April 1993 - cypherpunks-legacy

What Clinton's proposal will mean to the Rest of the World
by R.Tait＠bnr.co.uk 18 Apr '93

18 Apr '93

Cypherpunkers, Having just digested the press release, and the subsequent followups on sci.crypt and on here, I am beginning to wonder what ramifications this might have in other countries, specifically the "Superpowers". Surely setting such a precedent in his own country will spark off a flurry of activity in places such as the UK, Germany, France et al, so that they are not "left behind", so-to-speak? To be quite honest, I can't see the English government taking such radical steps about secure telecommunications, quite simply, because BT have such a lacsidasical [sp?] approach to new and emerging technologies. Take for instance, IDSN. Their philosophy of marketing and "selling" ISDN is laughable - I once read a newspaper article which related a tale of a Corporation who wanted to learn if ISDN could be useful to it's business practices, and it seems that BT just kept jostling them between department (Dept X: "Phone Dept Y", Dept Y: "Phone Dept X" etc). Can anyone really see that the US government (or whoever) will completely outlaw all strong data encryption? This violates the basic human right of free communications/privacy. What a world we live in, huh? -- Rick M. Tait Bell Northern Research Europe Tel: +44-81-945-3352, Fax: +44-81-945-3352 Network Management Systems <PGP 2.2 public key available on request> New Southgate, London. UK email: ricktait(a)bnr.co.uk || rt(a)cix.compulink.co.uk || ricktait(a)bnr.ca

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Test, please ignore
by Harry Shapiro 18 Apr '93

18 Apr '93

Just a alias test - please ignore /harry -- Harry Shapiro habs(a)panix.com List Administrator of the Extropy Institute Mailing List Private Communication for the Extropian Community since 1991

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AT&T Press Release on Clipper
by Dave Banisar 18 Apr '93

18 Apr '93

Here's AT&T's announcement on the Clipper. AT&T TO INCORPORATE NEW 'CLIPPER' CHIP INTO SECURE COMMUNICATIONS PRODUCT LINE GREENSBORO, N.C., April 16 AT&T (NYSE: T) said today it is moving to improve the security and privacy of telephone communications by incorporating a just-announced new U.S. government technology for voice encryption into its secure communications product line. AT&T will use the Clipper chip, announced today by President Clinton as a new technology for voice encryption, in all of its secure telephone products except those specially designed for government classified customers. The Commerce Department has announced a six-month timetable for the final certification of Clipper. "AT&T is pleased to be the first company to publicly commit to adoption of the Clipper chip," said Ed Hickey, AT&T vice president, Secure Communications Systems. "We believe it will give our customers far greater protection in defeating hackers or eavesdroppers attempting to intercept a call. "And now all commercially available AT&T voice encryption products will be compatible with each other, a major step forward in bringing secure communications capabilities to the business community." In standardizing AT&T voice encryption products on the Clipper chip, AT&T will include the algorithm in the Telephone Security Device as well as in the Secure Voice/Data Terminal. The AT&T Telephone Security Device is a compact, lightweight unit that brings advance encryption technology to conventional land-line and cellular telephones. It provides a powerful, convenient and reliable way to protect the most sensitive telephone conversations. The device works with a conventional land-line or transportable/mobile cellular phone. It turns the phone's signal into a digital stream of encrypted information that is decrypted by a Telephone Security Device attached to the phone at the receiving end of the call. The AT&T Telephone Security Device connects easily to desk telephones or tranportable or mobile phones. It weighs 1.5 pounds and is 7 inches long, 4.5 inches wide and 1.5 inches high. And it's as easy to use as it is portable. The AT&T Secure Voice/Data Terminals are desktop telephones that provide encryption for both telephone calls and data transmissions. These AT&T secure communications products use an enhanced voice encryption technique that provides very high voice quality. This technology allows calls placed with these products to approach the voice quality of normal calls. To further enhance interoperability, AT&T will consider licensing to other manufacturers its enabling technologies for interoperability. Interoperability of encryption devices requires common technology beyond the use of a common encryption algorithm, specifically common methods of digital voice encoding and signaling. AT&T has already performed integration tests with Clipper chips manufactured by the government's supplier, Mykotronx Inc., of Torrence, Calif., and is preparing to integrate the chip into the manufacturing of its secure products. AT&T's Clipper-equipped telephone security devices will be available to customers by the end of the second quarter. The federal government intends to adopt the Clipper chip as the standard for voice encryption to help protect proprietary information, protect the privacy of personal phone conversations and prevent unauthorized release of data transmitted electonically. At the same time, use of the Clipper chip will preserve the ability of federal, state and local law enforcement agencies to intercept lawfully the phone conversations of criminals. "Adoption of Clipper will support both the government's efforts to protect the public and the public's right to privacy," Hickey said. AT&T Secure Communication Systems provides products to protect voice, data, fax, cellular and video communications. It also engineers and integrates secure communications applications. Its customers include the governments of the United States and other nations as well as major corporations around the world. AT&T Secure Communications Systems is headquartered in Greensboro. For more information about the AT&T Telephone Security Device 3600 and other AT&T Secure Communications Products, call David Arneke at 919-279-7680. CONTACT: David Arneke of AT&T Secure Communications Systems, 919-279- 7680,or after hours, 919-273-5687, or Herb Linnen of AT&T Media Relations, 202-457-3933, or after hours, 202-333-9162

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Returned mail: Deferred: Connection reset by peer during greeting wait with churchy.gnu.ai.mit.edu
by Mail Delivery Subsystem 18 Apr '93

18 Apr '93

----- Transcript of session follows ----- While talking to toad.com: >>> RCPT To:<cyhperpunks(a)toad.com> <<< 550 <cyhperpunks(a)toad.com>... User unknown 550 cyhperpunks(a)toad.com... User unknown 451 extropians(a)gnu.ai.mit.edu... timeout waiting for input 421 churchy.gnu.ai.mit.edu (TCP)... Deferred: Connection reset by peer during greeting wait with churchy.gnu.ai.mit.edu ----- Unsent message follows ----- Received: by sun.Panix.Com id AA28608 (5.65c/IDA-1.4.4 for extropians(a)gnu.ai.mit.edu) Sun, 18 Apr 1993 08:41:03 -0400 From: Harry Shapiro <habs> Message-Id: <199304181241.AA28608(a)sun.Panix.Com> Subject: Re: More True Names: The NIST Security Board (fwd) To: cyhperpunks(a)toad.com, extropians(a)gnu.ai.mit.edu (Harry Shapiro) Date: Sun, 18 Apr 1993 08:41:03 -0400 (EDT) Reply-To: habs Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Content-Length: 1199 a conscious being, David Farber wrote:

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It is two 80-bit "halfs"
by Harry Shapiro 18 Apr '93

18 Apr '93

>From Mail sent via the Clipper Mailing list, forwarded to me: > In a conversation with NSA today, I was told that two random 80-bit > numbers will be XORed to produce the 80-bit key and the two individual > numbers kept by two separate escrow authorities -- who they are is to > be decided. So your suggestion is, in fact, how it will be handled. > martin hellman /HARRY -- Harry Shapiro habs(a)panix.com List Administrator of the Extropy Institute Mailing List Private Communication for the Extropian Community since 1991

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Mitch on the Clipper Mailing list
by Harry Shapiro 18 Apr '93

18 Apr '93

I had asked Mitch to repost any communications that have gone over this list. He has. I appreciate his willing to clear up this issue. As I have stated before, I believe him, that NIST simply created this list of people they wanted to be in direct contact with. /harry a conscious being, Mitchell Kapor wrote: > From mkapor(a)eff.org Sun Apr 18 00:58:00 1993 > Message-Id: <199304181257.AA06031(a)eff.org> > Date: Sun, 18 Apr 1993 08:58:00 -0800 > To: habs(a)Panix.Com > From: Mitchell Kapor <mkapor(a)eff.org> > Subject: Re: The mysterious mailing list > > I received the statement of the Press Secretary and the public fact sheet > from Ed Roback. I have not repoduced the full text as it is readily > available elsewhere. > > Following this is a thread between Gerano Cannoni and Martin Hellman. I > have deleted the text of Marty's longest response, as it is being > circulated elsewhere. > Last, there is a single message from A. Pagett Patterson. > And that's it (assuming I haven't missed something in reviewing my mail stream). > Feel free to re-post this, put in on an FTP, whatever. I don't have any > more time to deal with this issue. > > Date: Fri, 16 Apr 93 11:02:59 EDT > From: Ed Roback <roback(a)first.org> > Organization: FIRST, The Forum of Incident Response & Security Teams > Posted-Date: Fri, 16 Apr 93 11:02:59 EDT > To: clipper(a)csrc.ncsl.nist.gov > Subject: text of White House announcement and Q&As on clipper chip encryption > > Note: This file will also be available via anonymous file > transfer from csrc.ncsl.nist.gov in directory /pub/nistnews and > via the NIST Computer Security BBS at 301-948-5717. > --------------------------------------------------- > > THE WHITE HOUSE > > Office of the Press Secretary > > _________________________________________________________________ > > For Immediate Release April 16, 1993 > > > STATEMENT BY THE PRESS SECRETARY > > > The President today announced a new initiative that will bring > the Federal Government together with industry in a voluntary > program to improve the security and privacy of telephone > communications while meeting the legitimate needs of law > enforcement. > ... > > Date: Fri, 16 Apr 93 16:44:10 EDT > From: Ed Roback <roback(a)first.org> > Organization: FIRST, The Forum of Incident Response & Security Teams > Posted-Date: Fri, 16 Apr 93 16:44:10 EDT > To: clipper(a)csrc.ncsl.nist.gov > Subject: White House Public Encryption Management Fact Sheet > > > > Note: The following was released by the White House today in > conjunction with the announcement of the Clipper Chip > encryption technology. > > FACT SHEET > > PUBLIC ENCRYPTION MANAGEMENT > > The President has approved a directive on "Public Encryption > Management." The directive provides for the following: > ... > > Posted-Date: Sat, 17 Apr 93 01:26:06 +0200 > From: caronni(a)nessie.cs.id.ethz.ch (Germano Caronni) > Date: Sat, 17 Apr 93 01:26:06 +0200 > To: clipper(a)csrc.ncsl.nist.gov > Subject: Clipper-Chip Escrow-System Flaws > Newsgroups: > alt.privacy,sci.crypt,alt.security,comp.security.misc,comp.org.eff.talk > Organization: Swiss Federal Institute of Technology (ETH), Zurich, CH > Cc: > > > Good day, > as a non-citizien of USA I have read your announcment of the > 'Clipper-Chip' with great interest, and am happy to see a increase > in lawful privacy in the USA. I hope this policy will extend to > other countries too. > In the meantime I suspect two flaws in the 'Clipper-Chip' as it was > announced today via NIST/electronic media. > > 1) Keeping secret the algorithm which performs encryption is in my > humble opinion a bad idea. It hinders 'Clipper' to get publicly > accepted, and hinders the minute examination of the Clipper- > Algorithm by other then a few experts. > But I am sure this was well considered. > > Now the important suggestion :=) > > 2) By splitting the 80-Bit-Key of clipper in two parts, and give > them to different organizations, you add an uneeded WEAKNESS > to the escrow-system. This way, corruption of one escrow will > allow an easier attack on the Key than might be possible. > (e.g. if I obtain 40 bits of possible 80 bits keys, exhaustive > keysearch is definitively no problem.) > You might instead generate 2 (or even more, if this ist not > politically indesired) 80-Bit-Sequences which, when XOR-ed > together will provide the original, needed key, but alone they > are worthless. I am sure persons with knowledge in this area, which > surely can be found at NIST (or wherever) will agree. > > I hope that this remark is of interest for you. > > Friendly greetings, > > Germano Caronni > > > P.S. > I am sure you have remarked, that the current policy is interpretable > to tend toward an abolition of 'unbreakable' secure communication > via electronic Media, and hope that this will _not_ come true. > > Disclaimer: This mail is in now way whatsoever connected to the Swiss > Federal Inst. of Technology, but expresses my personal thoughts. > > > > > Organization: FIRST, The Forum of Incident Response & Security Teams > Posted-Date: Fri, 16 Apr 93 22:32:14 PDT > Date: Fri, 16 Apr 93 22:32:14 PDT > From: "Martin Hellman" <hellman(a)isl.stanford.edu> > To: caronni(a)nessie.cs.id.ethz.ch, clipper(a)csrc.ncsl.nist.gov > Subject: Re: Clipper-Chip Escrow-System Flaws > > I received your message suggesting: > > 2) By splitting the 80-Bit-Key of clipper in two parts, and give > them to different organizations, you add an uneeded WEAKNESS > to the escrow-system. This way, corruption of one escrow will > allow an easier attack on the Key than might be possible. > (e.g. if I obtain 40 bits of possible 80 bits keys, exhaustive > keysearch is definitively no problem.) > You might instead generate 2 (or even more, if this ist not > politically indesired) 80-Bit-Sequences which, when XOR-ed > together will provide the original, needed key, but alone they > are worthless. > > In a conversation with NSA today, I was told > that two random 80-bit numbers will be XORed to produce > the 80-bit key and the two individual numbers kept by > two separate escrow authorities -- who they are is > to be decided. So your suggestion is, in fact, how it > will be handled. > > martin hellman > > Disclaimer: this in no way should be interpreted to mean > that I approve of the Clipper Chip. While I am still in the > process of learning more about it, my immediate reaction > was not positive. More later. > > Organization: FIRST, The Forum of Incident Response & Security Teams > Posted-Date: Sat, 17 Apr 93 23:05:23 PDT > Date: Sat, 17 Apr 93 23:05:23 PDT > From: "Martin Hellman" <hellman(a)isl.stanford.edu> > To: ...clipper(a)csrc.ncsl.nist.gov... > Subject: Clipper Chip > > > Most of you have seen the announcement in Friday's NY Times, > etc. about NIST (National Institute of Standards & Technology) > announcing the "Clipper Chip" crypto device. Several messges > on the net have asked for more technical details, and some have > been laboring under understandable misunderstandings given > the lack of details in the news articles. So here to help out > is your friendly NSA link: me. I was somewhat surprised Friday > to get a call from the Agency which supplied many of the missing > details. I was told the info was public, so here it is (the cc of this > to Dennis Branstad at NIST is mostly as a double check on my > facts since I assume he is aware of all this; please let me know > if I have anything wrong): > > ... > > > Organization: FIRST, The Forum of Incident Response & Security Teams > Posted-Date: Sat, 17 Apr 93 08:55:31 -0400 > Date: Sat, 17 Apr 93 08:55:31 -0400 > From: padgett(a)tccslr.dnet.mmc.com (A. Padgett Peterson) > To: "clipper(a)csrc.ncsl.nist.gov"@uvs1.dnet.mmc.com > Subject: Panel > > I would like to be considered for the "outside panel" assessing the > Clipper Technology. > A. Padgett Peterson, P.E. > > > -- Harry Shapiro habs(a)panix.com List Administrator of the Extropy Institute Mailing List Private Communication for the Extropian Community since 1991

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The gov't makes sense ;-)
by baumbach＠atmel.com 18 Apr '93

18 Apr '93

My eyes have been opened, after reading the White House press release. Privacy can only be allowed if the users don't break any laws. If through accident or other means we find that someone who is using privacy has broken the law, we need to be able to discover what has been hidden by privacy in the past to see if other laws were broken. It is for the greater good! Let's have the gov't set a good example for us too follow. I want all government employees and anyone they have spoken to, to be recorded always. The tapes will be encrypted and stored safely in the hands of all losing presidential candidates. If a citizen has probable cause to believe that a person in gov't has broken the law, then, with proper safeguards, he will be given copies of the appropriate tapes and the keys, to get to the bottom of this. If through accident or other means we find that someone who is using privacy has broken the law, we need to be able to discover what has been hidden by privacy in the past to see if other laws were broken. It is for the greater good. Peter Baumbach baumbach(a)atmel.com

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The mysterious mailing list (fwd)
by Harry Shapiro 18 Apr '93

18 Apr '93

There have been reports about a mailing list set-up at NIST that had a number of people on it including Mitch Kapor. The list is named "clipper" and it was through that list that part of the Wire Tap Chip announcement came. I asked Mitch directly, what is involvement with that list was; I asked him if he was involved with the development of the Wire Tap Chip. Below is is reply. I believe him. /harry a conscious being, Mitchell Kapor wrote: > From mkapor(a)eff.org Wed Apr 17 23:11:38 1993 > Message-Id: <199304181111.AA05559(a)eff.org> > Date: Sun, 18 Apr 1993 07:11:38 -0800 > To: habs(a)Panix.Com > From: Mitchell Kapor <mkapor(a)eff.org> > Subject: The mysterious mailing list > > I believe the list in the question is an informational list set up at NIST. > My name was placed on it. I did not ask to be put on such a list. We > were (obviously) not involved in the development of Clipper. > I was sent the Clipper announcement fact sheet, for instance. > There has been a small amount of traffic on it, none of it consequential. > I would appreciate it if you would make these facts known. I have told Mitch I will put this info out and have asked that he make clipper list mail public at some FTP site. I have also asked him when he started getting traffic from this list. /harry -- Harry Shapiro habs(a)panix.com List Administrator of the Extropy Institute Mailing List Private Communication for the Extropian Community since 1991

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Media Blitz: May ourselves available
by Harry Shapiro 18 Apr '93

18 Apr '93

If there is going to me some kind of media blitz then we have to put some of ourselves forward as "experts" for the media to interview. Tim May, John Gilmore, come to mind. Any of us that are clean shaven and wear suits, etc. would also make good spoke-folks /harry -- Harry Shapiro habs(a)panix.com List Administrator of the Extropy Institute Mailing List Private Communication for the Extropian Community since 1991

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Re: Wiretapping chip: vid clips & sound bites
by rjc＠gnu.ai.mit.edu 18 Apr '93

18 Apr '93

The best innovation you came up with is calling it the "wiretap chip." I propose that we stop referring to this chip as the "clipper chip" and always refer to it as "the wiretap chip." Also, when using analogies, don't bring up drug smugglers or terrorists. One key to winning this battle is to wage an information war. We have to manipulate the image of this proposal so it looks more like a menace instead of a "protection." -- Ray Cromwell | Engineering is the implementation of science; -- -- EE/Math Student | politics is the implementation of faith. -- -- rjc(a)gnu.ai.mit.edu | - Zetetic Commentaries --

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