December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

The Cyber Lexicon of 2030
by terry.smith＠canrem.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Mnemonic(a)eff.org wrote |-------------------------------| > of littering. The MD Pound > logo features the mustaches of Salvador Dali, a notably prolific > 20th century surrealist. > > *Municipal Dump*: (n) an institution formed by the |-------------------------------| Hi - this was great - but I only got the first and last message in the series. Could you re-post it? Also, I have no internet access.. Terry Smith - XANTH sysop - 1:259/510 CI$ 70733,3013 PGP 2.3A KEY FREQABLE AS 'KEY'. My opinions are not that of my company. But one day they WILL be! And then - the -+*WORLD*+- Bwaw ha ha !!. Read the Tick and others by NEC. Geraldo - "So, Mr. Smith, you admit you like to eat babies!" Me - "Nono - I admit I like to eat BABES!" --- * TLX v1.55 * A bug is a feature that didn't make it into the manual.

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Secure Drive Distribution
by edgar＠spectrx.saigon.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- After reading Mike Ingle's post of Dec 21, I withdraw my request for a "public-spirited Cypherpunk (perhaps even an anonymous one) to place Secure Drive on an FTP site or a site with an E-mail file server." Mike said: If you do this [upload Secure Drive to an FTP or mailserver site], please make it a U.S./Canada only site. If you mean a site -in- the USA/Canada, no problem. If you mean a site which will not send files outside the USA/Canada, I don't think there is any such animal. The only site even -attempting- to restrict service I've heard of is RSA.com, which distributes RSAREF. And I think it would be rather easy to spoof. A foreigner can easily login to any public -domestic- internet BBS with just an international phone call, giving him a domestic-looking net address. Even if you distribute every copy yourself, Mike, you are not immune from this kind of "spoofing." >So far I still haven't heard from Eric. I did get two responses. >The first was anonymous and sent me a copy of Secure Drive with >a request for me to post it to foreign FTP site(s). The second >was a request from a foreign site for me to send them a copy. I'd like to see more about this, in private mail if you don't want to post it to the list. Not much to tell. I didn't keep copies of either request. I think the non-anon one was from Australia, maybe. The non-distribution of the beta was because I had no way to check it, and it could easily have eaten hard drives. I did say in the ad that you were not to export, although I didn't make anyone send a statement. Maybe I should have. Perhaps. But the ad says: This program may be freely distributed within the U.S. and Canada; do not export it. and the docs say: Exporting this program. This program is for use in the US and Canada only. Cryptography is export controlled, and sending this program outside the country may be illegal. Don't do it. Fine. But "freely distributed in the USA & Canada" would include uploading it to domestic BBS's & anon. FTP sites by my interpretation of English. If a foreigner enters the country and smuggles a copy home with him, whether he does it physically or electronically, he is committing the criminal act; not whoever uploaded SD and certainly not Mike. On the Hacker matter Mike said: They are going to attempt to break Secure Drive. He asked me to write a program which will take a list of passphrases and test them quickly to run a passphrase attack. I had a few qualms about writing a program to crack someone's data, but I don't think it really matters. Unless the hacker chose a very lame key, they don't have a prayer in hell. By all means, go ahead & write the program to their specs.! Of course, as a "forensic software consultant" you're entitled to a fee. I would say a minimum of $100/hour is "fair." After they try that for a while, you can offer an improvement that will try "more keys of a smaller possible set faster" by just trying the 2^128 keys directly without bothering with a passphrase, along with a mod to LOGIN which will insert a binary key directly rather than use MD5 on a passphrase. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.3a iQCVAgUBLR8uuN4nNf3ah8DHAQHQ1AP/ZXImvQO2XxKXi/k2CCMPgD12rYPAcfZp ZabuyERUGW8UuKZJLS8Wy4i7q2EdWi1TT80dKhHVQgO6ec+ybKyirXN/N8Ahz3BF zKqa+YKKgaroxv50Xg4RdQ3Cr/rfYQeQ0yiH1VdJOJj4dVwDMTnm+uC/Uph/wXJI U53PBfQWR28= =T2cH -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- -- edgar(a)spectrx.saigon.com (Edgar W. Swank) SPECTROX SYSTEMS +1.408.252.1005 Cupertino, Ca

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NBC news.
by GRABOW_GEOFFREY＠tandem.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Greetings all, NBC Nightly news recently did a report on the Internet and NII, at the end of which, they mentioned that they have an Internet address of: news:nightly@nbc.com They asked for comments regarding the use/misuse of Internet and I'm sure that they would be thrilled to hear from us. So drop 'em a line and tell 'em your opinion of the NII. ******************************************************************** Geoffrey C. Grabow grabow_geoffrey(a)tandem.com Oyster Bay, New York 'What we demand are rigidly defined areas of doubt and uncertainty!' - Hitchhiker's Guide To The Galaxy ********************************************************************

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GPS and security
by m5＠vail.tivoli.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

CBS's "60 Minutes" had a "Oooh Scarey" segment about the Global Positioning System last Sunday. The scarey part is, according to 60 Minutes, that any old terrorist government can now put together accurate guided missles and wreak death and destruction upon our homeland. The crux of the problem is that the system broadcasts out positioning information to one and all indiscriminately, and according to the show there's no way we can stop it. Because my mind is regularly exposed to wild conspiracy theories and all sorts of crazed paranoiac ravings (i.e., I read Usenet), I started thinking that this is rather unlikely. I speculated that the government may in fact have designed the satellite systems so that they could be told to do several things in case of national emergency: * Shut down (probably possible; they may have actually mentioned this on the show). Problem is that lots of friendlies may grow to rely on the data for life-critical things, like guiding commercial airliners. * Shut down normal transmission and begin strongly encrypted transmission. No mention of this; apparently, the satellites were originally designed with some sort of weak system that made the data difficult to use for high-accuracy purposes, but that's been defeated (by the FAA or someone contracted thereto). * Enter into a bogus-cleartext with encrypted subchannel mode, where the plaintext is slyly made to be wrong, but using some subchannel encrypted "good stuff" is still available. I don't know much about how this system works, so I don't know whether any of my thoughts are relevant. It's probably most likely that the government indeed blasted these things up into space without considering using encryption technology to enhance security. -- Mike McNally : m5(a)tivoli.com : Day Laborer : Tivoli Systems : Austin, TX ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Remember that all experimentation does not produce extrapolated results. - k. pisichko

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Re: anonymous video rental store - Libraries
by jazz＠hal.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Out of curiousity, has any ftp-archive maintainer tried to join the American Library Association, either directly or as part of some university's library system? I'm not sure what this would do. My wife is a professional librarian and a member of the ALA (and SLA and a few other besides) - as far as I know, the ALA doesn't directly intervene to protect its members. Jason

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Re: GPS and security
by Brenden Kootsey 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Like Mike, I don't claim to know much about the GPS, and I didn't see the 60 Minutes report, but it was my understanding that at least a portion of the signal is encrypted. The signal available to us mortal (non-U.S. military) types has a built-in inaccuracy; while it is still accurate enough for some general use, it is not nearly as accurate as the signal available to the military. Anyone have more of the technical details, especially regarding the accuracy?

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CACM Letters
by Pat Farrell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

There is a very nice letter on the government's rationale for controlling crypto in the current January 94 (received today) CACM, by Walter M Anderson. The main claim is that the government must want to control US citizens, because no other reason is logically consistant. And a nice short one from our own CME. Pat Pat Farrell Grad Student pfarrell(a)netcom.com Department of Computer Science George Mason University, Fairfax, VA Public key availble via finger #include <standard.disclaimer>

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RE: GPS and security
by Pat Farrell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

This is a bit off list topics. Press D now if you don't like it.... In message Tue, 28 Dec 93 14:01:15 CST, m5(a)vail.tivoli.com (Mike McNally) writes: > * Shut down normal transmission and begin strongly encrypted > transmission. No mention of this; apparently, the satellites were > originally designed with some sort of weak system that made the data > difficult to use for high-accuracy purposes, but that's been defeated > (by the FAA or someone contracted thereto). The GPS system was designed to have two modes, one highly acurate for military use, and a low accuracy version for commerce. Since initially no one had receivers, the whole system used military grade for the first few years. Before the Gulf war started, the military needed zillions of GPS units, so they bought commercial marine navigrtion units. After the war, there was talk of turning on the division, but that was made impractical with 'differential' calibration. To get military accuracy, all you have to do is take the commercial GPS to known places. Such as the surveying marks at the US Naval Acadamy, or "ground zero" in the Pentagon. Get your "imprecise" reading, calculate the difference between it at the known value, and use it for subsequent calculations. I expect that triangulation with a few known sites is better than a single one. Last I hear from the Sailing trade press was that the Gov still talked about going to the split setup, but there was little belief that they would. BTW, two satellites is enuff for a general location fix. Three identifies a place on the globe, four adds altitude (handy for planes, bombs, and missles) Pat Pat Farrell Grad Student pfarrell(a)netcom.com Department of Computer Science George Mason University, Fairfax, VA Public key availble via finger #include <standard.disclaimer>

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GPS and security
by jazz＠hal.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I speculated that the government may in fact have designed the satellite systems so that they could be told to do several things in case of national emergency: * Shut down (probably possible; they may have actually mentioned this on the show). Problem is that lots of friendlies may grow to rely on the data for life-critical things, like guiding commercial airliners. It's worse; the military relies on GPS. During the Gulf War large numbers of combat vehicles could rendezvous with high accuracy and no radio contact in the dark of night; staggeringly important in limiting fratricide as well (though not as well as one might have liked...) * Shut down normal transmission and begin strongly encrypted transmission. No mention of this; apparently, the satellites were originally designed with some sort of weak system that made the data difficult to use for high-accuracy purposes, but that's been defeated (by the FAA or someone contracted thereto). * Enter into a bogus-cleartext with encrypted subchannel mode, where the plaintext is slyly made to be wrong, but using some subchannel encrypted "good stuff" is still available. Well, this sounds like the "selective availability" (SA) capability, which still exists and has in fact been turned on. It is defeatable, but only under certain circumstances (see below). GPS is a clock-based system; by talking to a constellation of satellites (I think the minimum is 4, with 5 being desired and 6 being best) and munging the timestamps received from them, GPS systems can compute their location to a degree of precision related to the precision of the clocks. SA essentially truncates a few bits off the low-end of the time stamps and makes them available in an encrypted form. Without the key to decrypt the low-order bits, you get location information to within a couple hundred meters or so; with the low-order bits, within about six feet. During the Gulf War, the US military was unable to get enough military GPS receivers (i.e. ones that could decrypt the selectively-available data). Instead, they bought commercial over-the-counter GPS receivers and turned SA off. As soon as they got enough SA-enabled receivers, they turned it on. SA is defeated by something called Differential GPS. Basically, a ground station at a fixed location constantly computes its position via GPS, computes the difference between the GPS location and its known correct location, and broadcasts the correction factor. A differential-capable GPS receiver computes its location via GPS and then applies the correction fac- tor from the nearest differential station. These corrections are obviously of decreasing accuracy the farther you get from the fixed-position station, but you can correct for that to some degree once you have an estimate of the direction and distance from your location to that of the differential broadcaster; apply corrections iteratively until they converge. The requirement, of course, is that you be someplace near a differential GPS station. These stations are maintained by the US Coast Guard and obviously exist only where there is navigable water (and certainly not everywhere, since they take time and money to build). I'm curious if anyone has attempted to crack the encryption used in selective availability; although Differential GPS solves my most important issues (coastal navigation) it's be nice to be able to use a handheld GPS receiver in the middle of Rock Mountain National Park or some such and still locate yourself on the bloody maps with some precision. Jason

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GPS and security
by northrop＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

If the military is worried about delivery systems' accuracy, Phil Karn already mentioned kamikazies, but if you don't want to make suicide part of the package, you could always just have someone drop a radio transmitter on your target sometime in advance, possibly a day or two. The missile can then home in on the signal. (If you need to get it inside a high-security area, you could always encase it in foam and drop it from a model airplane or launch it in a model rocket.) Or you could just leave a suitcase with a timed bomb at your target location; plutonium bombs can be very small. It boggles my mind that the military mind prevents the use of tools that are just too complicated for the "bad guys" to bother with. Does CBS have an email address yet? :) -- Scott Northrop <northrop(a)netcom.com> (206)784-2083 ObVirus: The demand for obedience is inherently evil. ObVirus2: As a juror in a Trial by Jury, you have the right, power and duty to acquit the defendant if you judge the law itself to be unjust.

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NBC news address correction.
by GRABOW_GEOFFREY＠tandem.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Oops! The previous message incorrectly gave the address of news:nightly@nbc.com it should be: nightly(a)nbc.com Sorry about that chief!

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Re: Secure Drive Distribution
by W. Kinney 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Edgar Swank writes: > If you mean a site -in- the USA/Canada, no problem. If you mean a > site which will not send files outside the USA/Canada, I don't think > there is any such animal. The only site even -attempting- to restrict ripem.msu.edu evidently has such a policy. I'm considering using it to distribute Curve Encrypt. Anybody have any experience with this site? Should be pretty funny distributing PGP-authenticated software from the Ripem ftp site, but I guess if they don't mind, neither do I :-). -- Will

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Re: GPS and security
by wcs＠anchor.ho.att.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Thanks to Phil for the technical descriptions about GPS; I'd heard numbers like 1 foot for Differential accuracy. One minor correction to the "military buying civilian GPS gear" issues - a lot of it wasn't the military itself buying the gear, it was individual soldiers or their parents buying the sets so their kids wouldn't get lost out in the desert. I was at an AFCEA trade show, mainly looking for imaging and crypto stuff, but two of the biggest hits were the various GPS vendors and a vendor selling small drone airplanes. (Very few people probably needed the things for work, but they were Neat Stuff and you could understand what it did.) The 6-foot wingspan model had a payload of about 35 pounds; the 10-foot model had about 120 pounds, where payload includes fuel plus whatever else. The primary applications it was being marketed for were radio repeaters and video camera transmission systems, but the Army makes a backpack-carriable nuke that leaves you enough fuel-weight to get 1-200 miles.... Bill Stewart # Bill Stewart NCR Corp, 6870 Koll Center Parkway, Pleasanton CA, 94566 # Voice/Beeper 510-224-7043, Phone 510-484-6204 # email bill.stewart(a)pleasantonca.ncr.com billstewart(a)attmail.com

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Cylex is already reality
by jdblair＠nextsrv.cas.muohio.EDU 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

The very first entry of the Cyberspace Lexicon, *autolott* is well on its way to becoming a reality. An Associated Press story, "Is lottery by phone the ticket?" was on the front page of my local paper today. The article describes a proposed plan to establish a lottery where one would select numbers and pay for tickets via a touch-tone phone. The system would involve depositing money in a special account which the lottery commission could also access. The system could be set to purchase tickets when the jackpot reaches certain levels automatically. "Players could bet until their accounts are depleted, withdraw mopney anytime and replenish their accounts by check, electronic transfer, or credit card." It does state that "each wager would carry a $2 service charge." It souldn't be long before they realize they save more money by not printing the tickets. I don't have time to type in the whole article, but I think you get the picture. Six states are already interested. I'm surprised they didn't suggest just setting it up as a 900 number, or are there laws against that? So how long will it be before Las Vegas goes on-line? Call 1-800-LOAN-YES for easy credit extensions today! -john. ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ John Blair <jdblair(a)nextsrv.cas.muohio.edu> phone: (513) 529-4879 Insert cool signature file that makes a trendy, yet bold and original statement about my cyberspace proficiency, then mentions that I'll send you my PGP public key if you want it, and you trust that I'm actually me.

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No Subject
by ltech1!ltech1!mercury＠heifetz.msen.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Why WHY THINGS ARE MEASURED BY NUMBERS NEAR ONE by Michael E. Marotta We naturally choose scales that are naturally in tune with Nature. To do otherwise would be unharmonious and would be rejected by practice over time. Here are the numbers from an article about the Great Lakes in the World Book Encyclopedia. 5 lakes 1 in US 4 border 1909 year of treaty 94,650 combined area 600 alt of Superior 245 alt of Ontario 325 drop from Erie to Ont 1900 Chicago canal opened 1,000 miles inland 20 drop in St. Mary's 3 canal groups 1959 St. Law Seaway 182 miles of Seaway 2 times more than Panama Depths Areas 1333 31,800 Superior 923 22,400 Michigan 750 23,000 Huron 210 9,930 Erie 778 7,520 Ontario The numbers 4,5, and 6 are uncommon. You can round 7,8,9 to the next order of magnitude and make them all 1. This doesn't need explanation. Finding that measures clustered near 5 would...

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T-SHIRT UPDATE #2
by cvoid＠albemuth.tatertot.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Greetings. Sorry for the delay, I hope you all had a wonderful holiday. We are finishing up the t-shirt design, and it will soon be made available for approval in it's entirity. The plan is to have people order before the end of January (February 1st being the cutoff), and have the shirts shipped out in the first week of February. We are doing only as many shirts as we get orders for, hence the mass mailing. I will be posting an update in the next few days with information on the preview files and ordering information. The t-shirts will cost approximately $10 each, and will include shipping, etc. All additional information will be posted in the next update... We are only doing one mass run of this design, so it will not be made available again in the future. If anyone has any questions or comments please mail me. Thanks. Christian Void /T71 | "I don't like it, and I'm sorry I | V/M/Research, Inc. cvoid(a)netcom.COM | ever had anything to do with it." | P.O. Box 170213 Tel. 1+415-807-5491 | -Erwin Schrodinger (1887-1961) | SF, CA 94117-0213 * PGP v2.3a Public Key Available Via Finger *

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Domestic ftp sites
by mpjohnso＠nyx10.cs.du.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>> If you mean a site -in- the USA/Canada, no problem. If you mean a >> site which will not send files outside the USA/Canada, I don't think >> there is any such animal. The only site even -attempting- to restrict >ripem.msu.edu evidently has such a policy. I'm considering using it to >... I've just started an ftp site with a USA/Canada distribution policy for crypto software. Nothing can totally prevent the theft of data from this site, or ripem.msu.edu or rsa.com, but I decided that I would exercise my right to publish within the USA anyway. About the best I can do without demanding to see proof of citizenship in person (and even that could be forged) is to make it very difficult to get the data without reading a warning notice first, and hope that a combination of conscience along with the possibility of the actions being traced by the U. S. Government and/or the government of the perpetrator's country will limit the number of violations. anonymous ftp to csn.org and read mpj/README.MPJ for details. There is also the Colorado Catacombs BBS (303-938-9654) crypto areas that I hope to expand. Mike Johnson mpjohnso(a)nyx10.cs.du.edu

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VOICE-Why not?
by charliemerritt＠BIX.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Why isn't there a cypherpunk-ish voice crypto system? I would have to guess that it has to do with compression. Compression, lack of CPU and baud rate and money for gadgets. Well I have been fooling around and I think we can get a punk-phone up real quick. My system: 286-12 2400 baud modem sound blaster With just this I can get poor quality recognition of speech, In realtime. With a 9600 baud modem and nothing more than CVD for compression algorithm, fairly decent speech is a snap for the dumbest CPU. Surely the crypto is a lead pipe certainty in realtime. I would like to see this minimal secure phone system SOON: hardware: 286 9600 BPS (7680 bits of data/sec) sound blaster software: CVD "push to talk" (one at a time, please) xor against prng If we got this up, then people could improve on it, add "real" crypto auto detection of faster cpu for "real compression" etc. My point is we have to have something to improve on. My 2400 baud 286 compression is poor quality, very poor. But interesting, it shows what can be done with nothing. If the general feeling is that it would not be too disruptive i could post a reconstructed speech snippet UU Encoded on this list. (.VOC)

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RE: GPS and security
by Pat Farrell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

This is still off list, so consider pressing D now... Phil, Thanks for the corrections In message Tue, 28 Dec 1993 15:03:49 -0800, karn(a)qualcomm.com (Phil Karn) writes: > >>[general erroneous drivel elided] >> Such as the surveying marks at the US Naval Acadamy, or >>"ground zero" in the Pentagon. > > False. > [general good stuff by Phil elided] Last time I looked, the Pentagon was more than 100 meters in diameter. One of Phil's later posts talks about SA being in a 100 meter range. Obviously the Coast Guard and FAA want pretty good accuracy. Whatever the actual numbers on the error terms are, either a moderate high explosive, or tiny nuke, guided to within 100 meters of the Ground Zero Cafe will probably take out all of the above ground portions of the Pentagon. Look at what a single smart bomb (a fairly small one at that) did in the Pentagon's favorite Gulf War video. Similarly, just off the Naval Acadamy's grounds is a huge array of naval communincations gear. It wouldn't take much to put atserious hurt in the Navy's C-cubed net. And you could easily use GPS to get close, and then image recognition for final targeting. Seems to me that the important concept here is that this is yet another technology that the government can't control once its out of the bottle. The scare tactics, and worrisome quotes about "terrorists and drug dealers" will cause confusion among the masses, but I can't see them having any long term effect. Pat Pat Farrell Grad Student pfarrell(a)netcom.com Department of Computer Science George Mason University, Fairfax, VA Public key availble via finger #include <standard.disclaimer>

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Cypherpunk Credit Union
by L. Detweiler 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Hello cy{ph,b}er{wo,pu}nks. I wanted to follow up on a posting by B.Stewart who said that the cypherpunks are putting together a cash credit union over the Internet. I have a few questions about this. 1. Do you have to join the CA cypherpunks to learn about this? Obviously you guys have been working on this a long time, and as long as I was on the list I barely saw any peep about it. 2. Is this a private development group? Is it open to anyone who wishes to join? If so, are cy{b,ph}erwonks allowed to join in the development? We are interested in these kinds of projects. 3. Do you have a mailing list dedicated to this project alone or other internet development projects? We know about the cypherpunks list but there are rumors that there are some other development lists `behind the scenes' -- are these open to the public? 4. If any of your projects are indeed secret, why are many cypherpunks actively engaged in a campaign on the imp-interest list (Internet Mercantile Protocols)? Why don't you just stick to your own project and let the Internet sort out which protocol is more acceptable to the world-at-large? 5. What about the rumors that seem to be confirmed by what B.Stewart said about evading tax laws and black marketeering, that the cypherpunk credit union is actually a surreptitious front for plans to provide money laundering over the Internet? 6. Again, if this is a public project, why is there so little documentation available? There doesn't seem to be any on soda.berkeley.edu, and many of my requests elsewhere have been ignored. 7. What is the David Chaum connection to all this? I know that he met with E.Hughes to discuss plans but are the Cypherpunks to be understood as the U.S.-based Chaum group? Thanks in advance for any information, I hope we can get more cooperation where our goals overlap; it seems to me like we have many common goals.

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Cypherpunks & Clipper
by L. Detweiler 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Hello darlings. I heard a rumor that Mr.May has requested that everyone stop talking about Clipper on this list, saying it was `time to move on'. Or maybe it was one of his tentacles, say Wonderer. (It's hard to keep track, as you all know!) Anyway, I have written a lot about Clipper when it first came out on the list, and I have seen a lot of interest here, so I'm kind of mixed up. I have to admit my feelings are kind of hurt to hear Mr. May just kind of dismiss all the hard work of everyone who has lobbied against it here. Maybe everyone who has an opinion on this could post to the list -- is Clipper dead? Should we stop talking about it? Do cypherpunks have better things to do with their time? p.s. many cypherpunks have objected to my long postings, so I will try to post some shorter ones. I'm here to serve you, a fellow cypherpunk and human being, in whatever way I can.

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On Troublemakers and Torture Techniques
by L. Detweiler 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Hello, a long time ago I suggested on the cypherpunks list that people be limited in the tentacles and anonymous IDs they be permitted to use in Internet mailing lists and groups dedicated to serious subjects and goals such as project development. This fell on deaf ears at the time but perhaps the atmosphere and climate is more suitable at this time for both groups to consider ideas that will prevent their being tormented by troublemakers. One of the best ideas I have I like for its utter simplicity. The idea is this: the mailing list software tracks how long someone has had their email address subscribed. When they post, a field added by the list software broadcasts to the world how `old' they are. This is an interesting measure of their `wisdom' on the group. In the real world, we defer to people based on their age all the time; it is a basic aspect of our human interaction. Now, I know that there are objections to this kind of tracking, but it seems to me they come mostly from people who like to invade others attention with tentacles and anonymous posts. (Note that under the scheme, all anonymous posts or for that matter anything from `outsiders' gets a rating of 0 days old.) Nevertheless I think that this is a very reasonable measure of `credibility' and would be appreciated by everyone who is interested in building their own filtering tools. We need to get more information to individuals to make logical choices about filtering; today it is `every man for himself.' The second idea is this: let the list software track how much that certain people's postings are *replied* to. In a sense, this is a measure of their `relevance'. If I am continually posting messages that get no response at all, I am probably doing something wrong, like asking annoying newbie questions or posting on topics that are outside the charter. On the other hand, if I consistently get huge chains of interesting feedback on the list started, it suggests that what I am writing about is inherently interesting to everyone on the list. Now, when I post and an extra header tells everyone how `interesting' I am by this criteria, they can judge for themselves if I have a personality that is `irrelevant' or `fascinating' and reply to the list or privately based on that. The `reply tracking' has some extra considerations. One of the problems is that people tend to respond to posts that they think are irrelevant with further flames. But this just tends to start a chain reaction of meta-postings in which all the regular topics are buried in. I think that this suggests a fundamental frailty and deficiency in human nature: the inability to `turn the other cheek' when offended. Imagine! In cyberspace, all you have to do to neutralize a troublemaker is to delete his messages! But people cannot even do that. They believe that in cyberspace, as in all other realms of their life, justice is an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth and a flame for a flame. If someone makes you miserable, the only justifiable response (so it goes) is to make them miserable themselves. So, I think this new list software that tracked *responses* to messages would be very valuable in encouraging people to take the `Christian' approach of not counterattacking a tormenter but absorbing their hatred. Because, if you *did* respond to them with flames, it would actually aid their `reply count' rating, and you don't want to aid them in any way whatsoever, of course! So perhaps these new rating systems will actually encourage *real* `moderation' and forbearance. Once again, I urge everyone `out there' to experiment with new systems to encourage responsible and courteous Cyberspatial interactions.

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...Into your life it will creep
by L. Detweiler 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Hello {CA,CO,Internet} cy{ph,b}er{wo,pu}nks. Many cypherpunks have told me that trust is not an inherent element of daily life and that new features of cyberspace such as digital signatures make things like human trust obsolete. This reminds me of a poem that I saw by S.Boxx. ===cut=here=== How do I Trust Thee? S.Boxx <na12070(a)anon.penet.fi> How do I trust thee? Let me count the ways. Some sofware I get free, and have used for many days; I trust the program author is not waging Virus War. I trust that when I need a key The one I seek is there for me. And where a map depicts one door I don't stumble into four! I trust you not to peek When it's anonymity I seek; The cypherpunk remailers must be free from failures! You trust that when you send me mail, privacy isn't broken by a cyberspatial wail! All our mailboxes Are open to the world, To mailbombs and S.Boxxes and vicious insults hurled. I trust that when you hear my name, You will not smear me with the blame of another arsonist's black flame, My reputation you will not defame, My friends escape your poison aim! My messages go to many lists, I trust they go to all-- Though I've seen Dictators' fists And when they hit a wall-- If you notice that they do, I dearly hope to hear from you. (Afer all, if you should fall, or if you burn, you'll quickly learn, Cyberspatial liquidation Is like anarchy in a nation.) We all trust that our leaders are not evil breeders, and not Draculean feeders! We trust that when we hear `true' stories, They're not cruel lies for somebody's false glories. We trust that we aren't living lies, We trust our friends are friends, not spies: In dark hours their light lives, not dies. Otherwise their rotten smell Will not make you feel well-- Even be your living hell. Eventually your mind will drench, Permeated by their putrid stench, Finally your sanity will wrench. Above all else we trust our foes Not to lash us for their woes, That whatever it is they think we owe, Whatever secret sin of theirs we know, They avoid the `brick-through-window' throw. We pray that even while we doze, Their fuse or dynamite never goes... Not to assail me with deadly blows, Not to kill me for merely stepping on some toes.

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Paranoia Strikes Deep...
by L. Detweiler 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Hello, I have been hearing some rumors about the cypherpunks being `penetrated' by some spies and areas of the Internet (mailing lists, newsgroups, private mail, journal articles, etc.) being targeted with `tentacle' infiltrations. I thought this was kind of fascinating to contemplate how they would behave. It seems to me that loyalty is very hard to judge by mere email messages alone, and that these hypothetical spies might take that to their advantage. Here are some of the things that either cypherpunk loyalists (cyberanarchists) or cy{b,ph}erwonk spies might say to gain credibility and further `intelligence' from insiders: - L.Detweiler is insane, has sent death threats, is behind S.Boxx, is involved in cyberspatial guerrila warfare, is the mastermind of a spy plot, etc. He is the only person in the world who cares about pseudospoofing. (All the complete ad hominem fantasy stuff). - `T.C. May and E.Hughes and J.Gilmore are all outstanding and upstanding net citizens, have never pseudospoofed or done anything wrong, and are the target of an anonymous smear campaign by terrorists.' - `I have been to cypherpunk meetings and parties, and I have met all the people who have been accused of being tentacles, and they are all real. In fact, I saw their drivers licenses.' `Someone accused of being a tentacle actually lives with me.' - There are no conspiracies whatsoever going on inside the cypherpunks, including drug use by `leaders' or pseudospoofing or other illegitimate activities. - Lies are liberating. `We have a right to lie to the media and other people through tentacles.' One can make a game out of infecting respectable media outlets like Wired and NYT with elaborate deceptions. - Pseudospoofing is liberating. `You are only as good as the number of identities you can project on the internet; this is a feature, not a bug.' The Enders Game book (Orson Scott Card?) is an example of the liberating effect of pseudospoofing on freeing people from their arbitrary prejudices about human identity and accountability. - There's no big deal about black marketeering or tax evasion. Everyone does it. It's a survival tactic in a brutal world of corrupt governments and massive corporations out to oppress the little guy. We are entering a New World Order where anarchy will rule and all governments will crumble. - Blacknet is a harmless and visionary cyberspatial experiment done by T.C.May. - `Please take these annoying discussions about secret conspiracies elsewhere.' Of course, if any of these statements are by the spies, they are just trying to build up your trust so that they can betray you later when they have the proper opportunity. Or, sometimes, there is the dictum that `intelligence is more valuable than liquidation' and they may continue to deceive you just for the valuable intelligence indefinately. * * * Then there may be some `tentacles' out there that are being driven by the counterrevolutionaries bent on destroying the Cyberanarchist movement and interested in getting some of their own propaganda out there. These would be indistinguishable from cy{b,ph}erwonk loyalists. - L.Detweiler is brilliant, has made stellar net contributions, has never sent death threats, no evidence exists that he is behind S.Boxx, he has spoken out against cyberspatial guerrila warfare, is the mastermind of a new mailing list but talk of a spy plot is preposterous, etc. He is one of many in the world who cares very seriously about pseudospoofing as all his writing in e.g. RISKS and CUD attests. - `Very little is know about T.C. May and E.Hughes and J.Gilmore as far as their personalities, and in fact J.Gilmore has admitted publicly to drug use, and all vehemently resist making unequivocal public or private statements on pseudospoofing, although they do seem to be the target of an anonymous smear campaign by the anonymous person S.Boxx, but with some disturbing elements of truth.' - `I have never been to cypherpunk meetings and parties, and I am suspicious of the behavior of many of the `people' L.Detweiler has accused of being tentacles, because of the lack of verifiable information and a sort of `cardboard cutout' flavor to their personalities. There seems to be some desperate damage control going on.' - There seem to be some actual conspiracies going on inside the cypherpunks, including drug use by `leaders' or pseudospoofing or other illegitimate activities. - Lies are lies. `No one has a right to lie to the media or other people through tentacles.' Anyone who makes a game out of infecting respectable media outlets like Wired and NYT with elaborate deceptions is malicious, depraved, and perverted. - Pseudospoofing is perverted. Statements like `You are only as good as the number of identities you can project on the internet; this is a feature, not a bug.' are depraved and deluded. The Enders Game book (Orson Scott Card?) is an example of the very dangerous effect of pseudospoofing on manipulating people in their assumptions and presumptions about human identity and accountability, and for mind control and brainwashing. - Black marketeering and tax evasion are evil. Though many promote it, it is toxic to social harmony. Those that promote it are all hypocrites who claim that they have found new societies that are free of it, but have found only societies of poisonous distrust and paranoia. The whole purpose of governments and corporations is to serve people, and if they fail to do so they need to be adjusted but not destroyed. - `Please don't censor these fascinating discussions about secret conspiracies and cyberanarchists.' * * * It's quite a pity that in Cyberspace, to borrow a phrase that is rapidly becoming a cliche, no one knows if you are a spy. Perhaps we can work together to build systems that minimize this kind of rampant paranoia. It's really a shame that someone with a grudge against any mailing list or its leaders could so disrupt its smooth flowing operation with no repercussions. I have some ideas for preventing this, and in fact I encourage anyone else who does to join the Cy{ph,b}erwonks list and discuss these issues associated with Electronic Democracy. ``The first casualty in war is the truth.'' There is a saying in war, `shoot them all and let God sort them out.' Perhaps in these turbulent times, this message represents a `list all the rumors and let the People sort them out.' I hope the truth prevails in Cyberspace as it does in the real world. Our own controversies, such as those above, will serve as an interesting experiment.

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Revised Clipper FOIA results from Asst Secretary of Defense
by gnu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

We sent in an administrative appeal on June 17th, 1993, of various things that were withheld in the response to our FOIA request. The Office of the Secretary of Defense responded on December 21, 1993 -- six months later. (By law, agencies have twenty business days to respond to an administrative appeal. However, agencies regularly violate all FOIA time limits because the courts have largely refused to censure agencies for breaking the law, and have refused to force agencies to follow the law. I will point this out each time it happens, largely to educate you -- the general public -- about how pervasive a problem this is.) We did an administrative appeal of the parts they withheld and other documents they did not provide. The result is that one more doc came out (a cover sheet for a review copy of the President's actual directive, which is still classified and has been referred back to the National Security Council for processing), and the previously withheld paragraph of the last two memos below is now only blacked out for a sentence or two. The newly released text is highlighted with XXXX's and explanation. John Gilmore [This page originally XXXXXXXXXXXXXXX TOP SECRET; now UNCLASSIFIED] OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE WASHINGTON, DC 20301-3040 COMMAND CONTROL COMMUNICATIONS AND INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM FOR MS. JOANN H. GRUBE, NSA REPRESENTATIVE/NSC PRD-27 EXPORT CONTROL WORKING GROUP SUBJECT: Comments on PRD-27/NSA Draft (U) (U) Following are comments concerning your proposed memorandum to Jim Lewis, Department of State: XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXX blacked out via FOIA (b)(1) exemption. XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX (U) The assertions in this draft are merely unsupported statements. Recommend that the memorandum provide more empirical evidence to back up its assertions, and that the above comments be reflected in its contents. (signed) Daniel J. Ryan Director, Information Systems Security CLASSIFIED BY: OASD(C3I)/DIR, ISS DECLASSIFY ON: OADR [This page originally XXXXXXXX SECRET; now UNCLASSIFIED] OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE WASHINGTON DC 20301-3040 COMMAND, CONTROL, COMMUNICATIONS AND INTELLIGENCE 30 APR 1993 (stamped) MEMORANDUM FOR THE ACTING ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (C3I) Subject: PRD/NSC-27 Advanced Telecommunications and Encryption (U) (U) Advances in telecommunications have created the opportunity for public use of encryption to ensure the privacy and integrity of business and personal communications. These same advances threaten the capabilities of law enforcement and national security operations that intercept the communications of narcotraffickers, organized criminals, terrorists, espionage agents of foreign powers and SIGINT targets. Diverse interests are in diametric opposition with regard to industry's right to sell and the public's right to use such capabilities. A highly-emotional, spirited public debate is likely. (U) In its simplest construct, this complex set of issues places the public's right to privacy in opposition to the public's desire for safety. The law enforcement and national security communities argue that if the public's right to privacy prevails and free use of cryptography is allowed, criminals and spies will avoid wiretaps and other intercepts and consequently prosper. They propose that cryptography be made available and required which contains a "trapdoor" that would allow law enforcement and national security officials, under proper supervision, to decrypt enciphered communications. Such cryptography exists, and while there are many practical problems to be solved, this proposal is technically possible to achieve. (U) Opponents of the proposal argue that the public has a right to and an expectation of privacy, that a trapdoor system would be prone to misuse and abuse, and that the proposed solution would not work in any practical sense. They assert that people who are deliberately breaking much more serious laws would not hesitate to use cryptography that does not have a trapdoor, and that secure cryptography will inevitably be supplied by offshore companies. Thus, freedom will be lost and many tax dollars spent to no effect. (U) This situation is complicated by the existence of other interests. For example, there currently exist strict controls on the export of cryptography. The computer industry points out that it has one of the few remaining positive trade balances and that it is vital that the dominance of the American computer industry in world markets be preserved. The industry fears that this will be lost if offshore developers incorporate high-quality cryptography into their products while U.S. industry either cannot do so or suffers higher costs or delays due to requirements for export licenses. The industry argues persuasively that overseas markets (much less drug lords or spies) will not look with favor on U.S. products which have known trapdoors when offshore products which do not have them are available. In support of their argument, they note that powerful public-key cryptography developed and patented by RSA using U.S. tax dollars is free to developers in Europe, subject to royalties in the United States, and cannot be exported without expensive and time-late export licenses. These charges are true. (U) The national security community is especially interested in preventing the spread of high-quality encipherment routines overseas, and argues that more extensive use here at home will inevitably result in such a proliferation. Actually, it is too late. The Data Encryption Standard (DES) is already widely available throughout the world in both hardware and software forms, and DES software can be downloaded anywhere in the world from public bulletin boards by anyone with a PC, a MODEM and a telephone. In one recent experiment it took three minutes and fourteen seconds to locate a source-code version of DES on the INTERNET. Widespread availability of DES and RSA will enable offshore developers to provide high-quality encipherment for voice and data communications in competition with U.S. industry's products. XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX XXXX The entire paragraph that follows was originally withheld as XX XXXX classified information. We appealed the withholding, and XXXXX XXXX most of the paragraph was released, with only one or two XXXXXX XXXX sentences withheld at the bottom. XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX [(S) crossed out, replaced by] (U) Trapdoor encryption technology is not essential to the debate (a system that required the escrow of keys by users of cryptographic technologies could be established even if the trapdoor chips did not exist), proposed use of trapdoor technology does raise a further complication: neither the academic community nor private industry is comfortable with encryption algorithms that are kept secret, as will be the case with the trapdoor chip. It has been suggested that an independent panel of cryptography experts will be invited to evaluate the algorithm. This will undoubtedly fail to reassure the community at large that there are no unrecognized vulneratilities, since the panel will be perceived as captive and tainted. XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX XXXX One or two sentences blacked out via FOIA exemption (b)(1) XXXX (U) Despite these concerns, the President has directed that the Attorney General request that manufacturers of communications hardware use the trapdoor chip, and at least AT&T has been reported willing to do so (having been suitably incentivised by promises of Government purchases). The Attorney General has also been directed to create a system for escrow of key material. The Secretary of Commerce has been directed to produce standards based on the use of the trapdoor chip. (U) The President has also directed that the fact that law enforcement officials will have access to the keys will not be concealed from the public. National security officials are not mentioned. (U) The new administration is committed to the development of an information superhighway and a National Information Infrastructure in support of the economy. This worthy goal is independent of arguments as to whether or not law enforcement and national security officials will be able to read at will traffic passing along the information superhighway. A full-scale public debate is needed to ascertain the wishes of U.S. citizens with regard to their privacy, and the impact on public safety of preserving privacy at the expense of wiretapping and communications intercept capabilities of law enforcement and national security personnel. It is not clear what the public will decide. In the meantime, DoD has trapdoor technology and the Government is proceeding with development of the processes needed to apply that technology in order to maintain the capability to perform licit intercept of communications in support of law enforcement and national security. (signed) Ray Pollari Acting DASD (CI & SCM) [This page originally SECRET; now UNCLASSIFIED] ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE WASHINGTON DC 20301-3040 May 3, 1993 COMMAND, CONTROL, COMMUNICATIONS AND INTELLIGENCE EXECUTIVE SUMMARY MEMORANDUM FOR DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FROM: CHARLES A. HAWKINS, JR., ACTING ASD(C3I) (initialed C. Hxxx) SUBJECT: Advanced Telecommunications and Encryption (U) PURPOSE: INFORMATION DISCUSSION: (U) In response to DEPSECDEF's tasking of 21 Apr 93 (TAB A) this information is provided. Advances in telecommunications have created the opportunity for public use of encryption to ensure the privacy and integrity of business and personal communications. These same advances threaten the capabilities of law enforcement and national security operations that intercept the communications of narcotraffickers, organized criminals, terrorists, espionage agents of foreign powers and a broad range of SIGINT targets. Diverse interests are in diametric opposition with regard to industry's right to sell and the public's right to use such capabilities. A highly-emotional, spirited public debate is likely. (U) The law enforcement and national security communities argue that if the public's right to privacy prevails and free use of cryptography is allowed, criminals and spies will avoid wiretaps and other intercepts. They propose that cryptography be made available to the public which contains a "trapdoor" that would allow law enforcement and national security officials, under proper supervision, to decrypt enciphered communications. Such cryptography exists, and while there are many practical problems to be solved, this proposal is technically possible to implement. (U) Opponents of the proposal argue that the public has a right to and expectation of privacy, that such a system would be prone to misuse and abuse, and that the proposed solution would not work in any practical sense. They assert that criminals and spies will not hesitate to use secure cryptography supplied by offshore companies. Thus, the loss of privacy would outweigh any advantages to law enforcement or national security. (U) The computer industry points out that it has one of the few remaining positive trade balances and that it is vital that the dominance of the American computer industry in world markets be preserved. The industry fears that this will be lost if offshore developers incorporate high-quality cryptography into their products while U.S. industry either cannot do so or suffers higher costs or delays due to requirements for export licenses because of strict controls of export of cryptography. The industry argues persuasively that overseas markets (much less drug lords or spies) will not look with favor on U.S. products which have known trapdoors when offshore products which do not have them are available. CLASSIFIED BY: DASD(CI&SCM) DECLASSIFY ON: OADR [This page originally XXXXXXXX SECRET; now UNCLASSIFIED] (U) The national security community is especially interested in preventing the spread of high-quality encipherment routines overseas, and argues that more extensive use here at home will inevitably result in such a proliferation. This would increase the cost of performing the SIGINT mission or decrease the amount of intelligence, or both. The Data Encryption Standard (DES) is already widely available throughout the world in both hardware and software forms, and DES software can be downloaded anywhere in the world from public bulletin boards by anyone with a PC, a MODEM, and a telephone. Thus far, widespread availability has not led to widespread use. However, widespread availability of DES and RSA will make it possible for offshore developers to provide high- quality encipherment for voice and data communications in competition with U.S. industry's products. XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX XXXX The entire paragraph that follows was originally withheld as XX XXXX classified information. We appealed the withholding, and XXXXX XXXX most of the paragraph was released, with only one or two XXXXXX XXXX sentences withheld at the bottom. XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX [(S) crossed out, replaced by] (U) Trapdoor encryption technology is not essential to the debate since a system that required the escrow of keys by users of cryptographic technologies could be established even if the trapdoor chips did not exist. Proposed use of trapdoor technology does raise a further complication: neither the academic community nor private industry is comfortable with encryption algorithms that are kept secret, as will be the case with the trapdoor chip. It has been suggested that an independent panel of cryptography experts will be invited to evaluate the algorithm. This will not reassure the community at large that there are no unrecognized vulneratilities, since the panel will be perceived as captive and tainted. XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX XXXX One or two sentences blacked out via FOIA exemption (b)(1) XXXX (U) The President has directed that the Attorney General request that manufacturers of communications hardware use the trapdoor chip. The Attorney General has also been directed to create a system for escrow of key material. The Secretary of Commerce has been directed to produce standards based on the use of the trapdoor chip. The President has also directed that the fact that law enforcement officials will have access to the keys will not be concealed from the public. National security officials are not mentioned. (U) The new administration is committed to the development of an information superhighway and a National Information Infrastructure in support of the economy. This worthy goal is independent of arguments as to whether or not law enforcement and national security officials will be able to read at will traffic passing along the information superhighway. A full-scale public debate is beginning which will ascertain the wishes of U.S. citizens with regard to their privacy and the impact on public safety of preserving privacy at the expense of wiretapping and communications intercept capabilities of law enforcement and national security personnel. It is not clear what the public will decide. In the meantime, DoD has trapdoor technology and the Government is proceeding with development of the processes needed to apply that technology in order to maintain the capability to perform licit intercept of communications in support of law enforcement and national security. Prepared by: Dan Ryan/ODASD(CI & SCM)/x 41779/28 Apr 93/OSD -- John Gilmore gnu(a)toad.com -- gnu(a)cygnus.com -- gnu(a)eff.org ``This committee has not tried to determine whether the National Security Agency tendency to advance exaggerated claims of authority ... stems from conscious policy or the actions of individual NSA employees.'' The Government's Classification of Private Ideas, House Report 96-1540, p. 67

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