December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: Fortress Remailers
by macorp!moonlight!ken＠uu4.psi.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Could one set up a virtual remailer that floated around a set of news groups? The active remailer would pass an encrypted token to a randomly chosen member of the set which would become the remailer for the next interval. A compromized member of the set might then eat the token, rendering th remailer inoperative, but maybe that could be overcome. Although I don't have much more than a layman's grasp of cryptography my basic thought is to consider the set of potential mailers the way one would consider some known element in a cryptographic scheme, such as a randomly accessed lookup table, so that if a cracker couldn't determine the next element in the table, she couldn't determine where the remailer would be next, either.

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Re: 3DES
by GRABOW_GEOFFREY＠tandem.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>Quick question. There's a brief mention in Applied Cryptography that >triple DES uses: > > Eabc(x) = Ea(Db(Ec(x))) > >as opposed to: > > Eabc(x) = Ea(Eb(Ec(x))) > >in order to preserve some symmetry properties. Can anyone give a >better explanation? I thought it goes like this: Eab(x) = Ea(Db(Ea(x))) Anyone? G.C.G. ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ | Geoffrey C. Grabow | "What we demand are rigidly defined | | Oyster Bay, New York | areas of doubt and uncertainty!" | | | -------------------- | | grabow_geoffrey(a)tandem.com | Clipper, SkipJack & Digital Telephony | | | JUST SAY NO!!! | |----------------------------------------------------------------------| |PGP 2.6 fingerprint = AA 9E 35 12 F8 93 72 8D 1C E5 D5 BC 74 BE 49 D3| ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

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FABIO META: cartoon transcript
by sw＠smds.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

"Fox Trot," by Bill Amend, for Wed, Sept. 28, 1994: Computer: WELCOME TO COMPUNET. YOU HAVE 65,031 WAITING MESSAGES. Kid: [pause with pensive expression] Maybe setting my username to "Fabio" wasn't such a hot idea. Computer: DIANE(a)NASA.GOV WISHES TO CHAT. LUCILLE(a)OSU.EDU WISHES TO CHAT. JOYCE(a)UPS.COM WISHES TO CHAT. ... --Steve

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IN H.O.T. WATER
by Sandy Sandfort 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ SANDY SANDFORT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . C'punks, How exciting! My first anti-fan, Rishab Aiyer Ghosh wrote: Sandy's H.E.A.T was hard enough on my poor 'D' key; I hope ... yada, yada, yada ... While I agree that "Beach Clash" *is* too far afield (sorry, David), I have a serious and a *seemingly* not-so-serious reason for "reviewing" Acapulco H.E.A.T. MY SERIOUS REASON--The world does not see cryptography and related privacy technologies as do the Cypherpunks. Most folks "learn" about crypto from popular culture (e.g., TV and movies) and, to a lesser extent, the popular press. When we try to persuade others to support strong crypto, we have to know what *they* know (and don't know), if we are to be effective. MY REAL REASON--Cypherpunks is not just a mailing list. It is a wired community of people with strong, commonly held beliefs concerning privacy. The problem is, the intensity of our beliefs and the ultimate seriousness of what's at stake, can lead to a negative, siege mentality. I believe there is a place, in every community of fellow travelers, for humor and humanity. That's one of the reasons that physical meeting are so important. If you've been to one, you know that it isn't all strategy and tactics; there is also fellowship. After a Cypherpunks meeting, many attendees go out for dinner together. In California, we even--god forbid--"bond." (Not valid in Arizona, Kansas, Kentucky or where prohibited by law. Your mileage may differ. If pain persists, consult a physician.) Acapulco H.E.A.T., with dubious crypto and suspect technology, has become an inside joke for Cypherpunks. When we watch it, we see things the average person misses. This is something we share, and something that helps create the lighter side of Cypherpunk culture. S a n d y P.S. I'm serious. ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

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NYT on TLA Rot
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Today's NY Times has front page article and editorial on a congressional study to be done on the need for the CIA and reassessment of eleven other intelligence agencies. Says funds for the study were included in recent $28 billlion package for intelligence. One excerpt: "Throughout the cold war, the nation needed a great intelligence service, and by and large, it got one," said Allen Goodman, a former CIA official and dean of the School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University. "But from about 1985 onward nobody's been able to say if they are good or bad, and from 1990 onward nobody's been able to say exactly why we need them." End excerpt. Bet many "national threats" are in the offing. Email available for the NYT-impaired. John

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Digicash Palo Alto
by Hal 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Just browsing www.digicash.com, I see a relatively new web page with some info on various employees. They also mentioned that there is a U.S. office, DigiCash Inc 701 Welch Road, Suite 323 Palo Alto, CA 94304 USA tel +1-415 321 0300 fax +1-415 321 0322 Bay area CP's might want to check this out (unless it is already common knowledge). (I notice Chaum has his own picture and initials on the DigiCash coins in the graphics!) Hal

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3DES
by pstemari＠bismark.cbis.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Quick question. There's a brief mention in Applied Cryptography that triple DES uses: Eabc(x) = Ea(Db(Ec(x))) as opposed to: Eabc(x) = Ea(Eb(Ec(x))) in order to preserve some symmetry properties. Can anyone give a better explanation?

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groups
by pstemari＠bismark.cbis.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Another quick question. Frequently when discussing a cypher the question of whether it is a group arises. In the absence of further definition, is it safe to assume that the set of elements for this group is the cyphers with each possible key and that the operation for this group is composition? Paul

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Re: Quantum Cryptography Biblio.
by chen＠intuit.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

As an addendum to the bibliography that Tim Cole posted, there are three good papers in the July 1993 edition of _Physical Review A_ (vol. 48 no. 1): "Information-theoretic limits to quantum cryptography" by Stephen M. Barnett and Simon J.D. Phoenix, "Quantum cryptography without conjugate coding" by Simon J.D. Phoenix, and "Quantum computers and intractable (NP-complete) computing problems" by Vladimir Cerny. - Mark - -- Mark Chen chen(a)netcom.com 415/329-6913 finger for PGP public key D4 99 54 2A 98 B1 48 0C CF 95 A5 B0 6E E0 1E 1D

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re: new rules: filing electronic tax returns
by Martin Minow 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

In an note to Cypherpunks, LaurenN(a)wri.org notes that the IRS will require fingerprints (and other information) for people filing tax returns electronically. My understanding is that this refers to professional tax preparers. Note that individuals are currently filing "electronically" by sending their return to an agency, such as the MacInTax people. The problem the IRS faced, as I understand it from a brief report on NPR, is that there was a lot of fraud going around -- people filing bogus returns with refunds, then disappearing with the money. LaurenN also wondered why CPA's and lawyers are exempt -- I would imagine that this is because their identity is known through their professional licensing. Just my speculation. Martin Minow minow(a)apple.com

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More quantum references.
by Doug Shapter 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

This appeared on sci.crypt.research, so many on the list may have already seen it. For those that haven't (thanks and credit to Tim Cole) : As one reply to the thread on Quantum Cryptography, I have put together this bibliography of what I could find on the subject about 1 year ago. If there are other references that are not included here, I, and I suspect other readers of this group, would be very interested in those references. Anyway, here is the list: 1. Blow, K.J., S.J.D. Phoenix, On a fundamental theorem of quantum cryptography, Jnl. of Modern Optics, Vol. 40, No. 1 (Jan. 93),pp 33-6. 2. Brassard, G., C.H. Bennett, Quantum Cryptography, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Vol.325, 1988, pp. 79-90. 3. Bennett, C.H., G. Brassard and N.D. Mermin, Quantum Cryptography without Bell's Theorem, Physiacl Review Letters, Vol. 68, No. 5 (3 Feb. 92), pp. 557-9. 4. Bennett, C.H., Quantum Cryptography Using Any To Nonorthogonal States, Physical Reveiew Letters, Vol. 68, No. 21 (25 May 92), pp. 3121-4. 5. Bennett, C.H., Quantum Cryptography: Uncertainty in the Service of Privacy, Science, Vol. 257, (7 August 92), pp. 752-3. 6. Ekert, A.K., J.G. Rarity, P.R. Tapster and G. M. Palma, Practical Quantum Cryptography Based on Two-Photon Interferometry,Physical Review Letters, Vol. 69, No. 9 (31 August 92), pp. 1293-5. 7. Werner, M.J. and G. J. Milburn, Eavesdropping using quantum nondemolition measurements, Physical Review A, Vol. 47, No. 1 (January 1993), pp. 639-41. 8. Stewart, I., Schrodingers Catflap, Nature, Vol. 353, (3 October 1991), pp. 384-5. 9. Bennett, C.H., G. Brassard and A. K. Ekert, Quantum Cryptography, Scientific American, October 1992, pp. 50-57. 10. Ekert, A.K.,Quantum Cryptography based on Bell's Theorem, Physical Review Letters, Vol. 67, No. 6 (5 August 91), pp. 661-3. 11. Bennett, C.H., F. Bessette, G. Brassard, L. Savalle and J. Smolin, Experimental Quantum Cryptography, Proceedings of Eurocrypt '90, also in Journal of Cryptology, Vol. 5, No. 1 (1992), pp. 3-28. 12. Bennett, C.H., G. Brassard, C. Crepeau and M-H. Skubiszewska, Practical Quantum Oblivious Transfer, Proceedings of Crypto '91. 13. Bennett, C.H., and G. Brassard, The Dawn of a new era for quantum cryptography: The experimental prototype is working !, SIGACT News, Vol. 20, No. 4 (Fall 1989), pp. 78-82. I hope this is a help to those of you just getting started. Many of the articles have their own bibliographies, but htese were the articles that I could find in my files. Again, I hope this helps. Tim Cole. Doug.

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What is the PGP key for WIEN ?
by nobody＠shell.portal.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Where can I find the key for the WIEN remailer? It's not on the chaos gopher go or on soda

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Cypherpunkspeople
by merriman＠metronet.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>| A(a)ron M. Freed s009amf(a)discover.wright.edu > >Well for me as a Daytonian living in the Midwest, I can hardly make the >journey out to SF every month. Maybe we could branch out Cypherpunk >groups as a SIG in different cities, so each city or region could have a >physical meeting once in a while. IT's so crazy it might work... > > Oo! Oo! Cue time for keysigning(s)! Works for me - anybody in the DFW area (other than me, that is :-) Dave Merriman - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Finger merriman(a)metronet.com for PGP/RIPEM public keys and fingerprints. Unencrypted Email may be ignored without notice to sender. PGP preferred. Remember: It is not enough to _obey_ Big Brother; you must also learn to *love* Big Brother.

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RE: H.O.T. WATER (Cold on Rishab)
by blancw＠pylon.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>From Sandy Sandfort: Acapulco H.E.A.T., with dubious crypto and suspect technology, has become an inside joke for Cypherpunks. When we watch it, we see things the average person misses. This is something we share, and something that helps create the lighter side of Cypherpunk culture. ...................................................... Yeah, Rishab. What about all that social-cyberspatial-culture philosophy stuff you write. Surely you see a relation here to the concepts of tribal and cyberspatial society? Blanc

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Fortress/Little Bro
by j.hastings6＠genie.geis.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- FORTRESS remailers should be disguised in some way: "DBN announced solemnly that it was everyone's duty to turn in all computers and radios to the authorities for the duration of the Emergency. Not many were impressed by this pronouncement unless you counted laughter. I'd hate to be on the side trying to confiscate everything. That cactus might be a combination photovoltaic cell and radio antenna with green chlorophyll-enriched paint. Or it might just be a cactus. Maybe that flag pole is a hidden shortwave antenna. Should we tear down our own flag? That car engine, vacuum cleaner, hospital centrifuge, or those countless damned white-noise decoys might be unauthorized spread-spectrum radio transmitters. Or not. The bitter end had come, but the Feds wouldnÕt back down..." Another Little Brother problem: "Consumers wanted businesses to 'get it' concerning their preferences, without any effort on their part. But they insisted on absolute individual privacy. A method of scanning the face was devised that could evaluate and report the emotional state of the viewers, without disclosing the identity of any particular viewer, via a blind-audit protocol. This compromise was accepted by most broadcast receiver customers. It was not generally known that the biggest consumer of collective emotional data was the Department of National Security. The data was purchased under a number of marketing research company names, then transmitted directly to DNS in real time, making it the most important tool DNS had for "the manufacturing of consent." A Presidential speech was broadcast, and the sum of the viewer reactions was received. The speech program was adaptive, so statements evoking the most positive response were generated, if they fell within the policy constraints set by the Directorate of the Department." Excerpts from "Revolution Is My Hobby" by me. Kent - j.hastings6(a)genie.geis.com Ham packet AX.25: WA6ZFY @ WB6YMH.#SOCA.CA.USA.NA -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.3 iQCVAgUBLoo7/DQYUX1dU7vxAQHYlQP/Sq2eIcPOFzae5L+IFu/sKLc7ssGAE18T bWuAIOOGVWwhT4GAgnxDnYiJjn2Azt9pCeTLpe4ppPQ88SS3hX9fkg4cNWF3rRd1 gKRn7w7cwBwPZhJuvHEMUno/KFsEizFYFzLSEISp4DETp2TWpkowh65RB/RRGFM+ RMiAR2s2bNw= =VRH0 -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: Anyone seen the 'quantum cryptanalysis' thread?
by frissell＠panix.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 12:11 PM 9/28/94 -0700, Timothy C. May wrote: >Alice switches to 15,000-bit moduli....the how much longer does it >take the Shor machine to do its thing? (Even if polynomial, what >factor?) > >I won't speculate further. The numbers are indeterminate, even to >Shor, I suspect. > >In any case, nothing for Cypherpunks to worry about in our lifetimes >(certainly not in my lifetime, and probably not in the lifetime of our >youngest members). It's easier to make an omlette out of eggs than to make eggs out of an omlette so encryption should remain well ahead of decryption. This differs from the popular view that decryption would eventually win the "war" with the encryption and devise a way of defeating *any* possible code/cipher. This "fact" was expressed in Edgar Rice Burroughs' Mars stories where he said that the Martians didn't use codes much because they were vulnerable. See also Sneakers in which we have a "black box" decyption device that can break any code. Also the guy who confronted me at the London conference last year and said "they broke the satellite movie coding system so why can't they break PGP?" I wonder where this idea comes from. DCF "Who was shocked, shocked by the end title sequence in Sneakers which features a newsreader describing how good commie liberals like the Robert Redford and Dan Ackroyd characters are using their decoding device to steal money from the Republican National Committee and transfer it to Greenpeace and all the usual suspects. Looks like those guys don't believe in democracy. That sort of thing is worse than the Watergate break in."

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BATF info...
by Jim choate 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

BATF now has a site located at: atf.ustreas.gov It contains the crime bill and quite a few other tid bits...

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(n!)modx ...
by Jim choate 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

The nth derivative of x^n is n! ...

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Think you're a hacker, eh?
by Bill Baker 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Well, the only thing the pseudohackers seem to be able to do is forge-cancel postings that make them feel bad. So here it is again, with some extra data at the bottom. mjr(a)tis.com (Marcus J Ranum) writes: > > Sidewinder: > > Internet Security That Strikes Back > > Security software that strikes back? This sounds > cool. Is it like tcp_wrappers with the -retaliate option? > > :) > > mjr. No, it's actually Type Enforcement with the -patented option. :) :) Anybody wanting to bang into it for real can take a run at sidewinder.com (199.199.22.1 for the DNS-impaired). If we configured it with the product-level LOCKout I&A then nobody would get in far enough to bump into Sidewinder's defense in depth. So we left the door open a crack by allowing password-based logins (and what *are* those passwords? Well, hackerfolk, that's for us to know and you to find out). We particularly await the net.chatterers from the dank lowlands, who we invite to slip out of their wooden shoes, clear the pot fumes from their heads and show that xs4all can walk the walk as well as talk the talk. And of course we'd love to encounter Chaos Club (aka the Milli Vanilli of the Internet). Do hope that they can find time between press conferences to rememeber how its done. And our thanks to the uninvited visitors to sidewinder.com who helped us debug in the last couple of weeks. Pity that you can't enjoy the munged gifs of solar eclipses that we set up under hotcha file names as much as we enjoyed tracking your downloads. The breakin attempts were pretty pathetic (we thought the folks from oz were better than that, actually). Sorry to inform you that all that stuff you sniffed and saw was bogus. NetAdapts don't exist, nobody uses a STU-III to login on Internet, and the progress reports were a figment of our imagination. Hope you enjoyed the play as much as we enjoyed putting it on. Now please stay away and leave room in the log files for the next bunch of suckers. ---------------------- begin additional data ------------- Well, it's been pretty quiet here at the old secure site. Seems the vaunted hackers are real good at sniffing reusable passwords from bilgewater.edu and clueless.com but they're not so brave when it comes to running up against a real system. The official announcement is on Oct 11th, which is when we take sidewinder.com off the net. So, you self-proclaimed wizard hackers, you have until then to get to the machine which is on the other side of sidewinder.com. After that we play for keeps, and start putting you out of business one Sidewinder site at a time. So come on, wizzies, make our day. Or be forever exposed for what you are, a bunch of self-promoters who do the net.equivalent of snatching purses from old ladies and then crow about what a tough bunch of outlaws you are. Personal invitations have been sent to sexlessbe4all and the Chaos Chickenheart Club. The rest of you know who and what you are. able baker (bakerw(a)sidewinder.com)

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quantum-factoring talk at Columbia Univ. tomorrow
by stuarth＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Some cyherpunks readers who know their cryptography might be curious to see Rabin's talk as well as Peter Shor's. If you need directions by email you can send me private email (stuarth(a)netcom.com) ========================================================================== THE 24th THEORY DAY at Columbia University SPONSORED BY THE DEPARTMENT OF COMPUTER SCIENCE FRIDAY, SEPTEMBER 30, 1994 10:00 PROFESSOR MICHAEL RABIN Harvard University and Hebrew University "A New Paradigm for Hashing Data into Memory, and Applications" 11:00 DR DAVID KARGER AT&T Bell Laboratories "Approximate Graph Coloring by Semidefinite Programming" 2:00 PROFESSOR TOM LEIGHTON MIT "Multicommodity Flow: A Survey of recent results and algorithms" 3:00 DR PETER SHOR AT&T Bell Laboratories "Can Quantum Mechanics Help in Factoring Large Numbers?" Coffee will be available at 9:30AM. All lectures will be in the auditorium of the Schapiro Center for Engineering and Physical Sciences Research. This building is adjacent to the Mudd Building and entrance is from the campus. The lectures are free and open to the public. Call (212) 939-7000 for more information. Theory Day is supported in part by a grant from the National Science Foundation.

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Re: Anyone seen the 'quantum cryptanalysis' thread on sci.crypt?
by Carl Ellison 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>Date: Wed, 28 Sep 1994 11:21:45 -0700 >From: doug(a)OpenMind.com (Doug Cutrell) >I won't argue whether Shor's work will be implemented or not within any >given time period, but I thought that one of the most important properties >of it is that once (and if) achieved, the resources required to factor >increasingly large moduli lengths go up only polynomially, not >exponentially. The real roadblock might be that there are limits to how many bits there can be in a register. NIST's recent Quantum Computation conference included discussion of the expected lifetime of a computation (what fraction of a second the computation would have to complete in before the internal state space goes incoherent). The more bits are bound together, the shorter the lifetime of those bits, according to one result. However, the more bits you have the longer the computation has to be. This suggests that any given Quantum Computer technology point will lead to a maximum state size (likely in a small number of bits) for a given application. Trouble is, I'm not a quantum physicist, so my understanding of this is superficial. Any real physicists out there? - Carl

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REGIONAL MEETING
by Sandy Sandfort 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ SANDY SANDFORT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . C'punks, I've been having Cypherpunks-physical-meetings withdrawal since leaving the SF Bay Area. Unfortunately, I wasn't able to conjure up a venue nor enough folks for the Cypherpunks anniversary last month. For October, however, I've gotten a firm offer of the NYC living room of a local Cypherpunk (Hero of the Revolution). I also have compiled a list of a dozen and a half current C'punks and interested fellow travellers. Unless some problem comes up, we'll be getting together on the 8th of October at noon or so. If you are interested in attending, and we *haven't* communicated already, drop we some e-mail. Also, if you know anyone who might want to be on the Cypherpunks list, give me their contact info so I can invite them. We'll have ever so much fun. S a n d y ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

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Re: IN H.O.T. WATER
by rishab＠dxm.ernet.in 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Sandy Sandfort <sandfort(a)crl.com> > negative, siege mentality. I believe there is a place, in every > community of fellow travelers, for humor and humanity. That's > Acapulco H.E.A.T., with dubious crypto and suspect technology, > has become an inside joke for Cypherpunks. When we watch it, we > see things the average person misses. This is something we > share, and something that helps create the lighter side of > Cypherpunk culture. Absolutely. ;-) You notice that I don't post 'please stop that' every time you come up with another H.E.A.T. bulletin. But more than one TV serial would be a bit much. Luckily David has assured me that his was only for one episode. He doesn't plan to do more, but others, as he says, are welcome! ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- Rishab Aiyer Ghosh "Clean the air! clean the sky! wash the wind! rishab(a)dxm.ernet.in take stone from stone and wash them..." Voice/Fax/Data +91 11 6853410 Voicemail +91 11 3760335 H 34C Saket, New Delhi 110017, INDIA

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Electronic Revolution and Guerilla Warfare?
by merriman＠metronet.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

What with the governments of several nations around the world starting to get a bit heavy-handed with their populaces, I was wondering how a modern-day revolution could take place in a crypto-repressive society, and how the citizenry could sufficiently rattle/displace such a government so as to regain control over their destinies. For the purpose of discussion, I'd like to propose the following "environmental variables": > majority of the population unable/unwilling to do more than complain. > minority of the population not sure of how to fight the process, but willing to support those that do know. > some number (small) of those capable of crypto or other electronic mayhem depart the country in a short period bridging the implementation of repressive government controls and laws. > There are varying permutations of the crypto/electronic-capable, and the force-capable (ie, hackers-only to bomb-makers-only, and anything in between). > said government uses all means at it's disposal to try and apprehend those attempting to resist, as well as intercept communications, prevent damage to it's infrastructure and physical entities. > at the start of government "hostilities", all intra-national anon remailers are seized or shut down, and access to international ones is *heavily* monitored or blocked (yeah, I know, but we're gaming here!). > national identity medium (card, wristband, etc) in place and mandatory. > travel, currency, and information transfer restrictions (ie, no more "How to build a Backpack Nuke" or "How to hack the Tax Gestapo central computers" books :-) What problems would those willing to fight such government oppression be likely to face? How to deal with those problems? How to organize and exchange personnel/information? How to not get caught? How to avoid detection? What means/methods of, um, dissonance against such a government would be more/less effective? Under what various permutations of electronic/physical bushwhacking would the process be successful or not? Duration? Other than the obvious crypto/cyber/military disciplines, what other professions or specialized knowledge would be useful under what conditions? What blatantly obvious thing(s) have I left out? Dave Merriman - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Finger merriman(a)metronet.com for PGP/RIPEM public keys and fingerprints. Unencrypted Email may be ignored without notice to sender. PGP preferred. Remember: It is not enough to _obey_ Big Brother; you must also learn to *love* Big Brother.

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Re: Will all codes and ciphers be broken?
by Amanda Walker 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> What code and cipher breaking had occurred had generally happened > through HUMINT sources, as with the Walker spy ring (which sold old > code books, allowing earlier traffic to be reconstructed). Black bag > jobs, bugging of buildings, etc. And I have no idea what crypto > material Aldrich Ames transferred. Indeed. The situation is analogous when it comes to other areas (such as financial fraud, corporate espionage, and so forth). A modern cipher is not going to be the weak point of most cryptosystems, unless it is intentionally crippled (cf. export restrictions to <= 40 bit keys for DES & RC4). The (publically known) "codebreaking successes" (outside of contrived academic exercises) of recent decades have not involved cryptanalysis at all. This point is also lost to most people in the Clipper debate. Too many people, I feel, are focussed upon back doors in Skipjack. This seems to me to be missing the point. Skipjack could be a perfectly good block cipher, perhaps a Lucifer/DES-style product cipher with more rounds and bigger boxes. The point of Clipper is that it would institutionalize *non-cryptanalytic* intelligence gathering capabilities. It's the digital wiretap initiative wrapped in a large red herring. The actual cipher is completely incidental. At this point in history, humans are much easier to subvert than ciphers are. Amanda Walker InterCon Systems Corporation

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