December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: [NOISE] Re: NWLibs> Re: Anonymous trashing of Assassination Politics
by tallpaul＠pipeline.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On Jan 28, 1996 02:17:11, 'Rich Graves <llurch(a)networking.stanford.edu>' wrote: >-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- > >On Sat, 27 Jan 1996, Jack Hammer wrote: > > >I think it's time the wacky right and wacky left started looking at each >other's Web pages and lurking on each others' lists. It's really funny >putting two "Anarchist" pages, one featuring Che Guevara, the other >featuring David Duke, side by side. > I don't understand the crypto-relevance of this, but since it was posted: 1) What "anarchist" group featured a photo of Che Guevara; 2) When did the KKK that at one time proudly had Sheriff's. Judges, and Governor's as members become "Anarchist"? -- tallpaul "To understand the probable outcome of the Libertarian vision, see any cyberpunk B movie wherein thousands of diseased, desparate and starving families sit around on ratty old couches on the streets watching television while rich megalomaniacs appropriate their body parts for their personal physical immortality." R. U. Sirius _The Real Cyberpunk Fakebook_

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SDTI Patent (was "Concryption" patent)
by pcw＠access.digex.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Here are the Claims to the "Concryption" patent (5,479,512) that was just issued. I've annotated the claims with thoughts about how they shouldn't apply. For those who don't know patent law, the system is very heirarchical. For instance claim 1 here is known as a base claim. Claim 2 is dependent on claim 1. I believe that Claim 1 would be ruled invalid because of the prior art contained in my Cryptologia article, "A Redundancy Reducing Cipher" published in May 88. The journal is found in many university libraries so I don't think there should be any argument about the nature of publication. The article describes how to encipher text by permuting a Huffman tree used to compress data. The idea was to add some noise to the compression phase of any encryption. Huffman compression works by building a big binary tree. The characters are held in the leaves of the tree. The code for a particular character is specified by the path from the root to the leaf. Ordinarily, the left branch is given a 0 and the right branch is specified by a 1. This addressing remains fixed throughout the compression. I suggested flipping these addressing bits at some pseudorandomly determined interval. The purpose of the paper was to do compression and encryption at the same time. For that reason, I believe the paper reads directly against Claim 1, a claim that I also believe is overly broad. The rest of the claims seem obvious to me because they borrow well-known techniques from well-known ciphers like DES. "Obviousness" is a really non-obvious detail in patent law. Essentially, an idea is not patentable if the idea is "obvious" to one practiced in the art. Naturally, this is very hard to define and it depends upon plenty of case law. In my mind, the only novelty is their integration with claim 1. I don't know enough about "obviousness" in this case, but I wouldn't be surprised if the entire patent failed to hold up under scrutiny. -Peter Wayner >CLAIMS: What is claimed is: > > 1. A method for utilizing a data processor to change the >form of data >comprising the steps of: > > a) obtaining the data at the processor in clear form; > > b) obtaining an encryption key at the processor; > > c) the processor performing a multi-step compression >operation on said >clear-form data; > > d) the processor automatically utilizing said encryption key >in conjunction >with the results as directly generated by the processor for a >selected step of >said compression operation in performing an encryption >operation, the >compression steps of step (c) and the encryption step of step >(d) being >integrated to be performed as parts of a single operation; and > > e) the processor outputting the resulting compressed and >encrypted version >of the clear-form data. > > 2. A method as claimed in claim 1 wherein step (e) includes >the step, of >storing the resulting compressed and encrypted data in memory. This should be obvious to anyone skilled in the art of programming a computer. > > 3. A method as claimed in claim 1 wherein step (e) includes >the step of >transmitting the resulting compressed and encrypted data. This should be obvious to anyone skilled in the art of programming a computer. > > 4. A method as claimed in claim 1 wherein said encryption >key is a code >derived from a token. This should be obvious to anyone skilled in the art of programming a computer. > > 5. A method as claimed in claim 4 wherein the code derived >from a token is >a one-time nonpredictable code. I'm not sure what a one-time, unpredictably code. But it would help if both sides could have access to it. This should be obvious to anyone skilled in the art of programming a computer. > > 6. A method as claimed in claim 1 wherein step (d) includes >the steps >performed by the processor of dividing the results of the >selected step of the >compression operation into a plurality of segments, selecting >an encryption >key for each segment and performing an encryption operation for >each segment >utilizing the corresponding encryption key. This should be obvious to anyone skilled in the art of creating a crypto system. Block ciphers are very common. DES is well known. > > 7. A method as claimed in claim 6 wherein the step of >selecting an >encryption key includes the step of processing the obtained >encryption key to >form a separate encryption key for each of the plurality of >segments. Key permutation is also well-known. One form of DES uses the result from the previous block to change the key for the next block. > > 8. A method as claimed in claim 6 wherein the step of >selecting an >encryption key includes the step of utilizing the same >encryption key for all >segments. Big deal. > > 9. A method as claimed in claim 1 wherein step (d) includes >the steps >performed by the processor of dividing the results of the >selected step of the >compression operation into a plurality of segments, utilizing >the obtained >encryption key to perform an encryption operation for a first >of said >segments, and utilizing a selected function of at least a >portion of the >encryption operation for a given segment as the encryption key >for performing >an encryption operation on a succeeding segment. Should be obvious for the usual reasons. DES did cipher block chaining. > > 10. A method as claimed in claim 9 wherein the data is text >and wherein a >segment is N lines of such text, where N is an integer. Big deal. > > 11. A method as claimed in claim 1 wherein the encryption >operation >includes the step of the processor performing an exclusive >ORing operation >with the encryption key and the results of the selected step. Should be obvious. The method is used in other systems. > > 12. A method as claimed in claim 1 wherein step (b) includes >the step of >forming the encryption key by exclusive ORing a password for a >system user >with a code derived from a token in the possession of the user. > > 13. A method as claimed in claim 1 wherein step (c) includes >the step of >the processor performing an initial run-length encoding >operation on the > >clear-form data and > > wherein step (d) is performed on the results of the >run-length encoding >step. > > 14. A method as claimed in claim 1 wherein step (d) is >performed on at >least one element used in a compression step. > > 15. A method as claimed in claim 14 wherein the element on >which encryption >is performed is a table used in performing a compression step. > > 16. A method as claimed in claim 1 including the step of >restoring the data >to clear form for utilization, said restoring step including >the steps of >performing at least one decompression operation and at least >one deencryption >operation, said decompression and deencryption steps being >performed in >reverse order to the performance of steps (c) and (d). > > 17. A method for utilizing a data processor to concrypt data >comprising the >steps of: > > the processor obtaining the data in clear form; > > the processor performing a concryption operation on the >clear data, said >concryption operation including at least one compression step >and at least one >encryption step automatically performed in a selected sequence >as an integral >operation; and > > the processor outputting the resulting concrypted data. > > 18. A method as claimed in claim 17 including the step >performed at a data >processor of deconcrypting the concrypted data to permit use >thereof in clear >form, the deconcrypting step including at least one >decompression step and at >least one deencryption step performed automatically in a >sequence which is >substantially the reverse of said selected sequence. > > 19. A method as claimed in claim 17 wherein an encryption >step is performed >on the results of at least one stage of a compression step. > > 20. A method as claimed in claim 17 wherein an encryption >step is performed >on at least one element used in a compression step. The rest of these are just apparatus claims that seem to repeat the earlier, more abstract "method" claims in different form. Patent law has traditionally distinguished between an idea for doing something, the "method", and the machines that actually do it, "the apparatus." I didn't see anything new here. > > 21. Apparatus for utilizing a data processor to change the >form of data >comprising: > > means for obtaining the data at the processor in clear form; > > means for obtaining an encryption key at the processor; > > means for performing at the processor a multi-step >compression operation on >said clear-form data; > > means at the processor for automatically utilizing said >encryption key in >conjunction with the results as directly generated by the >processor for a >selected step of said compression operation in performing an >encryption >operation, the compression performed by the compression means >and the >encryption performed by the encryption means being integrated >to be performed >as parts of > >the same operations; and > > means at the processor for outputting the resulting >compressed and >encrypted version of the clear-form data. > > 22. Apparatus as claimed in claim 21 wherein the means for >performing an >encryption operation includes means at the processor for >dividing the results >of the selected step of the compression operation into a >plurality of >segments, and means for performing an encryption operation for >each segment >utilizing the corresponding encryption key. > > 23. Apparatus as claimed in claim 22 wherein the means for >selecting an >encryption key includes means for processing the obtained >encryption key to >form a separate encryption key for each of the plurality of >segments. > > 24. Apparatus as claimed in claim 21 wherein the means for >performing an >encryption operation includes means at the processor for >dividing the results >of the selected step of the compression operation into a >plurality of >segments, means for utilizing the obtained encryption key to >perform an >encryption operation for a first of said segments, and means >for utilizing a >selected function of at least a portion of the encryption >operation for a >given segment as the encryption key for performing an >encryption operation on >a succeeding segment. > > 25. Apparatus as claimed in claim 21 wherein the means for >performing an >encryption operation includes means at the processor for >performing an >exclusive ORing operation with the encryption key and the >results of the >selected step. > > 26. Apparatus as claimed in claim 21 wherein the means for >performing a >multistep compression operation includes means at the processor >for performing >an initial run-length encoding operation on the clear-form >data; and > > wherein the encryption operation is performed on the results >of the run- >length encoding operation. > > 27. Apparatus as claimed in claim 21 including means for >restoring the data >to clear form for utilization, said means for restoring >including means for >performing at least one decompression operation and at least >one deencryption >operation, said decompression and deencryption operations being >performed in >reverse order to the performance of compression and encryption >by said means >for compressing and said means for encrypting, respectively. > > 28. Apparatus for utilizing a data processor to concrypt >data comprising: > > means for obtaining the data at the processor in clear form; > > means for performing a concryption operation at the >processor on the clear >data, said concryption operation including means for performing >at least one >compression step and means for performing at least one >encryption step, said >compression and encryption steps being automatically performed >in a selected >sequence as an integrated operation; and means for the >processor outputting >the resulting concrypted data. > > 29. Apparatus as claimed in claim 28 including means at a >data processor >for deconcrypting the concrypted data to permit use thereof in >clear form, the >means for deconcrypting including means for performing at least >one >decompression step and means for performing at least one >deencryption step; >the decompression and deencryption steps being performed >automatically in a >sequence which is substantially the reverse of said selected >sequence. > << end of forwarded material >>

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Re: "This post is G-Rated"
by Duncan Frissell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 10:42 AM 1/26/96 -0800, Bill Frantz wrote: >I think you have a very different view of rating than I do. For example, I >would be comfortable rating all the Sesame Street shows for sex and >violence without seeing any more than I have seen, just based on the >reputation of the show's producers. Based on reviews in the newspaper >(since the net has replaced TV for me), most of the current network shows >can also be rated for all their episodes. Remember also, there is an >"unrated" catagory. Some people will refuse to access unrated material. >Others, (I suspect you and I) may seek it out. > That's fine for "brand name" shows but who's going to rate the 50 years of home movies Fred C. Schwartz has lovingly digitized and put up on *his* server. DCF

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YAN_kel
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

1-28-96. NYT: A "Viewpoint" article not on the NYT Web site: "Standoff in Cyberspace Gulch," by a Yankelovich author of the recent Cybercitizen Survey, reports on the showdown shaping up as the law moves into cyberspace, highlighting the clash between citizen fears about security and the desire for privacy, with stats from Yankelovich polls. The quandary here -- that regulations are both thought to be needed, yet anticipated to fail -- is the biggest issue, and one that puts additional pressure on the limits of cyberspace privacy. This crisis of confidence, as much as lawlessness itself, could easily choke the growth of cyberspace. YAN_kel Note: "Viewpoint" and "From the Desk Of" publishes readers' articles; submit by E-mail to <viewpts(a)nytimes.com> or to <fromdesk(a)nytimes.com>.

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Re: Microsoft's CryptoAPI - thoughts?
by James A. Donald 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>James A. Donald writes: > > A notable misfeature of the API is that it assumes that in general > > you will have two key pairs. One for signing and one for encrypting. > > > > Since in the most common case you are encrypting something related to a > > signed message by the person you are encrypting to, this is a > > bad idea, At 07:59 AM 1/27/96 -0500, Futplex wrote: > Could you elaborate ? I haven't heard of any known interaction > effects between a strong encryption algorithm and a distinct strong digital > signature algorithm (with or without distinct keys), I was concerned about a different issue: Suppose you have some signed information: You wish to send some encrypted information to the person who wrote that signed information. If the signing key and the encrypting key are the same, your software can locally ensure that you encrypt with the right key, (The correct key is the same public key that you used to check the signature on the message.) If the signing key and the encrypting key are different, then in order to ensure that you are not spoofed into using the wrong public key, the whole protocol must work correctly, exposing many more points of attack, since key management is the most complex and most vulnerable area. --------------------------------------------------------------------- | We have the right to defend ourselves | http://www.jim.com/jamesd/ and our property, because of the kind | of animals that we are. True law | James A. Donald derives from this right, not from the | arbitrary power of the state. | jamesd(a)echeque.com

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TollRoad (CA 91) and anonymity (fwd)
by nobody＠REPLAY.COM 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

From: gregbrooks(a)earthlink.net (Greg Brooks) Newsgroups: misc.transport.road,rec.autos.driving,ca.driving Subject: TollRoad (CA 91) and anonymity Date: 26 Jan 1996 03:08:09 -0500 Organization: Woo Studios Ltd. Lines: 103 Sender: dc(a)panix3.panix.com Message-ID: <xz3vilzcr9y.fsf_-_(a)panix3.panix.com> References: <4cv5j5$9ar(a)news.netvoyage.net> <dmoorman-1101961517300001(a)d189.nb.interaccess.com> <hatunenDL1F08.ILx(a)netcom.com> <4d6a2u$rh9(a)curly.cc.emory.edu> <hatunenDL3615.63(a)netcom.com> <1996Jan15.033217@clstac> <DLBBxG.5v7(a)freenet.carleton.ca> <gregbrooks-2201962151180001(a)gregbrooks.earthlink.net> <xz3wx6g8svx.fsf(a)panix3.panix.com> NNTP-Posting-Host: panix3.panix.com In-reply-to: dc(a)panix3.panix.com's message of 25 Jan 1996 05:34:43 -0500 X-Newsreader: Gnus v5.0.13 > From gregbrooks(a)earthlink.net Thu Jan 25 12:30:45 1996 > Date: Thu, 25 Jan 1996 09:39:18 -0800 > To: Minister of Truth <dc(a)panix.com> > From: gregbrooks(a)earthlink.net (Greg B.) > Subject: Re: Tolls and private highways (was: Re: private highway?) > > >The following message is a courtesy copy of an article > >that has been posted as well. > > [please post my response to the appropriate usenet groups -- I'm at work > and only have email here at my office.] > > > >[1] How easy is it to clone a valid toll box thingie (the thing you buy > > and put in your car) ? Such cloning has been a problem with > > cellular phones. > > There's a custom chip inside the transponder, so cloning is going to be > pretty much impossible without access to a supply of those chips. > Additionally, the communications between the transponder and the antenna > array, as well as between the array and our computer system, are encrypted. > > > > >[2] How actually does one buy a toll thingie and put money into an account ? > > Are they on sale at 7-11 or gas stations, or where ? > > We offer the transponders via mail (you can call an 800 number for an > application) and via a customer-service center for walk-ins. There's some > talk of exploring mass market channels, but nothing firm yet. > > > > >[3] How does one add more money to a thingie ? Or does one add money > > to an account, and leave the thingie unchanged ? > > The thingie remains unchanged. (Sounds prophetic, no?) When you sign up for > an account and transponder, here's what happens: If you sign up for a > credit-card account, we take an imprint of your card in lieu of a deposit > on the transponder, and we start your account off with a minimum balance of > $40. You, as a customer, agree to let us go back to your credit card and > replenish the account based on a pre-agreed amount when the balance reaches > a minimum level (typically $10). We also do the same for checking accounts > (automatic withdrawl) and have cash options for those customers who aren't > comfy with recurring automatic transactions on their card or account. The > replenishment of the accounts is system-based -- that is, you don't need to > physically bring your transponder in for a "fill up." > > > > >[4] If one is required to give a name when setting up an account > > is it an offense to give a false name ? > > We have an anonymous account option. > > > >[5] I have concerns about the privacy of the information collected > > about who goes where when. I suspect that your company will comply > > with a court order or search warrant rather than dual to the death with > > the SWAT team. How often and how thoroughly do you purge your > > records ? > > Our records are much like those kept by the phone company -- they're sealed > to the public and to official requests that aren't accompanied by a court > order. One area where we're actually more concerned about privacy than the > state of California is in the area of mailing lists. Quite simply, we'll > never sell our customer list to anyone for any reason -- but even the state > DMV sells lists. We don't ever purge our records. > > > > > >[6] How many intersections/on/off/ramps are there ? > > The project is a true express lanes configuration -- no intermediate > access. Basically, you get on at one end and get off 10 miles later. > Flexible channelizers form the barrier between the freeway and the project, > so in an emergency you could get out if you needed to. > > > > >[7] What is the speed limit and who set it ? > > Because the project was dedicated as part of the state highway system > before we opened to the public, the speed limit is the same as the adjacent > freeway -- 65 mph. > > > > > >[8] What is the largest/heaviest/most-wheeled vehicle you accept ? > > No trucks hauling boats or large horse trailers. No 18-wheelers. Bobtail > trucks are OK, I believe (I'll double-check this). > > > Hope this helps! > > //greg brooks > gregbrooks(a)earthlink.net > > >

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ANNOUNCEMENT: IMC Resolving Security Complexity Workshop
by Dave Crocker 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

These are the final arrangements: Resolving Email Security Complexity Workshop 21 February 1996 * 8:30 AM - 5:00 PM San Jose (CA) Hilton & Towers * San Carlos Room (next to Convention Center) Pre-registration & payment: $50 * After February 16: $75 (cash, check, wire transfer, money order, or First Virtual) Pass this note on to others who are deeply involved in email security. AGENDA The meeting will be structured with a tight agenda, having a very focused sequence of work; it is definitely not for general education. Some amount of review is appropriate, but not much. The following agenda is tentative and will be reviewed and modified on the pre-workshop discussion list. Morning * Very briefly describe the MOSS, PGP, and S/MIME solutions * Review the functional and technical concerns * Review the extent to which each alternative satisfies the concerns * Seek consensus for concerns that qualify as requirements Afternoon * Haggle about the strengths and weaknesses of the technical alternatives * Explore the choices and/or negotiate a preferred solution ONLINE RESOURCES To register for the meeting: Web: <http://www.imc.org/workshop-registration> Email: <mailto:workshop-registration@imc.org> For discussion before and after the meeting: Web: <http://www.imc.org/workshop/> Email: <mailto:resolving-security-request@imc.org>

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Re: Hash trees and bank solvency.
by James A. Donald 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>"James A. Donald" <jamesd(a)echeque.com> writes: > > > One solution to this problem is government auditors. > > Government inspectors, unlike private auditors, can force > > their way in, in the early hours of the morning, and as each > > bank employee turns up, take him to a separate cubicle and > > interogate him with a gun in one hand and an account book in > > the other. This makes it difficult for the financial > > institution to fabricate a misleading picture of its > > financial situation. At 10:43 PM 1/27/96 -0800, Mike Duvos wrote: >This would be killing a mosquito with a flyswatter. Besides, the >employees of a financial institution may be in no position to >accurately state its financial situation, even if they are in >little cubicles with guns to their heads. I refer to actual practice, not to theory: (Though the guns are only metaphorically held to peoples heads, the examiners forcing their way in at dawn and ambushing the senior employees as they arrive are entirely literal.) The objective is to take them by surprise and interrogate them separately, to avoid them "hiding" some customers and some liabilities. If the element of surprise is lost, the examiners are likely to be confronted with truckloads of plausible, consistent, and entirely bogus documentation, as happens regularly. > A somewhat more civilized method is used by my broker, [...] Of course a broker's opportunity to pull this kind of fraud is less than a banks, because his customers will generally hold diverse stocks. Suppose the broker has embezzled some IBM stocks. Then he will have to leave out some customers that own IBM stocks from his record keeping. But this will frequently result in inconvenient excesses of other stocks and unexplained transactions in other stocks, thus the needed book shuffling is more elaborate and inconvenient than that of a bank. > I would trust the typical customer to mail back a form to an > outside auditor far more than I would trust him to examine a hash > tree, check his own entry, check the neighborhood of his own > entry for cryptographic integrity, and sound an alarm. But it only requires one customer to discover the failure in in a cryptographic tree, whereas to discover the failure in the method of book keeping you describe, we have to be sure we have covered all customers, and we have to be sure that they receive the same information that the auditor does, and how can one ensure that, except by the dawn raid method? > To be perfectly candid, I would not even want the task of > explaining to the typical banking customer what a hash tree was. That is what software is for: The task would of course have to be done by financial software, not done by hand. > The outside auditor can of course be spoofed by giving him access > only to some subset of customer accounts. The hash tree can be > spoofed by not telling a subset of customers of its existance. Set up the protocols so that software that verifies the hash tree generates certificates that are proof that you are eligible to receive the money, and software that does not, cannot generate provably valid certificates. Then if the institution comitts the fraud you describe, the ill informed customers who use the rigged software get stiffed, as they cannot easily prove that they were owed, and the better informed customers do not get stiffed. Notice that the above system requires that the banking software be supplied independently and separately from the bank. Customer expertise will improve dramatically after the first fraud, much as computer security improves dramatically after the first breach. --------------------------------------------------------------------- | We have the right to defend ourselves | http://www.jim.com/jamesd/ and our property, because of the kind | of animals that we are. True law | James A. Donald derives from this right, not from the | arbitrary power of the state. | jamesd(a)echeque.com

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Re: SHA-2
by Kent Briggs 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- >I think that has a bit to do with a question I had, whether it was SHA >and SHA-1 (aka "Revised SHA") but I've found the revised version being >referred to as "SHA-2" in a couple of sources and went with that.... >unless there *is* a third revision...?!? > >Problem is the memo I saw still referred to the revised algorithm as >SHA. (Anyone have a URL for FIPS 180-1 Please...?) > >Rob. > It is SHA-1. Look for FIP180-1.TXT on NIST's BBS at (301)-948-5140. I think they also have a web site but I don't have the URL (try Yahoo). Kent - --- [This message has been signed by an auto-signing service. A valid signature means only that it has been received at the address corresponding to the signature and forwarded.] -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 Comment: Gratis auto-signing service iQBFAwUBMQue3CoZzwIn1bdtAQFd3AGA0hJA7VvzmikZ8lC3ZPnkudPvpnivBi6e sabfhN3DZXGYuhuOrHsEbYVmiTSfLPUK =V5G8 -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Open NNTP servers and logging
by stephen_albert＠alpha.c2.org 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- A little while back there were some very helpful posts about getting started wit open NNTP servers. Since my regular site runs kinda slow in the news department I've been having fun poking around and seeing about getting more current. Then it dawned on me. People keep logs. Presumably routine logging would point right back at my ISP, and from there it'd be not too hard to pin down me specifically. No, I don't think anyone is particularly *likely* to do that, but why take chances? So...anyone know of open NNTP servers that *don't* keep logs? Or some other way around the problem? Thanks! Stephen "extra! extra! read all about it!" Albert stephen_albert(a)alpha.c2.org <*> PGP key on request and on servers -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQEVAwUBMQYTNEimCtQtWVIdAQG/rQf/SnfVuv+fopypvTwKH9dm/4YPvwsgOjCG 5TBe0/wctyzVOEHoXiP3J/wagLrrvsuy8Xb3bRDWvJA+JoP5GOVh9RYG86ROG4Lf NIh1jKWG/FYotBYDclhROzv6+Fm4+7JXrbdVdPUTq5WwIHrmHeTMdkHv58WcJzOs PEvrpFUmTPswkIZbdyzrCz4P3GxsoUtu79Fe3QZNO83Jdwy8sIWFwGDvGq+WhJ3T 8/FLbJ2HLLqrXYYM4KYUSLShGvFyFqf/inZ9Ajbnx0p1hEXqR+/XZzyROEBdJWvJ PAIJA6ZiEeLeTXWD0jH1XlMElKAD7QYeJ2p9OcwhHabtEvgf7uIxSQ== =q/sb -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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PAC_man
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

1-28-96. TWP: "Informant's Revelations on Cali Cartel Implicate Colombian Officials." Inside the counterintelligence center for notorious Cali drug lord Jose Santacruz Londono was an IBM AS/400 computer storing coded information that listed thousands of bribes awarded by the Cali cartel to many individuals known collectively as "Caso 8000." The cartel's sysadmin has been decoding the computer's data and implicating officials from Colombian government, politics, the military and the entertainment industry. He later would be indicted as part of a major racketeering case brought by federal prosecutors in Miami against U.S. lawyers who allegedly have protected Cali interests here and abroad -- three private lawyers who are former federal prosecutors, including one who served as a high-ranking Justice Department official. PAC_man ----- TWP has a followup on the AOL raid, mostly a police story grisler on the cyber-prowling horny-cats. Has ICU of the terminal logoff by a 13-year-old nerd. The fuz posted a call-in for anon tips: "You know how many we've gotten from our on-line hot line? Not one. It's like they have this fantastic world they operate in, and we are seen as intruders or something." ICU_ded

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hash trees and bank solvency
by William "Bud" Kennedy 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- I am not so much worried about the bank stealing money out of my account as I am worried about them loaning to deadbeat countries to support some governmental idea of foreign policy. Then, of course, there is always the possibility that they will loan it to some deadbeat country, not because of the government, but because of just outright stupidity. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBMQu03QQo9ewScbyxAQE4HgP9GqMv8rs8PAEn16h8bZ0JHktAFm85EOr0 QI5BHqN2RYCpWzYpfE8aaD/4KgmKMJJQR2Ae0OSwBx6AY4CdgZlccr/ARn1a2vtN 5Wm7JQ2ymteWy5Jn0IocJkZkscX4q3WHp1Iuw8mhoT9+Y+0urOHHP+mH5YhDvj7R CaHWHAcI+iY= =U0jF -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: "German service cuts Net access" (to Santa Cruz)
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 5:07 PM 1/28/96, Mike McNally wrote: >Timothy C. May writes: > > "Deutsche Telekom, Germany's national phone company, blocked its 1 million > > customers Thursday from gaining access to Internet "Web sites" maintained > > by customers of Web Communications of Santa Cruz. > >I have this urge to e-mail Deutche Telekom the output of an >appropriate AltaVista query so they can make sure none of that nasty >stuff is reaching impressionable German adults & children. It's interesting that some of the first things to pop up with a AV search of "Webcom AND Zundel" were instructions posted in one of German groups about how to bypass the access restrictions... [Actually, I just tried this search again, and didn't find the messages. Maybe I am misremembering I did last night, or maybe....] A Usenet message claims that Deutsche Bank is on the same Web server (?) and cannot access some of its customers. Whatever the precise truth of this, a side effect of countries trying to disconnect themselves from Bad Thoughts is disruption of commerce. This may provoke a bigger reaction than all of our protests and civil liberties points. --Tim Boycott espionage-enabled software! We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, we know that that ain't allowed. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Higher Power: 2^756839 - 1 | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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Re: [NOISE] Re: NWLibs> Re: Anonymous trashing of Assassination Politics
by jim bell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- At 02:17 AM 1/28/96 -0800, Rich Graves wrote: >On Sat, 27 Jan 1996, Jack Hammer wrote: > >> Here might be an interesting example of a snippet from a plot to commit >> criminal syndicalism. > >You know, I'm not really sure whether you're kidding, ignorant, cheering, >or warning. Frankly, I don't fucking care. You guys are all nuts. And I >should know -- ask Clark or AlanD. I guess I should offer a partial apology, even though I'm not really responsible for this. Jack Hammer is the on-air name for John Benneth, who is a local (to me, Portland, Oregon) "moderator" for a "advertised as controversial" radio talk call-in show. He saw my Assassination Politics essay a few months ago, and for a few weeks just before the November sweeps Neilsen ratings period he was trying to bait me into calling in, thinking I'd be a sucker for a local audience. (He _needs_ controversy to be sucessful.) Since then he gave up for a while, although he occasionally snipes at me. I assume his interest will wax and wane as various ratings periods come and go. >I have saved Jim Bell's "Assassination Politics" essay, with his PGP >signature, and soon to be a lot of other things, at > > http://www-leland.stanford.edu/~llurch/Not_By_Me_Not_My_Views/ Thank you. I guess... BTW, I sent the file to you as A16.??? That isn't a really descriptive name. Please change it to something more mnemonic, like ASPOL.TXT or something. >I plan to collect as many off-the-wall conspiracy theories in this >directory as will fit in my disk quota. And when I run out of quota, I'll >raise it for myself. Now, now, Rich, "Assassination Politics" is not a "conspiracy theory". Or, at least, it's not your classic "conspiracy theory." >I think it's time the wacky right and wacky left started looking at each >other's Web pages and lurking on each others' lists. What about the wacky libertarians? Why did you leave us out?!? Waaaaaaahhhh!!! > It's really funny >putting two "Anarchist" pages, one featuring Che Guevara, the other >featuring David Duke, side by side. Both say the guvment is out to get >them; I, on the other hand, am out to "get" the government. But you'll be hearing more about that later. Jim Bell Klaatu Burada Nikto "Something is going to happen... Something....Wonderful!" -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBMQu0VPqHVDBboB2dAQHfegP/W67SNQnzCL7TYdphdVmQ6wwWUjniUkz5 PJG/vJzQONFlsqLyz0o+jn0dZsMquoAWmB6jkrSzN6oAPoSnpAL5e5GPxk7busP+ Jmn56UCCFc6TUPlA69zqI5EA0uctcTGPunnLhNN/aEFTmngwQVmgC8o/eRB8NEyt s2ImX/n6u0s= =0YOC -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: Doctor Denning
by jim bell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- At 02:52 PM 1/26/96 -0800, Timothy C. May wrote: >>What I found interesting was the lack of meat behind >>"Crypto Anarchy is Not Inevitable". It seemed to boil >>down to the vacuous "if everyone could just agree that key >>escrow is a good thing, there would be no problem". > >This is the main reason I haven't bothered to rebut her points: there were >essentially none to rebut. > >(There are substantive criticisms of my points that can be made, including >discussions of what might be done to delay or even head off crypto anarchy >completely. I had dinner a few nights ago with David Friedman, author of >"The Machinery of Freedom," and he made some incisive comments about how >the State might go about heading off this future. I'm glad he's on our >side, and not the government's.) > >Two other reasons I have not sought to rebut her analysis: > >First, I doubt many people saw either my original article (available on Bob >Hettinga's page: http://thumper.vmeng.com/pub/rah/anarchy.html) or >Denning's reaction article. > >Second, I stated my views, she stated her views, not much more to say. >Especially as she has not had an active presence on the Net, either in >talk.politics.crypto or in other forums I have seen, and thus a real debate >on the Net has not been possible. > >Mostly I know I can't change her views, so why bother? Other people may >have their views affected by what I say, and for these people I have >certainly written enough. Tim, trust me on this one. Dorothy Denning doesn't have a PRAYER. You already believe it, but I _KNOW_ it! Jim Bell Klaatu Barada Nikto. This will become important...soon Something is going to happen. Something...wonderful! (BTW, the above few lines, which looks like a canned signature, is not. Careful readers will note that I keep typing it in, which means that it isn't identical every time. This should be a clue to all you lurkers out there that I MEAN this; it's not just an idle macro. (It also means that I'm going to have to RTFM on my Eudora to do automatic signatures, but that's an ENTIRELY different story.) -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBMQmQGfqHVDBboB2dAQF3lwP+JzEaN+sR9PdvnaWf2EnWJuDddZs86GbS cO7t+BLb/ALvAExBhBmVhMbYU1lFQS92akUQoMXBM/TLf330QR7E0FOjBdv12rqg n4RfFN7xV6Stib7gDOl2Q2niNqBusIzXT5Isv1A7x4NGF5Yxu7fVtUJ52tRBxHFI 9V+68Z21E4c= =SCkf -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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The Politics of Mistrust
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

The Washington Post initiates today a 6-part series on the loss of trust in all American institutions, "The Politics of Mistrust," based on a recent poll sponsored by the Post, Harvard and the Kaiser Family Foundation. While not directly related to technical crypto, a number of findings parallel discussions here about the diminution of personal and economic security. Samples: America is becoming a nation of suspicious strangers, and this mistrust of each other is a major reason Americans have lost confidence in the federal government and virtually every other major national institution. Every generation that has come of age since the 1950s has been more mistrusting of human nature, a transformation in the national outlook that has deeply corroded the nation's social and political life. Mistrustful Americans repeatedly expressed far less confidence in the federal government, the military, the Supreme Court, Congress and the Clinton administration than the dwindling numbers of Americans who were more upbeat about human nature. Fear of crime, economic insecurity and pessimism about the lives of future generations all have separately added to the belief that government is either making things worse or is incapable of making them better. Today, a clear majority of respondents in their early 20s said they do not trust their fellow Americans, a view they share with one in four Americans over the age of 60. "It's like living in the cave man age," said a 29- year-old. "Nobody cares anymore. Nobody cares. They will no sooner run you down and run away than to spit in your face." An environment in which a majority of Americans believe that most people can't be trusted breeds attitudes that hold all politicians as corrupt, venal and self-serving, and government action is doomed to failure. Wages have stagnated, workers change jobs frequently and downsizing corporations offer little protection even to the most loyal of employees. Americans who feel most pessimistic about the economy also are more likely to see the government as a threat. Harvard and Kaiser are to separately publish their own analysis of the poll. The first article offers much more detail and is quite long, about a page and a half. Perhaps someone might offer a site where this and others in the series could be made available as they appear. If so, send me a note.

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Re: PIDAHO and EUDORA PRO 2.2
by David E. Smith 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- At 03:10 AM 1/28/96 -0800, bruceab(a)teleport.com wrote: >At 09:17 PM 1/27/96 -0800, jdoe-0007(a)alpha.c2.org wrote: >>In response to the "what has John Doe got that PIDAHO >>doesn't" messages I tried to PIDAHO v2.6b. I am unable >>to make it work. Messages from PIDAHO can not be sent to >>the selected and OnLine EUDORA PRO application. >Um, yes, indeed they can. I do it routinely. Eudora Pro >is one of the options in the drop-down list box in the >E-mail|Transfer options... dialog, right below the buttons >for canned settings. And it works just fine. You are >making sure that you've got Eudora with a blank new >message ready to go, right? I'm using an essentially identical setup to jdoe-0007's and I can't get it to work either. It worked nicely under Win31 and Eudora 2.1.2, but Win95 and Eudora 2.2(32) don't play nice with Eudora. It might be a bits thing (sixteen versus thirty-two)... ObCrypto: Um, well, this note is PGP clearsigned? (Seriously, this discussion ought to be Cc:ed to Joel, and/or taken off the list.) dave - ----- David E. Smith, c/o Southeast Missouri State University 1210 Towers South, Cape Girardeau MO USA 63701-4745 +1(573)339-3814, "dsmith(a)midwest.net", PGP ID 0x961D2B09 Do not use old PGP keys 0xFF829C15 and 0x92732139. http://www.midwest.net/scribers/dsmith/ -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQEVAwUBMQvCGDVTwUKWHSsJAQGWbQf9GPtB+VhubUDeBU56eYHJjPQmPfDRgJ6T NApeChNNYv57GH5/E+V7wEVwaWyF+wTdSAYnQVCWMUozSZ02V+m4MdtXT6vUQpya SSWt7h0BadOqbI+KR1gA1etGFC/kIHscRf2aGCUziHlpTe1nm7Hw9Kx/B1j9/Vc6 cFahN7wi+xohbRBJPYqsp/k1qNrDzuhySAW1+zNNSOPvxGQs5QrI9H5rIeL/L+iS wri1sq0GVrktEGue838HGUDG2E6RaELAQe3OV0Y6nhee0KvHAcidK75d988zSP+i DH7L6/nh/KC+72VwiuzoAsPy4PJvlLgmmiiWZYh1t1dtu97YGD1vKg== =CKEw -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Netscape, CAs, and Verisign
by Alex Strasheim 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I'm a big fan of Netscape and their products, and I think they do a good job of addressing the interests of their customers and the public at large with respect to crypto issues. But it's starting to become apparent that there's a fairly serious problem with Certification Authorities and SSL. The problem is simple enough: sites with certificates from one of the CAs that are preconfigured in Netscape have a tremendous advantage over sites with certs from other CAs, and it's expensive and difficult to get a cert if you're running an alternative server like ApacheSSL. This problem is going to get a lot worse when X509 client authentication becomes more popular. Netscape needs to address the situation. It's just not practical or desireable for one company (Verisign) to have a stranglehold on certificates. I'd like to see a less centralized CA that's tied into the existing system of notaries. The idea is to make it necessary to spoof a notary in order to spoof the CA. That won't make spoofing the CA impossible (nothing will), but it will make spoofing the CA illegal. A notary could apply to the CA for the right to work as an agent, for a nominal fee (<$100/year). Only notaries could be agents. If a person wants a certificate, they'd come in and present ID and a key to the notary/agent. The person would have to present a form document stating that he's requesting the cert. The notary would stamp the form and affix a signature to the key which would enable it to be processed automatically by the CA. Fees for the whole procedure ought to be less than $30. The CA ought to operate off of the fees from the agents as a non-profit organization, and the agents ought to keep the fees paid by the people requesting the certificates. Would any of the lawyers on the list be willing to comment on whether or not it's possible or practical to tie a CA into the notary system? Does anyone have any thoughts as to how difficult/risky spoofing my CA is compared to spoofing Netscape or Verisign? I could put up a server and I think I know a laywer who would help me set up a non-profit organiation on a shoestring, but I don't want to do it if the plan is impractical. Morevover, although I don't think it's reasonable to expect Netscape to agree to include a non-existent CA in their browsers sight unseen, at the same time it doesn't seem smart to sink money into setting up the CA without some indication from Netscape that they're willing to give the idea good faith consideration.

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Re: Denning's misleading statements
by pcw＠access.digex.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>I've never met Dorothy Denning, so I hesitate to characterize >her as a >villainess. But certainly she's the only noted cryptographer I >know of >who's gone so far out on a limb to defend a position the vast >majority of >computer scientists, civil libertarians, and cryptographers >scoff at. (And >I don't just mean it is we libertarians and civil libertarians >who are >scoffing, I mean that nearly every noted expert who has >carefully reviewed >the various schemes to control crypto and to provide GAK has >found them to >be essentially unenforceable except via draconian police state >methods, and >maybe not even then.) I believe that David Gelerntner, the professor of computer science at Yale University injured by a UNABOMBER bomb, is also a supporter of the Clipper chip. This may or may not be something that arose from the bombing. But I'm not sure how many cavaets and things he adds to his position. He may have changed it. But then he's not exactly a cryptographer. But, on the other side of the fence, I just passed a section in _Takedown_ where Shimomura and the FBI agents decide that the best place for the Clipper phones is "in the trunk." Apparently they don't communicate with regular phones so they were practically worthless. -Peter

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Re: "Gentlemen do not read each other's mail"
by jim bell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- At 01:40 PM 1/26/96 -0500, Robert A. Rosenberg wrote: >At 20:18 1/25/96, jim bell wrote: > >>Now, I was born in 1958 and thus can't claim personal knowledge of the time, >>but it's truly amazing how UNPERCEPTIVE the public must have been in the >>late 40's and early '50s about "intelligence" realities. Let me give you a >>specific example: The classic movie, "The Man who Never Was," relates the >>(true) story of a counter-intelligence mission done by the British to (I >>think) mislead the Germans into believing that the attack on Sicily would be >>substantially LATER than it actually was. > >The code name for the project was "Operation Mincemeat" and the intent was >to get the defences at Normandy ("Operation Torch" - ie: D-Day) away from >there and transferred to Sicily (which was NOT a D-Day objective) not as >you say to fool them on when the attack was coming. It did its job and much >of the mobile coastal defences were moved out of the area. I apologize for the error (presuming it's an error). I was working from an old memory there, from reading a book called "A Bodyguard of Lies" (William Cave Brown?) which addresses the misinformation/disinformation campaigns that went on during WWII. And, of course, seeing the movie "The Man who Never Was." -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBMQlEXfqHVDBboB2dAQHwlwP8DJt2Vg5jmI/gQ8dV5rXJ6mgHFwmzAcMA 12kJWWUJzQg/6M/acTtwTntUYaT9sJ5nxfE6mV58KEpGRuz76ZAZ3LSugG/DlAAx NL1AMqhcv1Xelh+UD7tLqhH/lTt5mDJC0pWWquyOi85l8TOo05142BUOYL9YPx6q 6XjRqUgIDu8= =CcUZ -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: "Gentlemen do not read each other's mail"
by jim bell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- At 04:22 PM 1/26/96 +0100, Asgaard wrote: >Jim Bell wrote: > >> While this may be based on the "classic" view of the start of the direct >> involvement in WWII, I agree with the opinion of an old college professor >> that the US KNEW that the Japanese were going to attack, SOMEWHERE and >> SOMEWHEN (but not exactly), and in fact WANTED the attack to occur to >> justify getting into a war that we "should" have entered. > >Alan Horowitz added: > >>I've read that FDR had a humint source warning of a Japanese strike on >>Pearl Harbor. I also recall reading that J Edgar Hoover received a report >>of a diplomatic conversation detailing the planned attack, but sat on it. > >And this is from a post I sent to the list last summer: >*************************************************************** >I just read 'Infamy' by John Toland (1982), containing 'proof' >- very convincing, in my opinion - of the Pearl Harbour cover-up. >The US president, selected members of his cabinette and a >few admirals and generals knew - from Magic and the 'winds' >execute, radio traffic analysis, diplomatic sources, double >agents - exactly when and where the Japaneese were going to >attack, but didn't warn Hawaii, fearing that too efficient >counter-measures by the Oahu military might make the attack >abort and so not convince the isolationists. The unexpected >tactical capabilities of the Japaneese armada then made a >cover-up all the more important. >***************************************************************** >The unfortunate cipher expert Captain Safford spent most of >his post-war life trying to uphold the honour of his fellow >cryptanalysts, putting the blame on generals and politicians, >but in vain. It's interesting that we even HEARD about Coventry, but of course that was a British decision, a civilian target in an attack during an era where there were already plenty of attacks on civilian targets, and the British UNDERSTOOD why Coventry had to die. (But I don't know WHEN "we" (the general public) first heard about Coventry. Anybody know? (For the historically-impaired: Coventry was/is an English town (small city?) perhaps most famous from the Lady Godiva legend...but I digress... British found out, I guess through Ultra, that it was going to be bombed. Telling the inhabitants would have saved many lives, but (possibly) alerted the Germans that Enigma had been broken. British made the correct choice: Let the city get bombed without (much?) warning. The value of keeping the broken-ness of Ultra a secret far outweighed the value of Coventry.) -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBMQlC2fqHVDBboB2dAQGfpgP+NloVapAgqC3NxGg7TcVMnx+Q1Cmu2B/w Alp8q6uFvWsRqutFZ2+oDElHFxnZiMwZ0sgJkP0xG57TGoRob/DHY1h3+/NN9sYi KApzJHaElMrPFzwgMRLHNOBU/SQ3GsYDA2i4hWZM5ojsqXJQ7H7ov5FFJLGdV1u1 cOb/mUN8q9Y= =SRGU -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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The Unintended Consequences of Suppression
by mpd＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

WARNING: This message contains Bad Thoughts. The Surgeon General has determined that Bad Thoughts cause Critical Thinking, which may be illegal in Canada, Germany, and other countries too numerous to mention. I just visited the Ernst Zundel Webcom page, which given the number of server overload errors I experienced trying to browse it, is now the Numero Uno Web Site on the entire Internet, thanks to some anonymous and largely clueless official running telecommunications services for the former Third Reich. Like most sites run by "Infamous Holocaust Deniers", this one was largely unimpressive, and would have garnered little attention from anyone were it not for the noisy public villification lavished upon it by its detractors. After the furor this site is alleged to have percipitated, I fully expected to see pictures of skinheads with explosives and automatic weapons holding up pictures of Nazi atrocities and libelous screeds blaming the Jews for all the misfortunes of mankind. You can imagine my surprise when I found only a few rather simplistic historical questions, and that Mr. Zundel had even included links to rebuttals of his points contained within the Simon Wiesenthal Center's own Web Pages. All of this might have gone completely unnoticed by the majority of humankind, or have been the subject of dry boring debates at occasional universities, were the topic not constantly dragged into the public eye by stories about anti-free speech laws, shrill cries by organizations like the SWC for censoring the entire Internet, and officials who summarily unplug major chunks of the Net and disrupt legitimate business while trying to stuff a sock into the mouth of some individual whose views they find embarrassing. In doing this, the Speech Nazis, the Wiesenthalistas, and the Clueless Bureaucrats have drawn more attention to the views of people like Mr. Zundel than he ever could have on his own, and have alienated many of the people who would cheerfully have argued against Mr. Zundel on their behalf. This goes beyond simple stupidity, and clearly approaches the lobotomy level of impaired mental functioning. -- Mike Duvos $ PGP 2.6 Public Key available $ mpd(a)netcom.com $ via Finger. $

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The Big Lie
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 7:59 PM 1/28/96, Mike Duvos wrote: >I just visited the Ernst Zundel Webcom page, which given the >number of server overload errors I experienced trying to browse >it, is now the Numero Uno Web Site on the entire Internet, thanks >to some anonymous and largely clueless official running >telecommunications services for the former Third Reich. Like many born after the Second World War, I took it as a fact that the so-called Holocaust actually happened. I saw pictures of death camps, interviews with survivors, etc. But if it really happened, why are so many countries trying to suppress the evidence that it was all just a CIA-Mossad plot? It seems more likely that the pictures were faked, or were pictures taken of dying Germans in Russian POW camps on the Eastern Front. If They are trying to suppress discussion, maybe there's something to their ideas. If the Germans are suppressing attempts to get at the truth, I suspect the stories are true that the Holocaust was part of Truman's "Big Lie." --Tim [Note: I present this as a line of thinking that is actually often the result of suppression of views. "If They are suppressing it, maybe there's some truth to it." Note also that the views of Zundel and other Holocaust Deniers are not causally related to the deaths of millions of Jews, gypsies, and others in WW II. The damage, if any, is in the "hurt feelings" and "insults" felt by survivors and their relatives. The other danger often cited, that Zundel will recruit a Fourth Reich or somesuch, is no more likely than that Jerry Falwell will recruit a New Crusade, or that J. Random Ranter will do the same. In a free and open society, we let people believe in "wrong ideas" (witness Christianity, Islam, Scientology, Judaism, and a thousand other cults).] Boycott espionage-enabled software! We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, we know that that ain't allowed. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Higher Power: 2^756839 - 1 | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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Re: more RANTING about NSA-friendly cpunks
by frantz＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 1:04 PM 1/28/96 -0800, Vladimir Z. Nuri wrote: >Zimmermann supports my contention, as I wrote in the post. NOTHING >happened to him. it is conceivable this same result could have >been arrived at (government drops investigation) if he never even >hired a lawyer. > >Zimmermann is a perfect example of what may be counterproductive >hysteria on *our* side, toward advancing crypto. if Zimmermann >cannot be prosecuted, and is not prosecuted, where are the ITAR "teeth"??? I am not a lawyer, but I suspect that the proscuters gave up because they could not build a trail of evidence between Zimmermann and the actual export. After all, Zimmermann only wrote PGP. He didn't post it on the net. ----------------------------------------------------------------- Bill Frantz Periwinkle -- Computer Consulting (408)356-8506 16345 Englewood Ave. frantz(a)netcom.com Los Gatos, CA 95032, USA

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Re: Denning's misleading statements
by Alan Olsen 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 03:12 PM 1/28/96 -0500, Rev. Ben wrote: >On Sun, 28 Jan 1996, Peter Wayner wrote: > >> I believe that David Gelerntner, the professor of computer >> science at Yale University injured by a UNABOMBER bomb, is also >> a supporter of the Clipper chip. This may or may not be >> something that arose from the bombing. But I'm not sure how many >> cavaets and things he adds to his position. He may have changed >> it. But then he's not exactly a cryptographer. > >There's quite a few folks in the Yale CS department that are pro-Clipper >or fence sitters. They justify it in class by claiming that law >enforcement needs these abilities if LE is to remain effective. I wonder if the same justifications were used for the Inquisition. "We have to use these methods in order for the Church to remain effective." Currently we have a whole host of laws that are difficult, if not impossible to enforce. The response from law enforcement is that we have to use stronger and stronger enforcement methods to shore up laws that are by their nature unenforcable. How they expect to do this and remain in a non-police state is beyond me. I expect that such enforcement methods will be sold to us the same way that they sell us soap and presidents. The media will give us plenty of "reasons" as to why we have to accept draconian methods to resolve problems from undefined enemies. Already we get the "real life" cop shows showing us a whole host of "enemies" who need to be hauled off to jail and the news programs showing us the scare story of the moment. Expect the four horsemen to get closer and closer as the shacles are ready to be put into place. Such enforcement is self-defeating in the long run. It is based off the false perception that the governed cannot recognise that these laws are unenforcable. Continued enforcement of "unenforcable" laws increases the disrespect for laws in general. ("The imposition of order equals the escalation of disorder.") The question is when the bulk of the population will see what is being prepared for them... Probibly after it is too late. Alan Olsen -- alano(a)teleport.com -- Contract Web Design & Instruction `finger -l alano(a)teleport.com` for PGP 2.6.2 key http://www.teleport.com/~alano/ Is the operating system half NT or half full?

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