December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

RSA '96 Conference
by Kevin L Prigge 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

This might be a little early, but will there be a cypherpunks get together at RSA '96? Perhaps a Coed Naked Cypherpunks Key Signing or something? -- Kevin L. Prigge |"A computer lets you make more mistakes faster UofM Central Computing | than any invention in human history--with the email: klp(a)umn.edu | possible exceptions of handguns and tequila." 01001001110101100110001| - Mitch Ratcliffe

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re: Re: Secret Clearance (was: re: NIST GAK export meeting, sv)
by Christopher Kleiman 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Bill Stewart <stewarts(a)ix.netcom.com> said: >>BS> secret clearances are _expensive_, usually take a long time to get, >>BS> and the military only gives them to people who need them. > Strange, the military processed a SECRET clearance on me even >before I signed on the dotted line. Now a TS, that's expensive, but >they didn't have much on me other than my SSAN and, I think, my prints >to process the SECRET, so they couldn't have done much more than run be >through the FBI criminal database. >#include <disclaimer.h> /* Sten Drescher Actually, you filled out some paperwork when you signed up that was sent forward; it wasn't much more than a check against all of the govts "evil type people" databases. However, I understand that it depends on what Level of background check as well. A limited background investigation involves filling out a long form saying that you've been a good boy/girl; it goes up from there. "Civilians" are different from military as well; after all, in one they own you, in the other, you can actually go home at night.;-) ** Nothing I say can be held as the viewpoint of my employer; I'm a short-timer any, so I really don't care what they think! Chris **

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Re: Still more on the Digicash protocol
by Hal 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

From: Mark Twain Ecash Support <support(a)marktwain.com> > Let us contemplate in which type of situation the payee will send such a > wildcard coin. To pay a shop via TCP? No. The payment request comes in with > the shop ID. The resulting payment won't be done with a wildcard coin. > > So when will the user pay with a wildcard coin? To make a payment to a party > that is (pseudo-) anonymous to the payor. That is, if the payor sends the > payment via anonymous remailer, in which case the messages should be > encrypted anyway. There might be some situations where it is useful to send a wildcard coin even via a TCP connection. For example, a pseudonymous server might pop up at some internet address different from its real one, make some transactions, and then go away. Or someone might set up an anonymous account at some public server (like c2.org) and conduct business anonymously on an ongoing basis. In either case the payee would be anonymous to the payor even though they communicated via TCP. The shop would have to send its payment request using "@" as the shop_accID field (I have heard of an undocumented "-X <payee>" switch in the Unix ecash program which allows the shop software to control this field in the payment request). We have also discussed the "pipe-net" which would allow anonymous TCP connections. This does not look like it can be as secure as the remailer net but for occasional or short-term use it can provide considerable privacy protection. I am glad that DigiCash supports this type of cash which anyone can deposit. Actually, I am surprised and puzzled that it does, given Chaum's apparent reluctance to endorse schemes to allow payee anonymity (due to political problems, apparently). It would be interesting to hear how DigiCash envisions this feature being used, and whether they plan to continue to allow it. Since it is not well documented (if at all) it's possible that they don't plan to keep it. But if they do, I think it would be good to adapt the protocols so this feature is usable over TCP connections. Hal

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Re: Responding to Exon -- technology is not enough
by E. ALLEN SMITH 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

From: IN%"Bill.Humphries(a)msn.fullfeed.com" 6-DEC-1995 20:16:17.29 >Anyone wish to comment on the prospect of a double blind server, set >outside U.S. borders, that can act as an interface to the rest of the >world, perhaps encrypting or stego'ing the data transfered between it and >the user? Basically, an anonymous remailer that acts as a cross between >an NNTP, POP3, and SMTP servers. ------------------------------ Encrypting data between the server and the user would probably not work very well, due to the lack of cryptographic knowledge among most users (_I_ don't know how to set up PGP for a VAX (even if I had the room to store it in my quota), and I have some interests in this stuff). However, something where someone did a standard http link in, typed in a destination, and got put there in a way that would look like the person was coming in from the server should work. For best bookmarking results, the added link should probably be inside the link that it looked to the user like they were on. For instance, http://www.anonserve.net/http/www.hotsex.com/ should bookmark properly, and be interpretable by the server as being a command to do a http link to that that web location. I am admittedly not that familiar with the root mechanism of the WWW, but I believe this would work. -Allen

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Re: Still more on the Digicash protocol
by Rev. Mark Grant 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On Thu, 7 Dec 1995, Mark Twain Ecash Support wrote: > >Anyhow, the obvious solution is encryption. Our new observation is > >that encrypting deposits & cancellations with the mint's public key > >is not enough to solve the problem. > [Argument in support of claim elided... I am not conviced.] I think he means you shouldn't use a stream cipher like RC4 that XORs the plaintext with the generated keystream, since if you know part of the plaintext, you can XOR those bytes with (the id you want) XOR (the id being sent) and change the encrypted data so that the payment goes into your account and not theirs. This is a tough, but potentially feasible attack if you use that kind of encryption scheme. Is there anywhere that you could use a similar attack on SSL ? Mark

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Re: FW: websurfer 4.6
by nobody＠REPLAY.COM 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On 7 Dec 95 at 18:06, Enzo Michelangeli wrote: > On Sat, 2 Dec 1995, Michael Froomkin wrote: > > > so much for compatibility....guess I'm sticking with netscape > > for now. > > These guys at Netmanage's support seem to confuse Trumpet's > version number with the Winsock version... Trumpet 2.0b (as, > AFAIK, any other Winsock package presently available) is > Winsock 1.1 compliant. Not surprising. They confuse random doodling with software, too. The real problem with NetManage is a severe case of brain death. The Sampler TCP/IP sucks, the paid-up TCP/IP is so-so, but of the clients, only ftp is fair, and the rest bite. All the NetManage clients I've tried crater, Mail can't rebuild its index structures if they are corrupted (uh, what was it that rebuild was supposed to do, Harvey?), the version of WebSurfer I evaluated took longer and longer to load and shut down, revealed on inspection to be due to loading/storing a very wordy global history in its, ahem, config file! Delete it and your config is gone. I wouldn't concern myself with what crypto is or isn't in a NetManage product -- they are not players as far as I'm concerned. They've been riding the wave of their TCP/IP not crashing as often as some others, but otherwise they're vacuum packed, untouched by coherent human thought.

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Re: 1)Age etc CA 2)Swedish Digicash
by E. ALLEN SMITH 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

From: IN%"jk(a)digit.ee" "Jyri Kaljundi" 7-DEC-1995 12:45:37.27 What about Estonia :) The taxes are low, there are a very few government regulations, the currency is very stable (based on German mark) ... One interesting law in Estonia is that the state budget must be balanced, so there is no way for the government to spend more money than it really has. Technological level here is also quite good, and Internet is more popular than in any other Eastern Europe or ex-USSR country. I think Estonia is an ideal place for such projects: high-tech companies testing their new technological ideas, inventions and business assumptions in real-life conditions. Just get yourself here ! -------- The various Eastern European countries have been targeted before as banking secrecy (read tax haven in the Feds' opinion) countries. Some others might include Malta, although the Catholic influence there may make pornography-related ventures problematic. On the other hand, using Malta would make the conspiracy theorists go nuts... -Allen

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Who Protects Us from the "Protectors?"
by tallpaul＠pipeline.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Who Protects Us from the "Protectors?" The Case of Father Ritter from Covenant House (and the Relevance to the Crypto/G.A.K. Debate) The issue of the need to "protect children" is used as a major attack on quality crypto. The "kiddie pornographers" are described as one of the "four horsemen" who will, we are told, hide behind the crypto. Yet a review of the character and activities (medically, psychotherapeutically, ethically) of the very child protectors shows a tendency for some to be involved in the very activities they are ostensibly opposing. Worse, the public reputations built not infrequently serve to shield the individuals against public investigation of their own sexual activities. Father Bruce Ritter, one founder of Covenant House, is an example. Covenant House was originally started in New York City and located in the 42nd St. Times Square "porn district." The announced purpose of the organization was to protect runaway youth, arriving in NYC at the nearby interstate bus station, from sexual and other predations by the Square's denizens. Ritter soon developed a national reputation as a leading child protector. He was, for example, appointed a member of the President's Commission on Pornography ("Meese Commission.") There was only one fly in the ointment: Fr. Ritter was sexually involved with the very youth he was "protecting." So Ritter's anti-sexual persona (no sex education, "just say 'no'," anti-condom distribution, anti-birth control, anti- abortion, clerical celibacy, anti-porn) covered his sexual practices. Ritter's fundraising to protect the children raised money for his hotel rooms. Worse, his public persona served to protect him as charges of his sexual proclivities surfaced. Ritter's supporters in the "save the children" coalitions did not investigate Ritter. They attacked the youth bringing charges against their saint. Some critics were charged with being fronts for the Times Square porn industry. Others had their honesty and their sanity questioned. Only when additional charges from additional youth surfaced and journalists "followed the money" trail did the true story of Ritter's sexual proclivities and masquerade develop. Critics of quality crypto and the internet demand that supporters of these things answer questions about what the supporters are doing to fight the "kiddie porn" forces. We should ask them the same question(s) about their own movement. Equally we should demand answers to the question of what they are doing to expose forces -- like Ritter -- who use the "protect the children" industry as camouflage for the very predations the industry ostensibly exists to fight.

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Re: Inherent Insecurity of Internet Commerce! (was RE: SecretClearance)
by E. ALLEN SMITH 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

From: IN%"pete(a)loshin.com" "Pete Loshin" 7-DEC-1995 14:37:13.07 OK, I'll try again. First, as I recall, SECRET clearance is actually not very high: when I got it, I had to answer a bunch of questions (do you abuse illegal drugs? are you now or have you ever been a member of any organizations? have you ever been _arrested_ for anything?) ---------------------- I suspect I know what organizations they're interested in (CPUSA et al), but did they ask about any specific organizations? -Allen

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Multiple questions
by liberty＠gate.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hello again cypherpunks: [In order to conserve bandwidth, I am going to ask for 5 things at once which have nothing to do with each-other in this post. Please reply to me privately if it's at all possible. <liberty(a)gate.net> ] 1. I have searched the archives for the author/artist of the "Rose on Random Bits" logo, and I have e-mailed many cypherpunks "old-timers" with no luck. [The logo appears at the top of the archives, but I am well aware that, as an anarchy, cypherpunks has no "official logo."] I have seen a number of beautiful logos during this search, but no- body has pointed me to the author of this particular logo. Any help finding this person would be _much_ appreciated. TIA. 2. I keep hearing every once-in-a-while about PGP3.0 (coming "real- soon-now") but there's nothing specific about what's delaying it. I would urge the developers (whoever they are) to release version 3.0 *before* the upcoming US presidential election, and I am interested in finding out more. TIA. 3. I have been asked by a Libertarian Party presidential candidate for a proposed platform plank in favor of strong, private, non-"GAK" encryption. [OK! I've stopped saying "FUCKED"!<g>] Of course, I want the maximum cypherpunk input possible, so feel free to suggest. The wording must *not* be too technical in nature and should (of course) condemn ITAR. <spit!> It should explain the real meaning of "escrow" and the "Newspeak" version in as few words as possible. TIA for any help on this. I'll post my final version if there's enough interest. 4. Has anyone in France been prosecuted for civilly-disobeying their anti-strong-crypto law by using PGP? What happened? Did the French people just roll over? TIA for any pointers (in English, please). 5. [A comment] Assuming the "secret clearance" requirement, how fast could an escrow agency be decertified if the "secret" person dies or is fired or heads for Anguilla, etc.? [Of course, I would not give a secret key to such a system, considering the effectiveness of simple attacks like "the honey trap" (ask Mordechai Vanunu how this attack works).] JMR - ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Regards, Jim Ray http://www.shopmiami.com/prs/jimray - ----------------------------------------------------------------------- PGP key Fingerprint 51 5D A2 C3 92 2C 56 BE 53 2D 9C A1 B3 50 C9 C8 Key id. # E9BD6D35 (key on homepage & servers) <liberty(a)gate.net> PGP encrypted mail enjoyed, even if it's _not_ "important." IANAL - ----------------------------------------------------------------------- Help Phil! email zldf(a)clark.net or http://www.netresponse.com/zldf _______________________________________________________________________ -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 Comment: Freedom isn't Freeh. iQCVAwUBMMdHO21lp8bpvW01AQEZDgP9Hw8Ymf2zHMY59+TUE6N8+v+WHSeAXsQk Kg7j3Z5jWwPSZopVL2joXolW2t41vDbFEgr5eclweGJXHkLiJdnlPEwGhr+rtf/n dqv/m/o99kBf92D7nCME3nzMxJ1c4eQcGwFBjBZRvysQZ6PU/s0sSo5xqd5g2Qku icleREE+aVc= =4NSh -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: Solution for US/Foreign Software?
by jim bell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 10:26 AM 12/7/95 -0600, you wrote: >jimbell(a)pacifier.com (jim bell) said: > >jb> 1. Write a program limited to keysize, carefully constructed to >jb> isolate those portions of the program which define key size, >jb> GAKedness, etc. > >jb> 2. Get it export approved. Export it. > >jb> THEN > >jb> 3. Announce that a "US-only" version of the same program is being >jb> released, and include the minimal component which replaces the >jb> limited software. Release it, only in the US of course! > > As has been pointed out, this would prolly doom geting export >approval for version 2.0. However, let's keep the developer/publisher >out of the loop. How about someone developing a 'binary diff', using >the functionality of nm to find subroutine entry points, and then doing >the binary diff from those starting points? Presumably, for most of the >program the diff would mostly be changed entry points, with the bulk of >diff being the crypto module. Then the bdiff gets exported, and >bpatch-ed into the export binary. Of course, this wouldn't work if they >strip the binary, but who is going to force them to do that? Okay, that was basically what I was suggesting. A full binary difference file wouldn't even need to have any information about the internals of the program anyway. Basically, what needs to be achieved is a way to allow the software manufacturer to sell an approved product outside the country, but allow the foreign buyer to (easily) convert it into a GOOD encryption product. Once that works, laws against the export of encryption are meaningless. In fact, the legally-exported program obviously wouldn't even need to HAVE encryption in it at all, so it won't fall under ITAR classification, and thus won't need any kind of export license.

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Re: FW: websurfer 4.6
by Rich Graves 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- On Thu, 7 Dec 1995, Anonymous wrote: > Not surprising. They confuse random doodling with software, too. > > The real problem with NetManage is a severe case of brain death. My, thanks for your opinion. It may interest you to know that Microsoft recently licensed a bunch of stuff from NetManage (San Jose Merc, no real details given). - -rich - --- [This message has been signed by an auto-signing service. A valid signature means only that it has been received at the address corresponding to the signature and forwarded.] -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 Comment: Gratis auto-signing service iQBFAwUBMMdKlSoZzwIn1bdtAQGYYgF8CIf5Trt1E5YdMCna43irv5MeGgFnzSvP KXQ0ZR22U9MqbFAbrTjVKUB4ojC30lwo =+3ha -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: Inherent Insecurity of Internet Commerce! (was RE: Secret
by futplex＠pseudonym.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

various people wrote: > OK, I'll try again. First, as I recall, SECRET clearance > is actually not very high: when I got it, I had to answer > a bunch of questions (do you abuse illegal drugs? are > you now or have you ever been a member of any > organizations? have you ever been _arrested_ for anything?) [and] > I suspect I know what organizations they're interested in (CPUSA et > al), but did they ask about any specific organizations? I think this discussion of background checks for clearances has gone rather far astray of cypherpunks relevance, folks.... -Futplex <futplex(a)pseudonym.com>

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Re: Still more on the Digicash protocol
by daw＠guaymas.CS.Berkeley.EDU 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- In article <Pine.3.89.9512071804.A21520-0100000(a)unicorn.com>, Rev. Mark Grant <mark(a)unicorn.com> wrote: > I think he means you shouldn't use a stream cipher like RC4 that XORs the > plaintext with the generated keystream, since if you know part of the > plaintext, you can XOR those bytes with (the id you want) XOR (the id > being sent) and change the encrypted data so that the payment goes into > your account and not theirs. Right. RC4 encryption doesn't provide message integrity. And I should mention that block ciphers like DES in chaining modes like CBC don't provide message integrity either -- it's a bit harder, but an active attacker can still tamper with the ciphertext to modify the plaintext in a predictable way, like with RC4. I admit it's a more difficult to mount this attack against a block cipher in chaining mode, and the success probability may go down (depending on the circumstances), but hey! paranoia is your friend; and my point remains valid: Don't count on encryption to give you message integrity. If you need message integrity, use a MAC. If you want a citation for this basic crypto design principle, I'll be happy to provide one. > This is a tough, but potentially feasible > attack if you use that kind of encryption scheme. Tough!? It's trivial for an active attacker, in the stream cipher case. He just xors some bits: no clever cryptanalysis needed. (Or did you mean it's tough to mount an active attack? I agree: that requires significant knowledge or motivation.) > Is there anywhere that you could use a similar attack on SSL ? Not in SSL v3.0; it explicitly uses a (cryptographically strong) MAC (message authentication code) on each message to prevent tampering and modification. Dave Wagner, speaking for himself, but thankful for all those behind the scenes who are helping to improve and open up Digicash communications. - --- [This message has been signed by an auto-signing service. A valid signature means only that it has been received at the address corresponding to the signature and forwarded.] -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 Comment: Gratis auto-signing service iQBFAwUBMMdVCCoZzwIn1bdtAQHEvQF/c1wmuVWCpmMo+4jY0cNlrrKD/5vYb/st xC2dFLgb1ydJm6kfWRw0Hz8vF55tzj9t =N+Gr -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Is there a lawyer in the house?
by cme＠acm.org 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- >Date: Sat, 2 Dec 1995 03:39:00 -0500 (EST) >From: Black Unicorn <unicorn(a)polaris.mindport.net> >Subject: Re: Netscape gives in to key escrow >An individual has no legitimate expectation of privacy in the encryption >numbers in his GAK browser, we reasoned, because he voluntarily conveyed >those numbers to the government when he purchased the software. It could be even worse. I was on a panel last year with Scott Charney (sp?) (I believe from DoJ) during which he commented that if you give your secret key to anyone -- e.g., your own company -- then you have given up the presumption of privacy. That leaves the police open to get that secret without a warrant. This claim should be checked by a real lawyer. +--------------------------------------------------------------------------+ |Carl M. Ellison cme(a)acm.org http://www.clark.net/pub/cme | |PGP: E0414C79B5AF36750217BC1A57386478 & 61E2DE7FCB9D7984E9C8048BA63221A2 | | ``Officer, officer, arrest that man! He's whistling a dirty song.'' | +---------------------------------------------- Jean Ellison (aka Mother) -+ -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBMMdbP1QXJENzYr45AQF64QP/dXHnfLuh6FFwCY2GxKNYC5lHlj/hcFmy KqwWLYVqyr5vf/ZFEA6wlnVRMAARnenfCDmu7XQ9v9YzRjVrpjQMQAFrl9qlBivB 5wFGYSLME9sVtKIIPR0YSV8Xbw613bLmEnKiGrXxPNQ/bkaO30WOxG3N9Oen9DX4 sFfVbA+Ek0c= =CEEO -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Internet Stocks
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 11:14 PM 12/7/95, Adam philipp wrote: >16% tumble today... > > ...is the word getting out? > A few of you have corresponded with me about investments, Internet stocks, etc., so I reckon there's enough interest out there to share a few thoughts with you. Those who think this list has only to do with number theory or PGP are of course welcome to skip this message now and get back to reading Koblitz. I won't say anything negative or positive about Netscape per se, but here are some various developments: * A Smith Barney analyst today made essentially the same sort of comments that I (and maybe another or two) made several days ago, namely, that the market capitalizations are incredible ($7 B for Netscape at $170/share), that browsers are not a proprietary "franchise" (in that the standard is an open one), that a lot of competition is coming (Spyglass Mosaic, Oracle, Microsoft, etc.), and that many people hysterically bidding up the price of Internet stocks are barely aware of what this "Internet thing" is. He issued a "sell" recommendation on Netscape, an "underperform" recommendation on Netcom, Spyglass, UUNet, etc., and was generally bearish on the sector. (I saw him interviewed on CNBC, minutes before Marc Andreessen was interviewed.) * From a high on Tuesday of $170, Netscape was down to $130 at one point today. I haven't seen the closing price. * Analysts are also closely looking at the February '96 end of the "lockout" in some stock sales by Netscape employees. Basically, a lot of the shares that went to employees, etc., cannot be sold for 180 days after the IPO, which was in early August of this year. The effects of shares being put on the market is not clear, of course, and it is possible the effects will be minimal. Still, it might be prudent to take this account when considering strategies. * Microsoft also made announcements indicating a move closer to a standard Web browser strategy (as opposed to trying to sell the world on Microsoft Network). deal with Spyglass, and a licensing of JavaScript. (There've been too many deals connected with browers, Java, etc. for me to even begin to summarize here.) * Sentiment moves in waves, as per the Dutch tulip bulb scenario, and what was headed for the moon a few days ago is suddenly a turkey, to many. The whipsawing in Netscape, UUNET, Netcom, etc., is incredible: up 30 points in two days, then down 30 points in two days! By the way, some have sent me mail asking about how to sell these and other stocks short. One can sell them short directly (getting the money now and agreeing to deliver the shares at a later date), but this is risky, should these stocks rise. (And some of these shares are not readily available for short sales, due to the limited number of shares on the market and the difficulty of finding someone to lend the shares for a short sale.) One's risk is essentially unbounded (but practically there are some reasonable limits to how much the stock can rise, of course). Short sellers are always advised to remember this maxim: "He who sells what isn' his'n, must buy it back or go to prison." (It is said that some of the rise in Netscape stock price is due to "the shorts running for cover." That is, those who shorted the stock at, say, $80 are frantically trying to buy the stock to close out their positions. This can cause the relatively few shares to be bid further and further up. As I keep saying, be careful in believing this or not.) A safer strategy is to buy puts and calls, or to sell puts and calls. Buying "puts" (my mnemonic: the right to "put it" to another investor) involves, say, buying the right to sell a stock at some price in the future. Thus, one might buy a put on the Internet Index (http://www.amex.com) a collection of Internet-related stocks, to sell the IIX at $25 in April, '96 for a strike price of $255. If the IIX goes _up_, and as April approaches, that put will become worth less and less and may become worthless. If the IIX goes _down_, that put becomes more worthwhile (because one has the right to "put" it someone for $255 when the actual value of the IIX has dropped to, say, $200. (Roughly speaking, at expiration in April '96 this put will be worth $55, for a doubling of one's original investment; the pricing of options depends on a lot of things, including risk, time value of money, expectations, etc.) At this point there are no widely-available puts and calls on most of the recent high-fliers on the Internet. This is why the IIX looks to be a way to play this game. Interested investors should also look at LEAPs, which are essentially puts and calls with much longer expiration dates. A friend of mine bought $25K worth of Intel LEAPs (JAN96s) during the height of the Pentium debacle, when Intel was trading at $30, and in the next six months this $25K investment became worth over $300K. (Needless to say, your mileage may vary. Don't blame me if you lose your shirt. Bulls make money, bears make money, but pigs never make money, as another maxim goes.) --Tim May Views here are not the views of my Internet Service Provider or Government. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Higher Power: 2^756839 | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders are just speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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Python Cryptography Toolkit v1.0.0
by Andrew Kuchling 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I've just uploaded version 1.0.0 of the Python Cryptography Toolkit, a collection of cryptographic routines for the Python programming language. It's at ftp://ftp.cwi.nl/pub/pct/pycrypt100.tgz. All my code is public domain; some of the algorithm implementations are GPLed. The Toolkit now contains various cryptographic algorithms such as DES, IDEA, MD5, etc. I will fix bugs in the software, and may add or remove the odd module if some startling new research result comes out, but things should be pretty stable from now on. The algorithms available are: Hash functions: Haval, MD2, MD4, MD5, SHA. Private-key encryption: Blowfish, DES, DES3 (Triple DES), Diamond, IDEA, Alleged RC4, 32-bit RC5, REDOC III. Public-key: Digital Signature Standard, ElGamal, RSA. (There's a non-functional ESIGN module included, too; I'll finish it for a subsequent release.) Python is an interpreted scripting language; see http://www.python.org for more information, the source code, and binaries. It includes arbitrary-sized integers, so the public-key algorithms are implemented in pure Python; this entails a speed penalty, but makes the code more valuable for educational purposes. A sample usage of a hash algorithm (MD5) is: >>> import md5 >>> hash=md5.new() >>> hash.update(message) >>> hash.digest() '\235\361\034\357\217MX\2246\226\367\366Ebx\326' A sample use of an encryption algorithm (IDEA, in this case) is: >>> import idea >>> obj=idea.new('This is a key456', idea.ECB) >>> message="The answer is no" >>> ciphertext=obj.encrypt(message) >>> ciphertext '\2325$\343=)d\341^\025<\344\013\204 T' >>> obj.decrypt(ciphertext) 'The answer is no' Questions, comments, or suggestions are welcomed at the address below. Andrew Kuchling andrewk(a)cst.ca

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Re: Still more on the Digicash protocol
by jim bell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 10:03 AM 12/7/95 -0800, you wrote: >I am glad that DigiCash supports this type of cash which anyone can >deposit. Actually, I am surprised and puzzled that it does, given >Chaum's apparent reluctance to endorse schemes to allow payee anonymity >(due to political problems, apparently). I, on the other hand, think one of the best uses of digital cash is to drastically reduce and eventually eliminate the whole concept of "government." I see payee-anonymous digital cash as being absolutely essential.

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revised librand now on ftp.research.att.com site
by Matt Blaze 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Sorry for the noise, but I just discovered that the librand.shar file that I put in my ftp directory got garbled somewhere along the line. I've repaired the damage and put a correct version of the file in: ftp://ftp.research.att.com/dist/mab/librand.shar (Worst of all, the garbled version actually compiled, but you can tell you have it by its failure to link properly). Again sorry for the noise. -matt

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Netscape stock on 12/7/95
by Adam philipp 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

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Micro$oft and Java
by gorkab＠sanchez.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Microsoft announced its Internet plans, and is considering licensing Java from Sun Microsystems. Other parts of the plan: OLE controls that can be transmitted over the Web, acting like applets; Web-related enhancements to Visual Basic; commerce, security, publishing and server software. [WSJ 12/7 p.B8] IBM joined the ranks of companies licensing Java software from Sun Microsystems. The company plans to integrate the technology into all its Internet software and operating systems, including the version of Windows 3.1 it sells. [NYT 12/7 p.D2] [WSJ 12/7 p.B8]

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Re: Is there a lawyer in the house?
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 9:27 PM 12/7/95, cme(a)acm.org wrote: >It could be even worse. I was on a panel last year with Scott Charney (sp?) >(I believe from DoJ) during which he commented that if you give your secret >key to anyone -- e.g., your own company -- then you have given up the >presumption of privacy. That leaves the police open to get that secret >without a warrant. This claim should be checked by a real lawyer. Huh? You mean if you give me your key the police can get it from me without a warrant? What if I don't want to give it up, and you don't? How would the police get it without a warrant? (And "I" could be your employer, so the point is clear.) And even more strikingly, what if you give your private key to your lawyer for safekeeping? Has attorney-client privilege gone away? (Granted, there are ways to break attorney-client privilege, but these are rare exceptions. In any case, the police could not get the private key without a court order, warrant, whatever.) I can believe that some cases of giving up keys wipes out one's arguments based strictly on "privacy," but not that it wipes out other arguments. It seems to me that if one wants to voluntarily escrow private keys, for safekeeping, one's personal lawyer is a safe bet: it is very difficult to break this kind of attorney-client confidentiality, from what I know of such things. --Tim May Views here are not the views of my Internet Service Provider or Government. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Higher Power: 2^756839 | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders are just speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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CPUSA = CypherPunks USA?
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 6:39 PM 12/7/95, E. ALLEN SMITH wrote: > I suspect I know what organizations they're interested in (CPUSA et >al), but did they ask about any specific organizations? CPUSA? You mean "CypherPunks USA"? I agree that being on the Cypherpunks list is probably a serious threat to one's security clearance. After all, the things we talk about are destabilizing to governments, are conducive to creating open channels for releasing material anyone thinks is useful to be released, and even makes espionage trivial. (We seldom mention this, it being old hat, but the Aldrich Ames' of the world need no longer resort to archaic tradecraft such as leaving messages in Coke cans in the crooks of trees--digital dead drops are as close as your nearest PGP package and remailer. This is a revolution in espionage--not that I am advocating or condoning it, although it is often necessary and even moral.) Given that many of us take an explicitly trans-national approach, with little or no loyalty to local and national governments, and given that many of us advocate a Nietzschean kind of personal choice in deciding which laws to obey and which to ignore, our outlook is probably as dangerous to secret programs as membership in the Communist Party would be (especially these days, where membership in the CP would be seen as either a sign of slow thinking or quaintness). --Tim May Views here are not the views of my Internet Service Provider or Government. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Higher Power: 2^756839 | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders are just speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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Re: Still more on the Digicash protocol
by daw＠delhi.CS.Berkeley.EDU 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Just a clarification about my comments on privacy against eavesdroppers with Digicash. I admit I didn't express myself very well the first time. In article <199512071610.KAA16536(a)admin.starnet.net>, Mark Twain Ecash Support <support(a)marktwain.com> wrote: > > >Worse still, anonymity for the shop is worse with Digicash than with real > >cash. If I pay you real cash on a secluded street, you're fairly anonymous. > >If I pay you Digicash over the Internet, any passive eavesdropper could be > >recording your identy and the whole transaction. Blech. > > This is raising an issue that has nothing to do with Ecash. The complaint is > in fact about the lack of a gereral link encryption on the Internet. I agree > that this is needed, but providing it really isn't Ecash's job. I am eagerly > anticipating the general use of IPSEC. > Hrm, I think you misunderstood what I was trying to say. Assume the attacker is not doing any traffic analysis. The problem is that even then, the shop's identity (and product info, and payment amount, and bank ID, etc.) are still sent *in the clear* in the Digicash payment protocol. Thus all those items can be correlated to the payee's identity: a complete loss of privacy for the shop. There's no need to send that payment info in the clear -- why not encrypt? If it is encrypted, a passive eavesdropper can only learn the payer's & payee's identity if he uses traffic analysis, and even then he doesn't know the payment amount, product description, etc. For all he knows, the transaction could've been a $0.01 cent donation to Sameer for his anonymous remailer, or it could've been a $10,000 transfer to Sameer's machine in (virtual) Anguila-space for a few dozen Apache servers. (So this also has implications for payer anonymity & privacy, not just payee privacy. When payment info is sent in the clear, and the eavesdropper is doing traffic analysis (e.g. by sniffing the link out from a small business), the eavesdropper can correlate payer's identity with the payment amount, product description, and other buying habit information. When Digicash protocol messages are encrypted, this information isn't released, and can't be correlated with payer identity, even when traffic analysis is being done.) That's why I really wish Digicash were encrypting all its messages. And I'm very glad to hear that Digicash will support sending the entire protocol over a SSL-protected link. Great feature! I'll be looking forward to it. > >* continue specifying the protocol at a deeper level, like you promised > > (and throw in source for security-critical modules too, eh? :-) > > Writing all this down takes time. DigiCash may hire a tech writer soon. That > should improve communications between all parties. Excellent! Thanks for all you're doing to improve Digicash's anonymity, privacy, and security features, Lucky. I think it's really important to get this right in the pioneering work... - --- [This message has been signed by an auto-signing service. A valid signature means only that it has been received at the address corresponding to the signature and forwarded.] -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 Comment: Gratis auto-signing service iQBFAwUBMMeEBCoZzwIn1bdtAQFzYAF/agJtA7eal+rEP0ki34FY/vyKc/EDqJ0p QR1T+zJZ0tn6i1hwluqlmvigJpWNst41 =/NJW -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: Micro$oft and Java
by Joel McNamara 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I was at the Microsoft presentation. Crypto-relevant info: A patch will be published in the next few days to address the weak .PWL encryption. I got a rather lame excuse about how the encryption was first implemented in 1991, and how it was sufficient then. They will supposedly be changing the seed. I asked about what MS was doing in regard to future strong crypto. Got an interesting response in that that "the government was going to let them implement 768 bit keys." I later asked an MS person if these were RSA session keys or what. He said yes, but I really don't think he knew what he was talking about based on some of his other comments. Visual Basic Script will be MS's response to JavaScript. The interesting thing here is a plan to use digital signatures on controls and scripts as a means of authentication. The comment was made "you'd trust something signed by Lotus or some other big name, but you probably wouldn't be that trustful of a piece of shareware." Hmmm... MS will be releasing a "safe" runtime version of Visual Basic that will supposedly prevent nasty virii and trojan horses from being implemented on Web pages. IMHO, Perry's previous comments on the security of Java apply. Servers and some clients will support end-to-end encryption. No details... I didn't ask about GAK. Bill said there was a white paper explaining Microsoft's position on encryption. Maybe I'll test the search capabilities of the MS Web site later tonight. Overall, the presentation was interesting (but obviously lacking in technical details as the audience was mostly press). MS is going to throw a lot of resources at this in order to maintain its industry dominance. Thought for the day. Bill on the relevance of the briefing being held on Pearl Harbor day quoted Admiral Yamamoto after the 1941 attack, "we have awoken a sleeping giant." Draw your own conclusions on that one... Joel

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