December 2001 - cypherpunks-legacy

Great Deals on New and Used Phones!!
by Carlo Rodriguez 18 Dec '01

18 Dec '01

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Fwd: Computer Experts Question National ID Schemes (fwd)
by Jim Choate 18 Dec '01

18 Dec '01

---------- Forwarded message ---------- Date: Tue, 18 Dec 2001 19:39:06 -0600 Subject: Fwd: Computer Experts Question National ID Schemes This just in... >> Subject: Computer Experts Question National ID Schemes >> >> For Immediate Release: December 17, 2001 >> For More Information: Susan Evoy, cpsr(a)cpsr.org, >> 650-322-3778 >> >> COMPUTER EXPERTS QUESTION NATIONAL IDENTIFICATION SCHEMES >> >> Computer Professionals for Social Responsibility (CPSR), >> a twenty year old international association of computer experts, >> released an FAQ (Frequently Asked Questions) explaining and >> critiquing recent proposals to create national identification >> schemes (NIDS) in the United States, Canada, and other countries. >> >> CPSR explains that a national identification scheme "could >> combine the functions of a driver's license, social security >> registration, immigration documents, and other government- >> issued identification." Individuals would be entered in a national >> data base and issued a "smart" card containing personal >> information, including, in some recent proposals, biometric >> data such as fingerprints or retina scans. >> >> CPSR president Coralee Whitcomb said, "CPSR doubts that >> national identification schemes can provide additional security >> against terrorist attacks." She added, "These ideas have been >> around for a while, but after September 11 their proponents, >> including potential suppliers, who stand to profit handsomely >> from massive ID Card programs, used the climate of fear to >> dust them off in response to the public's desire for improved >> security. National identification schemes instead would endanger >> civil liberties, allowing those with access to the data base to track >> the behavior, associations, and finances of innocent people." >> >> Moreover, a new identification system could "leave us relying >> on the wrong approach to security, and create a false sense of >> security that leaves us more vulnerable than before," Whitcomb >> said. >> >> CPSR is a public-interest alliance of computer scientists and >> others concerned about the impact of computer technology on >> society. As technical experts, CPSR members continue to >> provide the public and policymakers with realistic assessments >> of the power, promise and limitations of computer technology. >> >> CPSR representatives are available for interviews, testimony and >> other communications. >> >> Links to resources about National ID Card position statements >> and press >> coverage, ID Cards for immigrants, Smart Cards, Social >> Security Numbers, >> Biometrics (Fingerprints, >> Retina Scanning, and Face Recognition), and General Security >> Principles can be found at >> http://www.cpsr.org/program/natlID/natlIDlinks.html >> >> The FAQ is at >> http://www.cpsr.org/program/natlID/natlIDfaq.html >> >> > -- >> Susan Evoy * Managing Director >> http://www.cpsr.org/ >> Computer Professionals for Social Responsibility >> P.O. Box 717 * Palo Alto * CA * 94302 >> Phone: (650) 322-3778 * >> Email: evoy(a)cpsr.org >> Join/Renew online: >> https://swww.igc.apc.org/cpsr/sec-membership-form.html --------------------------------------------------------------------------- "I've never been a long-term planner about anything. I have lived my life with more of a short-term focus." - President George W. Bush (Texas Monthly, 5-94)

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Quantum encryption close but may not be uncrackable.
by mattd 18 Dec '01

18 Dec '01

Beryllium is valuable in the manufacture of nuclear weapons,China recently used some tipping their ICBMs.One atom of it was used in an experiment to decide the fate of Schroedinger's cat.From. . ...http://www.sciam.com/explorations/061796explorations.html The recent breakthrough of single photon emission in Britain brings quantum manipulation/encryption tantalizingly closer.The states days are almost certainly numbered but getting back to the cat.The Schroedingers cat experiment is based on the standard model of Quantum mechanics.The SMQM,if true means a universe must exist for every physical possibility.The notorious *parallel worlds* theory. This could guarantee uncrackable encryption yet its a big swallow for some,not just pussy.The double slit experiment is even cited as providing evidence for neighboring universes.(D.Deutsch.new scientist.july.01.)Its truly bizarre to see exactly what some present *concrete* beliefs are really based on.Shared hallucinations indeed,possibly even kitty litter. Is there a human Schroedinger? What of ralph Mc Gehee? Would looking to hard for his missing usenet posts kill him? Uncrackable quantum encryption will save ralph and us from the out of control rogue terror state yet if the SMQM breaks down even an higgs boson's worth then we could all be back to square one.

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Non-political, so probably off-topic for CP :_)
by measl＠mfn.org 18 Dec '01

18 Dec '01

In case anyone has *any* interest... ---------- Forwarded message ---------- Date: Mon, 17 Dec 2001 14:29:43 -0500 From: Franco Travostino <travos(a)nortelnetworks.com> Reply-To: anon(a)wireless.eecs.harvard.edu To: Anon Fwd <anon(a)wireless.eecs.harvard.edu> Subject: Re: Anon Fwd: analysis of covert channels in draft-kung-annfwd-framework Geoff, the security protocol that you're describing---i.e., generate a symmetric key and ship it encrypted with the recipient's public key---seems very expensive for a layer 3 forwarder (or, better, for what I think that that beast is, really). I understand that a) you have limited a forwarder's scope to processing signalling data only, and b) PGP email, for one, use keys pretty much the way you said. Yet, I think one could do much better with a Diffie-Hellman cycle producing a batch of symmetric keys, which need not to be exchanged across the wire. This is what IKE (rfc2409) does. IKE has all sort of wrinkles to it in order to thwart DH vulnerabilities to men-on-the-middle attackers. A forwarder implementing such solution could attain a wide range of throughputs, possibly exceeding 1Gb/s with hardware crypto-assists (as commodity VPN boxes show today). Public key operations as you scoped will definitely lock you out of these ranges. -franco At 03:39 PM 12/15/2001, Geoffrey L Goodell wrote: >In our last meeting, we discovered that we could discard the various metadata >fields in our protocol, thus reducing the ability for attackers to discover >clients or servers by sending an exorbitant number of packets to a forwarder >and simultaneously monitoring the forwarder's output link. So, with the >stipulation that the various field types have a specified size, and each >forwarder only provides exactly one of the three anonymity options (client, >server, and bidirectional), the only means by which attackers can correlate >their packets with packets found on the output link of the forwarder is to >examine the data contained in the fields themselves. In order for a >successful >attack to be possible, it must be possible for an attacker to correlate the >fields on the packet entering the forwarder with the packets leaving the >forwarder; in other words, individual fields leaving the forwarder must be >encrypted in such a manner to not be decryptable by the attacker into a form >that the attacker can recognize. > >SUMMARY: We discover that the single-hop protocols are demonstrably free of >covert channels, provided that the cipher upon which we ultimately decide is >also demonstrably free of covert channels. We find that if we expect to get >away with packet sizes that do not grow linearly with the number of forwarders >on the path between the client and the server, multi-hop forwarding depends on >some sort of public-key infrastructure. > >THE "GOOD" NEWS: We need a public key infrastructure for our network of >forwarders. > >THE ACTUALLY-GOOD NEWS: Clients and servers need not be a part of this >network, >though forwarders must be able to verify the authenticity of their public >keys. > >DETAILS: > >---------- > >I have examined the three single-hop protocols closely, and discovered the >following: > >1. Client Anonymity > >C's certificate and the request are passed along by the forwarder on the >way to >the server, so an attacker posing as a client can find the location of a >server >by monitoring the forwarder's output link. This is acceptable, though, since >the protocol explicitly does not call for server anonymity. > >On the way back to the client, the message is encrypted in a symmetric key >chosen by the forwarder, and the symmetric key is encrypted with the client's >public key. One apparent attack on this system would be to send a certificate >for an arbitrary public key for which the attacker holds the corresponding >private key; given enough computing power, the attacker could feasibly use >this >private key to decrypt the symmetric key on packets leaving the forwarder and >verify which ones contained the reply datum the attacker sent. We can >successfully defend against this attack by requiring that the forwarder verify >the authenticity of the client's public key. > >So, to my knowledge, this protocol does not have any threatening covert >channels. > >2. Server anonymity > >En route from the client to the server, the forwarder encrypts a packet with >a symmetric key and sends that key encrypted with the server's public key. To >avoid an attack similar to the one suggested above with the client anonymity >protocol, we require that the forwarder verify the authenticity of the >server's >public key. > >On the way back, the messages can easily be correlated by an attacker. But, >symmetrically to above, the protocol explicitly does not call for client >anonymity, and thus allowing an attacker to find client locations is >acceptable. > >So, to my knowledge, this protocol does not have any threatening covert >channels. > >3. Bidirectional anonymity > >En route from the client to the server, the forwarder encrypts the fields with >a randomly generated symmetric key of its choosing, and sends the >symmetric key >encrypted with the public key of the server. Thus, we need the forwarder to >verify the authenticity of the server's public key. > >On the way back, the forwarder encrypts the fields with a randomly generated >symmetric key of its choosing, and sends the symmetric key encrypted with the >public key of the client. Thus, we need the forwarder to verify the >authenticity of the client's public key. > >So, to my knowledge, this protocol does not have any threatening covert >channels. > >---------- > >The multi-hop protocols as described in the Internet Draft are like the >single-hop protocols, with the important exception that specific fields >are passed directly between the forwarders. Here, we have two problems: > >A. Since one of the encrypted fields contains more and more information as it >gets constructed, and never gets decrypted in the construction process, it >necessarily grows in size. This in turn means that information about the >position of a particular forwarder in the path will necessarily be leaked. > >B. Since fields are passed directly between the forwarders without alteration, >they can be correlated by an attacker to find the path through the forwarding >network. One possible solution to this is for the forwarders to choose >randomly-generated symmetric keys at each hop, and then encrypt the relevant >field with this key, and then send that key along, encrypted with the client's >or server's public key. The trouble with this is that the size of the packet >becomes increasingly large, just as in (A). > >To eliminate the problem with linearly growing packets along the pathe need a >PKI for the network of forwarders so that forwarders can encrypt and >decrypt at >each hop. This reduces the packets to a constant size (whatever we agree >upon), and prevents the problems associated by the covert channels >described in >(A) and (B) above. > >Geoff > > > > >To post: mail to anon(a)wireless.eecs.harvard.edu >To unsubscribe: mail anon(a)wireless.eecs.harvard.edu > with "unsubscribe" (no quotes) in the subject line >To subscribe: mail anon(a)wireless.eecs.harvard.edu > with "subscribe" (no quotes) in the subject line >To visit archive: go to http://wireless.eecs.harvard.edu/anon >Comments, suggestions? Send them to > postmaster(a)wireless.eecs.harvard.edu Franco Travostino, Director Content Internetworking Lab Advanced Technology Investments Nortel Networks, Inc. 600 Technology Park Billerica, MA 01821 USA Tel: 978 288 7708 Fax: 978 288 4690 email: travos(a)nortelnetworks.com

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Wired on e-gold
by Faustine 18 Dec '01

18 Dec '01

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 Nomen Nescio wrote: (snip) >With most people, if they have nothing to hide, they don't hide it. Why are you posting this from behind a remailer? >Only paranoids and extremists will adopt anonymity >technologies without nefarious purposes in mind. So why are you posting from behind a remailer? Which of your slurs are you willing to apply to yourself? > Anyone proposing to offer new services for privacy and anonymity should be > prepared to deal with the onslaught of criminals who will use the system for > bad ends. Why are you posting from behind a remailer? Hypocrisy isn't pretty. ~Faustine. *** He that would make his own liberty secure must guard even his enemy from oppression; for if he violates this duty he establishes a precedent that will reach to himself. - --Thomas Paine -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: PGPsdk version 1.7.1 (C) 1997-1999 Network Associates, Inc. and its affiliated companies. (Diffie-Helman/DSS-only version) iQA/AwUBPB/xi/g5Tuca7bfvEQJnEwCgt0+BccWxGdBFYckrzsB58rCNPjwAn1wS SBYVZQfjmiYGH9x9TWYBWUd+ =TmJG -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Everyone a remailer:Everyone a mint:Everyone an assassin predictor
by mattd 18 Dec '01

18 Dec '01

http://www.spammimic.com/ is a commercial example of a good use to put spam.Like steggin' pron.the hide in the herd idea.Its a shame larry ellison chose the dark side.Oracle sized remailers could be useful to speed the crypto-revolution. He used to make sense on the 'network as computer',then he must have twigged that would lead to his demise. In the developing labyrinth progress will be slower,but sure,toward distributed,P-P,encrypted,alternate OS plug ins that will accomplish all we seek to achieve. But remember, please, the Law by which we live, We are not built to comprehend a lie. We can neither live nor pity, nor forgive, If you make a slip in handling us you die! --The Secret of the Machines-- Rudyard Kipling

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Re: MY APPOLOGIES TO ALL CYPHERPUNKS - WAS Re: Returned mail:
by Eric Murray 18 Dec '01

18 Dec '01

On Tue, Dec 18, 2001 at 09:04:46AM -0500, baptista(a)pccf.net wrote: > All nite long i've been spammed by the account asoiau1632(a)yahoo.com. I'm > sure we've all seen the numerous messages on here. > > Anyway - my autoresponder has been responding to these messages and as a > result a number of bounced email ended up redirected to the > cypherpunks lists. Actually, I only got the originals. It looks like the mail kept going through the CDR nodes because one of them was re-sending it. Its hard to tell from the headers, but I think it's minder.net. If your autobounce was just feeding back the message that you receive with no changes (error headers, etc) to minder then you might have been the cause. Otherwise, there's some other problem. (if you didn't see it because you're subscribed to a filtering CDR that filtered them, it was about 400 copies of spam). Either way, you shouldnt set up an autobounce that can reply to a list. Please fix it so it won't do that. Eric > I have recently /dev/null all email from asoiau1632(a)yahoo.com - so the > bounces should stop soon. > > regards > joe > > On Tue, 18 Dec 2001, Mail Delivery Subsystem wrote: > > > The original message was received at Tue, 18 Dec 2001 08:41:04 -0500 > > from locust.minder.net [216.254.113.229] > > > > ----- The following addresses had permanent fatal errors ----- > > "|exec /usr/bin/procmail" > > (expanded from: <baptista(a)pccf.net>) > > > > ----- Transcript of session follows ----- > > 554 Too many hops 26 (25 max): from <owner-cypherpunks(a)minder.net> via locust.minder.net, to <baptista(a)pccf.net> > > > > -- > The dot.GOD Registry, Limited > > http://www.dot-god.com/

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spam and Remailers
by georgemw＠speakeasy.net 18 Dec '01

18 Dec '01

On 18 Dec 2001, at 14:42, Meyer Wolfsheim wrote: > On Tue, 18 Dec 2001, David Honig wrote: > > > Can't spam be repelled by not forwarding email not encrypted to > > the remailer's key? > > Who is to say that spammers won't use remailer clients that automatically > encrypt to the remailers' keys? > Wouldn't it HAVE to do that if they want their spam forwarded? I mean, doesn't the remailer perform one layer of decryption to find the address that it's supposed to next forward the message to? Say, what IS the situation with spam and remailers anyway? are spammers really trying to use the mixmaster network to send lots of spam, or is it more like that the remailers get sent lots of spam and have to filter it out because it would take too long to process? I mean, does spam follow the protocol? > Using remailer clients should be *easy*. Saying "this is too hard for the > average spammer to figure out" isn't acceptable. > > You know what else should be easy? Setting up and running a remailer! So why shouldn't an ambitious spammer set up his own remailer server? Or better yet, a whole bunch of them? Except instead of sending dummy traffic, it sends spam. This is actually a really good thing from remailer security, because a dummy message that ends up telling some fool about russian porn sites ot nigerian graft opportunities is much more befuddling to an attacker than one that just disappers, right? George > -MW-

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Wackenhutt west of Cabazon and the new "Aussi KGB"
by mattd 18 Dec '01

18 Dec '01

New powers 'create Aussie KGB' From AAP 19dec01 GIVING spy agency ASIO wide-ranging powers to fight terrorism would turn it into Australia's own KGB, civil libertarians have argued. Draft laws endorsed by cabinet yesterday include giving ASIO officers the power to detain people for 48 hours without a lawyer if they are suspected of having information about potential terrorist attacks. Civil Liberties Council spokesman Cameron Murphy today said the Government plan was unwarranted, and likened the resulting organisation to the Russian secret police of the Cold War. "They (the Government) haven't demonstrated that there's public need for the powers and they really are going to turn ASIO into a secret police," he told Channel Seven. "The last time we saw these sort of powers being given to an ASIO or intelligence service was like the KGB - it's that severe." Cabinet also agreed to make terrorism and fundraising for terrorists punishable by life imprisonment, and to crack down on financial transactions. Attorney-General Daryl Williams said the new measures were recommended by a top-level security review following the September 11 terrorist attacks in the US. Mr Murphy said that while there were immediate concerns over terrorism, the Government was proposing ASIO keep its powers indefinitely. "We need to be very careful of that because once the imminent crisis is over in terrorism what we'll find is that ASIO's attention will focus on innocent members of the Australian public," he said. "A response is necessary, but this is too much of a response ... the Government is going the whole hog and giving them too much power." A plan to allow ASIO to open unread e-mail also targeted innocent people, Mr Murphy said. "The powers are inappropriate and I don't think we can trust an organisation like ASIO with these sort of powers." He said security services such as ASIO had used the September 11 terrorist attacks as an opportunity to make a "grab for power". Labor has supported most of the measures, but said it would move for a parliamentary inquiry into the new ASIO powers, which the Australian Democrats and Greens have labelled draconian. Wackenhuts wacked. Detainees riot again From AAP 19dec01 WOOMERA Detention Centre in South Australia is on "red alert" after inmates rioted for a second night. Authorities used tear gas to disperse a group of detainees at the facility who lit a fire and attacked a perimeter fence late last night, a Department of Immigration spokeswoman said. That followed explosions and fires at the centre on Monday night, when hundreds of detainees rioted over the allocation of visas. "There was a further fire in the main compound at the centre (last night)," the immigration spokeswoman said early this morning. "There was also a significant number of detainees that entered what we call the sterile zone (between the inner and outer perimeter fences). "That group of detainees would not obey a direction to return to their accommodation." The spokeswoman said the detainees were attacking a perimeter fence and had to be subdued using tear gas. It was unclear how much damage was done, or how many detainees were involved. All detainees were returned to the accommodation blocks by 12.30am (AEDT). But the spokeswoman said the atmosphere was extremely tense with security forces standing "on red alert". Additional security has been imposed at the isolated facility, and Port Augusta police said they had sent a crew to the centre, about 160 kilometres away. The fire in the main compound was reportedly extinguished by detainees not involved in the riot, the spokeswoman said. In the previous night's attack, witnesses described "huge" explosions, flames 10 metres high and fires from one end of the centre to the other in the most serious incident at the facility since a mass break-out about 18 months ago. Fifteen buildings were set alight and four completely destroyed during the riot. KGB,Red Alerts,jamesd,HELP!

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RE: CIA in NYC
by Anonymous 18 Dec '01

18 Dec '01

On Tue, 18 Dec 2001, Trei, Peter wrote: > I used to work at 101 Barclay Street, across the street from > WTC #7. I watched it going up from my office window. I hated > the building - it blocked my view south. Hate is a strong word. Be careful, Peter; John will think you had something to do with the business of it falling down.

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