November 2001 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: Antivirus software will ignore FBI spyware: solutions
by mmotyka＠lsil.com 27 Nov '01

27 Nov '01

Sunder <sunder(a)sunder.net> wrote : >Great and wonderful except: > >1. If such spyware has already been installed on your system you can't >trust your os therefore: >[snip] > Yes - end of story. >2. Any hard drive you can access so can they. "They" can patch your >disk: >[snip] > The only way I can think of to prevent this is to have the disk completely encrypted in which case you could safely give a copy to anyone who wanted one. The BIOS shouldn't be trusted either. The problem then is booting which could be done from some sort of card/dongle that you carry with you that requires a (many digit)PIN before it regurgitates your boot code. >3. Newer G3+ Mac's use open boot prom or some such which lives in >eeprom. Such things can be patched at that layer and can propagate on >bootup. Booting off a read only disk (CDROM, etc) wouldn't help in this >case. > Yup. Maybe a bootFLASH can be replaced with some SRAM which must be downloaded from your key device before booting. Something like : power up, hold processor in reset, remove boot SRAM from bus, load boot code, switch boot memory to system bus, allow startup. >4. If you live in a crowded area, your iPod can be lifted off you >in a false mugging, or break in, pick pocketting while you're at a >restaurant, movie, etc. > A physical device plus a PIN seems somewhat immune to that problem. In fact you could keep multiple copies. >5. Watching for files that change daily is a fool's task for the reasons >mentioned above, and the Sysiphean task it presents. Better get the >equivalent of Cops or Tripwire to do the work for you, but they too can be >tampered with. > Mostly. >6. If McAffee bent over to the Feds, you can be sure that so will the >makers of Zone Alarm and other firewalls. > Probably anything that is exported and some that aren't. >7. Remember, they don't need to capture all your keystrokes. Just the >ones you use as passphrases. And they don't need to copy your whole hard >drive, though they easily could when you're out of the house. Just your >secret key file and your passphrase. > >8. If you shut off your computer when you leave your house, it makes their >job that much easier. If you leave it on, they could note what's open and >put it back to the same spot. > Not if there is no code in the clear on the machine - no functional BIOS, no usable HDD. >9. If you use a login screen, etc, Or they could simply run something that >would take a snapshot of your desktop, shutdown your Mac, install the >malware/copy your files, then and boot off of a floppy that displays the >screen you left up, plus a Type 1 Bomb (MacOS equivalent of blue screen of >death), and eject the floppy thus - making it look like your Mac crashed, >or, simply go down to the basement and trip your circuit breakers making >it look like you've had a power failure (even UPS's run out at some >point.) > With the BIOS and HDD encrypted off is safe. Might be a neat little gizmo with a keypad. BIOS is encrypted on the motherboard. Boot memory is SRAM that is lost when power is removed ( lost short of extreme detection measures that is ). The little gizmo reads the encrypted BIOS, decrypts and transfers it to boot SRAM. >10. Ordered any new copies of a bit of software? Maybe they have a deal >with FedEx, UPS, the Mailman. Maybe what you're getting is the upgrade >and then some. How can you tell that copy of SmallTalk doesn't carry an >extra bit of code just for you? How can you tell that the latest patch to >MacOS you've just downloaded really came from Apple? Sure DNS said it was >from ftp.apple.com but how do you know that the router upstream from your >internet provider didn't route your packets via ftp.fbi.gov? > >Once they have physical access, you're fucked. Remote access is almost as >dangerous as them having physical access, however it can work in your >favor as they won't be as familiar with your environment, and thus are far >more likely to expose the malware to you. > >Sure, all of these things are more or less preventable, except for >physical access, and a lot of these come down to trust and reputation. >But reputation and trust are also rubber hose-able (if there is such a >word.) :) > >You can trust your best friend until you find out otherwise. You can >trust your bank until you find out otherwise. You can trust your software >provider until you find out otherwise. But by the time you've found out, >if you've found out at all, you've already been fucked. > Maybe just installing an OS you got as a binary is all it takes to be F'd. Maybe rebuilding that OS with an F'd compiler propagates the effedness. If you have everything encrypted until your key device readies it for boot then you could run a F'd BIOS, OS and apps as long as you kept the system isolated. Let it log all it wants. Sounds like a good sentence for a Windows box. Mike

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remove
by Lionel MOUCHABAC 27 Nov '01

27 Nov '01

remove -------------------------------------------------- Gestionnaire de messagerie WebMail / Magic OnLine. http://webmail.magic.fr

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Have a look at this!
by roijr＠ozemail.com.au 27 Nov '01

27 Nov '01

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Sempre em Boa Forma com o Rudolfo
by infomacao＠giganetstore.com 27 Nov '01

27 Nov '01

Para retirar o seu email desta mailing list deverá entrar no nosso site http:\\www.giganetstore.com <http://www.giganetstore.com/> , ir à edição do seu registo e retirar a opção de receber informação acerca das nossas promoções e novos serviços

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Denning's Geo-crypto
by John Young 27 Nov '01

27 Nov '01

Time Magazine, November 26, 2001: Denning's pioneering a new field she calls geo-encryption. Working with industry, Denning has developed a way to keep information undecipherable until it reaches its location, as determined by GPS satellites. Move studios, for example, have been afraid to release films digitally for the same reasons record companies hate Napster: once loose on the Internet, there's little to stop someone from posting the latest blockbuster DVD on the Web for all to see and download. With Denning's system, however, only subscribers in specified locations -- such as movie theaters -- would be able to unscramble the data. The technology works as well for national security as it does for Harry Potter. Coded messages that the State Department sends to its embassies, for example, could only be deciphered in the embassy buildings themselves, greatly reducing the risk of interception. For now, Denning says, terrorists "may want to bring down the power grid or the finance system, but it's still easier to blow up a building." If she's right, it's due in large part to her.

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Compelling small cap investment opportunity
by Multex Investor 26 Nov '01

26 Nov '01

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Declans testimony;Clone me!,
by mattd 26 Nov '01

26 Nov '01

Hey measals,you shouldnt be called as a witless now the drumhead courts have got the nod.Living in amerikkka getting you down? "Defenders of the US Constitution and the common law from which it grew are being classified on the same level as the bottom-feeding Skinheads, Nazis and the KKK. "

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Health bill endangers civil rights
by Khoder bin Hakkin 26 Nov '01

26 Nov '01

http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?file=/c/a/2001/11/25/MN232750.DTL Health bill endangers civil rights The administration wants all 50 states to adopt a law allowing public health authorities to take over hospitals, seize drug supplies, quarantine people exposed to infectious pathogens, draft doctors to treat them, force patients to be vaccinated, and order police to restrain residents from leaving contaminated areas. ... Civil rights protections, however, are exactly what opponents find lacking. The kind of public health emergency that would trigger extraordinary powers for health officers is defined so broadly that it could include AIDS, HIV infection or a severe flu epidemic, said Tanya Ehrmann, director of public policy at the activist group AIDS Action in Washington, D.C. Annas said that under the legislation, people could be detained without a court order and isolated in stadiums or clinics without an adequate process to challenge the decision. The proposed law would also shield health officers from liability, along with anyone working at their direction, for deaths or health damage suffered by quarantined bioterror victims, he said. Under the measure, "if you kill people or hurt them, that's tough," said Annas, one of 10 New England health law scholars urging Thompson to change the draft law. "The families can't sue, nobody can sue."

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SBC says appointing Gore-for-pres chief as president "signals the importance of governmental matters to our company's ability to grow revenues"
by Declan McCullagh 26 Nov '01

26 Nov '01

11/19. SBC named William Daley its new President. Daley will report directly to SBC's Chairman and CEO Edward Whitacre. SBC is the incumbent local exchange carrier in California, Nevada, Texas, Oklahoma, Kansas, Arkansas, Missouri, Illinois, Michigan, Ohio, Wisconsin, and Indiana. SBC also holds a majority equity interest in Cingular Wireless. Daley was former President Bill Clinton's Secretary of Commerce from January 1997 to June 2000. He resigned in June 2000 to become Chairman of former Vice President Al Gore's presidential campaign. Whitacre stated in a release that "His appointment as president of SBC signals the importance of governmental matters to our company's ability to grow revenues ..." release: http://www.sbc.com/News_Center/1,3950,31,00.html?query=20011119-1

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RE: Ridiculous Airline Security Story N+1 and N+2...
by Trei, Peter 26 Nov '01

26 Nov '01

Rohit (whom I know slightly) is too much a gentleman to suggest that he may be being hit due to racial profiling. Peter Trei > ---------- > From: R. A. Hettinga[SMTP:rah@shipwright.com] > Reply To: cypherpunks(a)einstein.ssz.com > Sent: Sunday, November 25, 2001 9:38 AM > To: cypherpunks(a)einstein.ssz.com; cryptography(a)wasabisystems.com; > dcsb(a)ai.mit.edu > Subject: Ridiculous Airline Security Story N+1 and N+2... > > > --- begin forwarded text > > > Status: U > Delivered-To: fork(a)xent.com > Date: Wed, 21 Nov 2001 22:44:04 -0800 > To: FoRK(a)xent.com > From: Rohit Khare <Rohit(a)KnowNow.com> > Subject: Ridiculous Airline Security Story N+1 and N+2... > Sender: fork-admin(a)xent.com > List-Id: Friends of Rohit Khare <fork.xent.com> > > Executive Summary: I am near my limit of anger with the "random", > "neutral" FAA passenger profiling algorithm. I have every reason to > believe some programmer has coded some strictures into it which would > truly offend American civil society if translated from mathematics > back into the ugly politics from whence it came. > > Soon after my last installment, I had to turn back around and fly out > of Denver. They made me X-ray my *shoes*... This time, the problem > was *too much* time on their hands. The second story is how I missed > the last flight back home on Thanksgiving eve because the security > supervisor wouldn't show up to process me at the gate in time. That > snowballed into a series of Catch-22 situations trying to find a lost > pair of glasses along the way. > > First, Denver. A tip on avoiding the Disneyland-like lines at the two > main X-ray posts -- even though, strictly speaking, that's an insult > to Disneyland, since even they've instituted a take-a-number pass > system for the most popular rides. > > Rather than take the train to one of the outlying concourses, ignore > the main signage and *walk* to Terminal A over a bridge on the > ticketing level. That's the X-ray post to Continental, British, etc. > Much less popular, even though many a savvy traveler knew that was > the way around United's silly carryon sizer templates (Contintental's > machines don't use them). Then take the train to wherever you really > need to get to. > > A co-worker and I arrived at DIA together, and I was able to purchase > a new ticket, and even with the foolishness of fellow business > travelers in stocking-feet waiting for their shoes back, I caught up > with him in the same train car... he spent the entire time in United > lines. > > Now, for the real outrage. > > Today, I was warned about massive Thanksgiving delays at Sea-Tac, so > I cut short a beer with a buddy in Bellevue to race back two and a > half hours in advance. I returned the car, picked up a boarding pass > from a pliant robot kiosk, and got through security in a wink. Two > hours in advance... no problem, right? > > Well, I was a selectee, presumably since it was a one-way ticket. So > I sat through yet another embarassing tearing-apart of my bags, and > this time they found a pocket screwdriver. A promotional pen-style > screwdriver that I've had for ten years (it's a NeXT repair shop :-) > > 1. They think you are not allowed to board with a three-inch, > 1/8-inch wide screwdriver. > > 2. You are not allowed to ask the aircrew to hold it for you on the > flight. > > 3. You are not allowed to leave the selectee table until a "GSC" > supervisor comes to look it over. > > At this point, there's twenty minutes left.... tick-tock... now, the > flight is almost completely boarded. You're still waiting. And now > you suddenly realize you've lost your $400 prescription sunglasses. > > 4. You keep all your metal -- everything -- in your jacket at all > times, so that you can x-ray a jacket rather than begin to empty out > pockets. Your sunglasses have fallen out at some checkpoint. > > At this point, you start tracing back your steps. It's 7 minutes or > so to push-back. > > 5. If you leave the selectee table, you will have to be searched all > over again when you return to the gate > > 6. They do not have walkie-talkies to ask security if your glasses > were stuck in the X-ray tunnel > > 7. See #3: You are not allowed to leave at all until the mythical GSC > arrives. > > Finally, a GSC arrives. Two minutes or so to departure, you haven't > been given any chance to run down and solve the mystery. > > 8. The screwdriver must be confiscated or bags must be checked. > > 9. Just because you have been flying with it all week means nothing. > "We're supposed to randomly change what the FAA is looking for every > day". Parse that, if you dare! > > 10. Any carry-on bag may be gate-checked *except* those containing > "forbidden carry-on items". Catch-22 #1. > > So now you're finally free to run back to the X-ray post and miss your > flight. > > 11. With about fifteen uniformed personnel of various stripes > (National Guard, Argenbright, Alaska, and United), none of the first > half-dozen people you ask claims to know about lost articles. > > 12. Before you can find a supervisor, the GSC has wandered back to > warn them you are carrying a screwdriver. > > 13. So at this point, instead of any sympathy for a harried traveler > asking for a supervisor, it's time for a lecture about "having > committed two federal crimes, bringing a forbidden item into a > screening area, lying about it to a ticket agent, two fines at > $11,000 each" -- which they take the pompous time to warn you adds up > to "a potential total fine of $22,000" since you're not paying enough > attention to the supercillious bastard who won't admit to knowing who > to ask about lost articles. > > Note that A) you are not allowed to leave your bags unaccompanied; > and B) the only way for a solo traveler to speak to a security > supervisor is to enter the screening area. Catch-22 #2. > > 14. Sufficiently alarmed, I am ordered to walk around, get back in > line, and wait to be escorted back to the *front* of the metal > detector to be handed my bags back. > > At this point, my interest is in going back to the Rental car desk > and asking if I left the glasses there. At no point has anyone > volunteered a back-up flight alternative for how I might every make > it back to Northern California tonight. > > Ultimately, when rebooking my ticket for a later flight to SFO, I > mention that I missed my flight because as a selectee, the personnel > needed to inspect me were not available in time. I get snapped at for > suggesting I was at all inconvenienced. And I'm marked as a selectee > again. > > And when I finally wade through security for the fourth time, the > same super is there to claim that the glasses must have been swept up > to Port of Seattle Lost and Found. But that he doesn't know what > their phone number is. > > 15. Seattle is the only airport in the world without white courtesy > telephones :-) > > But while looking for those phones, the wandering GSC comes back > around and huddles with the supervisor, staring at me. She's > obviously asking him how I could have come back in without having > checked my bag - and my dreaded screwdriver. Gingerly, they begin to > follow me back out of the screening area. I decide to placate their > fears that I got back through their infallible dragnet with > contraband. > > "Oh, I mailed it to myself, first-class air-mail!" > > ... > > Clever solutions aside, the outcome of this story is that a very > harried, very frequent traveling US citizen was at no point treated > like an innocent person anxious to solve a problem. Instead, every > contact is an opportunity to be treated like a suspect criminal. In > three hours, I was patted down four times, had my bags X-rayed twice, > hand-searched twice more, and went through metal detectors six times. > > The irony of it all is that the selectee program was created by the > FAA for those passengers who choose NOT to provide photo > identification as a matter of right. > > CAPPS, the Computer-Assisted Passenger Profiling System, deserves to > be sued out of existence. I'm almost ready to join the ACLU. These > so-called "confidential" criteria are not convincingly as neutral as > the cheery pink "You have been randomly selected"! flyers in your > ticket indicate. And the time-filling additional random searches by > the gate security supervisor were even more visibly biased towards > brown young men. Even one Army soldier on Thanksgiving leave. > > I am sick of being treated as guilty until proven innocent! > > Not least by such a patently fallible and placebo-driven security > system... The Feds will be *such* an improvement. -- not! > > Yours, > Rohit > > > http://xent.com/mailman/listinfo/fork > > --- end forwarded text > > > -- > ----------------- > R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah(a)ibuc.com> > The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/> > 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA > "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity, > [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to > experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire' >

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