October 2001 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: Books being banned on planes...
by Optimizzin Al-gorithm 18 Oct '01

18 Oct '01

At 03:09 PM 10/18/01 -0700, j eric townsend wrote: >How to get detained and miss your flight. >Bring the wrong book with you: > >http://www.citypaper.net/articles/101801/news.godfrey.shtml >Plus, Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) regulations >stipulate that any passenger who jokes about explosives be arrested on the spot. By >contrast, Godfrey was never charged or even accused of breaking the law. I But the security personnel joke all they want. I flew out of San Jose after they gotten national guardsmen. Going through security, a security dude looks at my bottle of water, opens it, sniffs it, and acts like he's just whiffed sarin. Then he smiles and puts it back in my bag. I'm thinking, what an asshole, if I did that I'd be screwed. And I'm lucky no nervous guardsman saw his stunt from across the room and didn't see the laugh while he was slinging his M-16 around.. Wonder what they'll think if I bring my copy of _Demolition: the art of demolishing dismantling imploding toppling & razing_ by H. Liss & the Loizeauxs. The cover is a four-picture series of a hotel falling, less cleanly than the WTC actually. (But it looks like it was brick.) Or maybe _Why buildings fall down_ which has a B-25 bomber flying into a skyscraper (ca. 1945). Don't need Hollywood for that idea.

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StreetMail (triangulate this)
by Incognito Innominatus 18 Oct '01

18 Oct '01

In the view of imminent remailer takeover/shutdown, here is a scheme that can piggyback on any entry/exit point and provide rather decent anonymity. Until I do exhaustive trademark research, let's call it StreetMail. It has nothing to do with crypto. It just exploits anonymity that (still) exists for people using public streets. Background: cheap residential 802.11b access points have significant outdoor range and cost around $200 (orinoco rg-1100; proxym skyline; apple airport ($300)). Orinoco seems to be the best choice because it provides ready ability to attach antenna. All these can be configured to allow access to anyone. Also, it can be specified which kind of traffic is allowed (say, only port 8000). By directing these access points to use in-house http proxy (like squid) that is configured to allow ONLY access to remailers and throwaway accounts (hotmail, yahoo,etc) all other use of public access is effectively prevented. If antenna is placed close to the window the range should be around 100-200 meters in the open. An interested party could drive in the range and pickup/send e-mail at will. Unlike with traditional remailers, where one must trust the operator, here the terrorist user controls anonymity herself. Who has seen you ? If you just walk by with a laptop who can ID you ? (use the radio card that has programmable MAC, like Orinoco gold.) Best of all, the operator is automagically exonerated, since she has no way of knowing who is connecting to the WLAN. Until operating WLANs becomes a crime, that is. The disadvantages are obvious - today's few active remailers are reachable from anywhere on the net. The proposed solution requires access point, server and always-on link (like DSL) and there should be one location per, say, half million inhabitants. The only difference between StreetMail this and those that chose to offer their DSL to the public (http://www.seattlewireless.net) is that StreetMail is far more restrictive, so you don't have to worry about your freaky neighbour serving gigs of Illegal Bits. Now, the above can be set up in about half hour. Further enhancements require access to AP development toolkits (or playing with unix drivers for radio cards instead): - limiting a single remote MAC to preset time and volume (like once every 6 hrs and no more than 100 kb per session (this also creates liability because logs will exist) - using internal remailer with random delay, so she can escape - bouncing traffic via radio links with nearby nodes. etc.

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Re: Stu Baker on CALEA and the Net
by keyser-soze＠hushmail.com 18 Oct '01

18 Oct '01

>At 03:48 PM 10/18/2001 -0700, Declan McCullagh <declan(a)well.com> wrote: >>"FBI requires ISPs to permit easy surveillance; EFF founder agrees" >http://www.politechbot.com/p-02671.html > >>"Stu Baker replies to Politech post on ISPs and EFF founder" >http://www.politechbot.com/p-02672.html > >>From: "Baker, Stewart" <SBaker(a)steptoe.com> To: "'declan(a)well.com'" <declan(a)well.com>, politech(a)politechbot.com cc: "Albertazzie, Sally" <SAlbertazzie(a)steptoe.com> Subject: RE: FBI requires ISPs to permit easy surveillance; EFF founder ag rees Date: Thu, 18 Oct 2001 14:52:52 -0400 Declan, I guess I ought to know what Mitch said and didn't say at this event. In fact, I took Mitch's remarks as an olive branch and an invitation to more civil discourse now that we have a keener sense of how much unites rather than divides us. He didn't say he was willing to abandon principle for expediency. He did say that he defines himself as many things, and civil liberties advocate is (just) one of them. He also said he is open to reconsidering his views in the aftermath of September 11. Well, who isn't? Only an ideologue would refuse to reconsider his views in the light of new data (or would accuse those who do of abandoning principles for expediency). But in fact, Mitch held up the civil! liberties end of the discussion with dignity and moderation, offering a determined argument against national id cards, for example. Stewart Baker > >Anyone who has given this subject much consideration knows that today's threats are not new and were already incorporated into informed views before September 11. No new threat has been identified, only fairly well known threats have been acted upon. No credible reasons for reconsideration of the balance of security vs. civil rights have been presented only propaganda. It is only the dereliction of our news media and government officials which has made the situation seem new to many citizens. Too bad military standards of justice aren't applied to all government employees. > >steve

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Books being banned on planes...
by j eric townsend 18 Oct '01

18 Oct '01

How to get detained and miss your flight. Twice. Bring the wrong book with you: http://www.citypaper.net/articles/101801/news.godfrey.shtml -- J. Eric Townsend -- http://www.spies.com/jet Were you in USASSG/ACSI/MACV in Vietnam, 1967-1970? Drop me a line if so...

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Re: Expert Warns Coded Pictures Indicate Al Qaeda Planning
by citizenQ 18 Oct '01

18 Oct '01

Are there any image processing brains out there who can duplicate the results on downf.jpg? Without the filter kernel and other specific techniques known it's impossible to replicate and verify what this guy says, and after the Bert thingie he does to his credibility, well, you know, Trust but Verify. Messing around with the original using my graphics software's built-in filters I don't get anything that looks anything like the results on bringmenews.com. To me it looks doctored.

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Re: Stu Baker on CALEA and the Net
by mikecabot＠fastcircle.com 18 Oct '01

18 Oct '01

I've searched for other references to this and haven't found any... I work at a very large ISP and because of my job function, I would need to (a) know about such an order; (b) supervise its implementation; and (c) actively monitor compliance with it. And I can tell you that we've received no such order or even had a sniff that one was coming down (and yes, we do get served by various LEAs to disclose account details and account contents -- but they have always been specific court orders in the past; and no, no one has shown up with a Carnivore box under the arm asking us if they could plug it into the nearest router port). In addition to the blanket statement that Baker makes, there's also the suspicion that he doesn't really understand the subject.... what does he mean by "CALEA compliance"? Does he mean archiving packet data (if so, the notion is ludicrous)? Does he mean archiving just email POP3 contents? Does he mean archiving web/ftp space? What about colo boxes? CALEA as it applies to voice networks (packet switched or not -- most voice networks are packet switched already, just not necessarily IP packets) is really an expression of two specific things: a) transaction logging detail (Acme calls Beta on a specific date and time and for a specific duration) and b) the ability to easily and quickly get copies of the packet stream (the voice conversations and any data associated with them or in them) to a centralized distribution at which such data is made available to the LEAs. But this is a different thing entirely from data IP packet networks. So is this guy (Stu Baker) just blowing smoke? Mike > Original Message from Thu, 18 Oct 2001 15:48:03 -0700:> > "FBI requires ISPs to permit easy surveillance; EFF founder agrees" > http://www.politechbot.com/p-02671.html > > "Stu Baker replies to Politech post on ISPs and EFF founder" > http://www.politechbot.com/p-02672.html > > > > _______________________________________________________________________________ WANT YOUR OWN FREE AND SECURE WEB EMAIL ADDRESS? Visit http://www.fastcircle.com

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[EMED-L] CDC Update on Anthrax Investigation & Tx Recs (fwd)
by measl＠mfn.org 18 Oct '01

18 Oct '01

It is interesting to note that nasal swab appears to be a CDC standard tool, yet they are recommending *against* this basic diagnostic technique for John and Jane Doe physician... -- Yours, J.A. Terranson sysadmin(a)mfn.org ---------- Forwarded message ---------- Date: Thu, 18 Oct 2001 16:31:49 EDT From: Rachel Steinhart <RACHELS123(a)AOL.COM> Reply-To: EMED-L -- a list for emergency medicine practitioners. <EMED-L(a)ITSSRV1.UCSF.EDU> To: EMED-L(a)ITSSRV1.UCSF.EDU Subject: [EMED-L] CDC Update on Anthrax Investigation & Tx Recs October 19, 2001 ASCII text edition of the Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report is enclosed. View this week's MMWR as a web page at: http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr and http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/PDF/wk/mm5041.pdf Update: Investigation of Anthrax Associated with Intentional Exposure and Interim Public Health Guidelines, October 2001 On October 4, 2001, CDC and state and local public health authorities reported a case of inhalational anthrax in Florida (1). Additional cases of anthrax subsequently have been reported from Florida and New York City. This report updates the findings of these case investigations, which indicate that infections were caused by the intentional release of Bacillus anthracis. This report also includes interim guidelines for postexposure prophylaxis for prevention of inhalational anthraxand other information to assist epidemiologists, clinicians, and laboratorians responding to intentional anthrax exposures. For these investigations, a confirmed case of anthrax was defined as 1) a clinically compatible case of cutaneous, inhalational, or gastrointestinal illness* that is laboratory confirmed by isolation of B. anthracis from an affected tissue or site or 2) other laboratory evidence of B. anthracis infection based on at least two supportive laboratory tests. A suspected case was defined as 1) a clinically compatible case of illness without isolation of B. anthracis and no alternative diagnosis, but with laboratory evidence of B. anthracis by one supportive laboratory test or 2) a clinically compatible case of anthrax epidemiologically linked to a confirmed environmental exposure, but without corroborative laboratory evidence of B. anthracis infection. Laboratory criteria for diagnosis of anthrax consist of 1) isolation and confirmation of B. anthracis from a clinical specimen collected from an affected tissue or site or 2) other supportive laboratory tests, including (a) evidence of B. anthracis DNA by polymerase chain reaction (PCR) from specimens collected from an affected tissue or site, (b) demonstration of B. anthracis in a clinical specimen by immunohistochemical staining, or (c) other laboratory tests (e.g., serology) that may become validated by laboratory confirmation. Florida On October 2, the Palm Beach County Health Department (PBCHD) and the Florida Department of Health (FDOH) were notified of a possible anthrax case in Palm Beach County. The suspected case was identified when a gram stain of cerebrospinal fluid (CSF) revealed a gram-positive bacilli. An epidemiologic investigation was initiated by FDOH, PBCHD, and the FDOH state laboratory. The state laboratory and CDC confirmed B. anthracis from a culture of CSF on October 4. Later the same day, FDOH and CDC epidemiologists and laboratory workers arrived in Palm Beach County to assist PBCHD with the investigation. As of October 16, two confirmed cases of inhalational anthrax have been identified. The index patient was a 63-year-old male resident of Palm Beach County who sought medical care at a local hospital on October 2 with fever and altered mental status. Despite antibiotic therapy, his clinical condition deteriorated rapidly, and he died on October 5. An autopsy performed on October 6 confirmed the cause of death as inhalational anthrax. An investigation revealed no obvious exposures to B. anthracis. On October 1, the second patient, a 73-year-old co-worker of the index patient, was admitted to a local hospital for pneumonia. On October 5, a nasal swab was obtained from the patient that yielded a positive culture for B. anthracis. Subsequent testing revealed positive PCR tests for B. anthracis in hemorrhagic pleural fluid and reactive serologic tests. The patient remains hospitalized on antibiotic therapy. Enhanced case finding and retrospective and prospective surveillance systems were initiated in Palm Beach, and surrounding counties. Environmental assessments and sampling were performed at the index patient's home, work site, and travel destinations for the 60 days preceding symptom onset. Environmental sampling revealed B. anthracis contamination of the work site, specifically implicating mail or package delivery. Environmental samples of other locations the patient visited, including extensive sampling of his home, were negative. Questionnaires were administered to employees at the index patient's work site. Postexposure prophylaxis was administered, and nasal swabs were obtained from those with exposure to the work site for >1 hour since August 1. Of 1,075 nasal swabs performed, one was positive for B. anthracis. Environmental and co-worker testing indicated contamination of specific locations at the work site. The investigation and environmental sampling are ongoing. New York On October 9, the New York City Department of Health notified CDC of a person with a skin lesion consistent with cutaneous anthrax. CDC sent a team to New York City to provide epidemiologic and laboratory support to local health officials. As of October 16, two persons with confirmed cases of cutaneous anthrax have been identified. One person with confirmed anthrax was a 38-year-old woman who had handled a suspicious letter postmarked September 18 at her workplace. The letter contained a powder that subsequently was confirmed to contain B. anthracis. On September 25, the patient had a raised lesion on the chest, which over the next 3 days developed surrounding erythema and edema. By September 29, the patient developed malaise and headache. On October 1, a clinician examined the patient and described an approximately 5 cm long oval-shaped lesion with a raised border, small satellite vesicles, and profound edema. The lesion was nonpainful and was associated with left cervical lymphadenopathy. Serous fluid from the lesion was obtained and was negative by gram stain and culture. The patient was prescribed oral ciprofloxacin. Over the next several days, the lesion developed a black eschar, and a biopsy was obtained and sent to CDC for testing. The tissue was positive by immunohistochemical staining for the cell wall antigen of B. anthracis. The other person with confirmed cutaneous anthrax was a 7-month-old infant who visited his mother's workplace on September 28. The next day, the infant had an apparently nontender, massively edematous, weeping skin lesion on his left arm; he was treated with intravenous antibiotics. Over the next several days, the lesion became ulcerative and developed a black eschar; clinicians presumptively attributed the lesion to a spider bite. The infant's clinical course was complicated by hemolytic anemia and thrombocytopenia, requiring intensive care. The diagnosis of cutaneous anthrax was first considered on October 12 after the announcement of the other confirmed anthrax case in New York City. A serum specimen collected on October 2 was positive for B. anthracis by PCR testing at CDC; a skin biopsy obtained on October 13 was positive by immunohistochemical staining at CDC for the cell wall antigen of B. anthracis. No suspicious letter with powder was identified at the mother's workplace. Both patients were treated with ciprofloxacin and are clinically improving. B. anthracis grew from swabs (two nasal and one facial skin swab) from three other persons, suggesting exposure to anthrax. One of the exposures was in a law enforcement officer who brought the letter containing B. anthracis from the index patient's workplace to the receiving laboratory. The other two exposures were in technicians who had processed the letter in the laboratory. Environmental sampling in both workplaces is ongoing and investigations of other exposed persons continue. Reported by: L Bush, MD, Atlantis; J Malecki, MD, Palm Beach County Health Dept, Palm Beach; S Wiersma, MD, State Epidemiologist, Florida Dept of Health. K Cahill, MD, R Fried, MD; M Grossman, MD, Columbia Presbyterian Medical Center; W Borkowsky, MD, New York Univ Medical Center, New York, New York; New York City Dept of Health. National Center for Infectious Diseases; and EIS officers, CDC. Editorial Note: The findings in this report indicate that four confirmed cases of anthrax have resulted from intentional delivery of B. anthracis spores through mailed letters or packages. These are the first confirmed cases of anthrax associated with intentional exposure in the United States and represent a new public health threat. Anthrax is an acute infectious disease caused by the sporeforming bacterium B. anthracis. It occurs most frequently as an epizootic or enzootic disease of herbivores (e.g., cattle, goats, or sheep) that acquire spores from direct contact with contaminated soil. Humans usually become infected through direct contact with B. anthracis spores from infected animals or their products (e.g., goat hair), resulting in cutaneous anthrax (2) (Box 1). Inhalational and gastrointestinal are other forms of the disease in the natural setting (4,5). Humantohuman transmission has not been documented. Clinical laboratorians should be alert to the presence of Bacillus species in patient specimens. In particular, laboratorians should suspect B. anthracis when the specimen is from a previously healthy patient with a rapidly progressive respiratory illness or a cutaneous ulcer. If B. anthracis is suspected, laboratories should immediately notify the health-care provider and local and state public health staff. For rapid identification of B. anthracis, state and local health departments should access the Laboratory Response Network for Bioterrorism (LRN). LRN links state and local public health laboratories with advanced capacity laboratories---including clinical, military, veterinary, agricultural, water, and food-testing laboratories. Laboratorians should contact their state public health laboratory to identify their local LRN representative. Postexposure prophylaxis is indicated to prevent inhalational anthrax after a confirmed or suspected aerosol exposure. When no information is available about the antimicrobial susceptibility of the implicated strain of B. anthracis, initial therapy with ciprofloxacin or doxycycline is recommended for adults and children (Table 1). Use of tetracyclines and fluoroquinolones in children has adverse effects. The risks for these adverse effects must be weighed carefully against the risk for developing life-threatening disease. As soon as penicillin susceptibility of the organism has been confirmed, prophylactic therapy for children should be changed to oral amoxicillin 80 mg/kg of body mass per day divided every 8 hours (not to exceed 500 mg three times daily). B. anthracis is not susceptible to cephalosporins or to trimethoprim/sulfamethoxazole, and these agents should not be used for prophylaxis. CDC is assisting other states and local areas in assessing anthrax exposures. Additional information about anthrax and the public health response is available at <http://www.bt.cdc.gov>. This information was current as of 4 p.m., eastern daylight time, October 17, 2001. References 1. CDC. Ongoing investigation of anthrax---Florida, October 2001. MMWR 2001;50:877. 2. CDC. Human anthrax associated with an epizootic among livestock---North Dakota, 2000. MMWR 2001;50:677--80. 3. Ashford DA, Rotz LD, Perkins BA. Use of anthrax vaccine in the United States: recommendations of the Advisory Committee on Immunization Practice (ACIP). MMWR 2000;49(no. RR-15). 4. Brachman PS. Inhalational anthrax. Ann NY Acad Sci 1980;353:83--93. 5. Brachman PS, Kaufmann A. Anthrax. In: Evans AS, Brachman PS, eds. Bacterial infections of humans. New York, New York: Plenum Medical Book Company, 1998. *Cutaneous illness is characterized by a skin lesion evolving from a papule, through a vesicular stage, to a depressed black eschar; edema, erythema, or necrosis without ulceration may be present. Inhalational illness is characterized by a brief prodrome resembling a "nonspecific febrile" illness that rapidly progresses to a fulminant illness with signs of sepsis and/or respiratory failure, often with radiographic evidence of mediastinal widening; signs of bacterial meningitis may be present. Gastrointestinal illness is characterized by severe abdominal pain usually accompanied by bloody vomiting or diarrhea followed by fever and signs of septicemia. BOX 1. Clinical forms of anthrax Clinical Forms of Anthrax The following clinical descriptions of anthrax are based on experience in adults. The clinical presentation of anthrax in infants is not well defined. Inhalational. Inhalational anthrax begins with a brief prodrome resembling a viral respiratory illness followed by development of hypoxia and dyspnea, with radiographic evidence of mediastinal widening. Inhalational anthrax is the most lethal form of anthrax and results from inspiration of 8,000--50,000 spores of Bacillus anthracis (3). The incubation period of inhalational anthrax among humans typically ranges from 1--7 days but may be possibly up to 60 days. Host factors, dose of exposure, and chemoprophylaxis may affect the duration of the incubation period. Initial symptoms include mild fever, muscle aches, and malaise and may progress to respiratory failure and shock; meningitis frequently develops. Case-fatality estimates for inhalational anthrax are extremely high, even with all possible supportive care including appropriate antibiotics. Cutaneous. Cutaneous anthrax is characterized by a skin lesion evolving from a papule, through a vesicular stage, to a depressed black eschar. The incubation period ranges from 1--12 days. The lesion is usually painless, but patients also may have fever, malaise, headache, and regional lymphadenopathy. The case fatality rate for cutaneous anthrax is 20% without, and <1% with, antibiotic treatment. Gastrointestinal. Gastrointestinal anthrax is characterized by severe abdominal pain followed by fever and signs of septicemia. This form of anthrax usually follows after eating raw or undercooked contaminated meat and can have an incubation period of 1--7 days. An oropharyngeal and an abdominal form of the disease have been described. Involvement of the pharynx is usually characterized by lesions at the base of the tongue, dysphagia, fever, and regional lymphadenopathy. Lower bowel inflammation typically causes nausea, loss of appetite, and fever followed by abdominal pain, hematemesis, and bloody diarrhea. The case-fatality rate is estimated to be 25%--60%. The effect of early antibiotic treatment on the case-fatality rate is not established.

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by info＠giganetstore.com 18 Oct '01

18 Oct '01

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Re: Who represents the detained? Nobody...
by Anonymous 18 Oct '01

18 Oct '01

>>>They HAVE representation, and I don't THINK the Bill >>>of Rights says anywhere that you get to see Mommy >>>if you're arrested, but that you can obtain >>>representation, you are not required to incriminate >>>yourself, and so forth. In theory. >> >>Get a clue. The issue is not "get to see Mommy." >> >>Rather, the issue is the holding of 600+ various persons, some of whom are >>very vaguely claimed to be "material witnesses." > > >Note too that many of the detained >may not have lawyers. How about we play "let's hypothesize the conditions that make our argument true." That saves having to ground your reasoning in reality. The Washington Post article says "and limited access to their lawyers".... and "The Justice Department has also refused to reveal the names of the lawyers representing them." At least they have lawyers, don't you get the point? The dead had no lawyers to argue for thier lives. "That process is supervised by a court." The dead had no judge supervising their execution. >Most of them are >not being held on criminal charges. They are held as material witnesses or >on immigration holds. >I don't know if a material witness has a right to an Then you don't know what you're arguing, do you? Pick your battles. Wiretapping expansion, big problem, Lack of luxury accomodations for material witnesses who are at the least crucial information resources and may be co-conspirators, little problem.

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Stu Baker on CALEA and the Net
by Declan McCullagh 18 Oct '01

18 Oct '01

"FBI requires ISPs to permit easy surveillance; EFF founder agrees" http://www.politechbot.com/p-02671.html "Stu Baker replies to Politech post on ISPs and EFF founder" http://www.politechbot.com/p-02672.html

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