December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Address query
by Isaac.Norby＠f217.n125.z1.FIDONET.ORG 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Could someone here netmail me the address for Mike Godwin of the EFF? I should like to ask him about some issues he brought up here a couple of months back. Thank you. ___ Blue Wave/QWK v2.12 -- Isaac Norby - via FidoNet node 1:125/1 UUCP: ...!uunet!kumr!shelter!217!Isaac.Norby INTERNET: Isaac.Norby(a)f217.n125.z1.FIDONET.ORG

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Applied Crypto can be a menace to you anonymity?
by baum＠newton.apple.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>From: an4914(a)anon.penet.fi (Nitch) >....I received my copy of _Applied Cryptography_ >with amazing speed. I only ordered the thing this week,...) If I were the NSA (or, rather, someone who cared about who was using crypto in a way I might not approve of), I'd be keeping tabs on who ordered this book! ************************************************** * Allen J. Baum tel. (408)974-3385 * * Apple Computer, 20525 Mariani Ave, MS 305-3B * * Cupertino, CA 95014 baum(a)apple.com * **************************************************

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NSA, PGP, Cracking Keys, Recent Arrests...
by Jim choate 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On the topic of the deduction that the NSA can now crack PGP because of an arrest is probably faulse. It is much more likely that they were informed on by family or a direct member of the organization. There is no way that any crypto system can prevent defection or protect against it.

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Re: Applied Crypto can be a menace to you anonymity?
by koontzd＠lrcs.loral.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

So, buy a copy from Bruce, he mentioned something about ordering a 100 copies recently, I got one from him.

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Will Mike Ingle's name be a household word like "Buttafuoco"?
by James Still 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Mike Ingle comments on his recently released "Secure Drive" program: >What's the BBS? If you want to, put up a notice or something. [...] >encrypt the BBS itself, and set up a relay to power it down >if an alarm in your house goes off. Then you are raid-proof. In case someone isn't familiar with Mike's excellent program, it does for hard drives, what PGP does for messages. With Secure Drive (ver 1.0) you can set up a partition on your hard drive encrypt it (SecDrv uses the IDEA cipher for data and RSA for your pass phrase just like PGP) and access the encrypted drive from a TSR in your C drive. In my opinion, this is the best example yet since PGP of "cypherpunks writing code" because of the implications that this program has on privacy. (I'm using it to keep a personal space for my tax records, private correspondence, PGP dir, etc.), but Mike's suggestion for encrypting an entire BBS itself is a good point. What if *every* sysop encrypted their BBS with Secure Drive? His program is DOS freeware and available on the Hieroglyphic Voodoo Machine BBS at +1.303.443.2457 (V.32bis) as SECDRV10.ZIP. It is also available on soda.berkeley.edu I'm sure although I haven't looked there myself. This e-mail is also a shameless tag line promo! Know that it is I who waste that precious thing called *bandwidth*! +---------+--------------------------------------------------------------+ | The zine for the inzane and [sic]: | still@ | popE x Mass = Accelerated_J e s u s kailua. | colorado. | An intelligent e-zine that investigates the cultural and edu | ethical issues that we who dwell in cyberspace confront... | E-mail me *now* to subscribe, submit, comment, or ping test! PGP Public Key = 4E4937 = AD 29 BE 28 5D 2B 77 BE F6 85 08 45 B6 2D 0B 36 +------------------------------------------------------------------------+

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New public keyserver at martigny.ai.mit.edu
by Brian A. LaMacchia 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

A new public keyserver is now available. Send mail with "help" in the subject line to: public-key-server(a)martigny.ai.mit.edu The server support mail access only, not FTP access. Questions concerning this keyserver should be addressed to: public-key-server-request(a)martigny.ai.mit.edu Requests to automatically synchronize this keyserver with other keyservers should be sent to the above address. --Brian LaMacchia bal(a)zurich.ai.mit.edu bal(a)mit.edu

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Re: cryptanalysis for radio communications
by 155yegan%jove.dnet.measurex.com＠juno.measurex.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Someboy wrote: > I was wondering if any cryptanalysis packages existed which >could help in decrypted information picked up with a scanner. It seems >that a bunch of people trying to defend their home from the feds were >listening in on the feds radio communications, but now they're >encrypting stuff. It's probably not very strong crypto, maybe just a >simple XOR. > > (So I hear.. a friend asked me to help him, 'cause he's the >one helping these folk in Nevada.) > >Thanks. What folks? Is someone in Nevada defending their house from the Feds? Got any more details? Thanks Terry Egan ( egan_t(a)measurex.com )

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Re: ID hacking Pointer
by Black Unicorn 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-> For those who are interested, someone has started a thread on the Fringeware mailing list about spoofing and nyms.... The consensus (of 2 messages) is that the dreaded PSUEDOSPOOF is a bad thing... Anyone know if LD is on the fringeware list? <- he is now. -uni- (Dark)

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Good Curve Software Key
by W. Kinney 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- OK. Here's the de-glitched public key for Curve Software. It's properly signed with my usual key (available via finger). It'll be on a key server soon, hopefully with additional signatures, but I haven't gotten to it yet. Sorry for wasting the bandwidth, but I wanted to get it redistributed immediately... Additional note: I've received a few messages from anon users, ranging from very polite to major-league sleazy. So as a blanket response, let me make this very clear: I _will not_ mail Curve Encrypt to addresses outside the U.S. or to anon id's. I just don't have enough money to pay for the lawyers. Sorry. The rest of you will be receiving it soon. -- Will -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.3 iQCVAgUBLP9WDMJkEfxTVMrJAQGl2QP/TbLzZQBFM8VO2LdLCbmvb1HmiT2xCzsj xrCHph9dH3iLyUZ+2isvXU+ZmvMza1Pm9tUcUASPtCZ0sVY91vCnCEGEE8kMldM5 RNYl0yzJWnowfTfWK6bSdQgdABqhwaTQUmbz0uhqjMBAybdXScwizoqZ5Xeiw81B G1p688IECKQ= =METk -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- -----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- Version: 2.3 mQCPAiz+bEEAAAEEAMUbtdwYC1vY+s5559ERIvC1MT+Yaw3ozheaHcUciJe7cSAk k9TpAQd7iKukKnQe5kK1YtvYm0JP6fmNrcO8AmG5ukvcOlyuri618sjpXncpQ1cL 5xeV80f3JtmheGMnqAzTK8OyfJ7zRh1PhAZcT/vVzf+JGuCuVcJkEfxTVMrJABEB AAG0K0N1cnZlIFNvZnR3YXJlIDxraW5uZXlAYm9nYXJ0LmNvbG9yYWRvLmVkdT6J AJUCBRAs/wK89+/hOkiDY/EBAeN5A/0fFX5On4Zxc/guNdDb+nHZcd6TwJxUb9ST TlsJX4BAKAcf0xG4DY0L+9DN0N6w6FOR3RuZIAUx25xS9yRBSMLe1gOw6qI9C/lt Ovh7ycoKCkOBqoe6oisRzREhIr3U+FQXRIu7Qhn5ETEljRjWvQ6fheohrLhSGVsf pBaKtb2fVw== =LCyY -----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----

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Quantum Crypto lecture at MIT
by peb＠PROCASE.COM 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Now for the ultimate secure communications...warm up your interferometer. Paul E. Baclace peb(a)procase.com ----- Begin Included Message -----

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Re: Entropy, Randomness, etc.
by peb＠PROCASE.COM 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> Like the "pi" example Scott Collins used. My example, actually. But of course Scott Collins and I are actually subtentacles of the grand pseudo spoofer. Serious though, if anyone in the Bay Area spots: Ming Li and Paul Vitanyi, "An Introduction to Kolmogorov Complexity and Its Applications," Springer-Verlag, 1993. around here, please send me mail. I've been looking and neither Computer Literacy nor the Stanford Bookstore have it (sold out their stock quick). Paul E. Baclace peb(a)procase.com

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"Modern Optics & Spectroscopy Seminar" of special interest.
by poc＠im.lcs.mit.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

The upcoming Modern Optics and Spectroscopy Seminar on December 7 is of special interest to the Physics of Computation community: Tuesday, 7 December 1993 11:00 -- 12:00 AM Room 37-252 (Marlar Lounge) "Towards Perfect Ciphers --- Quantum Cryptography." Artur K. Ekert Oxford University Cryptography has, for a long period of time, been regarded as a part of mathematics, with computational difficulty as a safeguard of information. Unfortunately, faster computers and better algorithms have step by step cracked the protection barriers of even the most sophisticated codes. The quest for unbreakable ciphers had to venture outside mathematics, and surprisingly, towards quantum physics [1]. I will discuss the overlap between different theoretical and experimental techniques developed independently by research groups working in secure communication and quantum physics. In particular I will present a method in which the security of the so-called key distribution and also the key storing processes in cryptography relies on quantum correlations [2]. The proposed scheme is based on Bohm's well-known version of the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen gedankenexperiment and has been currently implemented using the Mach-Zehnder interferometer [3]. REFERENCES [1] For a simple introduction to quantum cryptography see BENNET_CH, BRASSARD_G, EKERT_AK "Quantum Cryptography" SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN 1992 OCTOBER PP.50-59; EKERT_AK "Quantum Keys for Keeping Secrets" NEW SCIENTIST 16 JANUARY 1993 PP.24-28. [2] EKERT_AK "Quantum Cryptography Based on Bell's Theorem" PHYSICAL REVIEW LETTERS 1992 VOL.67 PP.661-663. [3] EKERT_AK, RARITY_JG, TAPSTER_PR, PALMA_GM "Practical Quantum Cryptography Based on 2-Photon Interferometry" PHYSICAL REVIEW LETTERS 1992 VOL.69 NO.9 PP.1293-1295.

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No Subject
by ld231782＠longs.lance.colostate.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Hi!

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No Subject
by nobody＠shell.portal.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I'm sure I'm missing something obvious here, but why are all these keyservers being forced to shut down? isn't it obvious? it's almost certainly a combination of spineless academic administrators, and secret lawyers letters from pkp. i'm just surprised that nobody has scanned/typed in and published the letters from the bullies.

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Blind signature/Chaum cash info
by Mike Ingle 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Where's a good ftp site for papers on blind signature methods (RSA-compatible) and Chaum-type digicash? Is there an online digicash with strong anonymity? Where to ftp info on it? Are the patentholders of LUC and other public-key systems any more reasonable about noncommercial use than RSA? Interesting to note that RSA let the writers of HPACK modify RSAREF to use MDC encryption, even though HPACK uses PGP keys as well as RIPEM. Seems Bidzos is just vindictive, not to mention scared to death, by PGP. After all, his lousy company exists because of one patent which is on shaky legal ground, other algorithm patents having been shot down. So far, they've managed to keep their licensing fees below the cost to sue them and avoid a lawsuit by blustering. PGP was a challenge they didn't know how to respond to, especially since suing a privacy activist for a nonprofit political statement is not exactly a good test case for a patent. What damages could they claim? --- MikeIngle(a)delphi.com

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Will I be on a wanted poster?
by Mike Ingle 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>drive encrypt it (SecDrv uses the IDEA cipher for data and RSA *** No, it does not use RSA! Don't spread this rumor, ^^^ *** I don't need Bidzos on my ass. It uses MD5, which is *** allowed for non-commercial use. >for your pass phrase just like PGP) and access the encrypted >drive from a TSR in your C drive. >In my opinion, this is the best example yet since PGP of >"cypherpunks writing code" because of the implications that >this program has on privacy. (I'm using it to keep a personal >space for my tax records, private correspondence, PGP dir, etc.), >but Mike's suggestion for encrypting an entire BBS itself >is a good point. What if *every* sysop encrypted their BBS >with Secure Drive? No more Steve Jackson Games cases. I hope this happens. Computer theft and unreasonable seizure is a real problem. >It is also available on soda.berkeley.edu I'm sure although I >haven't looked there myself. Nope, at least I didn't put it there. Export problems. Not like Buttafuoco, I hope. Remember, he's in the cooler or soon will be. --- MikeIngle(a)delphi.com There's no government like *no* government.

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Retransmission in clear
by nobody＠shell.portal.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- Version: 2.3a mQCNAiz/ZcgAAAEEALrXxRyAPE8zxrvRxtYXvyXTdKDVSRMEky1Tb9gpx2Mnrkqw 5P8F3CoZv2FSPDiIvU3g+yMDbBT1sgOOKR8wja/HhrDwY+R/ckvZcGNKSrDtXgGN dheuOQsTxJUxAbVUN1DB87kC3sYyNGpD6bKUFm3vYJ+imoOP4ZPh+qb/+7ENAAUR tCJIb2JlciBNYWxsb3csIFRyYWRlciB0byBDeWJlcnNwYWNl =paYE -----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Let's make a deal, "CypherPunk Criminal"... Actually, let's 'construct' a deal. I'd like to hear your ideas for lucrative exchanges made possible by this sort of anonymity. I am particularly interested in markets which have some amount of public sympathy, but may be embarassing or illegal for some participants. Nothing drastic to start with, but it could be interesting... Hober Mallow, Trader to Cyberspace - -- To reach me, e-mail "To: catalyst(a)netcom.com" and include the following lines ("::" through "END PGP MESSAGE", inclusive) as the FIRST lines in your response. This will route it through a series of remailers using nested, encrypted forwarding. You would be wise to protect your own identity in like manner. - ------cut here------------cut here------------cut here------ :: Encrypted: PGP - -----BEGIN PGP MESSAGE----- Version: 2.3a hIwCm8e572PA6kkBA/0ZmtwxW2iMg6UOEKa2j62cLo6NzJPbeHPVlcGfIpllvjcM QZwtEWm8WdCPWGYIkD5AQ/93OG66GEk44CjaMub/y40qG9EzCgWRHalN7z7DUD44 uNrEew7+JX5ISNKJPzqa4MSGmtIzI3txWW23FX0OSk5HtP5/sAKpytxRk4htDaYA AAFVffi7A1ToIn0fIwvYjt0yIDFMrw1QNtOGmrYpDrVMxxHtCzVoRkrWxA4fZhr6 Jv/vXhbX5q1JXEcLgLuDj+AKA9106o/S1MjurCdN8KLGBiTANEgbXv1grF8Sd9hQ eKbMc/JoShRw9M+BqveFTPRRkoB4M8LRTNNDAQrdHULvRiIuMwawi0txxWqOz868 Mg4+TWqJlteXBj0EP2h4DtKmwHWaK0rEQjfeyIVgMcb8lBa92/NUb66cP7ciKYZ6 ITuYxFwDirtc3CrixwcdBwlNsE/QELyOMFdr/40+XcIfS7aQwcHDNIvOCgc6cLDd OJjJPE8ajdOcoNI2yf6Vp9cCLl1lT711Yu3HT8dwH/cAdWxE6Yz3jW+hRfSkgCeX fs3CHTaXzX8gQmrXd2lG5vGgf/ymZ/JMJRdKdV9/fKPW0ZQVrbkwNszEbQgSvvw+ Ep85L6Ft2ss= =rEKi - -----END PGP MESSAGE----- -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.3a iQCVAgUBLP95OJPh+qb/+7ENAQHiKAQAkW/4QfWeIg1hhOA/BzS2hM/gitJYCdeF GqF0RMf8Bg5uDjmk3goIhIb5LT2ycAGGmPJpI3Mm295G1KSZcy2MTBhfTbo0IkvY UFhuM6p+NtF+O9wy+3LntCE8DFdVhTYzjzpQb3ilQJ1agtIgv87b37KzkvMCj7pg Q+Yj9ZGIHRE= =noLd -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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FORGED POSTING
by an4914＠anon.penet.fi 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- The following message gave an error when I checked its signature! Chalk up another reason we should all be using the ASCII Armor option... Could someone check *my* sig and see if it's working? >-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- > >I'm sure I'm missing something obvious here, but why are all >these keyservers being forced to shut down? The possession of >PGP *keys* should be perfectly legal, no? Or is the logic the >same as that used to close down drug paraphernalia shops: if >people are buying bongs, they must be smoking pot, and so we >can't allow it? > >And exactly what grounds does PKP have for suing? Is it because >the servers themselves are using PGP, rather than just storing >keys? What if a server is using a legal (ViaCrypt) copy of PGP? >(Problem: this argument can only be used for DOS boxes currently.) > > --Dave. > > >-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- >Version: 2.2 > >iQCVAgUBLP+fvsfNklulBrsJAQGTCQP8DFF77E7zpB6nOzAwcLNbEgezVjt/yQTg >DEtdmeY+hO9rcOUJoXwWMPbai2EhBHiyriAMYD5kcHrsbdiS99PW5A5kh4htaFDr >Zrrkmn7KK0LXNL0fo2aJZVLKpiy9FxcJPmQvasTqe6EVltxbi4coTNR1wUoD5FE8 >0sGj9AsGr+s= >=2tQH >-----END PGP SIGNATURE----- -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.3a iQCVAgUBLP+tJOyu9liBvjrdAQFClAQAsWulTDSCG6bE8tAa7YqcMpUvITEesB84 tRzNWHGcBxLRlsteaTj0V/n+N7Bs/jf0MhspPPdO/IpIuDa2IpEi43FLYFaCuBSa dnq6Sgn588kPvk0ATwpkGAapViIZBlA2c0TlSsQHgaH5tVd5RRqyZSrq1miEyBFH b0FhJ05hr7k= =7hn1 -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- ------------------------------------------------------------------------- To find out more about the anon service, send mail to help(a)anon.penet.fi. Due to the double-blind, any mail replies to this message will be anonymized, and an anonymous id will be allocated automatically. You have been warned. Please report any problems, inappropriate use etc. to admin(a)anon.penet.fi.

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Cypherpunks Wired Photographer
by L. Detweiler 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I was talking to K.Kelly of Wired and rather surprisingly he can't remember the name of the photographer who shot the Cypherpunks pictures (e.g. the same one used in NYT). Does anyone know who this person is? Please send me email. tx.

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Re: Applied Crypto can be a menace to you anonymity?
by an53004＠anon.penet.fi 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On Dec 3, 14:04, Timothy C. May wrote: > But did you hear that the NSA has installed trap-doors in Schneier's C > code to do the same thing? I heard this the same place I heard that > Paul Zimmermann is actually an agent of the Mossad and the > International Trilateralist Cabal. Actually, they installed a viral implant in Paul Zimmerman's brain. He doesn't think that he's working for them, but he is. Ha, he thinks that he's a free man, but really he has these lapses and sabotages his own code and reputation. ------------------------------------------------------------------------- To find out more about the anon service, send mail to help(a)anon.penet.fi. Due to the double-blind, any mail replies to this message will be anonymized, and an anonymous id will be allocated automatically. You have been warned. Please report any problems, inappropriate use etc. to admin(a)anon.penet.fi.

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Re: FORGED POSTING
by Mike Ingle 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

"an4914(a)anon.penet.fi" wrote: The following message gave an error when I checked its signature! > >-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- >Version: 2.2 > The clearsig in 2.2 doesn't work right. This has been fixed in 2.3a, so your sig should be ok.

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Re: ID hacking Pointer
by Black Unicorn 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> Anyone know if LD is on the fringeware list? > <- > > he is now. > Oh god. Time to warn Jon and Paco. Sigh. -- ---------------- /\ Douglas Barnes cman(a)illuminati.io.com / \ Chief Wizard (512) 447-8950 (d), 447-7866 (v) / () \ Illuminati Online metaverse.io.com 7777 /______\ +++ Er, Actually my (apparently not so) humorous comment was intended to reflect the fact that by asking if LD was on the fringeware list, you have summoned him to the fringeware list. Speak not his name less thy summon him. Sorry for the confusion and the associated bandwidth. :( -uni- (Dark)

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Law student on cypherpunks list....
by Black Unicorn 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I guess I'm just THE bandwidth waster this morning. Sorry guys. A law student lurker had sent me mail asking for advice. Whoever you are, I lost your message. Entirely my fault. I meant to get back to you... sorry. Resend? -uni- (Dark)

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Cryptoanarchist Alert
by L. Detweiler 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I would appreciate that whoever at Sun is goofing around would cut it out. ===cut=here===

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Re: MIT Keyserver
by an4914＠anon.penet.fi 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- >> > I am sorry to announce that the PGP Keyserver at pgp.mit.edu >> > (a.k.a. toxicwaste.mit.edu) has to be shut down. [...] >> >> Anyone want to tell us why? >> Derek, I appreciate that you can't prevent it but a little more >> explanation of why would be much appreciated too. > [...] >Of course, by the lack of a reason, we can only assume that whoever >'it' was, it was 'big' enough to either scare you or threaten you with >some action if you talked... It might be wiser to assume that the machine (or some nearby machine) was having trouble with all the load that the remailer was putting on it. ...but, of course, you may be right. That message from "Hober Mallow, Trader to Cyberspace" may give a few people something to think about over the weekend, hmmm? Maybe MIT's administration doesn't want to be involved in that kind of traffic? Maybe *Derek* doesn't want to be involved in that kind of traffic? -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.3a iQCVAgUBLP+g3+yu9liBvjrdAQHE9wP+NMQM6rQpmK9Jy/ntDXBeVLWdcgFwfDE8 aolOo9cCh3VxlXK7EG/ylN1XXm1HnSIMCD335E+txb5M7KSs1xT/V4NRVU2py2Gz ItvfQ9NBBg5d5eP96V9XHIHzgGHlIaS6Ufw6+tBqtIkNE+cC+VsVUHKjTrONDXuM zVN+GTLJxXo= =SM/B -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- ------------------------------------------------------------------------- To find out more about the anon service, send mail to help(a)anon.penet.fi. Due to the double-blind, any mail replies to this message will be anonymized, and an anonymous id will be allocated automatically. You have been warned. Please report any problems, inappropriate use etc. to admin(a)anon.penet.fi.

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