July 1993 - cypherpunks-legacy

Mail failed, returning to
by M..Stirner＠f28.n125.z1.FIDONET.ORG 15 Jul '93

15 Jul '93

Uu> * Reply to msg originally in u_privacy AS> Is the anonymous server in Finland (anon(a)anon.penet.fi) down for good? Uu> We shall see. There may be monkey business afoot. Charcoal is also Uu> down. We'll see if this message goes through. Mail to Penet did indeed bounce. What's going on? There has been no mail from cypherpunks(a)toad.com for well over a week at this site. Mail to cypherpunks bounces showing insane routing. Charcoal is down. Penet is down. Most cypherpunks remailers are down. What's going on? Did the cypherpunks piece on The Hightower Report finally get Deadly Attention? Anyone? ********************************************************************* * <m..stirner(a)f28.n125.z1.fidonet.org> - PGP Key D30909 via servers * * > What country can preserve its liberties if its rulers are not <* * > warned from time to time that their people preserve the spirit <* * > of resistance? Let them take arms!" - Thomas Jefferson, 1787 <* ********************************************************************* ___ Blue Wave/QWK v2.12 -- M. Stirner - via FidoNet node 1:125/1 UUCP: ...!uunet!kumr!shelter!28!M..Stirner INTERNET: M..Stirner(a)f28.n125.z1.FIDONET.ORG

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Re: The right to be secure (fwd Computerworld article)
by wcs＠anchor.ho.att.com 15 Jul '93

15 Jul '93

Paul Ferguson sent out a copy of a ComputerWorld article "The right to be secure" (ComputerWorld, Volume 27, Number 28, July 12, 1993, page 28, James Daly), which had NIST/NSA Q&A on Clipper. A couple things were mildly interesting (assertion that use of escrow products would be voluntary (if we can trust them)), but one was complex and nasty: To obtain the key needed to unlock the encryption, law enforcement must present evidence of its authority for a key, typically a court order, to both key escrow authorities. ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ Finally, the system will be designed to ensure that law enforcement destroys the keys it receives when its authority to conduct the electronic surveillance has expired. "Typically", of course, means "not always", and it's coupled with the phrase "establishment of procedures by the attorney general for the access of the keys" in a previous answer, which means that anything the attorney general wants, he can get. It also suggests that keys *can* be kept longer than court orders permit if the attorney general wants. Bill Stewart

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Re: PGP
by peter honeyman 15 Jul '93

15 Jul '93

my advice is to obtain a copy of pgp, play with it, and read the docs. the sci.crypt faq is also valuable. peter

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stu-iii phones
by TO1SITTLER＠APSICC.APS.EDU 15 Jul '93

15 Jul '93

I believe that there is a centralized location keeping track of which phones have which keys, etc. Don't quote me, this is just a piece of information that I ran across somewhere(dunno where) and may be inaccurate. kragen

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PGP
by Michael Glazer 14 Jul '93

14 Jul '93

Folks, I'm trying to learn more about practical cryptography in general and PGP and similar programs in particular. Any advice? Thanks in advance. Michael

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The right to be secure (fwd Computerworld article)
by fergp＠sytex.com 14 Jul '93

14 Jul '93

ComputerWorld Volume 27, Number 28 July 12, 1993 page 28 Advanced Technology The right to be secure Government-backed data security standard raises Big Brother issues By James Daly Two months ago, the Clinton administration dropped a bomb on the world of computer security. In an effort to assist law enforcement officers looking for a legal back door into coded criminal communications, officials from the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) and the National Security Agency (NSA) said they intend to establish as a federal standard an approach to voice and data encryption called "key escrow." This method would require the technology needed to unlock a coded conversation to be kept by government-approved agencies and retrieved in the event of government-approved wiretaps. Data encryption would be done in silicon via a device called the "Clipper chip," which would be installed in machines needing its coding and decoding capabilities. To put it mildly, the Clipper chip proposal has generated a lot of excitement among privacy advocates who fear abuses by a technologically empowered Big Brother. Computerworld recently tried to talk with officials from both the NIST and the NSA to further explore the Clipper issue, but neither allowed a face-to-face interview with a staff member. Instead, we had to submit written questions. Here are the answers provided by officials from the NIST and the NSA. Q. The proposed Clipper chip technology has generated an awful lot of acrimony since it was announced in April. Has the government lessened its level of commitment to the chip? A. The administration remains committed too the initiative and is proceeding with the following actions: the acquisition of key escrow encryption devices by law enforcement agencies; the naming of key escrow agents to hold the keys for the key escrow microcircuits and the establishment of procedures by the attorney general for the access of the keys; the evaluation of the key escrow encryption algorithm by respected experts; the promulgation of a standard by the secretary of commerce to facilitate the procurement and use of key escrow encryption devices in federal communications systems; and the comprehensive review of encryption policy. In addition, discussions with industry and other concerned groups have proved very productive. The administration does not intend to arbitrarily end its study of the issue while helpful consultations are under way. It should also be understood that the use of products implementing the key escrow encryption microcircuit is voluntary. There has been no attempt to either mandate its use or to deny the entry of other encryption technologies into the marketplace. Q. Privacy advocates say that if the keys needed to de-crypt data are placed in the hands of government authorities, there is the potential for abuse. What kinds of safeguards would be implemented to prevent this? A. The government may conduct electronic surveillance only when lawfully authorized. Moreover, the key escrow procedures being developed provide that each key will be split into two parts, and different key escrow authorities will hold each part. Neither part alone can be used to decrypt messages. To obtain the key needed to unlock the encryption, law enforcement must present evidence of its authority for a key, typically a court order, to both key escrow authorities. Finally, the system will be designed to ensure that law enforcement destroys the keys it receives when its authority to conduct the electronic surveillance has expired. Q. Vendors who have extensive business overseas say they would not be able to sell Clipper-equipped machines on foreign shores. How do you respond? A. Key-escrowed products will be exportable to U.S. persons and companies operating overseas. One issue under consideration in the presidential review is whether a broader export policy is advisable. Should a broader export policy be adopted, we believe products implementing the key escrow technology will find favor among consumers who desire the superb encryption security offered. Q. If Clipper would be the standard, would the use of non-Clipper encryption devices be outlawed? If so, how would you find out who was using these non-Clipper devices? A. No. Use of key-escrowed products by the private sector would be entirely voluntary. Federal agencies will have the option of using this technology once it becomes a Federal Information Processing Standard. DES [Data Encryption Standard], the existing federal encryption standard, will still be available for use in federal systems. Q. Regarding DES, some security experts say that with powerful chips such as Pentium already on the market and the 686 and 786 in design stages, DES is getting near to being crackable. Is DES nearing the end of its useful life? A. NIST will recommend that DES be renewed for another five years as a Federal Information Processing Standard. We do recognize, however, that as computer technology advances, the expected effort needed to break DES-encrypted messages decreases. In time, DES will become less valuable for securing sensitive information. Q. What eventually made DES and other cryptosystems acceptable was their ease of use in software. Do you feel companies will be willing to go back to the hassle and additional expenses of hardware-based cryptography? A. Again, we must emphasize that use of this technology is voluntary. Software containing other cryptosystems is still available to consumers. As for use of this technology in hardware, new products are already being developed to lessen the "hassle" of hardware-based cryptography. One example would be its use of PCMCIA [Personal Computer Memory Card International Association] cards. Moreover, encryption implemented in software generally provides less security than hardware encryption. Q. What happens when the Clipper chip's technology cannot keep up with faster networks and becomes a bottleneck? Do we then have to have a multiyear review process wherein we select a Clipper-2 chip and retrofit all the devices across the country? A. We expect the key escrow microcircuits will be enhanced to keep pace with future data requirements. As with the introduction of any next-generation technology, consumers will decide the extent to which they require, and are willing to pat for, the new technology. We do not envision an "across the country" retrofit of all devices. Q. What should the role of the government, if any, in developing a nationwide computer security policy guideline? A. The government has a strong interest in computer security policies in light of the federal agencies' need to protect their own information: for law enforcement agencies to conduct lawfully authorized electronic intercepts in order to combat crime and terrorism; to protect national security through export controls of cryptographic technologies; and the growing U.S. economic interest in protecting corporations and citizens' information that is stored and transmitted electronically. That does not mean, however, that a government-imposed security policy is appropriate. Government must be actively involved in setting computer security standards for its own use and making its technology, expertise and guidance available to the private sector when requested and appropriate. Private sector organizations can then make appropriate risk-based, cost-effective decisions as to protecting their information assets. Paul Ferguson | "Confidence is the feeling you get Network Integrator | just before you fully understand Centreville, Virginia USA | the problem." fergp(a)sytex.com | - Murphy's 7th Law of Computing Quis Custodiet Ipsos Custodes?

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Re: Relation between number theory and cryptography
by peb＠PROCASE.COM 14 Jul '93

14 Jul '93

These are very interesting questions. I like the idea that the physical work of encryption and decryption might be accounted for by the increased entropy of the message. >Is this affected by whether or not the key is known? If the key is unknown, then the meaning or affect of the message on the recipient is that of noise (or more accurately, "this message exists but you can't read it"), but information theory has nothing to say about this since it is concerned only with the communication itself. Perhaps the AI theory of Language As Action could be connected to information theory (yeah, recast meaning as communication to a homunculous...) Somewhere I have a paper on Maxwell's Daemon and Data Compression, which seems related to this. I can dig it up if you want a ref. (I haven't read it yet; it's ftp available.) Paul E. Baclace peb(a)procase.com

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Re: Secure comm program, Sockets + LINK
by wcs＠anchor.ho.att.com 14 Jul '93

14 Jul '93

> > How do STU-III phones work then? Do they have some key in rom? I don't remember the details (and if I did I'd have to kill you :-), but they use a little plastic key-shaped dongle that's got some memory in it, probably EEPROM, which contains keying information. Each key works in only a few phones, and each phone only supports a few keys. The keying information tells it what level of classification the phone is authorized for when the key is in it, and phone calls negotiate that when they set up. If the phone decides it doesn't like something, it's able to zero out the key's memory. > I dunno enough about STU-III phones. Maybe they don't care about man > in the middle, or maybe they use fixed conventional of some sort for > authentication. I have a vague memory of someone telling me that some > of them have code keys. When you're making a TOP SECRET phone call, you *do* care about man in the middle, just as you care about being in a soundproofed room. The session key exchange is done with Diffie-Hellman with authentication; I'm not sure if the authentication uses public-key or secret-key technology, but my guess is it's basic secret-key stuff. The military version of the phone uses classified secret-key algorithms, so presumably the key handling does too. Bill

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Re: Secure comm program, Sockets + LINK
by smb＠research.att.com 14 Jul '93

14 Jul '93

> You can't even solve the problem with DH key exchange -- you are > subject to "man in the middle" attacks. You must share SOME > information via a secure channel in order to have both authenticatio n > and privacy on a channel. However, the information exchanged could b e > small and fairly one-time -- like the public key of a trusted entity > that signs other public keys. How do STU-III phones work then? Do they have some key in rom? RAM, actually. The phones are keyed for some set of individuals; these keys are tied to ``crypto ignition keys'' possessed by these individuals. When you insert your key, the phone knows who you are, and transmits a certificate containing your public key to the far end. Other information in the certificate includes your security clearance, and (I think) your name. On some models at least, the key storage can be erased instantly by pressing a single button. The uses for that feature are obvious... I highly commend this paper to the cypherpunks readership: @article{Diffie88, author = {Whitfield Diffie}, journal = {Proceedings of the IEEE}, month = {May}, number = {5}, pages = {560--577}, title = {The First Ten Years of Public Key Cryptography}, volume = {76}, year = {1988} }

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Re: Secure comm program, Sockets + LINK
by jim＠tadpole.com 14 Jul '93

14 Jul '93

> You can't even solve the problem with DH key exchange -- you are > subject to "man in the middle" attacks. You must share SOME > information via a secure channel in order to have both authentication > and privacy on a channel. However, the information exchanged could be > small and fairly one-time -- like the public key of a trusted entity > that signs other public keys. How do STU-III phones work then? Do they have some key in rom? Jim

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