May 1993 - cypherpunks-legacy

Shamir at Stanford on Thursday
by tcmay＠netcom.com 08 May '93

08 May '93

> From daemon(a)Sunburn.Stanford.EDU Thu May 6 14:34:13 1993 > Date: Thu, 6 May 93 14:18:26 -0700 > From: Daphne Koller <daphne(a)Theory.Stanford.EDU> > To: stc(a)Theory.Stanford.EDU > Subject: STANFORD THEORY COLLOQUIUM > > > S T A N F O R D T H E O R Y C O L L O Q U I U M > ===================================================== > > > The Stanford Computer Science Department is pleased to announce the > eighth Stanford Theory Colloquium this Thursday, May 13. > > > Polynomials and Cryptography - Some Recent Results > > Professor Adi Shamir > Weizmann Institute of Science > > > The talk will take place 4:15 -- 5:45 p.m. in Jordan 041. > > A RECEPTION in honor of the speaker will be held in the third floor > lounge of MJH around 3:45. Everyone is welcome. > > ------------------------------------------------------------------- > | Professor Adi Shamir is a coinventor of the RSA public key | > | cryptographic scheme and of several other key management and | > | signature schemes. He was involved in the cryptanalytic attack | > | on the knapsack scheme, and more recently he developed (with E. | > | Biham) the new technique of differential cryptanalysis and | > | applied it to the Data Encryption Standard. | > ------------------------------------------------------------------- > > ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- > > > Polynomials and Cryptography - Some Recent Results > > Professor Adi Shamir > Weizmann Institute of Science > > > Mappings defined by polynomials modulo n=pq are a fundamental tool in > modern cryptography. However, the inversion of such mappings usually > requires the extraction of roots or the evaluation of high degree > polynomials, which is quite slow. This talk will consist of two parts. > In the first part, we give an introduction to some basic cryptographic > techniques. The second part will describe some new results in the area. > We consider the class of birational permutations f, in which both f and > f^-1 are low degree multivariate rational functions mod n. We describe > new families of birational permutations, and how to turn them into new > cryptographic schemes which are much faster than previously known > schemes. In addition, we consider the general problems of factoring > multivariate polynomials mod n and solving systems of polynomial > equations mod n, and develop new techniques for proving the hardness of > randomly chosen instances of such problems. > > The talk will be self contained and accessible to a wide audience. > +----------------------------------------------------------------------------+

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Re: An end to the PGP quarrel? (fwd)
by Arthur R. McGee 08 May '93

08 May '93

---------- Forwarded message ---------- Date: Sat, 8 May 1993 01:57:56 +0800 From: John Perry Barlow <barlow(a)eff.org> To: Steve Jackson <sjackson(a)tic.com>, eff-austin(a)tic.com, eff-austin-directors(a)tic.com Cc: thesegroups(a)tic.com Subject: Re: An end to the PGP quarrel? At 2:13 AM 5/7/93 -0500, Steve Jackson wrote: >The creator of PGP has proposed to Jim Bidzos of RSA that RSA approve >a new, already-written version of PGP which uses "RSAREF," an unprotected >version of the PGP algorithm. I propose that EFF-Austin write to Bidzos >endorsing the suggestion. While I don't necessarily want to us to stampede at ol' Jim I wrote him the following yesterday: Jim, John Gilmore passed on to me Phil Zimmerman's recent peace overture to you. I expect I am joined by nearly everyone who cares about the issue of cryptography in the hope that you will bury an understandable sense of rancor and accept his offer. Further, if there is anything which the Electronic Frontier Foundation can do to introduce light and good will into the area between you and Phil, be assured we are ready and willing. While I realize that PGP has been a burr under your saddle for the last two years...growing steadily more irritating as it proliferated like a virus around the planet...one could argue that it has actually done PK Partners more good that harm. By introducing thousands to both public key cryptography and the RSA approach to it, it has gone a long way toward establishing RSA as the de facto international standard for personal encryption. This can only work to your long term benefit. On the other hand, if the current course of things remains fixed and no resolution is made between PK Partners and Phil, then PGP will continue to be modified and improved by many international volunteers and will eventually become seriously competitive to your own products. To me, it appears you have a choice between a position where everybody loses and one where everybody wins. Perhaps I'm wrong, but the only factor which supports the former course is an emotional sense of violated principle. As I say, I could hardly fault you for feeling bitter after all that's happened, but I sincerely hope you'll be able to rise above it. And please let me know if we can help in any way. Thanks, John Perry Barlow

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An end to the PGP quarrel? (fwd)
by Arthur R. McGee 08 May '93

08 May '93

---------- Forwarded message ---------- Date: Fri, 7 May 93 02:13:29 -0500 From: Steve Jackson <sjackson(a)tic.com> To: eff-austin(a)tic.com, eff-austin-directors(a)tic.com Cc: thesegroups(a)tic.com Subject: An end to the PGP quarrel? The creator of PGP has proposed to Jim Bidzos of RSA that RSA approve a new, already-written version of PGP which uses "RSAREF," an unprotected version of the PGP algorithm. I propose that EFF-Austin write to Bidzos endorsing the suggestion. Hmm. Perhaps other groups might feel the same way, so this will be copied appropriately.

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A few different topics
by Nickey MacDonald 08 May '93

08 May '93

I have a couple of different things I want to talk about, so I'll make one large post rather than several smaller ones. I posted a link encryption post a while back, and one of the responses I got back implied I was very naive in using a "shuffle" as part of the initial manipulation of the packet to be sent. I have spent some further time thinking about this, and I still fail to see how reshuffling the order of the data is anything but a good thing. If the encryption algorithm generates one output character for each input character, then I can see a situation developing where an "interloper" could cause the message being sent to be changed: sender ---> interloper ---> receiver ^ Knows senders password, but sender is unaware. Changes sent message without senders knowledge. Now this situation is a possibility any time a store and forward (such as email) situation exists and someone (other than the sender and receiver as appropriate) knows the password(s). This could still be a problem in a real time link, unless the data is sent in a nonlinear (shuffled) order. The implication is, that if the data has to be rearranged to be understood, then the interloper is going to have to gather more than one packet, and rearrange them to understand whats being sent, in order to be able to know what changes to make to the message to make it have an altered meaning for the receiver. Collecting the packets would cause a delay that would (should) be noticeable on a real time link. I still don't like the idea of trying to use timing as the only control, given the modern communications can be filled with arbitrary delays, but I don't know of any other approach that will offer any hope of detecting that someone knows your password. This is probably another problem that would be solved by a "more powerful mailer", but not having one on hand I do not know this to be the case: I have a second thought about the subject handling of posts to this (and other) email lists. In my Bitnet days, I used to be on a number of Listserv lists. One of things I liked about them was that the messages always showed up as being from the list. The email I get now, all appears to be a collection of private mail from a collection of individual people... The problem occurs when someone replys privately to one of my posts. It is impossible for me to tell which mail is sent directly to me, and which mail has been redirected by the list. I am about to start "spec"ing a software licensing system using public key technology. I would like any comments... this is not something I have seen discussed on the list in the short time I've been subscribed. What I propose is that the software would require (say in an environment variable or a special file some where) an "activation key". The activation key would be some licensing data that was encrypted with a private key by the software manufacturer (say a serial number, licensee's name, and a license duration (or expiry date)). The software would have the public key compiled into it, and only if it could decode the activation key, and it had not expired, would the software run. The majority response on "should I try my survey" was positive (in fact I only got one "count me out"). I was warned that it may end up meaningless because everyone will submit anonymous responses... I don't see where that will be a problem, unless someone submits multiple responses or unless hiding behind anonymity means someone still feels inclined to be untruthful. I guess maybe I'm just being foolish by assuming that allowing anonymous posts would make people feel more secure in telling the truth about themselves... In any case, I will start collecting my thoughts and form some questions... --- Nick MacDonald | NMD on IRC i6t4(a)jupiter.sun.csd.unb.ca | PGP 2.1 Public key available via finger

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testing....
by J. Michael Diehl 08 May '93

08 May '93

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One-time pads
by Clark Reynard 08 May '93

08 May '93

Is there any publically-available software which allows utilization of one-time pads? I know it's just a matter of XOR'ing digits, but something which would allow use by modem and transmit the pad itself by PGP or another secure encryption standard, or the delivery by mail or courier of the pad itself to allow the future exchange of information by a less-secure medium would seem to be something that SOMEONE must have thought of doing; and while it's by no means trivial, it would take a bit of work to program it with a snazzy front-end, idiot-proofing and other bells and whistles. Just wondering. Oh, yes, I've posted an amusing little bit of propaganda to sci.crypt and alt.privacy.clipper, a sensationalistic little hypothetical proposition which I'd be happy to email anyone who is interested and doesn't have UseNET access (is there such a person?). ---- Robert W. Clark Just Say No! to the rclark(a)nyx.cs.du.edu Big Brother Chip

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Carrier humor
by fergp＠sytex.com 07 May '93

07 May '93

Buzzword (acronym) of the day: VLCC (Very Large Crude Carrier) Where: UNIX Review May 1993 Vol. 11, No. 5 in "Devil's Advocate," page 126, by Stan Kelly-Bootle "VLCC (Very Large Crude Carrier) is not MCI's view of AT&T, but rather one of those supertankers that regularly resort premature delivery, known as spillage." My $.02: If it's not, it should be. Cheers. Paul Ferguson | Boycott AT&T, Network Integrator | Write your elected Centreville, Virginia USA | Representatives. fergp(a)sytex.com | Do the right thing. Just say "NO" to the Wiretap (Clipper/Capstone) Chip(s) I love my country, but I fear its government.

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Swaine Flames Denning
by fnerd＠smds.com 07 May '93

07 May '93

Nice editorial on the back page of the June Dr. Dobb's: "Pay No Attention to the Man Behind the Curtain, Dorothy" I won't quote the whole thing, but the first paragraph reads: "The debate on digital-telephony legislation in the March 1993 issue of *Communications of the ACM* was a fraud and a dissappointment." It's by Michael Swaine. More serious than "Swaine's Flames" sometimes are. Cypherpunks reminds me of the very first issues of "Dr. Dobb's Journal of TINY BASIC Calisthenics and Orthodontia: Running Light without Overbyte." Those days, when it seemed we all had a chance to steer the future, were over fast. -fnerd

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cheap secure telnet?
by david＠staff.udc.upenn.edu 07 May '93

07 May '93

I have a need to have a secure telnet connection. It has to be cheap (on the order of hundreds of dollars, not thousands), but it doesn't have to be free. It also has to be low cost in terms of setup; that is, I don't want to set up a full blown Kerberos system just to get a single secure telnet link. The link is to be between two unix systems. I have root and physical access to both systems. Anyone know of such a beast? On second thought, if you have leads on stuff in the thousands of dollars range, send me them too. This /could/ turn out to be that important. -- david david(a)staff.udc.upenn.edu

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EFF letter regarding crypto policy
by Mike Godwin 07 May '93

07 May '93

Forwarded message:

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