July 1993 - cypherpunks-legacy

Crypto Conference from Hell
by paul＠poboy.b17c.ingr.com 16 Jul '93

16 Jul '93

The attached message was originally posted in comp.dcom.telecom. I haven't contacted these people, but some 'punk in the DC area might be able to weasel in. Consider the list of speakers: - well-known (notorious) - Denning, Bidzos, Clint Brooks from NSA, Kammer from NIST - people we should be talking to - the mgr of AT&T's Secure Comm Systems division, that same division's chief scientist - Big Wheels - Rosenthal (chief counsel for SPA), Willis Ware, Jerry Berman. Fun for the whole family! -Paul Path: infonode!uunet!spool.mu.edu!telecom-request Date: Mon, 12 Jul 1993 16:26:13 -0500 From: Matthew Lucas <matt(a)telestrat.com> Newsgroups: comp.dcom.telecom Subject: Conference With Dorothy Denning: Encrypting Voice and Data Message-ID: <telecom13.468.1(a)eecs.nwu.edu> Organization: TELECOM Digest Sender: telecom(a)eecs.nwu.edu Approved: telecom(a)eecs.nwu.edu X-Submissions-To: telecom(a)eecs.nwu.edu X-Administrivia-To: telecom-request(a)eecs.nwu.edu X-Telecom-Digest: Volume 13, Issue 468, Message 1 of 9 Lines: 151 Conference Announcement: A TeleStrategies Conference with Dr. Dorothy Denning Encrypting Voice and Data: Strategies for the Future Aug. 3-4, 1993 Washington, DC Tuesday, August 3, 1993 8:30-9:00 Registration 9:00-10:30 CRYPTOGRAPHY OVERVIEW The basic concepts of cryptography and encryption, including single-key and publickey, authentication, digital signatures, key negotiation or distribution, and cryptanalysis (code breaking) will be introduced along with the Data Encryption Standard (DES), the RSA public-key system, and the Digital Signature Standard (DSS). The speaker will also discuss the need for encryption and the role of encryption in telephony and communications networks. Dr. Dorothy E. Denning, Professor and Chair of Computer Science, Georgetown University 10:30-10:45 Coffee Break 10:45-11:45 SURVEY OF ENCRYPTION PRODUCTS The speaker will survey commercial hardware and software products that contain encryption capabilities, including the types of products that are available, their relative strengths and weaknesses, and the major vendors. Jim Bidzos, President, RSA Data Security, Inc. 11:45-12:30 CELLULAR ENCRYPTION Cellular calls are especially vulnerable to eavesdropping. PrivaFone's approach, which is interoperable on cellular and land lines, will be described. Digital cellular standards that provide voice privacy and authentication for TDMA or CDMA technologies also will be discussed. Dr. Ming Lee, President, Synacomm Technology Charles Wistar, President, PrivaFone Corp. 12:30-1:45 Hosted Lunch 1:45-2:30 THE CLIPPER AND CAPSTONE CHIPS The Clipper and Capstone Chips are part of a new U.S. technology initiative to provide secure communications and legitimate law enforcement access through a key escrow system. The speakers will describe the initiative, the security functions provided by the chips, and the use of the Clipper Chip in the AT&T Telephone Security Device. William M. Agee, Manager, Secure Communication Systems - Government, AT&T Raymond G. Kammer, Acting Director, National Institute of Standards and Technology 2:30-3:00 BUSINESS CONCERNS WITH ENCRYPTION The speaker will give a snapshot of one computer security program and discuss business concerns with encryption, including practical needs and requirements, organizational constraints, operational concerns, security of the process, and balancing concerns and practical use. Randolph N. Sanovic, Manager of Computer Security Planning, Mobil Corp. 3:00-3:15 Coffee Break 3:15-4:00 USING CRYPTOGRAPHY TO ARCHITECT DISTRIBUTED OPEN SYSTEMS SECURITY: A CASE STUDY Securing networks and computers in a distributed environment presents several new challenges. The speaker will describe Bell Atlantic's enterprise-wide approach to architecting security in such an environment, showing how encryption fits into the design. Ravi Ganesan, Specialist, Security Research and Planning, Bell Atlantic 4:00-5:00 ENCRYPTION IN ELECTRONIC COMMERCE AND ELECTRONIC MAIL Encryption is becoming an integral tool for building secure applications. The speakers will discuss the use of encryption and digital signatures in Electronic Data Interchange (EDI) and Internet Privacy Enhanced Mail (PEM). Michael S. Baum J.D., Principal, Independent Monitoring Dr. Stephen D. Crocker, Vice President, Trusted Information Systems, Inc. 5:00-6:00 Reception Wednesday, August 4, 1993 8:30-10:30 CRYPTOGRAPHY POLICY IN THE U.S. The speakers will discuss the Clipper and Capstone chips, law enforcement needs and the Digital Telephony proposal, export and import of encryption products, international markets, industry growth and competitiveness, and individual privacy. They will also report on the national policy review in progress. Dr. Willis H. Ware, Chair, Computer Systems Security and Privacy Advisory Board (Moderator) Jerry Berman, Executive Director, Electronic Frontier Foundation Clinton C. Brooks, Special Assistant to Director, National Security Agency Alan R. McDonald, Special Assistant (Legal) to the Assistant Director, Technical Services Division, Federal Bureau of Investigation Ilene Rosenthal, General Counsel, Software Publishers Association 10:30-10:45 Coffee Break 10:45-11:30 CRYPTOGRAPHY IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY In the European Community, government controls on cryptography differ across countries and affect achievement of secure open systems and, consequently, achievement of the Open Market and transborder electronic trading. The speaker will summarize the current situation in Europe, describe some of the initiatives to address the issues, and comment on the recent initiatives in the US. Christopher E. Sundt, Business Strategy Manager, ICL Secure Systems 11:30-12:15 THE FUTURE OF CRYPTOGRAPHY IN TELECOMMUNICATIONS Several fast-moving trends in telecommunications demand cryptographic solutions, including wireless transmission, multi-media conferencing, and electronic commerce. As broadcast and multiple access technologies are used increasingly for information transmission, and everyday business is carried out in "cyberspace," structures that ensure privacy, authenticity, and (often) anonymity must become part of the natural landscape. Dr. David P. Maher, Chief Scientist for AT&T Secure Communications Systems, AT&T For complete information call TeleStrategies Inc. at (703) 734-7050.

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OPIN: PGP: When to sign keys
by edgar＠spectrx.Saigon.COM 16 Jul '93

16 Jul '93

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- J. Michael Diehl wrote: I'm having a philosophical problem regarding when to sign someone else's public key. Obviously, if you watch someone generate a key, and they physically hand you a copy of it, you should sign it. Fortunately, life has been this good to me about 5 times. But what if life isn't so good? Lets say someone emails me a key and the return address matches that of the address in the key. Do I assume no one is spoofing me? Bad idea! The danger is not especially that the person you're talking to isn't who he says he is. Chances are you've never met him and never will. The danger is that a third person is intercepting messages and substituting his own keys. This allows him to monitor your encrypted traffic, which is what encryption is supposed to prevent. My own rule for signing keys is that there must be a key verification independent of the net. i.e. nothing received by e-mail can be depended on to verify a key. If you live any distance from the other person, the most economical method is by postal mail. I will sign keys when I receive a mailed photocopy of any "official" picture ID, along with a signed statement containing the key "fingerprint" (-kvc), which matches the fingerprint of a key received via e-mail. You can mail a letter anywhere in the world for less than $1.00. Any "spoofer" short of governments (at either end) or organized crime will have a hard time intercepting much less altering letter mail. Another possibility is a phone verification. The person who will be signing the key should call the owner of the key at a -listed- phone number (use the out-of-town phone books at the library, or check with information at (xxx)555-1212.) Don't rely on a phone number in e-mail; it could be the spoofer's. Once again, though, a government or OC could arrange to intercept/divert incoming phone calls. I also carry business-card-size pieces of paper with my name, net address, and key fingerprint, with me. I give them out at parties, or anytime I physically meet someone who is on the net. Person's receiving the paper can use it to verify that the key I send them via e-mail has the same fingerprint as on the paper. Ideally, anyone giving you such a card should also show you a driver's license or other picture ID, before expecting you to go home and sign his key. Phil Zimmerman has endorsed the idea of mail and phone verification; this is the main reason the key fingerprint feature was added to PGP. Phil signed my key based on a phone call. Based on mail verification I just signed a key from Taiwan! I've also signed two keys from Germany with mail verification. There are those (e.g. Perry Metzker) who think this standard is too loose. Opinions differ. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.3.2/EWS iQCVAgUBLEThEt4nNf3ah8DHAQGJfgP/W85P6IEkGYkmKeFe/px0XPfMvDqTMWXA 5kJ2cTIDRdSbLqDh0VdMsUaAtDR2nkWJKCFRnXA+GEttXy31gPGq6bY/Q19U8dAq VzNHY0o2ldzrDmp77BQo2kqTapENvIxKkXFiFAATleoLt6hMAgfejRlci/uTfG7Z NoCwQVeac7c= =wwV4 -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- -- edgar(a)spectrx.saigon.com (Edgar W. Swank) SPECTROX SYSTEMS +1.408.252.1005 Cupertino, Ca

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steganography
by TO1SITTLER＠APSICC.APS.EDU 16 Jul '93

16 Jul '93

In a previous message, which my VMS newsreader is too stupid to remember and can just barely quote, an Evil Genius For A Better Tomorrow, mike(a)egfabt.org, says he thinks that xor'ing 'x' over a message would help to hide the fact that it is cyphertext. Problem: If someone is looking for encrypted information, IDEALLY we would like steganographically for it to be unconditionally impossible to determine that a file is cyphertext w/o the key. (It is of course only computationally infeasible to guess the key, if we pick our cryptosystem right.) The suggestions that the Evil Genius makes could easily be defeated with an hour or two of programming using pieces of PGP's source, or ripem, or a little piece of software designed to tell whether a file is Dolphin Encrypted or Mailsafed. The resulting program could check hundreds of database files easily, probably in almost exactly the time required for an open, a single disk access, and a close on each file. For a steganographically strong code, the cyphertext must not be recognizable to its home program. This means, among other things, no CRC's, no MD5's, etc, intended to assure data integrity. This means no delimiter-structured files. (I think--I'm not absolutely sure on this one.) Every field in the file must be either fixed-length or have a number somewhere in it (in a format indistinguishable from the rest of the cyphertext) which tells its length. And every field, individually, must not be recognizable as something unusual. (For instance, no sending of large prime numbers in the clear, as they are very unlikely to appear in a random file.) The foregoing "field" stuff has to do with things like PGP, which have a message cyphertext, encrypted with a session key, and a session key, encrypted with a PKC, in the same message. (Possible several cyphertexts of the session key.) Oh, and it would be nice, though not essential, if a corruption in the file made it completely, rather than partially, nonsense when decrypted. This way you can't have a file with no use to the recipient used as evidence against them. The important qualifications seem to rule out any crypto package in current widespread use, don't they? Kragen, an ignorant crypto-wannabe

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CPSR Secrecy Statement
by Dave Banisar 16 Jul '93

16 Jul '93

CPSR Secrecy Statement Computer Professionals for Social Responsibility (CPSR) has called for a complete overhaul in the federal government's information classification system, including the removal of cryptography from the categories of information automatically deemed to be secret. In a letter to a special Presidential task force examining the classification system, CPSR said that the current system -- embodied in an Executive Order issued by President Reagan in 1982 -- "has limited informed public debate on technological issues and has restricted scientific innovation and technological development." The CPSR statement, which was submitted in response to a task force request for public comments, strongly criticizes a provision in the Reagan secrecy directive that presumptively classifies any information that "concerns cryptology." CPSR notes that "while cryptography -- the science of making and breaking secret security codes -- was once the sole province of the military and the intelligence agencies, the technology today plays an essential role in assuring the security and privacy of a wide range of communications affecting finance, education, research and personal correspondence." With the end of the Cold War and the growth of widely available computer network services, the outdated view of cryptography reflected in the Reagan order must change, according to the statement. CPSR's call for revision of the classification system is based upon the organization's experience in attempting to obtain government information relating to cryptography and computer security issues. CPSR is currently litigating Freedom of Information Act lawsuits against the National Security Agency (NSA) seeking the disclosure of technical data concerning the digital signature standard (DSS) and the administration's recent "Clipper Chip" proposal. NSA has relied on the Reagan Executive Order as authority for withholding the information from the public. In its submission to the classification task force, CPSR also called for the following changes to the current secrecy directive: * A return to the "balancing test," whereby the public interest in the disclosure of information is weighed against the claimed harm that might result from such disclosure; * A prohibition against the reclassification of information that has been previously released; * The requirement that the economic cost of classifying scientific and technical be considered before such information may be classified; * The automatic declassification of information after 20 years, unless the head of the original classifying agency, in the exercise of his or her non-delegable authority, determines in writing that the material requires continued classification for a specified period of time; and * The establishment of an independent oversight commission to monitor the operation of the security classification system. The task force is scheduled to submit a draft revision of the Executive Order to President Clinton on November 30. The full text of the CPSR statement can be obtained via ftp, wais and gopher from cpsr.org, under the filename cpsr\crypto\secrecy_statement.txt. CPSR is a national organization of professionals in the computing field. Membership is open to the public. For more information on CPSR, contact <cpsr(a)cpsr.org>. July 14, 1993 Information Security Oversight Office 750 17th Street, N.W. Suite 530 Washington, DC 20006 Attention: PRD Task Force Re: Proposed Changes to the Security Classification System This submission is made in response to the Notice published in the Federal Register on May 20, 1993 (58 FR 29480). According to the Notice, the Task Force is soliciting submissions "by interested parties on proposals to change the system under which information is classified, safeguarded, and declassified in the interest of national security." Computer Professionals for Social Responsibility (CPSR), a national organization of professionals in the computing field, has a long-standing interest in the problems surrounding the current information classification system -- a system that has limited informed public debate on technological issues and has restricted scientific innovation and technological development. Based on our experience conducting litigation under the Freedom of Information Act and our efforts to assess certain government policies concerning cryptography and computer security, we have the following recommendations regarding changes to the security classification system. General Recommendations CPSR believes that the current Executive Order 12356 is far too broad in its definition of classifiable information and that post Cold War realities require the substantial revision of this outdated directive. We share the views of many public interest, journalistic, academic, historical, and scientific organizations that have recommended a complete revision of the classification scheme. We believe such a revision is both necessary and appropriate. In particular, we support the following changes to the classification system: * A return to the "balancing test," whereby the public interest in the disclosure of information is weighed against the claimed harm that might result from such disclosure; * A prohibition against the reclassification of information that has been previously released; * The requirement that the economic cost of classifying scientific and technical be completed before such information may be classified; * The automatic declassification of information after 20 years, unless the head of the original classifying agency, in the exercise of his or her non-delegable authority, determines in writing that the material requires continued classification for a specified period of time; and * The establishment of an independent oversight commission to monitor the operation of the security classification system. "Cryptology" as a Classification Category In addition to endorsing these general recommendations, we wish to address in detail one particular provision of the current Executive Order that unnecessarily restricts the dissemination of technical data that should be routinely available to the public and the scientific community. At the time EO 12356 was promulgated in 1982, a new classification category was established, simply defined as "cryptology." EO 12356, Sec. 1.3(a)(8). When the House Government Operations Committee examined the Executive Order shortly after its issuance, the Committee concluded that "[t]he need for this new category is uncertain" and noted that "[t]he word 'cryptology,' as added by the Reagan order, is not qualified or defined." H. Rep. No. 731, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 16 (1982). This concern carries even more weight today. The designation of a routine privacy-enhancing technology as presumptively a national security matter is inconsistent with the end of the Cold War and the dramatic growth of commercial and civilian telecommunications networks. While cryptography -- the science of making and breaking secret security codes -- was once the sole province of the military and the intelligence agencies, the technology today plays an essential role in assuring the security and privacy of a wide range of communications affecting finance, education, research, and personal correspondence. Electronic communications are now widely used in the civilian sector and have become an integral component of the global economy. Computers store and exchange an ever increasing amount of personal information, including medical and financial data. In this electronic environment, the need for privacy-enhancing technologies is apparent. Communications applications such as electronic mail and electronic funds transfers require secure means of encryption and authentication -- goals that can be achieved only through the development and dissemination of robust cryptographic technology within the civilian sector. The Computer Security Act and Civilian Cryptography In recognition of the emerging significance of civilian cryptography, Congress enacted the Computer Security Act (P.L. 100-235) in 1987. When Congress enacted the legislation, it expressed particular concern that the National Security Agency ("NSA"), a secretive military intelligence agency, would improperly limit public access to information concerning civilian computer security activities. H. Rep. No. 153 (Part 2), 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 21 (1987). The House Report on the Act notes that NSA's natural tendency to restrict and even deny access to information that it deems important would disqualify that agency from being put in charge of the protection of non-national security information in the view of many officials in the civilian agencies and the private sector. Id. To alleviate these concerns, Congress granted sole authority to the National Institute of Standards and Technology ("NIST") -- a civilian agency within the Department of Commerce -- to establish technical cryptography standards for civilian computer security. During Congress' consideration of the legislation, "NSA opposed its passage and asserted that NSA should be in control of this nation's computer standards program." Id. at 7. Congress forthrightly rejected NSA's position, noting that continued military control over all cryptographic development "would jeopardize the entire Federal standards program." Id. at 26. Since the enactment of the Computer Security Act, CPSR has sought to monitor compliance with its provisions. In keeping with those efforts, CPSR requested relevant information from NIST under the Freedom of Information Act ("FOIA") concerning the development of the "digital signature standard" -- the agency's first proposed cryptographic standard since passage of the legislation. It is important to note that the proposed standard itself would be "applicable to all federal departments and agencies for the protection of unclassified information." 56 Fed. Reg. 42981 (August 30, 1991) (emphasis added). After CPSR filed a lawsuit to compel disclosure of the information, NIST acknowledged that the great bulk of responsive material was under the jurisdiction of NSA. NSA, in turn, has sought to withhold a substantial amount of that information on the grounds that it "concerns cryptology" and is therefore classified. CPSR v. National Institute of Standards and Technology, et al., C.A. 92-0972-RCL (D.D.C.). The current Executive Order is thus being used to classify information relating to a civilian agency's development of a security standard intended to protect unclassified information. Such a result contravenes Congress' intent that non-military cryptographic standards would be developed openly and subject to public scrutiny. The Public Interest in Cryptography More recent developments further illustrate how the application of cryptographic technology is moving out of the "national security" realm and is thus an inappropriate subject for presumptive classification. On April 16, 1993, the President announced that "government engineers" had developed a new cryptographic device known as the "Clipper Chip" that is intended for widespread public use. The President noted that "[s]ophisticated encryption technology has been used for years to protect electronic funds transfer ... [and] is now being used to protect electronic mail and computer files." He also recognized that "encryption technology can help Americans protect business secrets and the unauthorized release of personal information." Unfortunately, the administration subsequently acknowledged that the "Clipper" technology was developed by NSA and that the underlying technical data is classified. As in the case of the digital signature standard, a new technology that may have a significant impact on the nation's telecommunications infrastructure was developed in secrecy behind a shield of NSA- imposed classification. There is a great deal of interest in the development of civilian cryptography, but public involvement in the process has been substantially hampered by the improper classification of relevant technical information. See, e.g., Markoff, U.S. as Big Brother of Computer Age, New York Times, May 6, 1993 at D1. In the Cold War atmosphere that prevailed for 45 years, cryptography was often viewed as a national security matter and policy makers were at times willing to permit the National Security Agency and the military establishment to maintain a shroud of secrecy around the technology, even to the detriment of scientific research and public accountability. With the end of the Cold War and the growth of widely available computer network services, this view of cryptography must change. Indeed, Congress recognized the need for reform when it enacted the Computer Security Act in 1987, even before the demise of the Soviet Union. At the same time, cryptographic technology has become an increasingly vital component of the nation's civilian information infrastructure. Under these circumstances, there is no rational basis for continuing the presumption that information that "concerns cryptology" should be classified. The economic and scientific cost to the country of the continuation of this policy will be substantial and cannot be justified. We believe that cryptographic information should only be classified upon a specific showing that such disclosure will result in an identifiable harm to legitimate national security interests. Such a showing could clearly be made, for instance, with respect to the actual "keys" to government cryptographic systems. However, the wholesale classification of all information relating to this increasingly important field of computer science cannot be justified and may even slow the development of more secure systems. We urge the Task Force to recommend to the President that "cryptology" be removed from any listing of classification categories that might be contained in a revised Executive Order on security classification. * "Cryptology" should be removed from the designated "Classification Categories." Limitations on Quasi-Classification Authority In addition to our concern regarding classification for cryptology, we wish to raise several additional points about the operation of the Executive Order. One aspect of the Executive Order concerning classification authority with which we agree has not received proper notice by federal agencies. That is paragraph (b) or Part 1 which states that "Except as otherwise provided by statute, no other terms shall be used to identify classified information." It has been CPSR's experience that agencies continue to use the designation "sensitive but unclassified" to invoke a national security concern when in fact there is no basis for such a claim and when such a "quasi- classification" is disfavored by the Executive Order and contrary to the intent of the Computer Security Act. In one instance, the Federal Bureau of Investigation specifically restricted public access to information regarding the development of certain computer systems because it designated technical documents "sensitive but unclassified." We believe that these activities improperly restrict public access to government information that should otherwise be made available. For this reason, we believe that a revised Executive Order should make very clear that classification authority is narrowly restricted. * Classification authority must be narrowly construed and invoked only pursuant to designated classification levels, recognized by statute or executive order. Limitations on Classification to Conceal Misconduct We are further concerned that Section 1.6(a)-(b) and Section 5.4(b)(2)(c) in the current Executive Order have not received adequate attention by the national security community. Section 1.6(a) states that: In no case shall administrative information be classified in order to conceal violations of law, inefficiencies, or administrative error; to prevent embarrassment to a person, organization, or agency; to restrain competition; or to prevent or delay the release of information that does not require protection in the interest of national security. Section 1.6(b) further states that "[b]asic scientific information not clearly related to the national security may not be classified." Section 5.4 (Sanctions) states, in pertinent part, that: (b) Officers and employees of the United States government and its contractors, licensees, and grantees shall be subject to appropriate sanctions if they: . . . (2) knowingly and willfully classify or continue the classification of information in violation of this Order or any implementing directive; (c) sanctions may include reprimand, suspension without pay, removal, termination of classification authority, loss or denial of access to classified information, or other sanctions in accordance with applicable law and agency regulation. As indicated above, it has been CPSR's experience that the National Security Agency sought to conceal its activities under the Computer Security Act through improper assertion of the (b)(1) exemption to the Freedom of Information Act. It is clearly an improper use of classification authority to conceal agency conduct in this manner. Such activities frustrate public oversight and permit the abuse of powers. Based on this experience, we make the following recommendations: * ISOO should conduct an investigation to determine whether the NSA's classification of documents regarding cryptography was improper and, if so, whether sanctions are appropriate for the agency officials involved. * Any agency or government official exercising classification authority with the intent of concealing misconduct, inefficiencies or improper conduct should be subject to sanctions and the ISOO should make known on an annual basis its efforts to ensure that such activities do not occur. Implementation and Review It is also our belief that it would be appropriate to establish an independent commission on classification authority that would meet periodically to review the activities of the Information Security Oversight Office and to solicit public input on issues regarding information classification and national security. Such a commission could include a representative of the National Security Council and the Director of the ISOO. It would also include distinguished archivists, historians, journalists, librarians, scientists and academics. Such a commission could provide ongoing oversight of the classification program and help ensure that future policies reflect the widespread needs of our country in information policy and the changing nature of our national security interest. We appreciate this opportunity to present our views and would be pleased to provide you with any additional information you might require. Marc Rotenberg David L. Sobel CPSR Washington Director CPSR Legal Counsel

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PGP and Offline Mail/News
by Andrew S Hall 16 Jul '93

16 Jul '93

A while ago some one here (from England) mentioned a program he was involved with that was an offline mail reader that allowed one to add external protocols like PGP. He gave an FTP site (also in England). The program was called something like APPNEWS. I downloaded it, looked at it, and archived it until I could put time into installing it with my connection and work out the bugs of dynamic addressing. Now was the time, but I have lost the program. Please help me. Perry queried earlier about what off-line readers people use. I use Pop-mail and Eudora, but neither are really friendly with adding externals. The problem I want to overcome is providing multiple users on a single machine with security. Pop-mail and Eudora are designed to be used by a single user and a personal (hopefully secure) machine. The solution currently implemented is to have users save mail only to floppy. Both mailers will create personal directories, but these can be accessed both within and from outside the program. I would like to add PGP (or another scheme) so that *all* saved messages (or ones so desired) are encrypted. This would use the user's password and would be automatic. A. Techno-Anarchy.Neophilia.Economic Freedom.Cryptography.Anti-Statism.Personal Liberty.Laissez-Faire.Privacy Protection.Libertarianism.No Taxes.No Bullshit. ********** Liberty BBS 1-614-798-9537 ********** ********** Dedicated to Freedom. Yours. **********

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Cypherpunks&Clipper in Scientific American
by hfinney＠shell.portal.com 16 Jul '93

16 Jul '93

In the Science and Business section, the August 1993 Scientific American has a short, negative article on Clipper, which mentions cypherpunks: Clipper Runs Aground Everyone seems to be listening in these days: tabloids regale readers with the cellular telephone intimacies of the British royal family, and more sober articles on the business pages tell how companies - or governments - devote resources to "signals intelligence" for commercial gain. So the Clinton Administration might have thought it was doing everyone a favor in April when it proposed a new standard for encryption chips, developed with the aid of none other than the National Security Agency (NSA). Instead the administration met with outrage. Along with the message, Clipper, as the chip is named, sends out a string of bits called a law enforcement field. Its purpose is to enable the police and the Federal Bureau of Investigation to decode conversations that they wiretap pursuant to court order. In addition, the chip's encryption algorithm, known as Skipjack, is classified. Thus, only a small cadre of cryptographic experts would be able to study it to determine whether or not it was indeed secure. Early in June the administration abandoned its plan to rush Clipper into the marketplace and extended its internal review of the policy issues raised by the chip until the end of the summer. This decision presumably also delays consideration of outlawing other encoding methods. A peculiar coalition of civil libertarians and large software companies has formed to plead the cause of unregulated cryptography. Self-styled "cypherpunks" argue that the government has no more right to insist on a back door in secure telephones than it does to restrict the language or vocabulary used in telephone conversations on the grounds that dialect might hinder interpretation of wiretaps. Companies such as Microsoft, Lotus Development Corporation, Banker's Trust and Digital Equipment Corporation are worried about the administration's proposal because they believe it will hurt the U.S. in international competition. Ilene Rosenthal, general counsel at the Software Publishers Association, which numbers 1,000 companies among its members, points out that telephones containing the NSA chip would be subject to export controls because cryptographic equipment is considered "munitions" under U.S. law. This bureaucratic restraint could force U.S. manufacturers of secure telephones to develop entirely different product lines for the domestic and international markets. Indeed, she says, even if the State Department did license Clipper for widespread export, it is doubtful whether any foreign government or company would buy a system to which the U.S. literally had the keys. Rosenthal contends that the U.S. has lost control of cryptography, citing more than 100 different brands of strong encoding software sold by non-U.S. companies. Indeed, discussion groups on the Internet computer network have been buzzing with plans for a do-it-yourself secure telephone that requires little more than a personal computer, a $200 modem and a microphone. It is not clear whether the administration will abandon its attempt to stuff the unregulated-cryptography genie back in the bottle. There are already 10,000 Clipper-equipped telephones on order for government use, and Jan Kosko of the National Institute of Science and Technology says the plan for the standard "is being advanced as fast as we can move it." Nine (thus far unidentified) cryptographers have been invited to review the algorithm, and Kosko reports that decoding equipment is in the works for "law enforcement and other government agencies that feel they need it." The Justice Department is busy evaluating proposals for the "key escrow agents" that are supposed to prevent the police and the FBI from listening in on conversations without a warrant. Some companies, however, are less concerned. They hope for enormous sales once privacy issues are resolved. AT&T, for example, announced its intention to sell Clipper-based telephone scramblers the same day that the chip was made public. "What the standard is," says spokesman David Arneke, "is less important than having a standard that all manufacturers can build to." - Paul Wallich

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Re:Crypto Credentials
by Andrew S Hall 16 Jul '93

16 Jul '93

Tim May writes: >It turns out that I was smack in the middle of both events Andrew just >referred to, and I can tell you first-hand that folks on the Net are >getting too freaked out over the views of others. Maybe it's just you, Tim... >Even better are in-person meetings, even if this contradicts the >"jacked-in," "wired" image of cyberpunks and console cowboys! The >Cypherpunks physical meetings in Mountain View are friendly, helpful, >and not at all rancorous. Likewise, the Extropians events I've >attended in the Bay Area (Thursday lunches, a couple of lectures, and >some parties) have been friendly and free of divisiveness and flaming. >This aspect of the in-person contacts has not been adequately >duplicated on the Net. This touches on what bugs me the most about the Net and why I post very little. People are too goddamn sensitive. Too many people sit around with a massive chip on their shoulder. I really have no idea why. I can't imagine that *all* of these people have never really experienced the hothouse atmosphere of hard-core problem-solving or brain-storming where one is often curt, harsh, hostile, obscene, etc during the exchange of ideas with no ill-effects later. Maybe people need to play rugby or soccer more. You know, kill one another for an hour and have a beer to laugh about it after. Maybe that brewski after is what is missing on the Net. The reason I am rambling on this here is that I also see a relation to cypherpunk technology. Is the relatively anonymous technology of the Net (faceless at least) causing people to forget the "polite society" which greases the skids of human contact? Will it be worse with even more anonymity? (To be fair to the anonymous posters here, I have seen no decrease of politeness from their quarter. When I have posted under my pseud, I have not been impolite either.) It would seem that we are still ape-like enough to need to see real teeth in that smile and not ASCII ones. I know we mostly like to talk tech on this list, but most of us see cypher-tech as a road to specific social goals. (see Tim's .sig) This tech does and will have social impact even if we are not sucessful in this agenda Part of the cypherpunks "job" needs to be to anticipate and help guide the social changes. Step one needs to be adapting homo sapiens to this new means of communication. A. BTW- I will stand by D. Denning's book as a crypto primer. It is a little outdated but, IMHO, is still the best starting point. Techno-Anarchy.Neophilia.Economic Freedom.Cryptography.Anti-Statism.Personal Liberty.Laissez-Faire.Privacy Protection.Libertarianism.No Taxes.No Bullshit. ********** Liberty BBS 1-614-798-9537 ********** ********** Dedicated to Freedom. Yours. **********

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Crypto Credentials
by Andrew S Hall 16 Jul '93

16 Jul '93

A query was made: > > I'm trying to learn more about practical cryptography in general > > and PGP and similar programs in particular. Any advice? A response: > @article{Nathan92, > author = {Paco Xander Nathan}, > journal = {Fringeware Review}, > month = {July}, To which Perry Metzger wrote: >Rather than pointing people to strange publications we've never heard >of written by authors without credentials, might I suggest... > >1) The PGP docs themselves are very good and far better as a tutorial > on cryptography than any of the "PGP tutorials" that have appeared > in the fringe literature. They are also free. > >2) Read a real text on cryptography. It isn't a childrens game. Its a > real branch of math and computer science, and really bright people > devote their lives to it. If you wanted to learn about medicine, > would you pick up a professional medical text, or something written > in a 'zine by people you hadn't heard of? And then Peter Davidson responded: : 1,2 deleted : 3. If you've never seen the article mentioned, and know nothing of : the author, on what basis do you claim that the author is without : credentials? Because he publishes in a magazine with "Fringe" in : the title? You're obviously prejudiced, Perry. : 4. Does it require an advanced degree in mathematics to write a clear : and lucid tutorial for those interested in using PGP? : 5. Is reading "a real text on cryptography" necessary in order to : learn to use PGP? Your remark suggests it is, which is likely to : discourage people from using PGP rather than encourage them. I agree with Perry. The original query was not 'how can I be cool and use PGP to write secret notes?' It was a serious enquiry about PGP and *other* similar systems. Reading a fringe popularization about PGP will not do much. (And I consider Paco to be a competent general writer.) Using PGP is about as easy as using DOS. Understanding PGP, its capablities, its strengths, how it relates to other crypto systems, and evaluating it and other systems is not so easy. It doesn't require 'an advanced degree in mathmetics,' but just high school algebra won't do it either. I have seen FringeWare and, while the treatment is PGP is fine as a tutorial, it is not an introduction to public key cryptography. It wasn't meant to be. There is a big difference between having people just use PGP and having them understand it. I know since I have worked several pieces to explain public key crypto for a general audience. If someone really wants to learn about the subject, the PGP docs are the best place to begin. From there, the sci.crypt FAQ, and then, if you are serious, Denning's _Cryptography and Data Security_. A deep and complex topic like cryptography requires as deep and complex study as the scholar wish to apply. That can mean a lifetime. A fluff, yet hip, article in a cool, yet sophisticated fringe journal is *not* the place to begin. Perry doesn't need my defense, but I will add that this mostly-lurking cypherpunk doesn't think he is an asshole. He is brutally honest and declares his opinion. I respect that. While he is often a bit wired, I have yet to see any hostility to those who didn't deserve it. ( cf recent extropians/pagans love-in or alt.binaries.pictures.erotica.children) I apologize for excessive re-quoting, and hope someone will forward a good crypto reference list to the original inquirer. I would, but I can't find it. A. Techno-Anarchy.Neophilia.Economic Freedom.Cryptography.Anti-Statism.Personal Liberty.Laissez-Faire.Privacy Protection.Libertarianism.No Taxes.No Bullshit. ********** Liberty BBS 1-614-798-9537 ********** ********** Dedicated to Freedom. Yours. **********

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Re: The right to be secure (fwd Computerworld article)
by smb＠research.att.com 16 Jul '93

16 Jul '93

Now this is news to me. You mean that they can listen to me if they can rationalize that there is a threat to national security? Here's a scenerio. John Q. Public HAS a copy of pgp and some LEA knows it. It must be that he's some kind of subversive. Therefore, he is a threat to national security. It is therefore legal to infringe on his rights? Maybe this is a bit of exageration...maybe it's not.... There are safeguards in the law; whether they're adequate or not is open to discussion. But it's not nearly as easy as you portray. Warrantless wiretaps are governed by the provisions of 50 USC 1801, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act. Under that act, the Feds can engage in electronic surveillance without a warrant if and only if all parties are non-Americans. If an American is picked up, they have to destroy the tape. Furthermore, under many circumstances (and I don't remember the details, and I don't seem to have a copy of that law in my folder for such things), the consent of a special court is needed. As I said -- they (or should that be ``They'') *can* do anything. But that doesn't make it legal, which was your question, and if they do it and are caught, the case will undoubtedly be thrown out of court. Furthermore, if the tap didn't fall under the exceptions of the FISA, it's barred by the ECPA, so you could sue for damages.

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Re: The right to be secure (fwd Computerworld article)
by peb＠PROCASE.COM 15 Jul '93

15 Jul '93

>> typically a court order, to both key escrow authorities. >"Typically", of course, means "not always", and it's coupled with the phrase I think they must be implicitly refering to the anti terrorist act which allows surveillence without a court order if national security is involved or if foreign nationals are involved, etc.

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