August 2002 - cypherpunks-legacy

"Good business is where you find it."
by Matthew X 16 Aug '02

16 Aug '02

http://www.amanet.org/events/china/index.htm Meeting No. 3890 This special AMA Current Issues Forum will dramatically increase your knowledge and sophistication about the business challenges and opportunities in China. It features a high-level group of experts put together by the National Leadership Forum on Global Challenges, a nonprofit organization that draws from the American intelligence profession and other seasoned professionals who have lived and worked overseas. October 11, 2002 AMA Executive Conference Center, New York, NY December 3, 2002 AMA Executive Conference Center, San Francisco, CA Co-sponsored by the National Leadership Forum on Global Challenges stuff to my belt. China suspends approval of new Internet cafes BEIJING (August 14, 2:47 p.m. EDT) - China has halted all approvals of new Internet cafes until the end of this month in the government's latest move to control cyberspace, state media said Tuesday. Your family will be only billed for one bullet.

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Identity crisis
by Matthew X 16 Aug '02

16 Aug '02

Govt planning I-cards for all citizens TIMES NEWS NETWORK [ THURSDAY, AUGUST 15, 2002 8:31:03 PM ] NEW DELHI: Identity cards for all citizens, a Rs 15,000-crore National Rail Vikas Yojana and a national commodities exchange were among the 15 key initiatives announced by the government on Thursday. The home ministry will prepare a plan to issue multi-purpose machine-readable identity cards to all citizens. A pilot project, which will be launched in October to cover select districts in eight states, will also facilitate the implementation of e-governance initiatives to be completed within a year.The Rail Vikas Yojana will over the next five years aim to remove all capacity bottlenecks in critical sections of the Railways, including a Rs 8,000-crore project to strengthen the Golden Quadrilateral to run more long-distance mail, express and freight trains at a higher speed, and a Rs 3,000-crore project to strengthen rail connectivity to ports and development of corridors to the hinterland.Rs 3,500 crore will be spent on constructing two bridges over the Ganga and one each over the Brahmaputra and the Kosi. The consumer affairs, food and public distribution ministry will set up a National Commodities Exchange to streamline commodity futures trading. All villages will be electrified by 2007 and 130 lakh new telephone lines, including 75 lakh mobile telephones, will be added in the coming year. A comprehensive social security scheme for the poor and the middle class and a food-based social security for the destitute will be launched. The communication and IT ministry will implement a programme to improve efficiency, transparency and accountability at the government-citizen interface, with the e-bill post and internet-based e-post service network to cover all districts in the coming year. Media Lab Asia, a collaboration between the IT department and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, US, will be set up to address the digital divide in the country. The government also announced formulating a model municipal law to facilitate private sector participation in urban infrastructure projects, especially in water supply and sanitation. Simultaneously, a fund will be operationalised this year to promote urban sector reforms with special focus on making urban local bodies viable. National scholarships will be given to disabled persons to pursue higher technical education. The culture ministry will launch the National Mission for Manuscripts to preserve and unlock the scientific, intellectual, literary and spiritual knowledge in different Indian languages. The ministry of petroleum and other ministries concerned will take steps to universalise blending of ethanol from various feedstocks, including sugar factories, with petrol and diesel. Sale of gasohol will become mandatory in nine states and four Union territories from January 1, 2003. http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/articleshow.asp?artid=19185813 A.Roy says,"dont listen." http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/articleshow.asp?artid=19207425

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Schneier on Arming Airplane Pilots (was Re: CRYPTO-GRAM, August 15, 2002)
by R. A. Hettinga 16 Aug '02

16 Aug '02

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 My sister-in-law had a brilliantly simple answer to the problem of hijacking which was, close, but, um, no spliff, :-), to Vin Suprynowicz's notorious "Ganja and Guns Airline" column of a few years back. She said, on September 12 or so last year, "Why don't you have a certification on your concealed-carry permit that allows you to carry on an airplane?" That means, like a hazmat certificate on a commercial driver's license, you've been trained. You know how to shoot on a plane: what kinds of frangible bullets to use, who to shoot at :-), and so on. At check-in time, the firearm owner pulls out her concealed-carry license with the cabin-carry certificate, shows someone the frangible ammo she's using, and is checked through to the gate. I figure if even Tim May thinks armed passengers are a bad idea, :-), and Bruce thinks even arming the *pilots* is a bad idea, I'm certainly leaning into the wind a bit here, but, I think it's a *great* idea, myself. It doesn't matter if someone smuggles a *machine gun* onto the plane, they don't know *who* is on the plane, with a gun, and *qualified* to take them out. Think of it as statistical process control for the rest of us. Or evolution in action. Or geodesic warfare. Cheers, RAH PS: I think we're going to *need* counter-attack scenarios on the net. Like Whit Diffie said, "infowar" will be fought between businesses. Governments are too slow, and not, paradoxically, nearly ubiquitous enough to do the job. All we need is bearer cash, :-), and, someday, machines even can handle it themselves... - --------- At 3:53 PM -0500 on 8/15/02, Bruce Schneier wrote: > Arming Airplane Pilots > > > > It's a quintessentially American solution: our nation's commercial > aircraft are at risk, so let's allow pilots to carry guns. We > have visions of these brave men and women as the last line of > defense on an aircraft, and courageously defending the cockpit > against terrorists at 30,000 feet. I can just imagine the > made-for-TV movie. > > Reality is more complicated than television, though. Sometimes, > security systems cause more problems than they solve. Putting > guns on aircraft will make us more vulnerable to attack, not less. > > When people think of potential problems with an weapons in a > cockpit, they think of accidental shootings in the air, holes in > the fuselage, and possibly even equipment shattered by a stray > bullet. This is a problem, certainly, but not a major one. A > bullet hole is small, and doesn't let a whole lot of air out. And > airplanes are designed to handle equipment failures -- even > serious failures -- and remain in the air. If I ran an airline, I > would worry more about accidents involving passengers, who are > much less able to survive a bullet wound and much more likely to > sue. > > The real dangers, though, involve the complex systems that must be > put in place before the first gun can ride along in the cockpit. > There are major areas of risk. > > One, we need a system for getting the gun on the airplane. How > does the pilot get the gun? Does he carry it through the airport > and onto the plane? Is it issued to him after he's in the cockpit > but before the plane takes off? Is it secured in the cockpit at > all times, even when there is no one there? Any one of these > solutions has its own set of security vulnerabilities. The last > thing we want is for an attacker to exploit one of these systems > in order to get himself a gun. Or maybe the last thing we want is > a shootout in a crowded airport. > > Second, we need a procedure for storing the gun on the airplane. > Does the pilot carry it on his hip? Is it locked in a cabinet? > If so, who has the key? Is there one gun, or do the pilot and > co-pilot each have > one? However the system works, it's ripe for abuse. If the gun is > always at the pilot's hip, an attacker can take it away from him > when he leaves the cockpit. (Don't laugh; policemen get their > guns taken away from them all the time, and they're trained to > prevent that.) If the guns remain in the cockpit when it is > unoccupied, we have a whole new set of problems to worry about. > > Third, we need a system of training pilots in gun handling and > marksmanship. Guns require training to use well; how much training > can we expect our pilots to have? This is different from training > sky > marshals. Security is the primary job of a sky marshal; they're > expected to learn how to use a gun. Flying planes is the primary > job of a pilot. > > Giving pilots guns is a disaster waiting to happen. The current > system spends a lot of time and effort keeping weapons off > airplanes and out of airports; the proposed scheme would inject > thousands of handguns into that system. There are just too many > pilots and too many flights every day; mistakes will happen. > Someone will do an inventory one night and find a gun missing, or > ten. Someone will find one left in a cockpit. Someone may even > find one on a seat in a terminal. > > El Al is the most security-conscious airline in the world. Their > pilots remain behind two bulletproof doors, and they're unarmed. > It's the job of the pilot to land the plane safely, not to engage > terrorists in close combat. For that, they rely on sky marshals, > crew, and passengers. If pilots have to leave the cockpit to > solve a security problem, it's too late. > > United States airlines are not comparable to El Al. Our flights > don't travel with two armed sky marshals each. We don't perform > security checks on passengers that, while legal in Israel, would > violate U.S. laws. We don't have two bulletproof doors separating > the cockpit from the > passengers. Many politicians see guns as a quick fix to a problem > that can't wait for a careful solution. > > Personally, I don't think pilots should be armed. But even if I > thought they did, I still wouldn't give them guns. Guns aren't > designed to be used in the cramped spaces you find in airplane > cockpits. They have too high a risk of doing unwanted damage if > they miss. And there's too much risk involved in putting > thousands of guns in airports, storing them, getting them on and > off airplanes, and keeping them in cockpits. If you want to arm > pilots, it would be much smarter to give them billy clubs or > tasers. At least those weapons make sense for the situation. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: PGP 7.5 iQA/AwUBPVw0u8PxH8jf3ohaEQJFLQCgiM0pbjq7eDI1OGpHSB4lBM7ECNEAn1fu weQEqAtqJjkAJLHuyki8WNty =xr6B -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- -- ----------------- R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah(a)ibuc.com> The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/> 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity, [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'

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Goldeneye.
by Matthew X 16 Aug '02

16 Aug '02

It was faintly disgusting to see jim leherer misting up over after TB's rabblerousing speech on Terror.Yet when you look at his leaders efforts you can understand why some displacement activity is going on.Blair gives good TV 'head',while the smirking chimp stumbles and bumbles his way through life like Homer Simpsons drinking buddy. The killing joke over TB is what can he do by himself? He's the puppet of a pretzel scoffing clown. How many Bond movies lately have you suspended belief over the ludicrous projection of the UK's power? It gets harder and harder.As a small favor,I'd appreciate a copy of 'Goldeneye' with the theme music inserted at the appropriate points,if you can cut out jar jar Binks you can do this for me...please? Thank you.

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Re: Overcoming the potential downside of TCPA
by Anonymous 16 Aug '02

16 Aug '02

[Repost] Joe Ashwood writes: > Actually that does nothing to stop it. Because of the construction of TCPA, > the private keys are registered _after_ the owner receives the computer, > this is the window of opportunity against that as well. Actually, this is not true for the endoresement key, PUBEK/PRIVEK, which is the "main" TPM key, the one which gets certified by the "TPM Entity". That key is generated only once on a TPM, before ownership, and must exist before anyone can take ownership. For reference, see section 9.2, "The first call to TPM_CreateEndorsementKeyPair generates the endorsement key pair. After a successful completion of TPM_CreateEndorsementKeyPair all subsequent calls return TCPA_FAIL." Also section 9.2.1 shows that no ownership proof is necessary for this step, which is because there is no owner at that time. Then look at section 5.11.1, on taking ownership: "user must encrypt the values using the PUBEK." So the PUBEK must exist before anyone can take ownership. > The worst case for > cost of this is to purchase an additional motherboard (IIRC Fry's has them > as low as $50), giving the ability to present a purchase. The > virtual-private key is then created, and registered using the credentials > borrowed from the second motherboard. Since TCPA doesn't allow for direct > remote queries against the hardware, the virtual system will actually have > first shot at the incoming data. That's the worst case. I don't quite follow what you are proposing here, but by the time you purchase a board with a TPM chip on it, it will have already generated its PUBEK and had it certified. So you should not be able to transfer a credential of this type from one board to another one. > The expected case; > you pay a small registration fee claiming that you "accidentally" wiped your > TCPA. The best case, you claim you "accidentally" wiped your TCPA, they > charge you nothing to remove the record of your old TCPA, and replace it > with your new (virtualized) TCPA. So at worst this will cost $50. Once > you've got a virtual setup, that virtual setup (with all its associated > purchased rights) can be replicated across an unlimited number of computers. > > The important part for this, is that TCPA has no key until it has an owner, > and the owner can wipe the TCPA at any time. From what I can tell this was > designed for resale of components, but is perfectly suitable as a point of > attack. Actually I don't see a function that will let the owner wipe the PUBEK. He can wipe the rest of the TPM but that field appears to be set once, retained forever. For example, section 8.10: "Clear is the process of returning the TPM to factory defaults." But a couple of paragraphs later: "All TPM volatile and non-volatile data is set to default value except the endorsement key pair." So I don't think your fraud will work. Users will not wipe their endorsement keys, accidentally or otherwise. If a chip is badly enough damaged that the PUBEK is lost, you will need a hardware replacement, as I read the spec. Keep in mind that I only started learning this stuff a few weeks ago, so I am not an expert, but this is how it looks to me.

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Schneier on Palladium and the TCPA (was Re: CRYPTO-GRAM, August 15, 2002)
by R. A. Hettinga 16 Aug '02

16 Aug '02

At 3:53 PM -0500 on 8/15/02, Bruce Schneier wrote: > Palladium and the TCPA > > > > There's been more written about Microsoft's Palladium security initiative > than about anything else in computer security in a very long time. My URL > list of comments, analysis, and opinions goes on for quite a while. Which > is interesting, because we really don't know anything about the details of > what it is or how it works. Much of this is based on reading between the > lines in the various news reports, conversations I've had with Microsoft > people (none of them under NDA), and conversations with people who've had > conversations. But since I don't know anything for sure, all of this could > be wrong. > > Palladium (like chemists, Microsoft calls it "Pd" for short) is Microsoft's > implementation of the TCPA spec, sort of. ("Sort of" depends on who you > ask. Some say it's related. Some say they do similar things, but are > unrelated. Some say that Pd is, in fact, Microsoft's attempt to preempt > the TCPA spec.) TCPA is the Trusted Computing Platform Alliance, an > organization with just under 200 corporate members (an impressive list, > actually) trying to build a trusted computer. The TCPA 1.1 spec has been > published, and you can obtain the 1.2 spec under NDA. Pd doesn't follow > the spec exactly, but it's along those lines, sort of. > > Pd has been in development for a long time, since at least 1997. The best > technical description is the summary of a meeting with Microsoft engineers > by Seth Schoen of the EFF (URL below). I'm not going to discuss the > details, because systems with an initial version of Pd aren't going to ship > until 2004 -- at least -- andthe details are all likely to change. > > Basically, Pd is Microsoft's attempt to build a trusted computer, much as I > discussed the concept in "Secrets and Lies" (pages 127-130); read it for > background). The idea is that different users on the system have > limitations on their abilities, and are walled off from each other. This > is impossible to achieve using only software; and Pd is a combination > hardware/software system. In fact, Pd affects the CPU, the chip set on the > motherboard, the input devices (keyboard, mouse, etc.), and the video > output devices (graphics processor, etc.). Additionally, a new chip is > required: a tamper-resistant secure processor. > > Microsoft readily acknowledges that Pd will not be secure against hardware > attacks. They spend some effort making the secure processor annoying to > pry secrets out of, but not a whole lot of effort. They assume that the > tamper-resistance will be defeated. It is their intention to design the > system so that hardware attacks do not result in class breaks: that > breaking one machine doesn't help you break any others. > > Pd provides protection against two broad classes of attacks. Automatic > software attacks (viruses, Trojans, network-mounted exploits) are contained > because an exploited flaw in one part of the system can't affect the rest > of the system. And local software-based attacks (e.g., using debuggers to > pry things open) are protected because of the separation between parts of > the system. > > There are security features that tie programs and data to CPU and to user, > and encrypt them for privacy. This is probably necessary to make Pd work, > but has a side-effect that I'm sure Microsoft is thrilled with. Like books > and furniture and clothing, the person who currently buys new software can > resell it when he's done with it. People have a right to do this -- it's > called the "First Sale Doctrine" in the United States -- but the software > industry has long claimed that software is not sold, but licensed, and > cannot be transferred. When someone sells a Pd-equipped computer, he is > likely to clear his keys so that his identity can't be used or files can't > be read. This will also serve to erase all the software he purchased. The > end result might be that people won't be able to resell software, even if > they wanted to. > > Pd is inexorably tied up with Digital Rights Management. Your computer > will have several partitions, each of which will be able to read and write > its own data. There's nothing in Pd that prevents someone else (MPAA, > Disney, Microsoft, your boss) from setting up a partition on your computer > and putting stuff there that you can't get at. Microsoft has repeatedly > said that they are not going to mandate DRM, or try to control DRM systems, > but clearly Pd was designed with DRM in mind. > > There seem to be good privacy controls, over and above what I would have > expected. And Microsoft has claimed that they will make the core code > public, so that it can be reviewed and evaluated. It's about time they > realized that lots of people are willing to do their security work for free. > > It's hard to sort out the antitrust implications of Pd. Lots of people > have written about it. Will Microsoft jigger Pd to prevent Linux from > running? They don't dare. Will it take standard Internet protocols and > replace them with Microsoft-proprietary protocols? I don't think so. Will > you need a Pd-enabled device -- the system is meant for both > general-purpose computers and specialized media devices -- in order to view > copyrighted content? More likely. Will Microsoft enforce its Pd patents > as strongly as it can? Almost certainly. > > Lots of information about Pd will emanate from Redmond over the next few > years, some of it true and some of it not. Things will change, and then > change again. The final system may not look anything like what we've seen > to date. This is normal, and to be expected, but when you continue to read > about Pd, be sure to keep several things in mind. > > 1. A "trusted" computer does not mean a computer that is trustworthy. The > DoD's definition of a trusted system is one that can break your security > policy; i.e., a system that you are forced to trust because you have no > choice. Pd will have trusted features; the jury is still out as to whether > or not they are trustworthy. > > 2. When you think about a secure computer, the first question you should > ask is: "Secure for whom?" Microsoft has said that Pd allows the > computer-owner to prevent others from putting their own secure areas on the > computer. But really, what is the likelihood of that really > happening? The NSA will be able to buy Pd-enabled computers and secure > them from all outside influence. I doubt that you or I could, and still > enjoy the richness of the Internet. Microsoft really doesn't care about > what you think; they care about what the RIAA and the MPAA > think. Microsoft can't afford to have the media companies not make their > content available on Microsoft platforms, and they will do what they can to > accommodate them. There's often a large gulf between what you can get in > theory -- which is what Microsoft is stressing in their Pd discussions -- > and what you will be able to have in practice. This is where the primary > danger lies. > > 3. Like everything else Microsoft produces, Pd will have security holes > large enough to drive a truck through. Lots of them. And the ones that > are in hardware will be much harder to fix. Be sure to separate the > Microsoft PR hype about the promise of Pd from the actual reality of Pd 1.0. > > 4. Pay attention to the antitrust angle. I guarantee you that Microsoft > believes Pd is a way to extend its market share, not to increase competition. > > There's a lot of good stuff in Pd, and a lot I like about it. There's also > a lot I don't like, and am scared of. My fear is that Pd will lead us down > a road where our computers are no longer our computers, but are instead > owned by a variety of factions and companies all looking for a piece of our > wallet. To the extent that Pd facilitates that reality, it's bad for > society. I don't mind companies selling, renting, or licensing things to > me, but the loss of the power, reach, and flexibility of the computer is > too great a price to pay. > > > <http://www.theregus.com/content/4/25378.html> > <http://www.msnbc.com/news/770511.asp?cp1=1> > <http://news.com.com/2100-1001-938973.html?tag=cd_mh> > <http://www.eweek.com/article2/0,3959,267488,00.asp> > <http://www.internetweek.com/story/INW20020626S0007> > <http://www.osopinion.com/perl/story/18379.html> > <http://www.infoworld.com/articles/hn/xml/02/06/25/020625hnpalladium.xml> > <http://www.newscientist.com/news/news.jsp?id=ns99992449> > <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A51780-2002Jun26.html> > <http://www.theregus.com/content/4/25630.html> > <http://www.internetweek.com/story/INW20020626S0007> > > Seth Schoen's meeting summary: > <http://vitanuova.loyalty.org/2002-07-03.html> > > Opinions: > <http://www.nytimes.com/2002/07/04/business/04SCEN.html> > <http://online.securityfocus.com/columnists/96> > <http://zdnet.com.com/2102-1107-942699.html> > <http://online.securityfocus.com/columnists/93> > <http://zdnet.com.com/2102-1107-939817.html> > <http://www.theregister.co.uk/content/4/25843.html> > <http://www.pbs.org/cringely/pulpit/pulpit20020627.html> > > Ross Anderson on TCPA and Palladium: > <http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/users/rja14/tcpa-faq.html> > <http://www.theregus.com/content/4/25415.html> > > TCPA Web site: > <http://www.trustedcomputing.org/tcpaasp4/index.asp> -- ----------------- R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah(a)ibuc.com> The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/> 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity, [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'

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Re: TCPA not virtualizable during ownership change (Re: Overcoming the potential downside of TCPA)
by lynn.wheeler＠firstdata.com 15 Aug '02

15 Aug '02

I arrived at that decision over four years ago ... TCPA possibly didn't decide on it until two years ago. In the assurance session in the TCPA track at spring 2001 intel developer's conference I claimed my chip was much more KISS, more secure, and could reasonably meet the TCPA requirements at the time w/o additional modifications. One of the TCPA guys in the audience grossed that I didn't have to contend with the committees of hundreds helping me with my design. There are actually significant similarities between my chip and the TPM chips. I'm doing key gen at very first, initial power-on/test of wafer off the line (somewhere in dim past it was drilled into me that everytime something has to be handled it increases the cost). Also, because of extreme effort at KISS, the standard PP evaluation stuff gets much simpler and easier because most (possibly 90 percent) of the stuff is N/A or doesn't exist early ref: http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsm2.htm#staw or refs at (under subject aads chip strawman): http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/index.html#aads brand & other misc. stuff: http://www.asuretee.com/ random evauation refs: http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsm12.htm#13 anybody seen (EAL5) semi-formal specification for FIPS186-2/x9.62 ecdsa? http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002j.html#86 formal fips186-2/x9.62 definition for eal 5/6 evaluation adam(a)cypherspace.org on 8/15/2002 6:44 pm wrote: I think a number of the apparent conflicts go away if you carefully track endorsement key pair vs endorsement certificate (signature on endorsement key by hw manufacturer). For example where it is said that the endorsement _certificate_ could be inserted after ownership has been established (not the endorsement key), so that apparent conflict goes away. (I originally thought this particular one was a conflict also, until I noticed that.) I see anonymous found the same thing. But anyway this extract from the CC PP makes clear the intention and an ST based on this PP is what a given TPM will be evaluated based on: http://niap.nist.gov/cc-scheme/PPentries/CCEVS-020016-PP-TPM1_9_4.pdf p 20: | The TSF shall restrict the ability to initialize or modify the TSF | data: Endorsement Key Pair [...] to the TPM manufacturer or designee. (if only they could have managed to say that in the spec). Adam -- http://www.cypherspace.org/adam/

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status of various projects?
by Miles Fidelman 15 Aug '02

15 Aug '02

It seems like a lot of interesting projects haven't been active for a while - notably Free Haven and Eternity Usenet. Where is the most active work, these days, on distributed publishing systems? ************************************************************************** The Center for Civic Networking PO Box 600618 Miles R. Fidelman, President & Newtonville, MA 02460-0006 Director, Municipal Telecommunications Strategies Program 617-558-3698 fax: 617-630-8946 mfidelman(a)civicnet.org http://civic.net/ccn.html Information Infrastructure: Public Spaces for the 21st Century Let's Start With: Internet Wall-Plugs Everywhere Say It Often, Say It Loud: "I Want My Internet!" **************************************************************************

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Overcoming the potential downside of TCPA
by Joseph Ashwood 15 Aug '02

15 Aug '02

Lately on both of these lists there has been quite some discussion about TCPA and Palladium, the good, the bad, the ugly, and the anonymous. :) However there is something that is very much worth noting, at least about TCPA. There is nothing stopping a virtualized version being created. There is nothing that stops say VMWare from synthesizing a system view that includes a virtual TCPA component. This makes it possible to (if desired) remove all cryptographic protection. Of course such a software would need to be sold as a "development tool" but we all know what would happen. Tools like VMWare have been developed by others, and as I recall didn't take all that long to do. As such they can be anonymously distributed, and can almost certainly be stored entirely on a boot CD, using the floppy drive to store the keys (although floppy drives are no longer a "cool" thing to have in a system), boot from the CD, it runs a small kernel that virtualizes and allows debugging of the TPM/TSS which allows the viewing, copying and replacement of private keys on demand. Of course this is likely to quickly become illegal, or may already, but that doesn't stop the possibility of creating such a system. For details on how to create this virtualized TCPA please refer to the TCPA spec. Joe --------------------------------------------------------------------- The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending "unsubscribe cryptography" to majordomo(a)wasabisystems.com

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Trei lies to himself again.
by Matthew X 15 Aug '02

15 Aug '02

>>a misplaced respect for the whims of The Men with Guns. This is not a Good Thing.<< Sure CJ would agree having been arrested at the point of one. >>A freedom to skulk in the shadows, hoping not to be noticed, is not the legacy I wish to leave behind. Peter Trei << So tell us peter,why did you shop CJ? You have been skulking on that point for months now.I've even written you directly about this.Tell me it was a mistake.

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