November 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

moderated cryptography list
by pmetzger＠lehman.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Hello, all. I'm looking for a site willing to host a high-quality moderated cryptography mailing list which I am thinking of starting up. The list would be designed as a low volume, high readership, high quality source for 1) In-depth technical discussions of cryptography 2) Announcements of cryptographic products 3) Announcements of news items of interest to the cryptography community. 4) VERY limited numbers of postings on the social implications of cryptography, and I mean VERY limited. All postings would be explicitly approved by the moderator before going out to assure quality. Yes, that means fascistic restriction of your capacity for free speech, in exchange for not being overwhelmed with garbage every day. It is ultimately envisioned that should the list be a success I would try to move it to a moderated Usenet newsgroup. If you think that such a list is a Good Thing, and you can host it (which requires that you have a good internet connection and root access or similar on the machine in question), please let me know. I'll do all the work, and the crypto community will thank you tremendously. Perry Metzger

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Re: Anarchy Gone Awry (fwd)
by Black Unicorn 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

This post is a perfect example why the two lists should be kept seperate and not merged. This sounds to me like it belongs on alt.politics.data- highway. -uni- (dark)

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Re: CHAUM CHIMES IN
by cme＠ellisun.sw.stratus.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>Date: 08 Sep 93 16:30:55 EDT >From: Sandy <72114.1712(a)CompuServe.COM> >Subject: CHAUM CHIMES IN >Message-Id: <930908203054_72114.1712_FHF95-2(a)CompuServe.COM> ..From: > SANDY SANDFORT Reply to: ssandfort(a)attmail.com [ . . . ] >Of course, the next letter to the editor calls for the adoption >of systems to track every vehicle at all times. The genius who >wrote the letter, thinks it would be a good way to prevent >nuclear, biological or chemical terrorism. Geeeeez. It was signed by Dorothy Denning, right? Actually, they should take that to its full conclusion. We need implants in every individual, broadcasting to the local surveillance agency, giving not only location but also every word spoken in the vicinity. It could also do a chemical analysis of the air in the neighborhood. It should also have a radiation counter. It should also monitor the host body, looking for signs of anger or sexual arousal? How else will we be guaranteed safe from mad bombers, rapists and child molesters? How else will our big budget LE agencies be able to protect us? I know. When it's finally adopted, worldwide, they'll call it the Ellison Plan. :-( - Carl

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Stegno and DAT and digital music...
by Peter Wayner 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

In this week's Sunday NYT, Hans Fantel, their music guy, writes at length about the new "dithered" CD's and how the guys have improved the sound. He says that the original CD format was limited to 16 bits of sound because of costs. But many audiophiles reacted very negatively to the tinny, metalic quality to the music. For this reason, the companies have developed 20 bit DAT recording tape and then come up with ways to "dither" this into 16 bits. I am curious if anyone knows the details of these algorithms. Also, his point suggests that flipping the least significant bit of 16 bit music may not be imperceptable to some ears. If the classical music starts to sound tinny then there might be something subversive in the least significant bits. -Peter Wayner

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Remail: errors
by HFinney＠shell.portal.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- I have been out of town for the last week, so I missed some CP mail. It looks like some good things are happening with remailers, though. Kudos to Karl, Sameer, and the others for their work! I have received many messages to my remailer in the last week which came from remail(a)tamsun.tamu.edu, which were PGP-encrypted apparently in an effort to get my remailer to send them. They did not work, though, because there was no "Encrypted: PGP" header to trigger the remailer's decryption. This can be arranged by creating the message something like this: ======================================================== :: Request-Remailing-To: hfinney(a)shell.portal.com :: Encrypted: PGP - -----BEGIN PGP MESSAGE----- <rest of message> - -----END PGP MESSAGE------ ======================================================== This would then be sent to remail(a)tamsun.tamu.edu. I don't know whether the multiplicity of such erroneous messages is just due to one person stubbornly re-trying, or whether there is an error in one of the new programs for creating chained remailer messages. Hal Finney hfinney(a)shell.portal.com -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.2 iQCVAgUBLJaNuKgTA69YIUw3AQHrNwQAowMEQwuH6YyHoj6T7AqZFLNdTf+eqJ9L LhAatHS94nmC1smkfVNq0dZmigmkvBdMNEPlBZemmxALz+KJw6OSY/ULSBmuVNEq 5rJANh3XimoJWqLISy2lZiuC5Fw2R7UvRadcdM94pncSVvev92Fyf7CqEOOtrGAK PUzRds7BVNo= =FpLa -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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more than spread spectrum
by cme＠ellisun.sw.stratus.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

There are alternatives to spread spectrum, if we're threatened with loss of freedom to communicate. We could lay our own wires/fibers. We could set up a mesh network of infrared lasers through the air. Last time I looked, there were no laws against shining lights out your window as long as they didn't bother anyone. An infrared laser could hardly bother anyone. We could produce a line of cheap cards to plug into a PC which would do packet routing, using a variety of physical links -- our own wires, lasers, very low range radio, .... Each card would connect to three or more neighbors and become part of the global mesh. Adaptive routing with no global map would suffice for the card and would keep the whole system peer-to-peer with no need for central control and no chance for central tapping. Of course all of these solutions require a high density of users. A college campus might be the right place to start. We could then branch out to cities. I suspect that a place like Chicago or NYC with high rise apartments might be the place to start -- many options for line-of-sight communications. The benefit isn't just for Cypherpunks. It's a free network for the masses -- like the original USENET (with each user donating routing and store/forward) but with unrestricted, low-range, continuously operating physical links. I'll volunteer to do the software for the node card. Does anyone have hardware design/fab to donate to the effort? - Carl

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Re: e voting (receipts, votebuying, brinworld)
by Tim May 02 Dec '03

02 Dec '03

On Nov 25, 2003, at 11:21 AM, Trei, Peter wrote: > Tim May [mailto:timcmay@got.net] wrote: > > >> On Nov 25, 2003, at 9:56 AM, Sunder wrote: >>> Um, last I checked, phone cameras have really shitty resolution, >>> usually >>> less than 320x200. Even so, you'd need MUCH higher resolution, say >>> 3-5Mpixels to be able to read text on a printout in a picture. >>> >>> Add focus and aiming issues, and this just won't work unless you >>> carry >>> a >>> good camera into the booth with you. > >> 1. Vinnie the Votebuyer knows the _layout_ of the ballot. He only >> needs >> to see that the correct box is punched/marked. Or that the screen >> version has been checked. > > I realize you big city types (yes, Tim, Corralitos is big compared to > my > little burg) have full scale voting booths with curtains (I used the > big > mechanical machines when I lived in Manhatten), but out here in the > sticks, > the 'voting booth' is a little standing desk affair with 18 inch > privacy > shields on 3 sides. If someone tried to take a photo of their ballot > in one > of those it would be instantly obvious. > > All I want is a system which is not more easily screwed around with > then > paper ballots. Have some imagination - you could, for example, set > things > up so the voter, and only the voter, can see the screen and/or paper > receipt > while voting, but still make it impossible to use a camera without > being > detected. But how could a restriction on gargoyling oneself be constitutional? If Alice wishes to record her surroundings, including the ballot and/or touchscreen she just voted with, this is her business. (I fully support vote buying and selling, needless to say. Simple right to make a contract.) I wasn't endorsing the practicality of people trying to use digital cameras of any sort in any kind of voting booth, just addressing the claim that cellphone cameras don't have enough resolution. Even 320 x 240 has more than enough resolution to show which boxes have been checked, or to mostly give a usable image with a printed receipt. As for creating tamper-resistant and unforgeable and nonrepudiable voting systems, this is a hard problem. For ontological reasons (who controls machine code, etc.). I start with the canonical model of a very hard to manipulate system: blackballing (voting with black or white stones or balls). Given ontological limits on containers (hard to teleport stones into or out of a container), given ontological limits on number of stones one can hold, and so on (I'll leave it open for readers to ponder the process of blackball voting), this is a fairly robust system. (One can imagine schemes whereby the container is on a scale, showing the weight. This detects double voting for a candidate. One lets each person approach the container, reach into his pocket, and then place one stone into the container (which he of course cannot see into, nor can he remove any stone). If the scale increments by the correct amount, e.g, 3.6 grams, then one is fairly sure no double voting has occurred. And if the voter kept his fist clenched, he as strong assurance that no one else saw whether he was depositing a black stone or a white stone into the container. Then if the stones are counted in front of witnesses, 675 black stones vs. 431 white stones is a fairly robust and trusted outcome. Details would include ensuring that one person voted only once (usual trick: indelible dye on arm when stones issued, witnesses present, etc. Attacks would include the Ruling Party depositing extra stones, etc. And consolidating the distributed results has the usual weaknesses.) Things get much more problematic as soon as this is electronified, computerized, as the normal "ontological" constraints evaporate. Stones can vanish, teleport, be miscounted, suddenly appear, etc. Designing a system which is both robust (all the crypto buzzwords about nonforgeability, satisfaction of is-a-person or one-person constraints, visibility, etc.) and which is also comprehensible to people who are, frankly, unable to correctly punch a paper ballot for Al Gore, is a challenge. I'm not sure either Joe Sixpack in Bakersfield or Irma Yenta in Palm Beach want to spend time learning about "all-or-nothing-disclosure" and "vote commitment protocols." I know about David Chaum's system. He has gotten interested in this problem. I am not interested in this problem. Moreover, I think working on electronic voting only encourages the political process (though implementing wide computer voting and then having more of the "winning totals posted before polls close" exposures of shenanigans might be useful in undermining support for the concept of democracy, which would be a good thing.) I don't say it's not a security problem worth thinking about. It reminds me a lot of the capabilities stuff, including Granovetter diagrams and boundaries. Probably a nice category theory outlook on voting lurking here (e.g., voting as a pushout in an appropriate category, or something whacky like that). Electronic voting of the type being pushed now is going to cause some major loss of faith in the system when some scandals emerge (and when even analyzing the protocols and talking about what one has learned results in a "cyst and decease" order from Diebold and that ilk).

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Chaum's hand?
by Major Variola (ret) 02 Dec '03

02 Dec '03

Take a look at http://www.chaum.com/images/Photo_of_David.gif and tell me his hand isn't photoshopped. Is this for security reasons, or is his hand malformed?

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Cypherpunks List Info
by cpunk＠lne.com 30 Nov '03

30 Nov '03

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Re: Gestapo harasses John Young, appeals to patriotism, told to fuck off
by Major Variola (ret) 30 Nov '03

30 Nov '03

At 07:40 AM 11/30/03 -0800, John Young wrote: >My comment about the SAs having no noticeable body odor >came out the notion that persons on a dangerous mission >emit an easily identifiable smell, a smell not unlike that >emitted by an unwary target when suddently confronted with >danger. Agents have their adrenal innervation snipped.

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