December 2001 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: Tim May on the end of a rope.,
by mattd 23 Dec '01

23 Dec '01

>>Last week I urged cypherpunks to > compare and contrast the noam chomsky article,"Objectivity > and liberal scholarship."with the material jamesd has on > display at his website. >>You cite Chomsky as evidence for the truthfullness of Chomsky.<< I suggest cypherpunks interested in the perversion of the word anarchy as used by crypto-fascists like Tim May read widely,compare and contrast.Try murray Bookchin's "the spanish anarchists"and Gaston Leval.George Orwell,Abel Paz. If you dont like chompsky.At the very least Hugh thomas.to balance jamesd's effort. >>> No anarchist supports a powerful,or indeed,any state >>Yet you cite (as evidence that I am a liar) Ian McKay's article on the Catalonian anarchists, in which he concedes that the anarchists wound up creating what most people would call a state, indeed a terrorist dictatorship, but argues that I am lying in that such a state was a good thing, and run by nice people, deeply concerned for the welfare of the masses<< I maintain that someone relying on your site for information on Spain,without other sources,would be misled at the very least.To leave out is another way to lie.I dont know who Ian McKay is but Durruti did say,"war makes jackals of us all" Lenin stole anarchist slogans and instituted a terrorist dictatorship.There exists a grave danger that crypto-anarchy as promoted by liars would create a terrorist dictatorship.The more knowledge we have of hirstorical anarchy we have the better.That means a wide variety of sources quoting from documents.I still prefer chomsky on spain to you jamesd. >>>.Jim Bell seems to be the closest thing to a trad anarchist > I've seen on this site >>What you are calling traditional anarchists were not "traditional" until 1938. When anarcho socialists found themselves implementing socialism in only possible form, in the form of a terrorist state, some recoiled, and some redefined anarchy to mean rule by a terror state, rule unrestricted by law and based on force, reinterpreting their pre 1936 positions in the light of the new post 1938 position.<< "Anarcho-socialist","is redundant and unusual.Ive not come across it in wide reading of anarchist texts.Who are the 'some' you refer to? No one Ive heard of. Anarcho-statist is an oxymoron like anarcho-capitalist.There are people who call themselves anarcho-communists.I argue with them sometimes.There are a wide range of views within anarchism. Trad anarchist is what I would say those views at the center were at the time a snapshot was taken.Anarchist don't "implement"anarchism,anarchism grows organically and exponentially or lays low while marxists and nazi's rampage. If you hate authoritarian and national socialism,I agree.You go over the top mixing libertarian socialism in with them. >>>.The anarcho-capitalists here are fakes,phonies and > frauds that are running but they cant hide,I can see the > whites of their eyes.Calling ted turner socialist is not > peculiar!? Ted Turner calls himself socialist. His network used to emit commie propaganda with great regularity, though since Fox news started in competition, they have laid off the commie propaganda. CNN used to emit commie propaganda,did they? Fascinating! I rest my case at this point.Tailgunner Jamesd has the last word.

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Re: Pay per use remailers and remailer reliability tracking.
by Tim May 23 Dec '01

23 Dec '01

On Wednesday, December 19, 2001, at 04:51 PM, Len Sassaman wrote: > Dear Cypherpunks and other unsavory characters, > > I was recapping for some other remops a conversation that Tim sparked at > the last cypherpunks meeting regarding pay-per-use remailers, and I had > some additional thoughts. I'm not an expert on digital cash, so please > pardon me if I make any obvious errors. I welcome criticism of these > ideas > and explanations as to why they won't work as well as tips for > improvement. > > I've been thinking about how to create pay-per-use remailers for some > time. The reasons for needing a remailer payment system are obvious: > aside > from handling spamming and flooding, it would encourage more people to > run > remailers. If a remailer operator can expect to make money off of a > remailer, or at least recoup his losses, he's more likely to do so. > (Discussion of how liability changes when money is involved is for a > different time.) Indeed, we can talk about how money affects liability another time. (But I will add that many people here and on the Net have a wrong-headed notion that "if you don't charge money, you are protected." This doesn't work with software piracy cases, this doesn't work with trespassing in physical or cyberspaces, and so on. "Not charging money" is not the cloak of protection some seem to think it is.) > "Digital cash" in the traditional sense isn't necessary for a > pay-per-use > remailer system. Like MojoNation, I am going to refer to the digital > cash > coins as something that has no monetary value in the traditional sense. > Tim pointed out at the last meeting that what we think of as "money" has > no inherent value. If you think of the remailer digital cash coins as > tokens with a very specific purpose, a lot of the objections to using > digital cash disappear. Yes, coupons or tokens (like subway tokens, like casino chips, though these are not the same thing) can be used in ways that don't require "true digital money" (say what? I will argue later that "true digital money" is a misleading meme). Even Magic Money (circa 1993, Pr0duct Cypher) or Tacky Tokens (approx. ditto) would be an interesting experiment. Even tokens _specific_ to the remailer! ("Use of this remailer costs 1 Melon"). Mixing tokens as a crude way to anonymize is possible. > Additionally, I am assuming that there would be a suitable digital cash > algorithm that could be used for these purposes. I am aware that there > are > algorithms similar to Chaum's in existence, but my level of knowledge > isn't sufficient to know if they would work for these purposes. In any > event, the Chaum patents expire soon enough. In this scheme, while the > anonymity of the token buyer is essential, neither the bank nor the > seller > will have their anonymity protected. Yes, Chaum happens to be sort of right in this particular case: the identity of the remailer is assumed to be traceable (because remailers usually operate openly), hence only buyer-untraceability is required, hence Chaum Version 2 ecash is OK. Anonymous remailers are possible, using broadcast or "message pool" models. For example, sending a message to alt.anonymous.messages and having remailers scan the pool for messages they can decrypt. This then requires seller-anonymity as well. Solvable. Agnostic digital cash (a la Barnes) could be deployed for remailers without an extensive "digital cash infrastructure" involving banks. One of the reasons I wanted to have a CP meeting focused on implementing Chaum protocols without the niceties of licensing from Chaum (or the Canadians who now own the patents) was to do this. Alas, our meeting went off into other directions....some of you were at that meeting last summer. > > The system would work as follows, from the point of view of the user: > > The user would purchase remailer tokens (digital cash) from a token > vendor > (the bank). This is an exchange similar to car wash tokens or > TicketMaster[tm], where the seller receives "real cash" and the buyer > receives a tangible promise of a future service. The tokens could be > purchased online using PayPal, credit cards, etc. (Yes, this means the > number of paying remailer customers must be large enough to constitute a > crowd.) > > The user than fires up his remailer client, and each remailer has > pricing > and token service information associated with its key and reliability > stats. (In this system, multiple token vendors could exist, and > remailers > could be their own vendors. For simplicity's sake, I am going to assume > that all remailers in this user's client accept the same ticket vendor's > tokens.) > > Each remailer sets a price (i.e., number of tokens) for its use. > Remailers > could even charge a different amount depending on where in the chain it > fell, with exit hop services costing more than beginning/middle chain > positions. The user would select his chain based on the reliability > stats > and the pricing information for each remailer. The client would tally > the > cost, and when the user approved, it would remove tokens from the user's > "purse" and attach them to the outgoing message, interwoven in the > various > layers of encryption in the message. Yes, this is how markets for remailing services would likely develop. All of the usual stuff about price discovery, competition, discounts, advertising, etc. > Now, from the remailer's point of view: > > A message is received, and the encryption stripped off. Inside is a > remailer token, which the remailer redeems with the token vendor after > ensuring that the token covered the price of the message (accumulating a > balance in his account, which can then be exchanged for cash by the > remop.) The message is then delivered to the next hop, and so forth. > > > I came up with this idea after an interesting conversation with Bram > Cohen > one night, and then after researching it realized that others had said > basically the same thing. I'm interested in hearing problems with the > above proposal, but for now I am going to assume it is sound. I have a > further enhancement to this system that I just now realized might be > possible, and this is what I'm really interested in discussing. I am painfully aware of the negative effects of saying "That's an old idea." But, of course, it is. No big deal, as it's all the way a paid remailer system would almost certainly have to operate. (Multiply-nested, with tokens obviously also nested...has to be this way.) This is how we modeled paid remailers at the very first physical meeting, in fact. (We used envelopes within envelopes to model nested, chained encryption/remailing, and we used Monopoly money to model payments at each stage. The simulated remailer operators even advertised discount prices...) > If a system as I have described above were to be implemented, we could > solve this problem (as well as the inevitable problems of remailers > cheating and collecting payment without delivering mail, and the problem > of double-spending) without having to reveal any useful information to > an > attacker who doesn't already have ability to observe the entire mix > network. > > If the remailer client were to keep track of which tokens were paid to > which remailer, the user could determine where in a chain message > delivery > failed, or if the message exited the last hop (not exactly the same as > if > it was delivered, but close. The last remailer could cheat, or the > recipient's mail server could fail. There's ways to improve this, > though.) This sounds likes a good line of thinking. > > After the remailer redeems the token with the token vendor, the token > vendor publishes the token. No one but the user and the remailer know > which message a given token was linked to, so information leakage is > minimized. The user can query the token vendor for the most recent token > redemptions, and will be able to determine where his message either is > currently waiting in the chain, or where it died. > > (This isn't exact either. Failure, in this case, is pinpointed at the > link > between two remailers, rather than at a given remailer. If a user > queried > the bank and discovered that, out of a 5 remailer chain, remailers A, B, > and C redeemed the tokens but D did not, this either means C is > cheating, > C is broken on sending, or D is broken on receiving. Further tests would > be necessary to determine the exact nature of the failure.) > > Does anyone have any thoughts on this? Reasons why the payment system > would not work? Reasons why the verification system would not work? > Improvements to either system? Thoughts on the specifics of the digital > cash algorithms needed? I wish you the best of luck and encourage others to help. We old-timers are accused of saying "That's been thought of before." Only because the outlines of these things unfolded pretty quickly (see the 1992-93 list traffic, for example). But true progress has historically come when someone pushed the implementation, as with the earliest remailers themselves, and later remailer sytems like Mixmaster. A token-based remailer system, while an "obvious" system, would be a major accomplishment. --Tim May "As my father told me long ago, the objective is not to convince someone with your arguments but to provide the arguments with which he later convinces himself." -- David Friedman

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FFRDCs was: Start Ups, Crypto Companies, and Commercialization
by Faustine 23 Dec '01

23 Dec '01

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 Tim wrote: >start up companies are not the place to do >basic R&D. That's the place for universities and for established >companies (with the companies either spinning-off divisions or selling >the products themselves or losing their staff who "steal" the work). You left out the FFRDCs... What Is an FFRDC? http://www.mitre.org/about/ffrdc.shtml A Federally Funded Research and Development Center (FFRDC) is a unique organization that assists the United States government with scientific research and analysis, systems development, and systems acquisition. FFRDCs bring together the expertise and outlook of government, industry, and academia to solve complex technical problems that cannot be solved by any one group alone. Working in the public interest, FFRDCs operate as strategic partners with their sponsoring government agencies. In order to ensure the highest levels of objectivity and technical excellence, FFRDCs are organized as independent, not - -for-profit entities , with limitations and restrictions on their activities. This special standing permits a degree of access and a long-term perspective not shared by commercial contractors. Since FFRDCs are prohibited from manufacturing products or competing with industry, commercial companies can divulge sensitive information with the confidence that it will not be misused. This enables FFRDCs to provide guidance across the full spectrum of capabilities development, from planning and concept design to technology insertion and integration, in a way that gives their government clients maximum flexibility for meeting future requirements. First established during World War II, FFRDCs currently number more than 40 different organizations, and work in the fields of defense, energy, aviation, space, health and human services, and tax administration. All FFRDCs are sponsored by government agencies, but they are privately administered by universities and other not-for-profit organizations. *** Master List of FFRDCs, 2001 - --------------------------- Department of Defense Office of the Secretary of Defense [1] Administered by universities and colleges [2]: Software Engineering Institute [3]: (Carnegie Mellon University), Pittsburgh, PA Administered by other nonprofit institutions [4]: Institute for Defense Analyses Studies and Analyses Federally Funded Research and Development Center (Institute for Defense Analyses), Alexandria, VA National Defense Research Institute (RAND Corp. [5]), Santa Monica, CA C3I Federally Funded Research & Development Center (MITRE Corp. [6]), Bedford, MA and McLean, VA National Security Agency Administered by other nonprofit institutions [4]: Institute for Defense Analyses Communications and Computing Federally Funded Research and Development Center [7] (Institute for Defense Analyses), Alexandria, VA Department of the Navy Administered by other nonprofit institutions [4]: Center for Naval Analyses (The CNA Corporation), Alexandria, VA Department of the Air Force Administered by universities and colleges [2]: Lincoln Laboratory (Massachusetts Institute of Technology), Lexington, MA Administered by other nonprofit institutions [4]: Aerospace Federally Funded Research and Development Center (The Aerospace Corporation), El Segundo, CA Project Air Force (RAND Corp. [5]), Santa Monica, CA Department of the Army Administered by other nonprofit institutions [4]: Arroyo Center (RAND Corp. [5]), Santa Monica, CA - -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Department of Energy [8] Administered by industrial firms: Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory (Bechtel BWXT Idaho, LLC), Idaho Falls, ID Sandia National Laboratories (Sandia Corporation which is a subsidiary of Lockheed Martin Corp.), Albuquerque, NM Savannah River Technology Center (Westinghouse Savannah River Co.), Aiken, SC Administered by universities and colleges [2]: Ames Laboratory (Iowa State University of Science and Technology), Ames, IA Argonne National Laboratory (University of Chicago), Argonne, IL Ernest Orlando Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory (University of California), Berkeley, CA Fermi National Accelerator Laboratory (Universities Research Association, Inc.), Batavia, IL Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (University of California), Livermore, CA Los Alamos National Laboratory (University of California), Los Alamos, NM Princeton Plasma Physics Laboratory (Princeton University), Princeton, NJ Stanford Linear Accelerator Center (Leland Stanford, Jr., University), Stanford, CA Thomas Jefferson National Accelerator Facility [9] (Southeastern Universities Research Association, Inc.), Newport News, VA Administered by other nonprofit institutions [4]: Brookhaven National Laboratory [10] (Brookhaven Science Associates, Inc.), Upton, Long Island, NY National Renewable Energy Laboratory [11] (Midwest Research Institute), Golden, CO Oak Ridge National Laboratory [12] (UT-Battelle, LLC), Oak Ridge, TN Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (Battelle Memorial Institute), Richland, WA - -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Department of Health and Human Services National Institutes of Health Administered by industrial firms: National Cancer Institute at Frederick[13] (Science Applications International Corp.; Charles River Laboratories, Inc.; Data Management Services, Inc.), Frederick, MD - -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- National Aeronautics and Space Administration Administered by universities and colleges [2]: Jet Propulsion Laboratory (California Institute of Technology), Pasadena, CA - -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- National Science Foundation Administered by universities and colleges [2]: National Astronomy and Ionosphere Center (Cornell University), Arecibo, PR National Center for Atmospheric Research (University Corporation for Atmospheric Research), Boulder, CO National Optical Astronomy Observatories [14] (Association of Universities for Research in Astronomy, Inc.), Tucson, AZ National Radio Astronomy Observatory (Associated Universities, Inc.), Green Bank, WV Administered by other nonprofit institutions [4]: The Science and Technology Policy Institute [15]: (RAND Corp. [5]), Washington, D.C. - -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Nuclear Regulatory Commission Administered by other nonprofit institutions [4]: Center for Nuclear Waste Regulatory Analyses (Southwest Research Institute), San Antonio, TX - -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Department of Transportation Federal Aviation Administration Administered by other nonprofit institutions [4]: Center for Advanced Aviation System Development (MITRE Corp. [6]), McLean, VA - -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Department of Treasury Internal Revenue Service Administered by other nonprofit institutions [4]: Internal Revenue Service (IRS) Federally Funded Research and Development Center (MITRE Corp. [6]), McLean, VA *** He that would make his own liberty secure must guard even his enemy from oppression; for if he violates this duty he establishes a precedent that will reach to himself. - --Thomas Paine -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: PGPsdk version 1.7.1 (C) 1997-1999 Network Associates, Inc. and its affiliated companies. (Diffie-Helman/DSS-only version) iQA/AwUBPCZOMfg5Tuca7bfvEQK0tgCgli9LDd+/x1ZkqAxEQ59wcDZaz4wAn0SL t6DvbcJMlkAtsQE3gFX5hTDK =wXR7 -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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C4 commercial web page
by Khoder bin Hakkin 23 Dec '01

23 Dec '01

http://www.ribbands.co.uk/prdpages/C4.htm -nice pix of a guy pulling C4 taffy A high quality, very high velocity military plastic explosive. Our C4 is supplied in bulk drums, in a slightly powdery form. Upon manipulation the material immediately consolidates into a rubbery fully plasticised mass which may be kneaded and pressed into any shape. The material has excellent mechanical and adhesive properties, and may be stretched into long strands without breakage. In its original powdery form the explosive may be poured into charge containers, then pressed into intimate contact with the liner. Substantial price discounts are available on full shipping containers (16 tonnes plus). Please enquire. UN No. 0084 - HazCat 1.1D Packaging: 25kg bulk drums Trade price: #15/kg ex-works UK Stock level: Small stock held. Large quantities (500kg plus) available to order, delivery approximately 90 days. Control Status: Very strictly controlled. Explosives authorisation and End User Certificate required MilSpec: MIL-C-45010A UK HSE Serial number: 32-A-68450 RDX content: 91 1 1% Polyisobutylene plasticiser: 9 1 1% Moisture: 0.1% max Velocity of Detonation: 8092 1 26 m/s Density: 1.63 g/cm3 Colour: Nominally white TNT equivalence: 118% Chemical marking for detection: Marked Shelf life: At least 10 years under good conditions

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FY;) [Pigdog] I've changed my mind, the 2nd amendment rocks (fwd)
by Eugene Leitl 23 Dec '01

23 Dec '01

---------- Forwarded message ---------- Date: Sun, 23 Dec 2001 12:42:51 -0800 (PST) From: Donkey Hotey <pigdonkey(a)donkeyshow.org> Reply-To: pigdog-l(a)bearfountain.com To: pigdog-l(a)bearfountain.com Subject: [Pigdog] I've changed my mind, the 2nd amendment rocks So yesterday for my girlfriend's birthday 10 of us went to the Jackson Arms Shooting Range ( http://www.jacksonarms.com ) in Millbrae to shoot some guns. I was a little scared about going, guns being EVIL and WRONG and very Un-Berkeley (unless they're melted down into a statue provoting nonviolence), but it was her 30th birthday, and she could do whatever the hell she pleases. We signed up for the novice package, which I must say is a pretty damn good deal. A retired cop gives you a 30 minute lecture on gun safety, how guns work, how to grip them, how to aim them and all that good stuff. He used a Ruger MkII .22 pistol for the demonstration. It was a little disturbing, because I was sitting in the front of the class, and everytime he needed to show one side of the gun or the other, he would point it up and around in this big dramatic motion. The intent was so that the gun never faced anybody, but it was still a little scarey. After the lecture and a little video that showed the semi-automatic pistol reloading, we got to go to the range. Everybody got a Ruger .22 and 100 bullets for target practice, but we were also allowed to upgrade our pistols later. We had the lane for two hours. I was a tad bit scared when I picked up the gun, but not much as I would have been if I hadn't had the course. All my shots were consistently at 7 o'clock on the target (which was only 7 yards away). I was sticking my trigger finger too far into the trigger, so I was pulling it down and to the left (I'm left handed). The 3 women who were there were all DROP DEAD ACCURATE though. I mean right in the center of the target every single time. So we started upgrading our guns. I tried a 9mm (don't know what kind) which I thought was as little jumpy and harsh, a Smith & Wesson revolver (a .38 which is a .357 which is a .356 or some such nonsense) which was FUCKING AWESOME, and a .44 which made really big wholes. I have to say I liked the revolver the most. Once I shot the other weapons, I went back to the .22 and was a hell of a lot more accurate. The thing seemed like a weak little toy gun. It might as well be shooting suction darts. They have a whole bunch of targets that you can choose from.... my favorite was the hostage page. It had some unabomber looking guy with a gun pointed at a woman. I blasted the woman right between the eyes. While we were there, a reporter from K101 who was doing a story on women and guns interviewed us. I guess she's a regular and when she learned a woman was celebrating her 30th birthday by learning how to shoot, she had to be there. The woman kept asking Mary about safety and protection and Mary said "oh, no, I just wanted to shoot stuff." I guess we weren't what she was looking for. Mary will get a copy of the story in the mail, so we'll see her take later. Wow I really didn't think I'd enjoy shooting guns. Now I need to join a militia right away. The teacher at one point did mention the 2nd amendment. He said "although the 2nd amendment guarantees us the right to bear arms, we do not believe guns are for everybody." So that was wholesome and refreshing. When the revolution comes I won't shoot him. Actually I think I'll stay away from him, after I saw what he could do rapidfire. Also he would like the world to know that Danny Glover doesn't know how to handle a firearm. yikes! guns are cool! What's a hippyuppymus to do?!?! -- "go ahead, make my day. BLAM BLAM BLAM BLAM BLAM BLAM" -- Ben Franklin

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AIT Abuse Complaint
by null＠aitcom.net 23 Dec '01

23 Dec '01

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Slashdot | Ford vs. 2600 Judge Upholds Right To Link
by Jim Choate 23 Dec '01

23 Dec '01

http://slashdot.org/yro/01/12/23/1342231.shtml -- -- ____________________________________________________________________ Day by day the Penguins are making me lose my mind. Bumper Sticker The Armadillo Group ,::////;::-. James Choate Austin, Tx /:'///// ``::>/|/ ravage(a)ssz.com www.ssz.com .', |||| `/( e\ 512-451-7087 -====~~mm-'`-```-mm --'- --------------------------------------------------------------------

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[>Htech] A gift for language (fwd)
by Eugene Leitl 23 Dec '01

23 Dec '01

-- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> ______________________________________________________________ ICBMTO: N48 04'14.8'' E11 36'41.2'' http://www.leitl.org 57F9CFD3: ED90 0433 EB74 E4A9 537F CFF5 86E7 629B 57F9 CFD3 ---------- Forwarded message ---------- Date: Sun, 23 Dec 2001 00:11:10 -0500 From: Brian Atkins <brian(a)posthuman.com> Reply-To: transhumantech(a)yahoogroups.com To: "transhumantech(a)yahoogroups.com" <transhumantech(a)yahoogroups.com> Subject: [>Htech] A gift for language You can use winzip to determine what language or even what author a small piece of text is from: http://pil.phys.uniroma1.it/~loreto/press.html (I got this from new scientist dead tree, but this .ps file is all I can find quickly) -- Brian Atkins Singularity Institute for Artificial Intelligence http://www.singinst.org/ ------------------------ Yahoo! Groups Sponsor ---------------------~--> Access Your PC from Anywhere - Full setup in 2 minutes - Free Download http://us.click.yahoo.com/1GUySC/E6eDAA/ySSFAA/PMYolB/TM ---------------------------------------------------------------------~-> -----BEGIN TRANSHUMANTECH SIGNATURE----- Post message: transhumantech(a)yahoogroups.com Subscribe: transhumantech-subscribe(a)yahoogroups.com Unsubscribe: transhumantech-unsubscribe(a)yahoogroups.com List owner: transhumantech-owner(a)yahoogroups.com List home: http://www.yahoogroups.com/group/transhumantech/ -----END TRANSHUMANTECH SIGNATURE----- Your use of Yahoo! Groups is subject to http://docs.yahoo.com/info/terms/

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Re: More on remailers
by Ryan Lackey 23 Dec '01

23 Dec '01

> What do you mean, "no client software"? How do you propose to get > secure anonymous mail without client software? I'm arguing that with less anonymity than the current mixmaster network, but with greater ease of use, you could have superior experiences. Specifically using standard MUAs, like MS Outlook, which include SMTP-TLS and IMAP-SSL; operate as a normal user, with the normal MS-default MUA, connecting to a remotely maintained mailserver which filters attachments, keeps no logs, and is optionally implemented in tamper-resistant hardware with published code. Located in a jurisdiction and a network environment where, provided an AUP is complied with, subpoenas or denial of service are at least as unlikely as shutdown of the aggregate of most major mixmaster remailer nodes today. "Click here for an offshore anonymous mailbox" is a lot easier than reading even a simple description of mixmaster remailer theory. Sheep use it in unencrypted-message, unencrypted-mailbox, pseudonymous, linkable, communicate-via-SSL, download-on-message-receipt mode. Wolves can operate in a way which is indistinguishable to casual observation, but with encrypted message contents, and possibly with redirection via reply-blocks through remailers, or remailed to an address through the remailer network normally, or encrypted and deposited to a web server which also contains mailing list archives in SSL, or to a usenet group with wide distribution. I want something *I* would use, ultimately. I both trust myself not to violate my own privacy, and am lazy on a day to day basis. > 2-way communications Oh, certainly group-mediated communication is interesting -- and the Beale Screamer incident was one of the few highly worthwhile uses of remailers I've seen since running one. I'm concerned that if remailers have only a bad rep, it will be easier to criminalize their operation, and they will be persecuted more by network administrators (rather than operated, or at least benignly ignored) IRC servers are already prohibited on various colo/leased circuits, even though they're legal, due to technical and social issues.. Same with spam. Users won't be drawn to use technology which has a reputation of being used primarily for harrassment; if sending an anonymous message to someone is more likely to have it ignored or otherwise not taken seriously than sending a non-anonymous message. Already (from reading abuse(a)remailer.havenco.com) I've seen that a lot of abuse@network addresses refuse to act based on messages sent via anonymous remailers. If they were instead sent through a pseudonymous system with some accountability/linkability/cheap-way-to-do-reputation, or indistinguishable from non-remailer mail (by hosting domains and sending under that domain), or a 2-way system where the abuse desk could contact the user making a complaint and interact, they'd be taken more seriously. I'd like anonymous email to accomplish something more than just sending messages anonymously to one another as today; I'd like it to serve as an example of why cryptography, anonymization, and other techniques are things which should be widely supported. For that to happen, someone needs to be able to communicate why it should be used in a convincing way to reporters, show them how to use it, and then convince the mass-market that participating in some way is something they should be doing. "If you support freedom of speech, send anonymous email through mixmaster remailers" is less likely to work than "if you support freedom of speech, make sure your ISP supports "secure (ssl) mail" and click the "use SSL" option in your copy of MS Outlook. SSL for http has done a good thing by getting people to associate crypto and (financial) privacy and security; pushing SSL email could do the same thing for privacy. Recent hassle over 802.11b encryption, open networks, etc. is perhaps an inspiring sign -- once it became widely reported (due initially to pete shipley coming up with a cute name for something he was doing, I think), it became "the cool thing" to use encryption on your 802.11b network; the WEP break notwithstanding, people went from using no crypto to lame-but-better-than-nothing crypto in larger numbers per unit time than I've seen before. I don't really care about privacy for random stupid people as an end in itself, but I need the cover traffic. Rather than making people smarter, I'd rather make the crypto stupider, or at least easier to use poorly. (when ecash happens, this will be even more important, but luckily paying people anonymously and doing unobservable finance is a compelling end-user application, given a good ui) > [email vs. communicating anonymously] Oh, I certainly agree on this -- I'd love to see a great p2p system which protected privacy while moving *large* files (upper bound, say 1GB DivX movies). Trading pr0n warez DivX is a compelling end-user app. Yet, for these, latency *is not* as serious a concern as human interaction. If I were designing the ultimate p2p system, I'd do: [note: this is a 6 paragraph digression from the topic at hand] * Small fast 2-way anonymous interactive network for sending control information...maybe the lower bound is being able to do 100bps constant-rate to the cloud of actual information, constantly send dummy traffic. * Searches which operate remotely, so you don't need to download index info from every server, just results * High-bandwidth, async, high-latency transport for sending files. Maybe multicast, using a multicast transport. I can do VSAT in US/EU for something like USD 3k/month to broadcast 34Mbps...you could broadcast a stream of random encrypted data and then distribute keys separately after the file is distributed widely. (it's called "Usenet", and there are a bunch of VSAT-based usenet delivery services, a friend of mine used to run one). Just auto-couriering stuff onto rooted servers and publishing the URL over the 2-way anonymous network is probably fine, if the end-user's anonymity is not required. * The ability to do something like say "I want all kiddie porn featuring anal penetration of older than 3 but younger than 6, wearing red t-shirts" and have these files appear over the next 6 months -- "subscribe" to a search, vs. doing a search repeatedly. (Ideally you'd request files in a way where you offer ecash for them...if I want a CD, I might be willing to pay enough to make it worthwhile for someone to purchase, encode, and upload it, then recursive auctions and all that...) (all of these concepts have been discussed or used in various p2p systems...I only mention them as a way to avoid the necessity for a low-latency, high-bandwidth, high-anonymity channel for every single user of a file sharing system) [end digression] I think "email", which I take to mean "15 second to 5 day latency, under 40KB, armored text unidirectional messaging with rfc822 headers prepended, no return receipts or delivery confirmation, best effort, store and forward, delivery-time-uncertain" is a pretty general technology. Unless you're concerned about reliable delivery and receipts, or substantially deviating from anonymous-mix-email's latency/bandwidth regime, I don't see much point in doing anything but email. MTAs don't suck that much these days -- postfix is a lot better at what it does, specifically, than any "cypherpunk" I've ever seen. Building a tolerable p2p system which used *just* mixmaster and rooted cablemodem-hosted boxes would be entirely possible, but pretty boring. Pipenet is very interesting; I'd certainly run few 10Mbps nodes for experimental value. But it would be hard to do cost-recovery on a pipenet except for small (control?) data, or multicast. Until the risks of being identified as an end-user in the warez game are increased to criminal, and the profusion of easily-routed throwaway servers dries up (hah), there won't be a way to charge enough to make it worthwhile for unicast media object transport. Realtime chat, though, would be a killer app for pipenet -- fairly multicast, low bitrate, 512Kbps DSL users could be first-class nodes, "legally compelling" (it's user to user human speech, so courts are less likely to be able to categorically hate on it enough to shut down nodes), lots of users (I'm sure you could get 100k users for the new cool kids IRC replacement, with end to end security, on the fly group creation, less key management/channel management issues than irc, group chat, good clients, ease of installation, etc. with no trouble, and maybe a few million users over time. Add some bots, which can migrate, and it starts to be really interesting.) I'd always assumed all nodes on a pipenet were first-class; if you're talking about a pipenet with leaves, then yeah, you'd want a constant-bitrate channel in. Raph was disliking gale's lack of anonymity; anonymous realtime human-human and group messaging is probably more reasonable than I thought at the time. The unimplemented but academically-interesting alternate mixes proposed would maybe be just as good as a pipenet; ideally you'd be deploying all of these in a framework which allowed different transports, but provided common keying, addressing, and external API. Maybe I've contradicted my earlier argument against interesting new p2p software -- I think for "bread and butter" secure *email* you might as well use a decent SSL mail server with optional ubobservable I/O instead of mixmaster, but for something closer to chat, the new stuff might be interesting. Mixmaster is in the middle ground between the two; it should go to one side of the road or the other. > [ecash needing something other than mail as transport] If you're doing an ecash system which has >8KB/message and more than, say, 5 exchanges per transaction, you're doing something wrong. And the aforementioned latency/anonymity slider is just as easy to shift on an SMTP based system as on any other protocol as transport. You need protocol-specific cryptographic receipts as part of the protocol anyway (which various values serve as), so really you could just use [encrypted-payload] UDP [multicast], but whatever. I think ecash will ultimately have many transports, but one of them should almost certainly be PGP-encrypted email which looks exactly like any other PGP-encrypted message, back and forth with an ecash server attached directly to a remailer, where every message fits within the remailer standard mail sizing. The pipenet/chatnet solution would probably be suitable for ecash protocol communications as well. -- Ryan Lackey [RL7618 RL5931-RIPE] ryan(a)havenco.com CTO and Co-founder, HavenCo Ltd. +44 7970 633 277 the free world just milliseconds away http://www.havenco.com/ OpenPGP 4096: B8B8 3D95 F940 9760 C64B DE90 07AD BE07 D2E0 301F

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Tim May in a box.
by mattd 23 Dec '01

23 Dec '01

Matts monetarism is an advance on Milton Friedmans;Everyone a mint means the govt no longer has to keep a tight fist on the money supply.Its supply of money is rapidly depleted as no taxes come in.All attempts to collect tax meeting stiff resistance ranging from civil and passive disobedience all the way up to the disappearance's of several highly placed IRS agents.I'm confident enough now to offer 100,000,000$ BUMs or US dollars for the head of GWB.While the remailer threads been interesting,the fact that one of the very first in would be Soprano waste management's APster for hitmen. Fascist celebrities,crypto-fascists,the entire oligarchy would be wiped out almost overnight.Where the hell are they going to fly to that's not online? Funny if they all wound up in Afghanistan.Might help the local economy recover.The mexican wave of crypto-anarchy will sweep all nations before it.When you see the lungs of America collapse and the life pass out of the last empire,who will stand against that power?Everyone with a computer is a remailer.Everyone can become a mint with the knowledge that reputations,financial especially,will be measured in negative terms such as AP nominations.Such is life. Cruel are the times when we are traitors and do not know ourselves;When we hold rumor from what we fear,yet know not what we fear, but float upon a wild and violent sea each way...and none. Macbeth.

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