August 1993 - cypherpunks-legacy

"Inspired by the Cypherpunks"
by tcmay＠netcom.com 25 Aug '93

25 Aug '93

It's nice to know we're having some influence. The latest "Wired" has the following letter, which credits the Cypherpunks as the inspiration for a privacy seeker: "A few days ago, in a chain record store, I bumped into this big screen on a box marked with an "i." I looked at it, thinking it would be a good idea to know what I'm buying, when this guy came up and told me that to be able to use this neato piece of high tech, I'd have to fill out a piece of paper, which not only asked about my taste, but about my credit, my name, my address, etc. Inspired by the cypherpunks of your last issue (_Wired_ 1.2, page 54), I decided there was no good reason for these people to know this about me. I took the reply form and walked off, throwing it away when I got home. The next day, I went searching bookstores and found the new _Wired_. What did I see, but a glowing recommendation for this privacy-basher on page 23 (_Wired_ 1.3). I'm sorry, 30 seconds of a pop tune is too little for the price of my privacy." "Dave Jacoby Please don't print my user ID" So, we are playing our part in raising consciousness. (I'll avoid getting into a political debate about whether these corporations asking questions havd too much power, whether the market works or not, etc.) -Tim May -- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)netcom.com | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero 408-688-5409 | knowledge, reputations, information markets, W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA | black markets, collapse of governments. Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: by arrangement Note: I put time and money into writing this posting. I hope you enjoy it.

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recommended reading
by Brian D Williams 25 Aug '93

25 Aug '93

Friendly Spies How America's allies are using economic espionage to steal our secrets By Peter Schweizer ISBN 0-87113-497-7 'bout twenty bucks I would have to rate this as a must read for anyone concerned with Privacy. Schweizer has written a very informative, and well written text describing in great detail the involvement of so called "friendly" inteligence services in corporate espionage. Brian Williams Cypherpatriot

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SEA Opposes Privatization of Digital Signature Standard (fwd)
by Eric Hughes 25 Aug '93

25 Aug '93

Simona Nass of SEA sent this over to me for y'all. Eric ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- From: Simona Nass <simona(a)panix.com> Subject: SEA Opposes Privatization of Digital Signature Standard (fwd) > August 19, 1993 FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE > > CONTACT: Simona Nass > (212) 982-4320 or simona(a)sea.org > > Society for Electronic Access (SEA) Opposes > Privatization of Digital Signature Standard > > In June, the National Institute for Standards and Technology (NIST) > published in the Federal Register its intention to grant an exclusive > license for nongovernmental use of the Digital Signature Algorithm > (DSA), a technique developed for NIST by federally-funded researchers. > DSA can help people authenticate the origin of electronic mail and > other computerized messages. NIST has proposed making DSA the basis of > a standard for digital signatures for transactions within federal > agencies and by anyone doing electronic business with the government > (and thus, de facto, by anyone else interested in a widely-accepted > digital-signature standard). Interested parties were given 60 days to > comment. The SEA has now gone on record opposing this license on three > grounds: > > 1) The law requires an open discussion of whether such an exclusive > license serves the interests of both the government and the public > _before_ the license and its terms are proposed. > > 2) The proposed license directly contravenes NIST's stated purpose > in developing DSA in the first place, which was to make a > digital-signature standard free of encumbrance from privately held > patent licenses, one that would be available royalty-free worldwide. > > 3) The proposed license violates federal law governing the granting > of exclusive licenses. The law states that an exclusive license can > only be granted for a patent if it can be shown that the technology > embodied in the patent would not otherwise be developed, brought to > market and widely used. Considering that NIST's proposed licensee, > Public Key Partners, is currently engaged in legal action to prevent > anyone else from developing or marketing digital-signature technology > in the U.S., they appear to be an unlikely choice to ensure the widest > possible use of DSA. Indeed, granting an exclusive license to PKP > would extend their potential legal monopoly on digital signatures > until 2010. > > Opposition to the NIST/PKP deal has been widespread throughout the > electronic community. NIST has yet to respond to the SEA's August 9 > filing, or to comments filed by other organizations (a full text of > the SEA's statement, written by SEA board member Clay Shirky, is > available via Internet gopher -- reach gopher.panix.com and look under > Society for Electronic Access (SEA), Telecom Law Information, SEA > Comment on NIST-PKP Agreement -- or via e-mail by sending a request > asking for the "SEA Comment on NIST-PKP Agreement" to sea(a)sea.org) > > The Society for Electronic Access is a New York-based organization > focusing on electronic civil liberties and access issues; for more > information, e-mail sea-info(a)sea.org; write to The Society for > Electronic Access, Post Office Box 3131, Church Street Station, > New York, NY 10008-3131; or call (212) 982-4320.

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Chaum on the wrong foot?
by hfinney＠shell.portal.com 25 Aug '93

25 Aug '93

A lot of our discussion is influenced by the ideas of David Chaum. He pioneered technology which could protect individual privacy while allowing very flexible sorts of credentials and guarantees. He has also played a big role in the various proposals for digital cash. But I think that Chaum has gone off in the wrong direction in the last few years. More and more he is concentrating on protocols which rely on a tamper-proof, hardware implementation of a cryptographic protocol which he calls an "observer". This observer chip would sit in your computer (which could be a Newton-style PDA or a smart card) and would play an important part in the exchanges of information, cash, or credentials which you would make with others. The observer basically makes sure you are telling the truth in your transactions, that you are not double-spending your digital cash, or not claiming a credential which you don't have. Now, this approach has the obvious advantage that it allows solving certain problems which can't be solved otherwise. There appears to be no way to provide for secure, off-line digital cash, for example, other than with something like an observer. But it has the equally obvious problem of relying on a tamper-proof chip as a necessary part of the protocol. Recently it seems that many of the papers out of his group are designed to explore observer-based protocols. This means that these ideas are not useful for software-only implementations. One of the (relatively few) strengths that we and the forces we represent have is that free software can be spread very far and very fast, making it hard for those opposed to privacy to successfully stop our efforts. Any technology based on special chips is going to lose these advantages. Another problem with the observer is psychological. Although Chaum goes to great lengths to design his cryptographic protocols so that even a cheating observer can learn effectively NOTHING about the computer user that would compromise his privacy, people may still feel uncomfortable about having a mechanical "conscience" in their pocket. People want to feel in control of their computers, and I think supporting this control is a big part of the Cypherpunks philosophy. A related point is that there have already been comparisons on sci.crypt between Chaum's observers and the Clipper chip, in that both rely on tamper-resistant technology to implement features which are not entirely in their owner's best interests. Assuming we do manage to successfully defeat Clipper, the taint of this association may increase resistance to observers. I wish Chaum and his group would stop directing their efforts towards protocols which require an observer chip to be effective. Granted, there are some things that don't work as nicely without observers. But I think that a realistic appraisal of the pros and cons suggests that non-observer protocols are more likely to further our ultimate goal of personal privacy. Hal Finney hfinney(a)shell.portal.com

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Coming Soon: Commercial version of PGP!
by Philip Zimmermann 25 Aug '93

25 Aug '93

Coming Soon: Commercial Version of PGP! Philip Zimmermann has signed an agreement with ViaCrypt, a division of Lemcom Systems, Inc, to sell a commercial version of PGP. ViaCrypt is a company in Phoenix Arizona that already has an RSA license from Public Key Partners to sell products that use the RSA algorithm. The freeware version of PGP will still be available, and will be maintained as well as the commercial version. Most corporations were not willing to use PGP because it was not licensed by PKP or RSA Data Security. With this commercial version of PGP, it will be possible for PGP to enter commercial environments for the first time, and compete with other products such as PEM. This is expected to enhance PGP's viability as a de facto standard in the long run. ViaCrypt PGP will be available in the USA and Canada, for an introductory price of $100 for a single user, with quantity discounts available. For details, call ViaCrypt at (602) 944-0773, or contact Philip Zimmermann at prz(a)acm.org.

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Digital Coin Claim
by hnash＠mason1.gmu.edu 25 Aug '93

25 Aug '93

The first certificate attached to this message is a claim to ownership of the first digital gold coin. Some anonymous person is claiming ownership of this coin simply because no one else has claimed it. This original owner has signed a deed granting ownership of the coin to himself. The second attached certificate is a transfer of ownership of the same digital coin. The first owner has granted ownership of the coin to some other anonymous person (who could be the original owner himself). If someone tries to offer you coin #1 in exchange for some good or service, make sure his signature matches the public key in the latest deed of ownership of coin #1. (The first public key is now worthless, by convention.) -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- <>-<>-<> Deed of Ownership <>-<>-<> The following digital coin is hereby granted to the owner of the following alias by the signer of this deed. coin #1 - -----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- Version: 2.3 mQA/Aix7OzAAAAEBgNeA+IZOQOmczjSUMiWaMTnkZLDYCA1XGzxjnXTiYA1/LVpN SkUywA+kGfe9cCuaQQARAQABtAlhbm9ueW1vdXM= =YrPq - -----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.3 iQBFAgUBLHtQdYuK85NmoAdhAQHevwF+OOZEZHUjDADYBaM5EQvDbfCTTEskX2kr aA46cE2GaZBPV5JdyjR+dnNwRXHfug0M =z9OC -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- <>-<>-<> Deed of Ownership <>-<>-<> The following digital coin is hereby granted to the owner of the following alias by the signer of this deed. coin #1 - -----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- Version: 2.3 mQA/Aix7SWsAAAEBgLanVXE9dTkrDCAWOt1Dw3bhLSIGMVweD1zifEpiDIWRZzXO Sl22i4YVPmeLvfdL3QARAQABtAVhbm9uMg== =5fkK - -----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.3 iQBFAgUBLHtQo4uK85NmoAdhAQEF9QF/aB6iX/bwXn6HEerJrOzES0VTpxsybC9L L++CIvjbDLBXmgPzXClGuGKg5t+urJ8J =Jabu -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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link
by Kevin Reynolds 25 Aug '93

25 Aug '93

Is anyone currently porting link to msdos? I have the ability, but it may take me a while to do so, so if anyone is already doing it, I'd rather not overdo it. The file is available from soda.berkeley.edu in /pub/cypherpunks. Check it out. kev

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Re: Bank misbehavior (was: Re: No digital coins?)
by plmoses＠unix.cc.emory.edu 25 Aug '93

25 Aug '93

Maybe someone has said this, but another key way to foster privacy is to START A BANK that values this. I recal some references to Swiss banking, anonymous accounts, etc, before. So wouldnt it be a good idea to find some bankers out there who wanted to create a niche market for themselves, and sell them on the crypto-protocols? First suggestion: try Miami.... - paul

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Re: Attacks on remailers
by remail＠tamsun.tamu.edu 25 Aug '93

25 Aug '93

Hal Finney writes a nice "To Do" list for the cypherpunks remailers by enumerating and describing possible attacks. Let's priortize these items. First we should do those items that are easy to implement, and those items needed to prevent any remaining cheap 'n easy attacks. We can leave expensive attacks for future projects. > Response: Encrypt the messages. Use "nesting", so that all that is > visible as each message leaves a remailer is the destination of the > next remailer. This should be made smoother. The learning curve needed to get to this stage : install PGP & get it working, learn how to use remailers, install remailer nesting script, debug all of the above, because something in there is bound to break at this stage : quite a lot of work! Just improving things up to here with clearer documentation, and better scripts and GUIs, would greatly increase the number of remailer users and traffic. > Response: Run the remailer on a machine which does not keep mail logs, > or on a machine to which you can deny the attackers access. The former is much to be preferred! The first link in the remailer chain, especially, needs to be trusted not to maintain logs. The trustworthy remailer operator goes to great lengths to minimize the temptation to look at messages. >[Attack 3: timing & ordering of messages in & out] >[Attack 4: look at subject line, message size, etc.] >[other attacks involving intercepting mail stream] Batching and random delays only work well if there is large message traffic through the remailer. What in specific detail is needed to gain access to the mail stream to make these attacks? If no mail logs are kept, and the remailer denies access to a spool file, by hiding it or putting random garbage in it or denying access to its host computer, an attack looks to me like it requires a sophisticated wiretap. Avoiding expensive attacks is low priority at this point. >[Message pools] have the problem that they expose everyone > in some group to all of the messages intended for every group member, > hence the number of messages will scale as the square of the number of > group members. First let's make the problem happen. Then we can solve it! Here's another item: faster links! The delay between when I post this and when it arrives on "cypherpunks" can be half a day. What about that idea of using direct sockets instead of SMTP between remailers? That could kill two birds with one stone: delivery speed and cheap attacks against the intermediate links via logging or spool files.

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Blinding messages (newbie questions)
by nobody＠shell.portal.com 25 Aug '93

25 Aug '93

>[Karl Barrus describes blinding] Excellent post! Can you tolerate a few newbie questions? > Conceptually, when you blind a message, nobody else can read it. So "blinding" is a synonym for encryption with your own public key, aka multiplication by a very-hard-to-factor number? > under the right circumstances if another > party digitally signs a blinded message, the unblinded message will > contain a valid digital signature. In other words if Alice encrypts and Bob signs, Da(Db(Ea(M))) = Db(M)? Under what conditions? Does RSA (in PGP) satisfy those conditions? > If someone asks > you to digitally sign a random stream of symbols, remember that what you > sign may be unblinded to reveal a contract, etc. For what applications would Bob want to sign an encrypted contract instead of a plaintext?

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