May 1993 - cypherpunks-legacy

Unsubscribe
by spencew＠BIX.com 11 May '93

11 May '93

Please remove me from the list. Spencer K. Whetstone

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NIST Open Meeting
by fergp＠sytex.com 11 May '93

11 May '93

This message is forwarded from RISKS Digest (14.59) 8<---------- Begin forwarded message -------------- Date: Tue, 11 May 93 13:42:18 EDT From: Clipper-Capstone Chip Info <clipper(a)csrc.ncsl.nist.gov> Organization: National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Subject: NIST Advisory Board Seeks Comments on Crypto Note: This file has been posted to the following groups: RISKS Forum, Privacy Forum, Sci.crypt, Alt.privacy.clipper and will be made available for anonymous ftp from csrc.ncsl.nist.gov, filename pub/nistgen/cryptmtg.txt and for download from the NIST Computer Security BBS, 301-948-5717, filename cryptmtg.txt. Note: The following notice is scheduled to appear in the Federal Register this week. The notice announces a meeting of the Computer System Security and Privacy Advisory Board (established by the Computer Security Act of 1987) and solicits public and industry comments on a wide range of cryptographic issues. Please note that submissions due by 4:00 p.m. May 27, 1993. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE National Institute of Standards and Technology Announcing a Meeting of the COMPUTER SYSTEM SECURITY AND PRIVACY ADVISORY BOARD AGENCY: National Institute of Standards and Technology ACTION: Notice of Open Meeting SUMMARY: Pursuant to the Federal Advisory Committee Act, 5 U.S.C. App., notice is hereby given that the Computer System Security and Privacy Advisory Board will meet Wednesday, June 2, 1993, from 9:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m., Thursday, June 3, 1993, from 9:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m., and Friday, June 4, 1993 from 9:00 a.m. to 1:00 p.m. The Advisory Board was established by the Computer Security Act of 1987 (P.L. 100-235) to advise the Secretary of Commerce and the Director of NIST on security and privacy issues pertaining to Federal computer systems and report its findings to the Secretary of Commerce, the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, the Director of the National Security Agency, and the appropriate committees of the Congress. All sessions will be open to the public. DATES: The meeting will be held on June 2-4 1993. On June 2 and 3, 1993 the meeting will take place from 9:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. and on June 4, 1993 from 9:00 a.m. to 1:00 p.m. Public submissions (as described below) are due by 4:00 p.m. (EDT) May 27, 1993 to allow for sufficient time for distribution to and review by Board members. ADDRESS: The meeting will take place at the National Institute of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg, MD. On June 2, 1993, the meeting will be held in the Administration Building, "Red Auditorium," on June 3 the meeting will be held in the Administration Building, "Green Auditorium," and on June 4, 1993 in the Administration Building, Lecture Room "B." Submissions (as described below), including copyright waiver if required, should be addressed to: Cryptographic Issue Statements, Computer System Security and Privacy Advisory Board, Technology Building, Room B-154, National Institute of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg, MD, 20899 or via FAX to 301/948-1784. Submissions, including copyright waiver if required, may also be sent electronically to "crypto(a)csrc.ncsl.nist.gov". AGENDA: - Welcome and Review of Meeting Agenda - Government-developed "Key Escrow" Chip Announcement Review - Discussion of Escrowed Cryptographic Key Technologies - Review of Submitted Issue Papers - Position Presentations & Discussion - Public Participation - Annual Report and Pending Business - Close PUBLIC PARTICIPATION: This Advisory Board meeting will be devoted to the issue of the Administration's recently announced government-developed "key escrow" chip cryptographic technology and, more broadly, to public use of cryptography and government cryptographic policies and regulations. The Board has been asked by NIST to obtain public comments on this matter for submission to NIST for the national review that the Administration's has announced it will conduct of cryptographic-related issues. Therefore, the Board is interested in: 1) obtaining public views and reactions to the government-developed "key escrow" chip technology announcement, "key escrow" technology generally, and government cryptographic policies and regulations 2) hearing selected summaries of written views that have been submitted, and 3) conducting a general discussion of these issues in public. The Board solicits all interested parties to submit well-written, concise issue papers, position statements, and background materials on areas such as those listed below. Industry input is particularly encouraged in addressing the questions below. Because of the volume of responses expected, submittors are asked to identify the issues above to which their submission(s) are responsive. Submittors should be aware that copyrighted documents cannot be accepted unless a written waiver is included concurrently with the submission to allow NIST to reproduce the material. Also, company proprietary information should not be included, since submissions will be made publicly available. This meeting specifically will not be a tutorial or briefing on technical details of the government-developed "key escrow" chip or escrowed cryptographic key technologies. Those wishing to address the Board and/or submit written position statements are requested to be thoroughly familiar with the topic and to have concise, well-formulated opinions on its societal ramifications. Issues on which comments are sought include the following: 1. CRYPTOGRAPHIC POLICIES AND SOCIAL/PUBLIC POLICY ISSUES Public and Social policy aspects of the government-developed "key escrow" chip and, more generally, escrowed key technology and government cryptographic policies. Issues involved in balancing various interests affected by government cryptographic policies. 2. LEGAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES Consequences of the government-developed "key escrow" chip technology and, more generally, key escrow technology and government cryptographic policies. 3. INDIVIDUAL PRIVACY Issues and impacts of cryptographic-related statutes, regulations, and standards, both national and international, upon individual privacy. Issues related to the privacy impacts of the government-developed "key escrow" chip and "key escrow" technology generally. 4. QUESTIONS DIRECTED TO AMERICAN INDUSTRY 4.A Industry Questions: U.S. Export Controls 4.A.1 Exports - General What has been the impact on industry of past export controls on products with password and data security features for voice or data? Can such an impact, if any, be quantified in terms of lost export sales or market share? If yes, please provide that impact. How many exports involving cryptographic products did you attempt over the last five years? How many were denied? What reason was given for denial? Can you provide documentation of sales of cryptographic equipment which were lost to a foreign competitor, due solely to U.S. Export Regulations. What are the current market trends for the export sales of information security devices implemented in hardware solutions? For software solutions? 4.A.2 Exports - Software If the U.S. software producers of mass market or general purpose software (word processing, spreadsheets, operating environments, accounting, graphics, etc.) are prohibited from exporting such packages with file encryption capabilities, what foreign competitors in what countries are able and willing to take foreign market share from U.S. producers by supplying file encryption capabilities? What is the impact on the export market share and dollar sales of the U.S. software industry if a relatively inexpensive hardware solution for voice or data encryption is available such as the government-developed "key escrow" chip? What has been the impact of U.S. export controls on COMPUTER UTILITIES software packages such as Norton Utilities and PCTools? What has been the impact of U.S. export controls on exporters of OTHER SOFTWARE PACKAGES (e.g., word processing) containing file encryption capabilities? What information does industry have that Data Encryption Standard (DES) based software programs are widely available abroad in software applications programs? 4.A.3 Exports - Hardware Measured in dollar sales, units, and transactions, what have been the historic exports for: Standard telephone sets Cellular telephone sets Personal computers and work stations FAX machines Modems Telephone switches What are the projected export sales of these products if there is no change in export control policy and if the government- developed "key escrow" chip is not made available to industry? What are the projected export sales of these products if the government-developed "key escrow" chip is installed in the above products, the above products are freely available at an additional price of no more than $25.00, and the above products are exported WITHOUT ADDITIONAL LICENSING REQUIREMENTS? What are the projected export sales of these products if the government-developed "key escrow" chip is installed in the above products, the above products are freely available at an additional price of no more than $25.00, and the above products are to be exported WITH AN ITAR MUNITIONS LICENSING REQUIREMENT for all destinations? What are the projected export sales of these products if the government-developed "key escrow" chip is installed in the above products, the above products are freely available at an additional price of no more than $25.00, and the above products are to be exported WITH A DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE LICENSING REQUIREMENT for all destinations? 4.A.4 Exports - Advanced Telecommunications What has been the impact on industry of past export controls on other advanced telecommunications products? Can such an impact on the export of other advanced telecommunications products, if any, be quantified in terms of lost export sales or market share? If yes, provide that impact. 4.B Industry Questions: Foreign Import/Export Regulations How do regulations of foreign countries affect the import and export of products containing cryptographic functions? Specific examples of countries and regulations will prove useful. 4.C Industry Questions: Customer Requirements for Cryptography What are current and future customer requirements for information security by function and industry? For example, what are current and future customer requirements for domestic banking, international banking, funds transfer systems, automatic teller systems, payroll records, financial information, business plans, competitive strategy plans, cost analyses, research and development records, technology trade secrets, personal privacy for voice communications, and so forth? What might be good sources of such data? What impact do U.S. Government mandated information security standards for defense contracts have upon demands by other commercial users for information security systems in the U.S.? In foreign markets? What threats are your product designed to protect against? What threats do you consider unaddressed? What demand do you foresee for a) cryptographic only products, and b) products incorporating cryptography in: 1) the domestic market, 2) in the foreign-only market, and 3) in the global market? 4.D Industry Questions: Standards If the European Community were to announce a non-DES, non-public key European Community Encryption Standard (ECES), how would your company react? Include the new standard in product line? Withdraw from the market? Wait and see? What are the impacts of government cryptographic standards on U.S. industry (e.g., Federal Information Processing Standard 46-1 [the Data Encryption Standard] and the proposed Digital Signature Standard)? 5. QUESTIONS DIRECTED TO THE AMERICAN BUSINESS COMMUNITY 5.A American Business: Threats and Security Requirements Describe, in detail, the threat(s), to which you are exposed and which you believe cryptographic solutions can address. Please provide actual incidents of U.S. business experiences with economic espionage which could have been thwarted by applications of cryptographic technologies. What are the relevant standards of care that businesses must apply to safeguard information and what are the sources of those standards other than Federal standards for government contractors? What are U.S. business experiences with the use of cryptography to protect against economic espionage, (including current and projected investment levels in cryptographic products)? 5.B American Business: Use of Cryptography Describe the types of cryptographic products now in use by your organization. Describe the protection they provide (e.g., data encryption or data integrity through digital signatures). Please indicate how these products are being used. Describe any problems you have encountered in finding, installing, operating, importing, or exporting cryptographic devices. Describe current and future uses of cryptographic technology to protect commercial information (including types of information being protected and against what threats). Which factors in the list below inhibit your use of cryptographic products? Please rank: -- no need -- no appropriate product on market -- fear of interoperability problems -- regulatory concerns -- a) U.S. export laws -- b) foreign country regulations -- c) other -- cost of equipment -- cost of operation -- other Please comment on any of these factors. In your opinion, what is the one most important unaddressed need involving cryptographic technology? Please provide your views on the adequacy of the government-developed "key escrow" chip technological approach for the protection of all your international voice and data communication requirements. Comments on other U.S. Government cryptographic standards? 6. OTHER Please describe any other impacts arising from Federal government cryptographic policies and regulations. Please describe any other impacts upon the Federal government in the protection of unclassified computer systems. Are there any other comments you wish to share? The Board agenda will include a period of time, not to exceed ten hours, for oral presentations of summaries of selected written statements submitted to the Board by May 27, 1993. As appropriate and to the extent possible, speakers addressing the same topic will be grouped together. Speakers, prescheduled by the Secretariat and notified in advance, will be allotted fifteen to thirty minutes to orally present their written statements. Individuals and organizations submitting written materials are requested to advise the Secretariat if they would be interested in orally summarizing their materials for the Board at the meeting. Another period of time, not to exceed one hour, will be reserved for oral comments and questions from the public. Each speaker will be allotted up to five minutes; it will be necessary to strictly control the length of presentations to maximize public participation and the number of presentations. Except as provided for above, participation in the Board's discussions during the meeting will be at the discretion of the Designated Federal Official. Approximately thirty seats will be available for the public, including three seats reserved for the media. Seats will be available on a first-come, first-served basis. FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Mr. Lynn McNulty, Executive Secretary and Associate Director for Computer Security, Computer Systems Laboratory, National Institute of Standards and Technology, Building 225, Room B154, Gaithersburg, Maryland 20899, telephone: (301) 975-3240. SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Background information on the government- developed "key escrow" chip proposal is available from the Board Secretariat; see address in "for further information" section. Also, information on the government-developed "key escrow" chip is available electronically from the NIST computer security bulletin board, phone 301-948-5717. The Board intends to stress the public and social policy aspects, the legal and Constitutional consequences of this technology, and the impacts upon American business and industry during its meeting. It is the Board's intention to create, as a product of this meeting, a publicly available digest of the important points of discussion, conclusions (if any) that might be reached, and an inventory of the policy issues that need to be considered by the government. Within the procedures described above, public participation is encouraged and solicited. /signed/ Raymond G. Kammer, Acting Director May 10, 1993 8<--------- End forwarded message ---------------- I didn't see "Clipper" or "Capstone" or "SkipJack" mention once in the entire post. What did they do -- drop the name? I'm starting on my own submission for presentation tonight... Cheers. Paul Ferguson | Boycott AT&T, Network Integrator | Write your elected Centreville, Virginia USA | Representatives. fergp(a)sytex.com | Do the right thing. Just say "NO" to the Wiretap (Clipper/Capstone) Chip(s) I love my country, but I fear its government.

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book reference request
by deboni＠diego.llnl.gov 11 May '93

11 May '93

A month or so back, there appeared on this list a reference to a book on the history of cryptology in telecommunications in the country. If memory serves me (and it may well not) its title was something like "The Invisible Weapon". Could some knowing person please send oe the full reference, or otherwise unconfuse me? Thanks! Tom DeBoni deboni(a)llnl.gov

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[Torbjorn Granlund: GNU Multiple Precision Arithmetic Library]
by gnu＠cygnus.com 11 May '93

11 May '93

It might be interesting to compare the speed of this library with the speed of the multiprecision code in RSAREF and in PGP. May the fastest library win! John ------- Forwarded Message To: info-gnu(a)prep.ai.mit.edu, bug-gnu-utils(a)prep.ai.mit.edu Subject: GNU Multiple Precision Arithmetic Library Date: Mon, 10 May 1993 16:35:35 +0200 From: Torbjorn Granlund <tege(a)sics.se> Version 1.3 of the GNU Multiple Precision Arithmetic Library is now available for anonymous ftp from prep.ai.mit.edu as /pub/gnu/gmp-1.3.tar.z. The main differences between 1.2 and 1.3 are bug fixes and support for 64-bit machines. There are also a couple of enhancements that affects the speed of some operations. There are no new user-visible functions in this version. (There will be a new major version of this library in a not distant future. That version, 2.0, will contain additions of new functions contributed from other people. It also has a documented low-level interface for really time-critical applications. I don't know exactly when it will be ready.) These people (in alphabetical order) helped with testing of this release: Per Bothner <bothner(a)cygnus.com> Bruno Haible <haible(a)ma2s2.mathematik.uni-karlsruhe.de> J.W.Hawtin-SE0(a)computer-science.birmingham.ac.uk Joachim Hollman <joachim(a)matematik.su.se> Phil Howard <pdh(a)netcom.com> Henrik Johansson <Henrik.Johansson(a)nexus.comm.se> AOKI Kazumaro <maro(a)terada.info.waseda.ac.jp> Steve Linton <sl25(a)cus.cam.ac.uk> Alyson Reeves <reeves(a)archimedes.cc.brandeis.edu> Nils Rennebarth <nils(a)exp-math.uni-essen.de> Joachim Schimpf <Joachim.Schimpf(a)ecrc.de> Ken Weber <kweber(a)mcs.kent.edu> Plus possibly somebody whose name I have lost. Many other people have contributed bug reports during the 1 1/2 years since the last release. Thanks everybody! Torbjorn Granlund [ Most GNU software is packed using the new `gzip' compression program. Source code is available on most sites distributing GNU software. For information on how to order GNU software on tape, floppy, or cd-rom, check the file etc/ORDERS in the GNU Emacs distribution or in GNUinfo/ORDERS on prep, or e-mail a request to: gnu(a)prep.ai.mit.edu By ordering tapes from the FSF you help us continue to develop more free software. Media revenues are our primary source of support. Donations to FSF are deductible on US tax returns. The above software will soon to be at these ftp sites as well. Please try them before prep.ai.mit.edu! thanx -gnu(a)prep.ai.mit.edu ASIA: ftp.cs.titech.ac.jp, utsun.s.u-tokyo.ac.jp:/ftpsync/prep, cair.kaist.ac.kr:/pub/gnu AUSTRALIA: archie.oz.au:/gnu (archie.oz or archie.oz.au for ACSnet) EUROPE: irisa.irisa.fr:/pub/gnu, grasp1.univ-lyon1.fr:pub/gnu, unix.hensa.ac.uk:/pub/uunet/systems/gnu, src.doc.ic.ac.uk:/gnu, ftp.informatik.tu-muenchen.de, ftp.informatik.rwth-aachen.de:/pub/gnu, isy.liu.se, ftp.stacken.kth.se, ftp.luth.se:/pub/unix/gnu, nic.funet.fi:/pub/gnu, ugle.unit.no, ftp.win.tue.nl, ftp.denet.dk, ftp.eunet.ch, nic.switch.ch:/mirror/gnu, archive.eu.net USA: wuarchive.wustl.edu, labrea.stanford.edu, ftp.kpc.com:/pub/mirror/gnu, ftp.cs.widener.edu, uxc.cso.uiuc.edu, col.hp.com:/mirrors/gnu, ftp.cs.columbia.edu:/archives/gnu/prep, gatekeeper.dec.com:/pub/GNU, ftp.uu.net:/systems/gnu ] ------- End of Forwarded Message

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notes from meeting?
by jet＠nas.nasa.gov 10 May '93

10 May '93

anybody keep some sort of notes/minutes/summary of the meeting that they can post? I managed to misplace mine, and with it, things like names and email addresses... thx -- J. Eric Townsend jet(a)nas.nasa.gov 415.604.4311 NASA Ames Numerical Aerodynamic Simulation | play: jet(a)well.sf.ca.us Parallel Systems Support, CM-5 POC | '92 R100R / DoD# 0378 PGP2.1 public key available upon request or finger jet(a)simeon.nas.nasa.gov

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Early Battles
by norm＠netcom.com 10 May '93

10 May '93

I remember hearing an anecdote from a fairly private but unclassified source. According to this source NSA was incensed when IBM first developed Lucifer for banking applications, especially because they published details in a Scientific American article. NSA accused IBM of stealing secrets from NSA thru IBM employees having access to NSA technology as part of their jobs developing hardware and software for NSA. IBM was of course prepared for this eventuality. They quoted an early paper by Shannon suggesting that a mixture of transpositions and permutations would likely produce strong ciphers. This is, of course, the heart of both Lucifer and DES. NSA backed off.

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FWD: Archimedes PGP 2.2 & PGPwimp
by whitaker＠eternity.demon.co.uk 10 May '93

10 May '93

This article was forwarded to you by whitaker(a)eternity.demon.co.uk (Russell Earl Whitaker): --------------------------------- cut here ----------------------------- Path: eternity.demon.co.uk!demon!rundart.demon.co.uk!gt Newsgroups: demon.security From: gt(a)rundart.demon.co.uk (Giles Todd) Cc: chrisg(a)nedman.demon.co.uk Reply-to: uploads(a)demon.co.uk Subject: Archimedes PGP 2.2 & PGPwimp X-Mailer: VE3PZR VIEW DIS V1.01. Lines: 34 Date: Sat, 8 May 1993 15:51:01 +0000 Message-ID: <31705.gt(a)rundart.demon.co.uk> Sender: usenet(a)demon.co.uk > Date: 08 May 93 16:05:23 GMT > Message-Id: <930508160523(a)nedman.demon.co.uk> > From: Chris Gransden <chrisg(a)nedman.demon.co.uk> > Reply-To: chrisg(a)nedman.demon.co.uk > To: uploads(a)demon.co.uk > Subject: Archimedes PGP 2.2 & PGPwimp > Organization: Home > X-Mailer: ReaderS for the Acorn Archimedes > > I've just uploaded a new version of PGP 2.2 for the Archimedes to /incoming. > The main improvement for this release, v1.14, is the encryption/decryption > phase is significantly speeded up. Also using language translation files now > works. > > I've also uploaded PGPwimp. This is a desktop front end to Archimedes PGP. > This was produced by Peter Gaunt. This can only be used with RISC OS3. It > makes using PGP alot simpler. > > Could you put both these programs in /pub/archimedes. > Thanks. > > Chris > > -- > Email: chrisg(a)nedman.demon.co.uk These files are now available from /pub/archimedes. Thanks for the upload. Giles. -- Giles Todd gt(a)rundart.demon.co.uk (Internet) Rundart Ltd Demon Internet Services Voice: +44 925 33472 PGP 2.x public key available. --------------------------------- cut here -----------------------------

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FWD: UK English language file for PGP
by whitaker＠eternity.demon.co.uk 10 May '93

10 May '93

This article was forwarded to you by whitaker(a)eternity.demon.co.uk (Russell Earl Whitaker): --------------------------------- cut here ----------------------------- Path: eternity.demon.co.uk!demon!rundart.demon.co.uk!gt Newsgroups: demon.security From: gt(a)rundart.demon.co.uk (Giles Todd) Cc: pla(a)sktb.demon.co.uk Reply-to: uploads(a)demon.co.uk Subject: UK English language file for PGP X-Mailer: VE3PZR VIEW DIS V1.01. Lines: 40 Date: Sat, 8 May 1993 13:13:47 +0000 Message-ID: <31691.gt(a)rundart.demon.co.uk> Sender: usenet(a)demon.co.uk > Date: Sat, 8 May 1993 12:37:27 GMT > From: "Paul L. Allen" <pla(a)sktb.demon.co.uk> > To: uploads(a)demon.co.uk > Subject: UK English language file for PGP > Message-ID: <8FoXA4j024n(a)sktb.demon.co.uk> > Reply-To: pla(a)sktb.demon.co.uk > Organization: Chaos > Lines: 21 > X-Mailer: Archimedes ReadNews > > -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- > > I became a little tired of PGP misspelling `armour', so I created a UK > English language.txt (which also tells people to press keys instead of > hitting them). I've just uploaded it as language.uk. > > Archimedes users of PGP will need release 1.14 of PGP for the Archimedes > to use other languages (should appear on demon in the next day or two, if > it hasn't already). > > - --Paul > > -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- > Version: 2.2 > > iQCVAgUBK+upf2v14aSAK9PNAQFg9gP+NNareZokjgy+MJMWbfK+ny3CfzMdoTRO > cHhw8hOFDd+v8h4ezUFhI9YIFV6cfJDW9VesvcfFTlTkJ33V1x1YXKcPznxnF6fM > yUBbgWUEooLDMjEVjB+lpK3nBy+0HDTpH1zVwYgpNQTV8pITApVzG7FobwGJGFia > z21//VYWG6g= > =eiIE > -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- /pub/pgp/language.uk is now available. Thanks for the upload. Giles. -- Giles Todd gt(a)rundart.demon.co.uk (Internet) Rundart Ltd Demon Internet Services Voice: +44 925 33472 PGP 2.x public key available. --------------------------------- cut here -----------------------------

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FWD: PGP Menu Utility
by whitaker＠eternity.demon.co.uk 10 May '93

10 May '93

This article was forwarded to you by whitaker(a)eternity.demon.co.uk (Russell Earl Whitaker): --------------------------------- cut here ----------------------------- Xref: demon demon.security:118 demon.ip.cppnews:318 Path: eternity.demon.co.uk!demon!rundart.demon.co.uk!gt Newsgroups: demon.security,demon.ip.cppnews From: gt(a)rundart.demon.co.uk (Giles Todd) Cc: pbrett(a)tamara.demon.co.uk Reply-to: uploads(a)demon.co.uk Subject: PGP Menu Utility X-Mailer: VE3PZR VIEW DIS V1.01. Lines: 61 Date: Fri, 7 May 1993 22:35:33 +0000 Message-ID: <31617.gt(a)rundart.demon.co.uk> Sender: usenet(a)demon.co.uk > From: Paul Brett <pbrett(a)tamara.demon.co.uk> > Subject: PGP Menu Utility > Reply-To: pbrett(a)tamara.demon.co.uk > To: uploads(a)demon.co.uk > Message-ID: <736839528snx(a)tamara.demon.co.uk> > X-Mailer: cppnews $Revision: 1.35 $ > Date: Fri, 07 May 93 22:38:48 GMT > Organization: Disorganised > Lines: 41 > > -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- > > PGP MENU > ~~~~~~~~ > PGP menu is a simple utility to allow easy use of PGP from within CppNews (or > any other program that allows you to shell out to an editor as you prepare > your text). > > The program calls up your editor, to allow you to edit a text message, and > then prompts you to allow you to sign, encrypt or sign & encrypt (both) a > file. > > Known Bugs / Features > ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ > > 1. The program will always use default key for encryption of your message > (i.e. the key specified by 'MyName' in %PGPPATH%\config.txt). > > 2. There is currently no way to specify the encryption flags. > > Legal Stuff > ~~~~~~~~~~~ > > This program is copyright by me. It is made available as is, for unlimited > distribution and use provided that the program and documentation are > distributed as is. No warranty is given for malfunction of the program, > or consequent damages. > > - -- > Paul Brett EMail : pbrett(a)tamara.demon.co.uk > Uxbridge, UK Voice : 0895 251479 > PGP2.x key available > > > -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- > Version: 2.2 > > iQBVAgUBK+rVWdQocaCQTJGXAQE3JQH/UX6/QxlFJViBw3Na+/anMV78OsziHEfh > KfjRg65rrUWB4NY+rjBhBOSKtn8uSv+kVZYZjx6TiAYSqsLqpeNczg== > =OMdm > -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- pgpmenu.zip is available for anonymous ftp from ftp.demon.co.uk:/pub/pgp. Thanks for the upload. Giles. -- Giles Todd gt(a)rundart.demon.co.uk (Internet) Rundart Ltd Demon Internet Services Voice: +44 925 33472 PGP 2.x public key available. --------------------------------- cut here -----------------------------

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Random Numbers
by KINNEY WILLIAM H 10 May '93

10 May '93

There's was some traffic on sci.crypt today about generating random numbers by reading noise off a sound port, which ties in to discussion here of using a Zener diode device. The question is, if you have a noise source that is likely to create, say, long strings of zeros or to have some other statistical bias, how do you fix it up to create a good distribution? Certainly, if your only problem is that you have an input stream where the ones are randomly distributed but _rare_, in the sense that the stream is mostly zeros, you can just count ones for a period of time and create an output stream like output[i] = 1 if the parity of N input bits is odd 0 if the parity of N input bits is even Then the ouput stream will be very high-entropy. Something similar, but more complicated, would probably apply to reading thermal noise as well, since you know the input has a Boltzmann distribution or whatever, and can transform it to a distribution of your choice. The problem seems to boil down to having random input with a distribution f() and transforming it to random output with another distribuion g(). Or if you want to make it worse, having some not-really-random input f() and transforming it to random output g(). But this is probably naive -- what are the pitfalls here? What is the best way to do it for cryptographic purposes? -- Will

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