August 2001 - cypherpunks-legacy

IP: Wired: Wireless Networks in Big Trouble (fwd)
by Eugene Leitl 22 Aug '01

22 Aug '01

-- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://www.lrz.de/~ui22204/">leitl</a> ______________________________________________________________ ICBMTO : N48 10'07'' E011 33'53'' http://www.lrz.de/~ui22204 57F9CFD3: ED90 0433 EB74 E4A9 537F CFF5 86E7 629B 57F9 CFD3 ---------- Forwarded message ---------- Date: Wed, 22 Aug 2001 05:04:54 -0700 From: David Farber <dave(a)farber.net> Reply-To: farber(a)cis.upenn.edu To: ip-sub-1(a)majordomo.pobox.com Subject: IP: Wired: Wireless Networks in Big Trouble >Date: Tue, 21 Aug 2001 00:41:11 -0700 >From: "Robert J. Berger" <rberger(a)ultradevices.com> >Organization: UltraDevices Inc. > >Wireless Networks in Big Trouble >By Michelle Delio >http://www.wired.com/news/wireless/0,1382,46187,00.html >2:20 p.m. Aug. 20, 2001 PDT > >Wireless networks are a little less secure today with the public >release of "AirSnort," (http://airsnort.sourceforge.net/) >a tool that can surreptitiously grab and analyze data moving across >just about every major wireless network. > >When enough information has been captured, AirSnort can then piece >together the system's master password. > >In other words, hackers and/or eavesdroppers using AirSnort can just >grab what they want from a company's database wirelessly, out of thin >air. > >AirSnort's abilities aren't groundbreaking -- security experts know >all too well that wireless networks can be easily accessed and >monitored by outsiders. But a fully featured tool to facilitate >password-grabs wasn't readily available until this past weekend, when >AirSnort was released on the Internet. > >"AirSnort certainly ups the ante in the sense that with this tool, >your 'encrypted wireless net' can be quickly and easily breached," >said Randy Sandone of Argus, a security company. > >"Once AirSnort breaks the encryption, you're basically hosed. A >malicious hacker can read any packet traveling over the network, >gather information, passwords -- you name it." > >Wireless networks transmit information over public airwaves, the same >medium used by television, radio and cell phones. The networks are >supposed to be protected by a built-in security feature, the Wired >Equivalent Privacy system (WEP) -- also known as the 802.11b standard >-- which encrypts data as it is transmitted. > >But WEP/802.11b has proved to be quite crackable. And that's exactly >why AirSnort was publicly released, said AirSnort programmers Jeremy >Bruestle and Blake Hegerle. They hope that AirSnort will prove once >and for all that wireless networks protected only by WEP are not >secure. > >"Yes, AirSnort can be used as a cracking tool, but it can also be used >as a really big stick in an argument over the safety of WEP," Hegerle >said. > >"We felt that the only proper thing to do was to release the project," >Bruestle said. "It is not obvious to the layman or the average >administrator how vulnerable 802.11b is to attack. It's too easy to >trust WEP. Honestly, there is a lot of work involved in hardening a >wireless network. It's easy to be complacent. AirSnort is all about >opening people's eyes." > >Added Sandone: "Perhaps its release will prompt wireless vendors to >significantly enhance the encryption of their products. And hopefully >users will come to understand that encryption (regardless of how it is >used) is not a panacea." > >"Some people overhype the power of encryption, and others put too much >faith in its 'mathematical precision.' It clearly has its value, but >it shouldn't be the only security mechanism in use." > >"Weaknesses in the Key Scheduling Algorithm of RC4," a recently >published paper by Scott Fluhrer, Itsik Mantin and Adi Shamir, >outlined a way to learn the master key to the WEP encryption system, >which would allow an intruder to pose as a legitimate user of the >network. > >Adam Stubblefield, a Rice University undergraduate who was working as >a summer intern at AT&T Labs, tested that exploit (with the permission >of the network's administrator) and was able to pull up the network's >master password in just under two hours. > >Stubblefield published his research on the Internet, but did not >release the program he used to access AT&T's wireless network. > >If the software that he wrote to grab passwords were published, >Stubblefield told a reporter from The New York Times, anyone with a >basic knowledge of computers and a wireless network card could easily >crack many wireless networks. > >"Basically I read the paper and wondered if the attack would actually >work in the real world, and how hard it would be to implement," >Bruestle said. "I am the CEO of a small security firm, Cypher42, and I >wanted to know just how difficult or easy it would be to implement the >attack, so we could properly advise clients on 802.11b security." > >Another tool, WEPcrack, was released on the Internet around the same >time as AirSnort, but WEPcrack is still considered an alpha release, a >work in progress. > >Bruestle and Hegerle's AirSnort is a beta release, a designation that >indicates a program is not quite ready for primetime, but is further >along feature and stability-wise than alpha. > >Bruestle said he and Hegerle had a basic working version of AirSnort >after less than 24 hours of programming time. > >Bruestle said he has received many e-mails about AirSnort, some in >favor of the public release of the tool, others accusing him of adding >to the malicious hackers' arsenal. > >"Many of the people who have e-mailed me about AirSnort are sysadmins >who thanked me for giving them a way to convince management that WEP >really is insecure," Bruestle said. "Of course, I have gotten a number >of flame mails too, comparing the release of AirSnort to 'giving guns >to children.' I understand the viewpoint of those who believe >dangerous information should be hidden, but I disagree." > >Hegerle and Bruestle said that they believe that many people did not >understand the academic nature of Fluhrer, Mantin and Shamir's paper, >and may not understand how vulnerable wireless systems are. > >"It was beyond even my humble attempts to understand (the paper's) >full depths," Bruestle said. "The implications of a tool like AirSnort >are much harder to deny than the paper it was based on." > >AirSnort uses a completely passive attack: An AirSnort user needs only >a Linux-operated computer with a wireless network card, and access to >whatever wireless network he or she wishes to crack. > >Many wireless networks allow amazingly easy access to unauthorized >users, as some have discovered when their laptops suddenly connect to >the Internet when they are in or near a building that has a wireless >network. > >"I've been able to connect to networks when standing outside of >businesses, hospitals or Internet cafés that offer the service," said >Mark Denon, a freelance technology writer. > >"You can jump in and use the network to send e-mail or surf the Net, >and often it's quite possible to access whatever information is moving >across the network. It's very easy to piggyback onto many wireless >networks, and some people make a game of driving or walking around a >city and seeing how many networks they can jump into." > >"A wireless card in the machine that's running AirSnort does not send >out any data or actually talk with any of the other machines on the >network," said Hegerle. "It simply listens to all the other traffic, >so it doesn't matter if the network allows unauthorized access, as >none of the other machines on the network will even know anyone is >listening," said Hegerle. > >The amount of time required to piece together a password with AirSnort >depends on a number of factors, Bruestle said, but mostly depends on >the amount of network traffic and "luck." > >"On a highly saturated network, AirSnort can usually collect enough >packets to guess the key in three or four hours. If the network is >very low traffic, it can take days to get enough data," Bruestle >said. "Since the attack is based on probability, the actual number of >packets required to guess a given key varies from key to key, >sometimes significantly." > >AirSnort monitoring does not have to be all done in one session, >though. "Five hours one day and five the next works out to be about >the same as 10 hours in a row," Bruestle said. > >Systems administrators have mixed reactions over the release of >AirSnort. > >"Granted, this program will hammer the truth into people's heads about >the insecure nature of any wireless network protected only by WEP," >said Gerry Kaufman, a medical network and systems consultant. "But >releasing this tool also allows a lot of people access to networks who >couldn't have cracked them before. I'm really torn between advocating >open access to information, and keeping tools like AirSnort out of the >hands of kids with too much free time on their hands." > >Kaufman said the "only good thing" that could come from AirSnort's >release is its use for proving to "those who approve the expenditures" >that wireless networks need stronger protection. > >Hegerle and Bruestle suggest that wireless network users look into >other end-to-end forms of encryption, such as Virtual Private Networks >(VPNs) to protect data going over wireless networks. > >"While this requires more work, the false sense of security WEP offers >is worse than no security at all," Bruestle said. > >"Quite simply, I won't be happy until there are no people trusting >their data to WEP as it now exists," Hegerle said. "There are several >possible ways to change WEP, and I would like to see a new dialog >begin, one that looks for a replacement to the badly designed WEP we >are now stuck with." > >Under development are new versions of WEP/802.11b that will include >stronger security features. But the new standards won't be released >until mid-2002 at the earliest. > >-- >Robert J. Berger >UltraDevices, Inc. >257 Castro Street, Suite 223 Mt. View CA. 94041 >Voice: 408-882-4755 Fax: 408-490-2868 >Email: rberger(a)ultradevices.com http://www.ultradevices.com For archives see: http://www.interesting-people.org/

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credit card number
by stevan wijaya 22 Aug '01

22 Aug '01

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Now Available - FilterSim Version 2.0
by Gareth Jones 22 Aug '01

22 Aug '01

SYSTOLIX HAVE RELEASED FILTERSIM VERION 2.0 - INTEGRATED FILTER DESIGN, SIMULATION AND ANALYSIS A fully working trial version of FilterSim 2.0 can be downloaded now from Systolix web site at http://www.systolix.com/swdownload.htm. FilterSim is the latest DSP development tool from Systolix. It combines a sophisticated multi-stage filter design tool with an integrated digital simulator. Simulation results can be viewed using the built-in signal viewer and analysis tools, allowing designers to study filter characteristics and quantisation effects in detail. Version 2.0 is a complete rewrite of the tool, it includes a new simplified user interface to streamline the process of specifying complex multi-stage filters. Here is a summary of the key features, more information can be found at http://www.systolix.com/fsintro.htm. * FILTER SPECIFICATION & DESIGN * Import externally generated FIR / IIR coefficients for analysis / re-quantisation Design filters to user specified quantisation Export coefficients Simple graphical entry of filter networks - Support of multi-stage (FIR / IIR / mixed) - Support for multi-rate filters (decimating / interpolating / resampling) - Support for multiple levels of quantisation in a single network Support for multiple filter types including IIR Filters - Butterworth / Chebychev I-II / Elliptic - Low Pass / High Pass / Band Pass / Band Stop Windowed FIR Filters - Kaiser / Blackman / Von Hann / Hamming / Rectangular - Low Pass / High Pass / Band Pass / Band Stop Equiripple FIR filters - Low Pass / High Pass / Band Pass / Band Stop Half-Band FIR Filters (Window & Equiripple) Pulse-shaping Filters - Raised Cosine / Root Raised Cosine / Gaussian Hilbert Transforms * FILTER SIMULATION * Extensive simulation capabilities including - Fast, optimised simulation engine - Built in signal generation functions - Import user test data - User definable quantisation for coefficients and data - Define unique quantisation per stage * FILTER ANALYSIS * Powerful analysis capabilities including - Graphical view of magnitude/phase/impulse response - Built-in FFT - Graphical viewer for simulation/FFT data - Automatic system transfer function evaluation - Automatic calculation of SNR / THD For further enquires about FilterSim please email filtersim(a)systolix.co.uk.

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None
by Free Lotto 22 Aug '01

22 Aug '01

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Re: Arresting Henry Kissinger
by A. Melon 22 Aug '01

22 Aug '01

> Well, "under our laws" may be a non sequitur here, as I don't think > any of the discussion, with one possible exception, has involved any > law of the US. Please acquaint yourself with the crimes under discussion. "The Trial of Henry Kissinger" is one source. There are many others. > As to other laws, most importantly the international body thereof, > there is a respectable--note I do not say persuasive, as I don't > have enough facts--that Kissinger as a "subordinate" was carrying > out the policy of the state and, as such an actor, may be clothed > with sovereign immunity. Kissinger was hardly a flunky. As chair of the "40 Committee" from 1969-1976 Kissinger personally oversaw all U.S. covert actions. He had tremendous power in the Nixon and Ford administrations. ("Do not follow the President's orders without clearing them through me.") And, since when is being a flunky an excuse? We're all supposed to follow the laws. It's basic to our system of government that the executive branch and its employees are not above the law. The U.S. hanged a number of people at the end of World War II as "war criminals" who had less relative responsibility than Henry Kissinger. The U.S. supports international tribunals now. Therefore, under the stated beliefs of the U.S. government Kissinger should be subject to these sorts of proceedings. Concerns about international tribunals are valid. If you reject them for all leaders you may be making sense. But, it sounds as if you reject them only for Kissinger.

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Re: Arresting Henry Kissinger
by keyser-soze＠hushmail.com 22 Aug '01

22 Aug '01

At 10:00 PM 8/21/2001 -0500, Mac Norton wrote: >Well, "under our laws" may be a non sequitur here, as I don't think any of the discussion, with one possible exception, has involved any law of the US. As to other laws, most importantly the international body thereof, there is a respectable--note I do not say persuasive, as I don't have enough facts--that Kissinger as a "subordinate" was carrying out the policy of the state and, as such an actor, may be clothed with sovereign immunity. > >This is not an uncomplicated area of the law, and is one that gets very deep very fast. It's also one of those areas where the law is about as far divorced from common morality and decency as it ever gets. MacN A "subordinate" carrying out the policy of the state may still be held responsible if their orders or actions were "manifestly illegal (mealy mouth words to be taken to mean whatever they wish)." Of course, this begs the question was Kissinger following any direct/explicit orders regarding what transpired in Chile or did take the details of carrying out the matter on himself thus offering the Pres plausible deniability. Journal of Conflict and Security Law Volume 6, Issue 1: June 2001. http://www3.oup.co.uk/jconsl/current/pdf/060003.pdf The Boundaries of Liability In International Criminal Law, or `Selectivity by Stealth' Robert Cryer. ---------------------------------------- 3.1 Superior Orders The issue of superior orders has traditionally been a dif ?cult one, although to read the Nuremberg IMT Charter on the matter,those thinking it to be simple could be forgiven.The Nuremberg IMT Charter simply provides:[t ]he fact that the defendant acted pursuant to order of his government or of a superior shall not free him from responsibility,but may be considered in mitigation of punishment if the Tribunal determines that justice so requires. .... Still, both Control Council Law 10 and the Nuremberg Principles asserted the view that superior orders were not a defence (Principle IV). This is possibly theNuremberg Principle around which most controversy has centred.A major reason for this has been the relatively low uptake for this position in national laws. This need not be fatal to the claim that the Nuremberg provision represents the law,but the position is weakened by the presence of contrary practice.This contrary practice began in the Nuremberg subsequent proceedings , in which US tribunals,in the Einsatzgruppen and High Command cases,seemed to use the manifest illegality test,as did certain other judgments in the direct post-war period. Expressions of that test have continued in various cases up to the present day, although the defence has been generally rejected, on the facts at least. In the sphere of international legislation, suggestions were made to include provisions relating to superior orders. All were rejected as they did not gather enough support. The ILC has wavered on the! total exclusion of the defence, and academic opinion has been split. The schism is between those asserting the manifest illegality test, and those adopting the position that superior orders are never a defence per se, but may be a relevant factor for other defences, such as duress. In practice, the difference may not be particularly important, as the orders in cases coming to trial will probably be considered manifestly illegal. That does not mean it will never be so, particularly in matters such as targeting,where the application of the rule to the facts may be dif?cult.B y the early 1990s, the simple fact was that either position could be asserted and receive a fair level of support. ... Opposition came from another group led by the US,who clung to the manifest illegality test,as the position,lex lata .79 The result was a compromise,and not comfortable one. Article 33 reads: 1.The fact that a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court has been committed by a person pursuant to an order of a government or of superior,whether military or civilian,shall not relieve that person of criminal responsibility unless: (a)That person was under a legal obligation to obey orders of the Government or the superior in question; (b)The person did not know that the order was unlawful;and (c)The order was not manifestly unlawful. 2.For the purposes of this article,orders to commit genocide or crimes against humanity are manifestly unlawful. Free, secure Web-based email, now OpenPGP compliant - www.hushmail.com

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Science News Online - Past Issues - 5/4/96
by Jim Choate 22 Aug '01

22 Aug '01

Speaking of splitting the cake, who gets the trim? http://www.sciencenews.org/sn_arch/5_4_96/bob1.htm -- -- ____________________________________________________________________ natsugusa ya...tsuwamonodomo ga...yume no ato summer grass...those mighty warriors'...dream-tracks Matsuo Basho The Armadillo Group ,::////;::-. James Choate Austin, Tx /:'///// ``::>/|/ ravage(a)ssz.com www.ssz.com .', |||| `/( e\ 512-451-7087 -====~~mm-'`-```-mm --'- --------------------------------------------------------------------

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Anonymous Posting
by An Metet 22 Aug '01

22 Aug '01

Faustine wrote: > So why is it that the vast majority of the technical and insightful > contributions here seem to come from people who aren't averse to > using a reasonable simulacrum of a real name and address? I find the content from remailers is far higher than average for the list. > I made the deliberate choice not to use a remailer because I think > it's more interesting to contribute while having a prior body of > posts "attached" to me. People come to know more what to expect--and > if I irritate/bore/piss them off too much, they stop reading > me. Which is exactly as it should be. So sign your messages. With your true name, if that's important. > Though if you're after complete privacy re: your opinions and the > details of your life, you're better off not writing them down in the > first place, here or anywhere else. The technology isn't there yet, true, but it won't get there without deploying it and using it. Why isn't this obvious? > I assume everyone here weighed those considerations for themselves > before they got here: as far as I'm concerned, nobody has the > slightest business deciding it for anyone else. Don't worry, the cypherpunks list isn't going anywhere. It's just not realistic to put that genie back in the bottle. It would have to be a separate list entirely or one which rode on the current cypherpunks list. We may not be able to decide for others, but we can certainly look down on so-called cypherpunks who, in many cases, cannot even encrypt a message, never mind "writing code". Many, in fact, exhibit hostility towards remailers and anonymity, as you do. What I fail to understand is why such people are on this list in the first place, but, as you say, people make their own decisions. (None of these comments apply to Tim May, of course.)

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News4Jax - Proposal Wants To Keep Big Brother's Eye Shut
by Jim Choate 21 Aug '01

21 Aug '01

http://www.news4jax.com/jax/news/stories/news-92779620010821-150801.html -- -- ____________________________________________________________________ natsugusa ya...tsuwamonodomo ga...yume no ato summer grass...those mighty warriors'...dream-tracks Matsuo Basho The Armadillo Group ,::////;::-. James Choate Austin, Tx /:'///// ``::>/|/ ravage(a)ssz.com www.ssz.com .', |||| `/( e\ 512-451-7087 -====~~mm-'`-```-mm --'- --------------------------------------------------------------------

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CFP: Financial Cryptography '02 (fwd)
by Jim Choate 21 Aug '01

21 Aug '01

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