October 2000 - cypherpunks-legacy

CDR: proggies
by Slyng69＠aol.com 09 Oct '00

09 Oct '00

please send me prggies thanks

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CDR: cypherpunks
by billp＠nmol.com 09 Oct '00

09 Oct '00

http://www.geocities.com/CapitolHill/Congress/8327/ http://members.tripod.com/bill_3_2/ http://www.nmol.com/users/billp/

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CDR: RE: Rijndael & Hitachi
by Lucky Green 09 Oct '00

09 Oct '00

> -----Original Message----- > From: cypherpunks(a)openpgp.net [mailto:cypherpunks@openpgp.net]On Behalf > Of Julian Assange > Sent: Sunday, October 08, 2000 01:04 > To: Multiple recipients of list > Subject: Re: Rijndael & Hitachi > Not so, inprepid Vin. A Belgian cipher was chosen simply because > the NSA was able to operate with relative impunity in that region, > in which it has huge per-capita deployment, compared to a similar > actions on its own soil. You /are/ joking ... right? The AES contest was held in the open, which should alleviate any concerns about NSA involvement in the desing of Rijndael. --Lucky Green <shamrock(a)cypherpunks.to> "Anytime you decrypt... its against the law". Jack Valenti, President, Motion Picture Association of America in a sworn deposition, 2000-06-06

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CDR: Re: Disposable remailers
by despot 09 Oct '00

09 Oct '00

On Fri, 6 Oct 2000, dmolnar wrote: > On Fri, 6 Oct 2000, despot wrote: > > > But, this disposable remailer idea is solid. As a quick example > > scheme, if there were some sort of remailer protocol that > > functioned like routing protocols, as disposable remailers came > > online, they could announce themselves to other remailers. > > Pseudorandom hopping from one disposable remailer to another could > > occur in a remailer-chained message, instead of manually > > encrypting a message for a chain of remailers. The sender could I will inject one missing piece of my example, the final remailer address (and perhaps even the whole message) should be obfuscated by the hop count. This way only the last disposable remailer before the final remailer has this information. > This reminds me of something I was looking at this spring. Markus > Jakobsson has two papers on "A Practical Mix" and "Flash Mixing" which > look at mix-nets in a different way than we see in remailers. There, > instead of a message being successively encrypted for a particular > path through a series of remailers, the remailers pass a prepared > encrypted message around and perform a distributed computation on it. At > the end of the computation, the decrypted name of the recipient > automagically pops out. > Anyway, both papers deal with a collection of mix servers fixed in > advance. It seems that disposable remailers would work well with > extensions of these protocols modified to deal with dynamic leave and > joins of servers. Add this to wireless and you have mobile disposable > remailers. Ok, I am stretching my memory here, but... I read about mix-nets and the "Flash Mixing" paper months ago, so I may be a bit off. If I remember correctly, you have network of mix servers. Any set of these mix servers can be used to perform the mix, and as long as one is "honest," the result will be private. These servers communicate over some sort of broadcast channel. Lets say C is a list of the ciphertexts (c0...ci) after encrypting messages M (m0...mi) with a public key. C flows through the mix-net where it is re-encrypted, permuted, sorted, etc by each mix server (so each mix server has a modified copy of the list) and out pops C'. C' is a list of ciphertexts corresponding to M. For the Flash Mix, the mix servers can confirm to a high probability that C' was computed correctly. As long as one of the mix servers is honest and an attacker does not know, I think it is, 2 plaintexts corresponding to input ciphertexts, then there is a high probability of privacy. More so, I believe there are even dummy inputs in the list C to help strengthen this scheme against attacks. So, off the top of my head, issues with extending this scheme to disposable remailers... Well, the list size immediately comes to mind for memory-constrained devices. The resistance to attack is dependent on the list size and the number of lists (which corresponds to the number of mix servers used). Adding nodes should have no impact as they would not be part of the current mixes. Dropping nodes not used in any mixes would be fine, but what happens when a node being used in a mix fails? The mix could start over, using pseudorandomly selected nodes perhaps. The system also seems to fall prey to malicious remailers. For the flash mix, I believe, it is assumed that nodes will perform properly more often than not, but this seems to be the rarer case in a disposable remailer structure. The means of communication would need to be looked at, especially with this dynamic environment. How to eliminate nodes that are found to be malfunctioning from being used by other nodes? A few trusted, "honest" nodes should be available to the mixes in order to ensure privacy. And so on... :) > So a further question would be whether we can design a mix protocol > which can > a) take advantage of all these cheap, (hopefully) distinct > devices and their computation power > but > b) doesn't give the commodity devices enough power to > break the mix, even if many (almost all??) of them act in > concert. Indeed... -andrew

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CDR: How the Feds will try to ban strong anonymity
by Declan McCullagh 09 Oct '00

09 Oct '00

I wrote in another thread: >framework to reasonably exist. Cypherpunkish technology will create >underground markets, anonymous distribution methods, and so on, and the >only way to enforce such regulations will be for the Feds/Mounties to take >drastic steps. (For instance, strong anonymity is an emergent property of >a distributed network combined with strong encryption. Restricting strong >anonymity means key escrow.) Perhaps I overstated my argument above. It seems to me that if the Feds want to restrict strong anonymity, they have some choices: * Make it a felony (death penalty may have some deterrent effect) to take advantage of it. * Require key escrow/key recovery/message recovery/Clipper * Require that anonymous remailers or similar devices implement identity escrow/keep logs * Ban Internet service providers/backbone providers from accepting traffic from an anonymous remailer node (a tricky tactic, this, since end-of-chain remailers are relatively few compared to the middle-of-chain ones, at least today). * Do the same thing with outgoing traffic directed to the first remailer node * Ban the operation or hosting of remailers, and work internationally to do the same thing, through G8, Council of Europe, UN Anything else? -Declan

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CDR: Re: RC4 - To license or not?
by Greg Broiles 09 Oct '00

09 Oct '00

On Sun, Oct 08, 2000 at 03:12:20AM +0200, Stefan Arentz wrote: > Real-To: Stefan Arentz <stefan.arentz(a)soze.com> > > Applied Crypto says this about RC4. > > So what's the deal with RC4? It's no longer a trade secret, > so presumably anyone can use it. However, RSA DSI will almost > certainly sue anyone who uses unlicensed RC4 in a commercial > product. THey probably won't win, but they will certainly make it > cheaper make it cheaper for a company to license than fight. > > This was in '96. I do not want to buy a complete BSAFE license. > It is too expensive and I only need RC4. > > Anyone experienced with this? Will they sue? No, they almost certainly won't. Over the past few years they've moved away from their former pugilistic stance and their marketing/sales strategy seems to focus more on code quality and diversity of platform support rather than fear. -- Greg Broiles gbroiles(a)netbox.com PO Box 897 Oakland CA 94604

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CDR: Re: Supreme Court denies reporter's kiddie porn appeal
by Eric Cordian 08 Oct '00

08 Oct '00

Tim May <tcmay(a)got.net> writes: > Journalists have no special rights. None. They are simply those who > are (usually) paid for their words. This does not exempt them from > any laws. The First Amendment does not confer special rights to > writers; in fact, it says that government may not create such > distinctions by "approving" certain journalists. > A journalist who buys pot or coke for a story on drug abuse is as > vulnerable to the drug laws as any other person (including cops, by > the way) who buy drugs. ... Yes, of course this is true. However, child porn laws, with the exception of those very few laws whose goal it is to prevent specifically identifiable children from experiencing the harm of the porn-producing workplace, are clearly unconstitutional. The courts simply ignore this fact, and pander to the moral witch hunt driven by the political and religious right wing. The entire doctrine that non-obscene material depicting the sexuality of minors can be made illegal rests on a single Supreme Court case, that of Ferber. Ferber revolves entirely around the notion that identifiable minors featured in porn are harmed by exposure to the workplace in which the porn is produced. So - laws criminalizing material featuring only social and recreational nudity on the part of consenting minors are unconstitutional, as no one is harmed in its production. Laws criminalizing the possession of old porn made before child porn laws were passed are unconstitutional. Laws criminalizing the production and possession of simulations of the sexuality of minors, involving no actual humans, are CLEARLY unconstitutional. Laws criminalizing the possession of material in which the models, now adults, have no objection to its distribution, are unconstitutional. Laws criminalizing the possession of material legally produced outside the US are unconstitutional. Laws criminalizing the importation of such material are equally illegal. Futhermore, Ferber suggests that the link between porn possession and harm to minors in an unhealthy work environment only exists when the people producing the porn sell it for money to the people who possess it. Clearly a reporter downloading images for free to write a story doesn't cause any further "exploitation" of the underage models, any more than possession of footage of 12 year old Palestinians being deliberately shot by Zionist Entity snipers makes one an accessory or participant in such behavior. Child porn laws are about the elimination of counterexamples to a certain segment of the population's ideas about morality. They are not about protecting children, real or virtual. They are about the public being forced to listen to only the government's description of certain material, with anyone else being locked up instantly for looking at it, including legitimate scientists and journalists. Once this doctrine is rubber-stamped by the judicial system, and the Sheeple are used to it, it is highly unlilkely that sexual pictures of minors are the only material it is going to be appplied to. Hakim Bey suggests that plastering large full-color pictures of naked children around ones community is an excellent form of political protest. -- Eric Michael Cordian 0+ O:.T:.O:. Mathematical Munitions Division "Do What Thou Wilt Shall Be The Whole Of The Law"

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CDR: FinCEN report on e-cash
by R. A. Hettinga 08 Oct '00

08 Oct '00

--- begin forwarded text

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CDR: DNAP - EMERGING BIOTHECH COMPANY - 2 NEWS RELEASES!
by HotStock＠masterone.com 08 Oct '00

08 Oct '00

One of a few emerging companies invited to the European Biotech Conference: http://biz.yahoo.com/prnews/001006/biopartner.html Dnaprint (DNAP) is an emerging biotech company and is trading under $1 !!! 1) CEO (Dr. Tony Frudakis) Lead scientist for Corixa starts his own company a few months ago 2) Company is formed by a reverse merger of a pinksheet company 3) DNAP has already completed the accounting to get off the pinksheets and should be listed on the OTCBB soon. 4) Dr. Frudakis was responsible for a patent that sold for $54,000,000 to Smith Kline Beecham while he was at Corixa. 5) Corixa's stock has gone from 14 Cents a few years ago to 50 Dollars today. 6) According to the Barron's article (9/25/00 pg 52), Dnaprint is in the late stages of forming strategic alliances with major companies.

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CDR: Make a Solid Income on the Web
by gerry 08 Oct '00

08 Oct '00

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