April 1993 - cypherpunks-legacy

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by James A. Donald 19 Apr '93

19 Apr '93

subscribe James A. Donald In case a human is reading this, I wish to subscribe to the cypherpunks mailing list. --------------------------------------------------------------------- | James A. Donald | Joseph Stalin said: "Ideas are more powerful | than guns. We would not let our enemies have jamesdon(a)infoserv.com | guns, why should we let them have ideas."

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gentlemen
by D Anton Sherwood 19 Apr '93

19 Apr '93

Who was the statesman who said, two generations ago, "Gentlemen do not read each other's mail"? By the way, the San Francisco Chronicle's business section's Saturday headline was Secret Phone Plan Under Fire or maybe it was Secure Phone Scheme Draws Fire *\\* Anton Ubi scriptum?

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musings from a madman
by ld231782＠longs.lance.colostate.edu 19 Apr '93

19 Apr '93

Hellman's Hints --------------- [Hellman] >When a message is to be sent it will first be >encrypted under K, then K will be encrypted under the unit key UK, >and the serial number of the unit added to produce a three part >message which will then be encrypted under the system key SK >producing > > E{ E[M; K], E[K; UK], serial number; SK} > >When a court order obtains K1 and K2, and thence K Just a quibble, Mr. Hellman says earlier that K1 and K2 lead to unit key UK, not family code K. And given the above, how do they ever decrypt the message if they don't have K, unless the scheme is insecure under the `family code'? (>barf<, leave it for the Ministry of Truth to come up with some user-friendly term for something inherently nauseating like `friendly fire', I wonder if Dingaling is behind this one too...) Do you get it? -------------- This little formula is not obvious to me. It seems to me two basic questions have to be answered, could someone spell these out given what's known? 1. How the phones interact prior/during a call 2. How the sinister TLAs wiretap 3. How casual eavesdropping by other than billion-dollary agencies is prevented (if at all) The Flimsy Code --------------- The family code is clearly a propaganda wrench in the works. `They' now have some pretty powerful ammunition--it must be secure if you get to change your code whenever you want, right? It's so simple anyone can use it! I'm a bit surprised it wasn't mentioned in the announcement. I guess all the hoopla and slick and vapid AT&T ads about `wow, you get to *choose* your combination!' will come a bit later, it'll fit in quite nicely with their `I' plan, as in Illegal... (I hope Sprint and MCI sue the pants off AT&T and the government for this outrageous collusion, unless of course they are in the collusion too...) Conspiracy Theories ------------------- how is it that CPSR and EFF came out with responses to the initial announcement virtually instantaneously after its release? Are they just really swift? I want to know what >every< single person on those mailing lists has to say about how their name got there and how long they knew about this abomination (and before they have a chance to agree on stories!). I don't appreciate Mr. Banisar's little slash suggesting that the issue is already closed and that anyone who thinks something just a tad unusual is going on is a deranged conspiracy monger... I think its kind of cute how he says that `nothing significant' appeared in the traffic... Who Has the Keys? ----------------- The evasion of `who stores the keys' makes me wonder. It suggests that the proposal was poorly crafted (which is true in any case), but, more likely, IMHO, the scheme is weak enough for the NSA (but maybe not cops) to break regardless, and hence their casual disregard for this seemingly monumentally crucial point. Also, they can make it sound like they are `compromising' by giving the appearance of public debate on the agencies, because it won't really matter, while diverting attention from the *real* issues (look here! see your rights? now you see 'em, now you don't... pick a key, any key---was it this one? >wow< how'd you *do* that?). What IS Acceptable ------------------ We should be prepared to say what >is< acceptable for the government to do; don't get caught off guard with a question like ``well, what are you people proposing as an alternative?'' Here are a few ideas... 1) Get the hell out of the cryptography and hardware development business, and leave private industry alone to do what it does best when not harrassed by extortionists and terrorists who shall remain nameless but have the initials N.S.A. ... 2) Let the NIST pick a phone encryption scheme after totally open debates and total noninvolvement by the NSA, who is obviously biased. We can note that this has been attempted to be followed for other encryption schemes (e.g. digital signature, DES, etc.) why not here? what's so special? 3) Let communications companies loose on it, stay out of the way or get trampled by the stampede, and we'll all be happy. Ministry of Truth (1993-?) -------------------------- Finally, drive home the point: the government may have always had the `precedent' (don't ever use `right' here) to *listen*, there has never been any assurance that they must *understand* what is being said, and we are assured by our Noble Constitution that we can say what we please, and if by exercising this fundamental and inalienable right we upset the fragile status quo, then so be it, because the monument of freedom of speech will always overshadow the weak and tenuous `precedent to listen'. Cryptography simply alters their *understanding* of what is on a line from the meaningful to the meaningless, and only the Ministry of Truth is allowed to regulate *meaning* (hm, maybe that will be the next government agency created under the New Regime...) Mea Culpa --------- sorry for the rough editing on the last message, that's what happens in the heat of the moment from one of those impatient and extremely agitated cypherpunks... For those of you keeping score at home, the ``Notice how the proposal talks about'' non sequitur should read ``Notice how the proposal talks about criminals and terrorists without any qualifications such as `alleged' and `suspected' ''. as my penance you have this little beauty in front of you... How Does Cypherpunk Sound? -------------------------- `cypherpunk' actually has some pretty endearing qualities as a name, and I'd be a bit horrified to give it up, just when I was waiting for the T shirt ``Cypherpunks do it stealthily'' (secretly? sneakily?). The public seems to have a bit of fascination for `cyberpunk' right now and we are just riding on it (stealthily? secretly? sneakily?). OK, so we don't publicize that term, but it could actually increase the glamor and mystery of the cause; we shouldn't pretend that we're not seriously pissed off... Quote Corner ------------ ``the TURNCOATS ARE COMING!'' ``REMEMBER THE LIBERTY!'' ``They're HEEEERE...'' ``Keys? I thought YOU had the keys! Do you have a crypt hanger? We better call the cryptsmith...''

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Re: AT&T Press Release on Clipper
by hkhenson＠cup.portal.com 19 Apr '93

19 Apr '93

On Sun, 18 Apr 1993 09:49:35 -0500 Dave Banisar <banisar(a)washofc.cpsr.org> posted: >Subject: AT&T Press Release on Clipper > >Here's AT&T's announcement on the Clipper. > > > AT&T TO INCORPORATE NEW 'CLIPPER' CHIP INTO SECURE COMMUNICATIONS >PRODUCT LINE > >GREENSBORO, N.C., April 16 > > AT&T (NYSE: T) said today it is moving to improve the security and privacy >of telephone communications by incorporating a just-announced new U.S. >government technology for voice encryption into its secure communications >product line. > > AT&T will use the Clipper chip, announced today by President Clinton as a [mucho deleted] > AT&T Secure Communications Systems is headquartered in Greensboro. > For more information about the AT&T Telephone Security Device 3600 >and other AT&T Secure Communications Products, call David Arneke at >919-279-7680. > CONTACT: David Arneke of AT&T Secure Communications Systems, 919-279- >7680,or after hours, 919-273-5687, or Herb Linnen of AT&T Media Relations, >202-457-3933, or after hours, 202-333-9162 Expecting to get a recording or something of the like, I called the last of these numbers, and got a considerably agitated Herb Lennen--at home--who had already been the recipient of a call or two. He was not happy, to put it mildly! I kindly informed him that his home phone number had been posted all over the computer nets by someone posting an official ATT press release, and that the government's universal wiretap chip, er Clipper chip, was fast becoming a controversial topic. He accused me of being with an "organized hacker group," and stated that he only talks to people from news organizations of the NYT and Wall Street Journal size. I offered to send him a sample of the comments, but he declined to give me his email address. (Though I suspect that Herb_Lennen(a)att.com might work.) Most interesting though, he told me that John Markoff had written the definitive (and he implied positive) story on the chip. Yo John! If you are not reading the cypherpunks list for the "other side" of this story, you might want to. Keith Henson

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MEDIA: Calm
by Matthew J Miszewski 19 Apr '93

19 Apr '93

Everyone, Im glad to see so many insightful letters being sent/broadcast to media types. I think that our cause would be better served with a toning down of the rhetoric and techno-talk. I understand what your saying but Joe Byline may not. Keep it simple. On that note, I think one more effective strategy is for some cypherpunks to write thoughtful letters which appear (or do) come from strict lay people scared at the thought of the "Wiretap Chip". If it appears that only techno- types care about this issue, then no one else will. I know non-crypto experts read this list, so this is a call to you to express your opinions publically as john/jane doe on the street. You dont have to speak to the technical side of things at all. Simply let the world know your afraid and so should everyone else. Leave the cryptoanalysis to the experts (Tim, Eric, et al) Keep up the good work everyone. Matt

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unsub
by vanam＠phazer.ksu.ksu.edu 19 Apr '93

19 Apr '93

unsubscribe me please thanx.... Stephen

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Followup message from Hellman
by karn＠qualcomm.com 19 Apr '93

19 Apr '93

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Amiga programmers.
by Haywood J. Blowme 19 Apr '93

19 Apr '93

A curious thought occurred to me several months ago, and it was recently brought up again when someone mentioned doing it on IBM's with soundblasters. This idea has been sitting basically on the back burner for a while now. But now with the current climate (Wiretap chip proposed) I think it is relevant. This idea basically applies to Commodore Amiga computers. So if you are a programmer and would like to help me with this please E-Mail me about it. The basic idea I think would need the following: - A sound digitizer - High speed modem - 68020 or above processor (for speed purposes) - Good encryption algorithm (IDEA for example) Implementing the system would involve using the digitizer to digitize the voice. Then processing the sample (in real time) through the encryption algorithm and sending the output to the modem for transmission. The process would be repeated on the other end. The problems I see occurring are the following - Speed of the computer affecting real time encryption - Synchronizing the data packets for accurate decryption on the other side. - simultaneous I/O on the serial and parallel ports(for modem and digitizer) - outputing to speakers on receiving end. - having the whole process operate in a full duplex mode (ie. both people can talk at the same time). I think the majority of functions can be handled by the system libraries and outside sources (such as xpkidea.library for encryption). Does this sound feasible?? ============================================================================= /// | psionic(a)wam.umd.edu | Q: How did the govt. decide to use an 80 __ /// C= | Craig H. Rowland | bit key for the new clipper chip? \\\/// Amiga| PGP Key Available | A: They combined Bill and Hillary \/// 1200 | by finger. | Clintons' IQ's. =============================================================================

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Figuring out ZyXEL's CELP specs
by wbe＠bbn.com 18 Apr '93

18 Apr '93

After various people expressed interest in the ZyXEL modem CELP specs... Tyrone.Horton(a)p101.f701.n202.z1.fidonet.org replied: > As far as CELP, ZyXEL will not be releasing the specs. OK. In that case, it's up to us to figure it out. :-) I saw the following post about 4800 CELP on another newsgroup and thought it might help someone here get closer to figuring out how ZyXEL's 9600 CELP works. PLEASE: the following message mentions a source of CELP source code that's free. Rather than everyone calling all at once, I suggest: (1) If you live in the D.C. area, maybe go ahead and call anyway and then post the results in this newsgroup. Otherwise (2) If you have a high interest and it's likely you'll actually do something with the information, POST A NOTE TO THIS NEWSGROUP saying so and wait a couple of days so we can all see who else is interested. (3) When the dust settles, the most interested, and/or those nearest Washington, D.C., call to get the source code and then post it to the newsgroup (if permitted). (Unfortunately, you may have to consider U.S. export restrictions, but since the author says the code "is available for worldwide distribution", I don't expect this to be a problem.) -WBE --------------------------------------------------------------------------- From: jpcampb(a)afterlife.ncsc.mil (Joe Campbell) Newsgroups: comp.compression.research Subject: Re: CELP vocoder refs Date: 17 Jan 93 21:38:07 GMT Organization: The Great Beyond Hi, I hope that the following information answers your questions. Joe The U.S. DoD's Federal-Standard-1016 based 4800 bps code excited linear prediction voice coder version 3.2 (CELP 3.2) Fortran and C simulation source codes are available for worldwide distribution at no charge (on DOS diskettes, but configured to compile on Sun SPARC stations) from: Bob Fenichel National Communications System Washington, D.C. 20305 1-703-692-2124 1-703-746-4960 (fax) Example input and processed speech files, a technical information bulletin, and the official standard "Federal Standard 1016, Telecommunications: Analog to Digital Conversion of Radio Voice by 4,800 bit/second Code Excited Linear Prediction (CELP)" are included at no charge. The following articles describe the Federal-Standard-1016 4.8-kbps CELP coder (it's unnecessary to read more than one): Campbell, Joseph P. Jr., Thomas E. Tremain and Vanoy C. Welch, "The Federal Standard 1016 4800 bps CELP Voice Coder," Digital Signal Processing, Academic Press, 1991, Vol. 1, No. 3, p. 145-155. Campbell, Joseph P. Jr., Thomas E. Tremain and Vanoy C. Welch, "The DoD 4.8 kbps Standard (Proposed Federal Standard 1016)," in Advances in Speech Coding, ed. Atal, Cuperman and Gersho, Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1991, Chapter 12, p. 121-133. Campbell, Joseph P. Jr., Thomas E. Tremain and Vanoy C. Welch, "The Proposed Federal Standard 1016 4800 bps Voice Coder: CELP," Speech Technology Magazine, April/May 1990, p. 58-64. The U.S. DoD's Federal-Standard-1015/NATO-STANAG-4198 based 2400 bps linear prediction coder version 53 (LPC-10e v53) Fortran or C simulation source codes are available on a limited basis upon written request to: Tom Tremain Department of Defense Ft. Meade, MD 20755-6000 USA The U.S. Federal Standard 1015 (NATO STANAG 4198) is described in: Thomas E. Tremain, "The Government Standard Linear Predictive Coding Algorithm: LPC-10," Speech Technology Magazine, April 1982, p. 40-49. There is also a section about FS-1015 in the book: Panos E. Papamichalis, Practical Approaches to Speech Coding, Prentice-Hall, 1987. The voicing classifier used in the enhanced LPC-10 (LPC-10e) is described in: Campbell, Joseph P., Jr. and T. E. Tremain, "Voiced/Unvoiced Classification of Speech with Applications to the U.S. Government LPC-10E Algorithm," Proceedings of the IEEE International Conference on Acoustics, Speech, and Signal Processing, 1986, p. 473-6. Copies of the official standards "Federal Standard 1015, ...", and "Federal Standard 1016, Telecommunications: Analog to Digital Conversion of Radio Voice by 4,800 bit/second Code Excited Linear Prediction (CELP)" are available for US$ 2.50 each from: GSA Rm 6654 7th & D St SW Washington, D.C. 20407 1-202-708-9205 Realtime DSP code for FS-1015 and FS-1016 is sold by: John DellaMorte DSP Software Engineering 165 Middlesex Tpk, Suite 206 Bedford, MA 01730 1-617-275-3733 1-617-275-4323 (fax) dspse.bedford(a)channel1.com DSP Software Engineering's FS-1016 code can run on a DSP Research's Tiger 30 (a PC board with a TMS320C3x and analog interface suited to development work) or on Intellibit's AE2000 TMS320C31 based 3" by 2.5" card. DSP Research Intellibit 1095 E. Duane Ave. P.O. Box 9785 Sunnyvale, CA 94086 McLean, VA 22102-0785 (408)773-1042 (703)442-4781 (408)736-3451 (fax) (703)442-4784 (fax) -- ............................................................................. ; Dr. Campbell N3JBC jpcampb(a)afterlife.ncsc.mil 74040.305(a)compuserve.com ; ; My opinions are mine! Happiness = Reality - Expectations, Click & Clack ; ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

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CLIP: Sample/Draft letter to the editor
by zane＠genesis.mcs.com 18 Apr '93

18 Apr '93

I wrote up a letter to the editor on the issue, which I will send to the local newspapers and the major newspapers. I'd like comments, and criticisms so that I may make the letter more effective. I also plan on writing an article in my newsletter _The Free Journal_ on this big brother plan. (I plan on including excerpts from _From Crossbows to Cryptography_ in this "Crypto" issue as well.) Editor: The Clinton administration on Friday unveiled their plan for establishing a standard data encryption system for voice communications. This plan is abhorrent and reeks of Big Brother. President Clinton says that he wants to bring the United States into the twenty-first century. This proposal is bringing us to 1984. First I will mention technical reasons why the system is inadequate. The encryption algorithim is classified. Only a select group of people will be allowed to examine the algorithim for flaws. The members of the cryptographic community emphasize that the only way to make sure that a cryptographic system is secure is to have as many people as possible analyze and try to break it for as long as possible. A system which has been examined by a small segment of the population will not be trusted to be secure. The key used in this algorithim is very small-- it is easily attacked by brute-force. The encryption key is only eighty bits long. Such a small key lends itself to easy decryption by an unauthorized party. It would lend a false sense of security to laypersons in the field who do not realize that a key of such simplicity could be cracked easily by any talented criminal. Apart from the technical flaws in the system, there are many political problems with the recent big brother proposal. First, there is the assumption that the government has a right to spy on its own citizens. The proposal for this wiretap chip includes the registration of keys with two escrow agencies. This is purported to allow law enforcement to keep track of "terrorists" and "drug-dealers." The first flaw in this key-escrow system is that no self-respecting criminal will use a cryptography system which can be easily tapped by law enforcement officials-- they will use strong cryptography. Thus the only people who may end up using the wiretap encryption system will be law-abiding laypeople who don't fully understand cryptography. (Law-abiding citizens who do understand cryptography will use strong cryptography to preserve their privacy from a talented criminal.) The proposal says that in order to obtain the key of a wiretap chip user a law enforcement agency must first establish that they have a valid interest in the key. Translated out of legalese, that means that all a government agency will have to do to get access to all of the private communications between, for example, a lawyer and her client will be to fill out the necessary forms. Registering cryptographic keys with the government is similar to giving the IRS the keys to your house and filing cabinet. The chip is being manufactured exclusively by one company. The release stated that the Attorney shall request (i.e. coerce) telecommunication product manufacturers to use this product. This aspect of the system is a government-mandated monopoly. Such monopolies result in high prices and the elimination of market forces which drive the improvement of technology. (One needs only look at the state of the Soviet Union to see how the lack of market forces affects consumer technology.) What is feared the most from the proposal is that if the wiretap chip becomes the standard, strong cryptography will be declared illegal. If such is the case, then only criminals will have access to strong cryptography. As I have stated above-- the wiretap chip will not be used by criminals because of the obvious flaws in the crypto-system-- criminals will use strong crypto, while law-abiding citizens will have to use a system which can be easily defeated by any criminal. Strong cryptography already exists for data communications, for -free-. Strong cryptography for voice communications for -free- is only a few months away for people who own a personal computer. There is no way that making strong cryptography illegal will stop it-- it will only turn otherwise law-abiding citizens into criminals. Sincerely, Sameer Parekh -- | Sameer Parekh-zane(a)genesis.MCS.COM-PFA related mail to pfa(a)genesis.MCS.COM | | Apprentice Philosopher, Writer, Physicist, Healer, Programmer, Lover, more | | "Be God" - Me __ "Specialization is for Insects" - Robert A. Heinlein ____/ \_____________/ \____________________________________________________/

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