.edu> wrote: >Electronic signatures will not make for a paperless environment. They will >add to the lawyers generation of paper when you have to defend yourself >because your file became the basis of another project in which you were >not involved. Once you send a electronic/magnetic form of a document you >lose all control over who has access and what they do to your files. You >can protect yourself in your contract with your client and by making >hardcopy (more paper) the drawing of record. However, anybody can and will >sue if your title block, signature, etc. is found when something goes >wrong. It has happened. >In short, an electonic signature is nice to protect what you sent >electronically, but I would not want it to replace my seal on a paper copy >that could be kept as a record. Forensics can detect changes on paper but >not on electronic files that have been transmitted around. I have to voice the comments that our customers are saying about our electronic approval software for AutoCAD. Many of our customers are still archiving a paper copy of the electronically signed original, however because ERA allows them to sign in the same environment as where the drawing was created (i.e. the electronic environment) it becomes a very simple matter to know if the drawing that you are looking at on your computer screen is the latest electronic approved original. Most companies today create their drawing on a CAD system, plot those drawings for visual verification and sign those drawings in the paper world. The minute those drawings are signed in the paper world they become "originals" that must now be archived and stored in some form of filing cabinet. If we did not need to refer to those archived drawings life would be fine, but unfortunately we do. Today you pull up a drawing on your computer and hope that everyone followed proper procedures and you are looking at the latest copy of the paper signed "original" - you can never be sure because the drawing was approved in a different domain than where it was created, and the only thing linking the two domains (paper and electronic) is procedures. Our ERA system was first designed to be used by a large nuclear generating facility and is now available to the public. What we did was mimick the paper world as much as possible when it came to approving a drawing. With ERA you now approve and sign a document from right inside AutoCAD using a ball point pen and a pressure sensitive digitizer. The key thing here is to allow the approval of the drawing to take place in the same domain as where the drawing was created (i.e. the electronic domain) but still offer all the security expected in the paper world (if not more), and still maintain the ability to generate a signed drawing that can be used in the field or be archived. This is achieved by doing the following: The persons' signatures are not AutoCAD entities and therefore cannot be cut and pasted. The signatures are DES encrypted along with time stamp info and information that uniquely describes the current state of the drawing being approved. The signatures will not be printed on a drawing that has been altered after the drawing was signed. All of the above plus a whole lot more are meant to facilitate the creation of paper, but eliminate the need to go find that paper afterwards - sort of producing a photocopy. The original is in the electronic domain, while the paper becomes a redundant copy. The benefits are HUGE. A drawing can now be sent electronically from desk to desk to be approved. A drawing can be retrieved electronically and by simply clicking on VERIFY our customers can check to see if they are looking at the drawing that was approved or if someone has accidentally or maliciously altered an original rev. We have had such great response to ERA product for AutoCAD that we just announced at COMDEX our ERA product for MS Word so that any wordprocessor type document can be approved in the same fashion. I apologize for rambling on, but I believe that we have really solved the last issue required to achieve the ability of creating, revising, and approving in an electronic domain. One customer went from a 7 week typical approval cycle down to 8 days using this technology - how much is that worth don't really know, but it makes a lot of sense. People don't realize that they are performing electronic approvals every day. When you walk up to an ATM machine and withdraw $100, by entering your PIN you are authorizing the withdrawl to take place. The question every company must ask, is how secure do I feel with the technology. Can someone take my bank card and figure out my PIN to forge my electronic authorization? Yes but it is difficult - not impossible. Can someone forge my handwritten signature? Yes but it is difficult - not impossible. What I tell our customers is to use the electronic approval for the projects where they feel comfortable - for many of them it is the internal based procedures and projects that requires 80% of the time and money and still use traditional methods for high-risk projects. It seems to work for them quite well. -- Tommy Petrogiannis tommy(a)Fateepee.CAM.ORG _ __o ______ `\<, Going slow just hurts too much. -- O/ O Going fast gets me there sooner - so I can... recover from the pain quicker ------------------- End Forward

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Cell Phones Security??
by werewolf＠io.org 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

As one who will be shopping for a cell phone in the next week, what should I look for in terms of security? What features are available in phones on the market....if any?

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Re: Admiral Inman
by dwa＠mirage.svl.trw.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> > From owner-cypherpunks(a)toad.com Mon Nov 21 17:49:07 1994 > Date: Mon, 21 Nov 94 20:17:47 EST > From: wcs(a)anchor.ho.att.com (bill.stewart(a)pleasantonca.ncr.com +1-510-484-6204) > To: pcw(a)access.digex.net > Subject: Re: Admiral Inman > Cc: cypherpunks(a)toad.com > Sender: owner-cypherpunks(a)toad.com > Content-Length: 1071 > > Peter Wayner writes: > > I've always assumed that the excitement behind the Digital Telephony > > bill was to go after VoicePGP. > > Not really - Digital Telephony goes after the phone companies, > not the end users, which makes it easier for the government to impose. > Among other people it *is* going after are cellphone companies which > are getting a lot of pressure to include encryption on their radio links > (some people are pressuring them to use *real* encryption, the NSA has > been pressuring them to use at most wimpy encryption, and some people have > been pressuring them to put in _anything_, even rot-13, just so there's > _some_ vague privacy protection out there.) > It's also, of course, going after carriers who have the _gall_ to use > more powerful telephone systems than the FBI can afford to crack :-) > > Now, VoicePGP may be the next step in banning things - after all, > they could declare use of cryptography to be Probable Cause that > you're conspiring about something, which would let them confiscate your > computer equipment and make you sue to get it back. > > Bill > Check out: TIA/EIA Telecommunications System Bulletin Cellular Radiotelecommunications Intersystem Operations: Authentication, Signaling Message Encryption and Voice Privacy TSB51 Their idea of "Voice Privacy" is to repeatedly XOR a 260 bit session key with the data stream. I quote: 8.2.47 VoicePrivacyMask (VPMASK) This parameter contains a 528-bit field consisting of two 260-bit masks used for voice privacy on a digital traffic channel. One mask is for speech transferred in the inward direction (from the CSS toward the MSC) and one is for speech transferred in the outward direction (from the MSC toward the CSS). These masks are calculated using CAVE parameters in effect when the call is established and remain constant for the duration of the call. So, while analog calls are not encrypted, you can look forward to COMPLETELY SECURE (sarcasm) digital transmission. Wonder how much the Gov'mint bribed the phone companies for this stunt... Dana W. Albrecht dwa(a)mirage.svl.trw.com

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Re: A Chance Encounter with Brad Templeton, of ClariNet
by mkj＠october.ducktown.org 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Adam Shostack wrote: > There is an entire parasitic > class that does nothing useful, but makes money from the idea of > copyright. (Most entertainment industries operate like this. The > industry puts up seed money in exchange for the profits that an artist > generates.) Books, music, film to a lesser extent are all in the path > of a digital revolution which eliminates the need for a middleman. If > I can download music to DAT, I don't need Sony records. Neither does > Peter Gabriel, Robert Fripp or any other musician. The above is a key insight into what I see as one of the biggest issues of the next couple of decades, certainly one of the biggest issues affecting the networks. A battle is looming between public freedoms on the nets, and powerful copyright-based economic interests. Such a battle is very apt to turn the networks into a minefield of impossible laws, ubiquitous surveillance and unending litigation. Note that the Clinton/Gore administration, and its Information Infrastructure Task Force (IITF), have already taken the (in my opinion extreme and unrealistic) position that intellectual property laws must be not merely preserved but *strengthened* and *expanded* in the context of the National Information Infrastructure. (See the report of the IITF's Intellectual Property Working Group, as well as other relevant reports available at iitf.doc.gov.) And I see no reason to hope that Congress will take a different approach. Such a battle could have far-reaching implications. Taken to its logical conclusions, a "War on Piracy" could make the "War on Drugs" look benign (and inexpensive) by comparison. Averting this disaster may be one of the most important challenges facing the cypherpunks. Just my two cents' worth. --- mkj

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more on twwells
by an234＠vox.xs4all.nl 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- The discussion we've seen here re the reputation of the anon server at twwells.com has found its way to the a.s.a.r. newsgroup. Most, if not all, of the thread has been posted there via the khijol anon-server, including Tim's repost of Mr. Wells' remarks to the list. These posts to a.s.a.r. evidently prompted this from Mr. Wells: >Sat, 19 Nov 1994 10:11:29 >alt.sexual.abuse.recovery >Phui! >bill(a)twwells.com <T. William Wells at None, Mt. Laurel, NJ> > >I'm having a nice time at a science fiction convention and a brand >new, well paying job to return to Monday, and other good things >are happening in my life. I'm not going to let Ed and the cohort >of Wells-bashers spoil things for me. I won't play, and that's >that. > >I know that some of you will be concerned about what they're >saying. If you are, you can send me e-mail and ask whatever you >want. Alternately, there are plenty of people on asar who are not >involved in this whole mess, who will give you straight, unbiased >answers. > >I can be reached at: bill(a)twwells.com, admin(a)anon.twwells.com, or, >anonymously, at anon-0(a)anon.twwells.com. > >Other than that, I'm out of this. The khijol server, being little >more than a blind for Ed and his own, I'm killfiling entirely, as >well as the threads concerning my server (including this one). If >there is going to be yet another (this has been going on for over >two years!) anon server flame-war, I will not be a part of it. > >Take care everyone, and may you find the healing you need. And the posts have apparently caused one user of Wells' service to become a former-user: >Sat, 19 Nov 1994 00:21:55 >alt.sexual.abuse.recovery >Re: T. Wells Anon Service--His Comments >laurahelen(a)delphi.com <Laura Helen at Delphi> > >T W Wells writes: >>> >>>I provide a service to people who, at least in specific areas, >>>are not rational, who are definitely irrational. I know of, for >>>example, one person who went into convulsions simply because they >>>received e-mail from a person who, many years ago, had abused a >>>child. >>> > >this sounds like my fucking father -- I want more respect than this. >No I am not the person he's referring to but I trust an anon server to >be neutral, forward messages and not make highly personal and judgemental >comments on survivors. Fuck him. I'm not using that server any more. > >I suppose this will be labelled "irrational" by some. > >I don't even believe in a separation between the head and the heart. > >It's pretty warped. > >I feel betrayed. > > Laura N. Cognito =-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-= N. Cognito "Don't put no constrictions on da people. an234(a)vox.xs4all.nl Leave 'em ta hell alone." -- J. Durante =-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-= public key available via keyserver -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBLtDWTqL3ipYu3mvVAQHa3wP+MqLly0c3PGbQKOOKI3cEjFVhMBx3aQYf P6/MAaim41+EoL7CTk1TQszSpTeGDwHm8axUeAhManAuPzEBRbLdh6pvFTrnZ3Om 0j2HXDH5zrRHvL8lTRrWtFnK5/VVWdttMGt4qe7YDbu4Ekm60MSagstly1DFfpo2 4l9wiUMEJtc= =MItJ -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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PGP for VMS
by Tony.Gurnick＠nzdairy.co.nz 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Can anyone tell me where I can get a copy of PGP for vms? AXP or VAX. T

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Re: A Chance Encounter with Brad Templeton, of ClariNet
by adam.philipp＠ties.org 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>> (For one thing, the ECPA protects the mail, and allows the machine >> owner to adopt a "hands off" stance. For another, an "abused account" >> can simply and quickly be killed, with new ones taking its place! >> Think of the benefits.) >> >I'm not sure the ECPA provides the protection you want here. I'll have >to look again, and do not assert this as certain, because I'm only >pulling of the top of my head what I remember from a quick scan of the >Steve Jackson Games opinion. > >Anyone want to repost it? I recall it limited the ECPA in some >interesting way, and I remember being offened, and not surprised at the >narrow reading. The ECPA offers two levels of protection to e-mail, transmitted e-mail and stored e-mail. The some mail on Illuminati (Steve Jackson's BBS) had been sent but had not been read by the intended recipients. The the first trial found that the there had been a violation of the ECPA with regard to the section on stored mail, but not on transmitted mail. It narrowly defined the transmitted section to include only interception contemporaneous with transmission with the e-mail. Sine the mail had been sitting around on the hard disk, the court refused to call it interception. If anyone really cannot find a copy of the ECPA I can go search for my ASCII edition, but right now I only have a hard copy lying around somewhere on this desk. Adam -- PGP Key available on the keyservers. Encrypted E-mail welcome. Sub rosa: Confidential, secret, not for publication. -Black's Law Dictionary

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San Diego CYPHERPUNKS symposium (11/30)
by Claborne, Chris 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- CPUNKS symposium this next Wed, November 30. Invitation to all Cypherpunks to join the San Diego crowd at Hops Brewery were I hope to discuss "What's your fingerprint?" and other related topics. Don't forget to bring your public key fingerprint. If you can figure out how to get it on the back of a business card, that would be cool (mailing labels work). Place: Hops Brewery at the UTC Mall Time:1800 Directions: University Town Center is at 805 and La Jolla Village Drive. From 805 head west until you get to Genesee and make a left. On Genesee make a left at the first light and turn into the mall. Hops will be directly in front of you. Recon shows that there are lots of alternative locations with lots of tables close by. Try to be there by 1830, as we may decide to move the meeting. I will be standing wearing a BRIGHT PURPLE BICYCLING JACKET. See you there! 2 - -- C -- P.S. Tell your wife/husband you are going to a symposium. Unless she/he looks in the dictionary, she/he won't know that your are really going to a drinking party! BEWARE: There is an anarchist in the group! ... __o .. -\<, chris.claborne(a)sandiegoca.ncr.com ...(*)/(*). CI$: 76340.2422 PGP Pub Key fingerprint = A8 FA 55 92 23 20 72 69 52 AB 64 CC C7 D9 4F CA Avail on Pub Key server. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.7 iQCVAwUBLtC70lzvpSsKhLftAQFD8QQAgpwkFYVjvJnLwGGojX8mPJN/fAHKdfIY HDx9mkIf5uNjiQ8dxWtbaVn8RLFHQy3+mMzMXEeXv5jkzoJO3otgR0dkEbIQIxHT +VgO/GtVsS9MK30COCT6vzAYo+aKZ+lClty72ONoG1PcE11KpXz3kfhalb25Jsqk cPTKcJt20f0= =/7oB -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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RE: San Diego CYPHERPUNKS symposium (11/30)
by Claborne, Chris 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

---------- >From: Claborne, Chris >To: cypherpunks >Cc: 'Cottrell, Lance'; Karn, Phil; Maher, Kevin; Philipp, Adam; Tocher, John; >Witham, Philip >Subject: San Diego CYPHERPUNKS symposium (11/30) >Date: Monday, November 21, 1994 10:25AM > >-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- > > >CPUNKS symposium this next Wed, November 30. > Because I'm not currently receiving mail from the CP list (I don't know what's wrong), please respond directly to me. Thanks ... __o .. -\<, chris.claborne(a)sandiegoca.ncr.com ...(*)/(*). CI$: 76340.2422 PGP Pub Key fingerprint = A8 FA 55 92 23 20 72 69 52 AB 64 CC C7 D9 4F CA Avail on Pub Key server. PGP-encrypted e-mail welcome!

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Guerrilla Remailers
by skaplin＠skypoint.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Has anyone else given thought to "Guerrilla Remailers?" Basically someone obtains an account on one of the freenets or similar free account, sets up a remailer and lets it sit for a while. (Until telnet and/or phone logs are overwritten) After this time frame the address of the remailer is posted. The remailer then would be used until it is shut down by the Powers that be. The account would be set up under a bogus name etc. This would make the remailer the ideal candidate for the last hop in a remailer chain. (After all if they can't find Juanna DuBone or Jack Mehoff they can't apply any pressure to them or hold them responsible. It seems to me the extent of pressure in this case would be just to shut down the remailer) Just keep a few ahead and keep leap frogging, as one is shut down another is put on line. ============================================================================== A man either lives life as it happens to him, meets it head-on and licks it, or he turns his back on it and starts to wither away. -- Dr. Boyce, "The Menagerie" ("The Cage"), stardate unknown ============================================================================== skaplin(a)skypoint.com | "...vidi vici veni" - Overheard | outside a Roman brothel. PGP encrypted mail is accepted and | preferred. | Change is the only constant in the | Universe..."Four quarters, please." E-mail key(a)four11.com for PGP Key or | Finger skaplin(a)mirage.skypoint.com | Smile!! Big brother is watching. ============================================================================== -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBLtHIWApnimeWAf3FAQGLYAQAgon4d7tKmj1qKJuzSHrZUVhULJKEj7AF vdIA4Ul2H/M3Sv3eP4CPPzCZTVun2ani5k0OhF9pM1cg8coTpepGTF/cGdBEhfN5 /YLkDteMAqqnVu6YxCuLwUDvtHm5QUj1Qj+VM8tTgivfbFnGgcLuu2wx+5XQ7FAP bPSwRLwGGXE= =jOD3 -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: Admiral Inman
by frissell＠panix.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 08:30 PM 11/21/94 EST, Jim Grubs, W8GRT wrote: >> It does amaze me that what can be a victimless activity is such >> a hotbutton. > >Drugs are victimless? What about crack babies, which cost a million >dollars EACH in medical care, btw. > Just as I could not sue my parents for being dumb commies who would send me to government schools (not that they are or did), I could not sue my parents for using crack. One takes one's parents as one finds them (at Common Law in any case). The medical care cost *can* be blamed on the government that exacts payments for it. DCF

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Re: NYT on MCI Net Shop
by habs＠warwick.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> > > Interestingly, our MCI salesman has told us they cannot offer Internet > > Access.. e.g, we can't buy a T1 line (for example) from them... > > Ack, Pfft! Little Garden is in the process of getting about 3 T1s from MCI. Now they finallly admited to offering the service... We had a meeting last week where they claimed not to offer this service... /hawkk

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Re: Admiral Inman
by Rich Salz 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> I recall hearing that Inman lost a tremendous amount of credibility in the > government and the media during the confimation; He lost even more during his rambling, almost incoherent "I'm withdrawing my name" speech, which apparently took the administration by surprise and wherein he sounded like a paranoid Perot as a victim of drug experiments. Followup articles explained things like "hey, MCC isn't such a sterling success as we all first thought." Even if he were willing to be a spokesman, it'd probably hurt the cause. /r$

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Re: Admiral Inman
by Connie Sadler (415)725-7703 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Subject: Re: Admiral Inman From: "Connie Sadler"@MR.STANFORD.EDU Date: Tue, 22 Nov 1994 07:58:00 PDT A1-type: DOCUMENT Posting-date: Tue, 22 Nov 1994 00:00:00 PDT In list.cypherpunks, jgrubs(a)voxbox.norden1.com writes: > jamiel(a)sybase.com (Jamie Lawrence) writes: > >> It does amaze me that what can be a victimless activity is such >> a hotbutton. > > Drugs are victimless? What about crack babies, which cost a million > dollars EACH in medical care, btw. Exactly! And this is just one example of the victims. What about the extremely high rate of crime motivated by the need for drugs? I have personally been a victim twice (theft of my car and *nice stereo system* and a breakin to my house where much was taken) in crimes which appeared to be motivated by the the need for drugs. I don't see where legalizing drugs would motivate addicts to start working to legitimately pay for their habits. CJS

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NYT on DNA Compute
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

If anyone wants to know the NYT has a longish article today on Leonard Adleman's experiment using DNA as a molecular computer. It amplifies the Science article mentioned here earlier and quotes several computer scientists who praise the work. To see it, send a blank message with subject: DNA_la

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Borenstein Speech
by Rich Salz 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Nat Borenstein is speaking nearby on Monday. OPEN PROTOCOLS FOR INFORMATION COMMERCE Nathaniel Borenstein, Chief Scientist First Virtual Holdings Inc. Traditional one-way payment mechanisms, such as cash, credit cards, and digital cash, presuppose the necessity of payment validation in advance of the completion of a transaction. In contrast, a "closed loop" protocol that verifies both payment information and customer satisfaction permits a far simpler payment engine in an open Internet environment, and is well-suited to a broad sub-class of Internet commerce applications. In this talk, I will present the underlying philosophy, design rationale, and specification overview for a recently-developed set of open protocols for information commerce. Send me questions :-)

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Wired Whitehall
by m5＠vail.tivoli.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Has anyone heard off or seen a report by a UK firm called "Kable" entitled "Wired Whitehall 1999"? I've just been looking at a summary of parts of it, and it seems scary: national ID cards and a concept called "Single Citizen's Account" for management of money flow from (and certainly to) the government. This fits with what Levy described as the low-resistance path most likely to be taken for online money schemes: more visibility, less privacy. | GOOD TIME FOR MOVIE - GOING ||| Mike McNally <m5(a)tivoli.com> | | TAKE TWA TO CAIRO. ||| Tivoli Systems, Austin, TX: | | (actual fortune cookie) ||| "Like A Little Bit of Semi-Heaven" |

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