January 1993 - cypherpunks-legacy

Neuvo-Crypto
by Matt Willis 25 Jan '93

25 Jan '93

I'm researching fractals here at glorious Stetson University and it crossed my mind that there are possibilities in the combination of fractals with current encryption standards... for instance, using a piece of the mandelbrot set as a key or a Julia set with a standard center and radius, thereby reducing a key to a sort of x,y,z,F() coordinate... And if you and a friend established a standard equation... that would make it a sort of three-key system. On a simpler level, couldn't the RSA method be converted to use the Complex number system... (which is the base of fractal mathematics) Anyone follow? +-------Matt-Willis--------------------------------+ | Matt Willis ASTMWILL(a)STETSON.BITNET | elsewhere: | Matt Willis Head of the Underground | mwill(a)mindvox.phantom.com | Matt Willis Robotech PBM List | +-------Matt-Willis--------------------------------+ "Absolutely alone in awareness of the mechanism." -Agrippa by WG

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Re: public privacy, NSA resources
by pfarrell＠cs.gmu.edu 25 Jan '93

25 Jan '93

A fellow cypherpunk lister says about the number of employees at NSA: >40,000? Is this for real? Does anyone know how this would compare to >FBI or CIA? Also, does anyone have a clue on the black budget? The >author seems to hint here that while it is not "readily discernible" it >might be inferrable. > The number of employees at the FBI is public info. I don't have it at hand. CIA employment used to be secret, and may still be. Of course you can buy a picture from SPOT and count the cars for an estimate. At both agencies, there are a significant number of contract employees, who are not on the employment rolls, but are efectively the same as government employees. They aren't counted in public info. I can't guess at the number of NSA folks. But I can relate an story.... I gave a paper at this year's National Computer Security Conference, in Baltimore. Like all conferences, it had a registration area, vendor's booths, etc. Following form, it had nice folks behind counters with signs over the top, with the usual: Prepaid A-F | Prepaid G-M | .... | Walkup | Press | ... sections. What surprized me was the row of counters labeled: NSA A-E | NSA F-H | ..... NSA W-Z There were as many NSA booths as all the rest combined. (ok, +- 10%) Another aside. The NCSC is essentially a front for the NSA. NCSC exists but has no more than two employees, one is the secretary to an NSA official. Pat Pat Farrell, Grad Student pfarrell(a)cs.gmu.edu Department of Computer Science, George Mason University, Fairfax, VA PGP key available via finger or request #include standard.disclaimer

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NUpop is the answer was Re: PGP on BBS
by pfarrell＠cs.gmu.edu 25 Jan '93

25 Jan '93

I don't know if the sources are available, NorthWestern's NUpop is the key to making PGP acceptable to masses of not-very-computer-literate users. Ask archie for nupop103.zip NUpop is a PC (MS-DOS) program that uses the PC as a computer. It uses SMTP to send mail and receives mail via POP. It works on networks and thru dialup. It works with SLIP and more simply over a reliable ASCII connection. It is a great program. CUA, mouse, folders, auto sigs, etc. All it needs is to have a "encryption outgoing" flag in its "group" (alias) directory, and pump the message thru PGP in filter mode. On receipt, find the PGP headers, push thru the filter, and show the clear text. I haven't looked for either the PGP or NUpop sources, but I'd expect this to be a near trivial hack. It may even be already done. NUpop (and its Mac equivalent Eudora) are the right way to get users on the net. Using a PC as a VT100 to login to a full blown Unix system, using vi to edit mail, etc. is near criminal. NUpop makes it easy enuff for econ profs. (Seriously, I set up NUpop for an econ prof here last weekend. He loves it. He is definitely not a Unix wizard.) If NUpop source is not available, then we'll have to reverse engineer something similar. I've learned how NUpop does the communications, and it is straight-forward (also in the RFCs if you care to look) I thought about doing a Windows-only program, but wonder if we really have to support diehard DOS users on ATs and less. I've been meaning to ask about source availablity. I'll do so now, and probably have an answer tomorrow. Pat Farrell, Grad Student pfarrell(a)cs.gmu.edu Department of Computer Science, George Mason University, Fairfax, VA PGP key available via finger or request #include standard.disclaimer Write PKP. Offer money for a personal use license for RSA.

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Re: PGP on BBS
by david.brooks＠cutting.hou.tx.us 24 Jan '93

24 Jan '93

Eric Hughes speaks: EH> The solution is cooperative processing systems, where both the host EH> and the terminal cooperate to perform some task. Unfortunately, there EH> is precious little software infrastructure to support such a EH> development. Terminal programs on PC's are still for the most part EH> acting as dumb terminals, with the notable exception of file transfer EH> protocols such as zmodem. EH> I believe that cooperative communication software will be necessary EH> for widespread use of cryptography--not just pleasant, but a EH> precondition to large scale deployment. You've hit the nail on the head here, Eric. If public key encryption is REALLY going to be for the masses, we are going to need something like this... But it seems I'm going to have to code the damned thing myself, eh? Anyone want to help? EH> Onward. Indeed! David david.brooks(a)cutting.hou.tx.us * Q-Blue v0.7 [NR] * ---- +---------------------------------------------------------------------+ | The Cutting Edge BBS (cutting.hou.tx.us) A PCBoard 14.5a system | | Houston, Texas, USA +1 713 466 1525 running uuPCB | +---------------------------------------------------------------------+

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Re. PGP on BBS
by Hal 24 Jan '93

24 Jan '93

One thing I didn't follow about this was the supposed need to put the private key onto the BBS in order to send encrypted mail. This is not necessary. The private key is only used for signing messages. For privacy purposes in many cases encryption is sufficient. PGP could be run on the BBS to do encryption. Of course, the local sysop could see your message as you compose it or upload it to the BBS, but if you're then sending it through a BBS network it can travel privately. Hal 74076.1041(a)compuserve.com

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Re: PGP on BBS
by david.brooks＠cutting.hou.tx.us 24 Jan '93

24 Jan '93

David Brooks writes: DB> > I have been mulling over the idea of a BBS door which allows users DB> to DB> >send PGP encrypted messages to other users using a system pubkey file. DB> >I don't see a way to do it without the sender having to transfer (at DB> least DB> >temporarily) his secret key to the host system. Karl L. Barrus responds: KLB> Well, you could always allow the users to download the public key file KLB> and do the encryption on their home machine, and then upload the mail KLB> file. KLB> That way their secret key stays off the BBS... Well, yeah, that's the way we do it now, use the BBS as a Public Key Certification office...) I was sort of hoping for something a bit more direct... David david.brooks(a)cutting.hou.tx.us * Q-Blue v0.7 [NR] * ---- +---------------------------------------------------------------------+ | The Cutting Edge BBS (cutting.hou.tx.us) A PCBoard 14.5a system | | Houston, Texas, USA +1 713 466 1525 running uuPCB | +---------------------------------------------------------------------+

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Digital cash redux
by ghsvax!hal＠uunet.UU.NET 24 Jan '93

24 Jan '93

Here is an excerpt from a description of one version of Chaum's digital cash, which I posted on Nov. 25: > There are lots of proposals for electronic cash in the literature, > mostly very complex. I think one of Chaum's simpler proposals would be > adequate for email "banking". This proposal, from the beginning of > his paper "Untraceable Electronic Cash" in Crypto 88(?), goes like > this: > > 1. Alice chooses a random x and r, and supplies the bank with > B=r^3*f(x) mod n, where f is a one-way function (like MD5), and n is > the modulus for the bank's public key. > > 2. The bank takes the third root of B (e.g. via an RSA decryption) and > sends it back to Alice: D = r * f(x)^(1/3), and withdraws one dollar from > her account. > > 3. Alice extracts C = f(x)^(1/3) by dividing D by r. (Note that > division can be done mod n without knowing the factors of n, but it's > rather complicated.) > > 4. To pay Bob one dollar, Alice gives him (x, C). > > 5. Bob can verify that C = f(x)^(1/3), but he still has to send (x, C) > to the bank in order to make sure that x hasn't been used before. > Otherwise Alice could spend (x, C) twice. The bank increases Bob's > account by one dollar. > > This scheme is pretty simple and provides untraceability - the bank > saw B and D but not C, so although it can verify that (x, C) is legit, > it can't correlate that with Alice's withdrawal. > > The main disadvantage of this approach is that Bob has to send (x, C) > to the bank right away (or at least before sending Alice anything in > return for her cash) to verify that the cash hasn't been used before. > But in email, where turnarounds of a day or more aren't unusual, this > should be tolerable. > > Alice and Bob could be pseudonyms, using anonymous addresses to > communicate with each other and with the bank. > > Different denominations of cash could correspond to different > exponents than "3" in the example above. (That is, $1 would use > C=f(x)^(1/3), $2 would use C=f(x)^(1/5), $4 would use C=f(x)^(1/7), > and so on.) > > Technically, this would be quite easy to implement, using the code in > PGP for the arithmetic, and MD5 for the one-way function. We'd need > to define a few message formats. The RFC1113 ascii encoding from PGP > could be used as well. > > The "social" problems are more challenging, it seems to me. What is > the backing for this electronic money? Why do people care what their > bank balances are? Is this stuff really worth anything? > > One possibility is to base digital cash on real money. People would > open a pseudonymous account via email, then postal-mail dollars to the > bank, enclosing their account number so the bank would know whom to > credit with the deposit. Later, if someone wanted to withdraw "real > money" from their account they would have to give a real postal > address where it could be mailed. Now the electronic money is worth > real dollars. Even if people didn't deposit or withdraw very often, > it still has value because of the backing. > > Unfortunately, this approach would currently be illegal (at least, > unless you actually were a real bank!). If there were some way the > bank itself could be anonymous, it might survive, but I don't see how > to mail it money while keeping the anonymity. Still, we could > consider experimenting with this on a small scale with accounts of no > more than a few dollars. As long as it was clearly an experiment I > doubt that any prosecutions would result even if it attracted > government attention, because the expense involved in court costs > would be so disproportionate to the few dollars involved in this > technically illegal act. > > Another approach would be not to try backing the digital cash at all, > or rather backing it implicitly by the determination of various people > to accept it and perform services or supply goods in return for it. > Tim's offer to Xerox papers in return for digital cash would be one > example. Perhaps others could provide some other services. It would > be great if some shareware author would accept digital cash as a > symbol of support for crypto anonymity. > > One problem that I see with this approach is how you determine the > size of the money supply. Or, in other words, how does new digital > cash get started circulating? How do people get new accounts, and how > much money is in them? > > If these problems can be solved, a big advantage of this approach is > that the banker can be anonymous. He would be known only by his > anonymous address and his public key(s). This would provide some > safety in the event that even a small-scale experiment like this > was targetted for a crackdown. > > Another issue is the prospect of multiple "banks", each issuing their > own (incompatible) cash. How would they compete? Perhaps in terms of > rapid turnaround? Some might choose to be anonymous, others would go > public. The latter would have the advantage that people might trust > them more, but OTOH there is more chance of your bank account > disappearing after a crackdown for a public bank than an anonymous > one. > > Lots to think about here! > > Hal > 74076.1041(a)compuserve.com

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Re: public privacy, NSA resources
by jim＠tadpole.com 24 Jan '93

24 Jan '93

> >Another aside. The NCSC is essentially a front for the NSA. > >NCSC exists but has no more than two employees, one is the > >secretary to an NSA official. > > Extremely interesting. What does NCSC stand for? tadpole 11 whois -h nic.ddn.mil ncsc.mil. National Computer Security Center (NCSC-DOM1) 9800 Savage Road Fort George G. Meade, MD 20755-6000 Fort Meade *is* the main NSA campus. docmaster.arpa (nee: docmaster.ncsc.mil) is one of the infamous Internet spook hangouts. :-) > I am doubtful of the 40,000 figure even with contract employees. That's > a small army. What the hell could keep that many people busy? (shudder) You should take a look at the campus sometime, its big. Lots of big-sheilded buildings. Lots of big satellite antennas. I have no trouble accepting the 40k figure, it is, after all a bureaucracy. Jim

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digicash fundamentals
by Eric.Forste＠f33.n125.z1.FIDONET.ORG 24 Jan '93

24 Jan '93

I came into this discussion fairly late and most of what I've been able to read has been good stuff about anonymous remailers. However, there are many tantalizing bits dropped here and there about digital cash, including some recent discussion of a form that requires no encryption. However, I missed all the groundwork discussion on digicash, and I'd really like to understand the digital cash protocols more thoroughly. Can someone here please direct me to a text file with the basics of Chaum's digital-cash ideas presented in it? I am not a cryptographer, but I consider myself proficient in the use of PGP and I've read PGP's docs thoroughly and understand them, and have pretty good background in LAN communication protocols, so that's about the technical level I'm at. Thanks. -- Eric Forste - via FidoNet node 1:125/555 UUCP - ...!uunet!hoptoad!kumr!fidogate!33!Eric.Forste INTERNET - Eric.Forste(a)f33.n125.z1.FIDONET.ORG

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a few good weasels
by deltorto＠aol.com 24 Jan '93

24 Jan '93

Eric.Fogleman(a)analog.com contributes his view that: >>I agree with Dave Deltorto's idea about "a body that decided on a case >>by case (or a class by class) basis what accounts would be subject to >>heavy scrutiny". Or perhaps limiting certain public servants (the >>chief executive, Oliver North's successor, etc) to a set of >>"open" computing systems and communication paths. (Similar to limiting >>people with security clearances to sets of closed computing systems, >>communication paths.) >> >>Dave says: >> >>> Unfortunately, this begins to create a overseeing body so >>> huge and convolute as to render the entire process unwieldly >>> approaching on the absurd. I read Kafka's "The Trial" and I don't >>> want to face that sort of Juggernaut any time soon. >> >>Unwieldy? Kafka-esque? Expensive? Possibly, but it doesn't have to >>be that way. As Bongo says: "The price of freedom is eternal >>vigilance." How much do you want to pay? Well, Eric, I take your point, and I'm willing to 'pay' quite a bit for freedom, especially if I have pals like you to help out in the biz of watchfulness. :-) I guess what I was trying to get at here was that the process could become so convolute that it would no longer be _technically feasible_ to keep an eye on the dangerous character(s) such as the President's National Security Advisor, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the twisted geeks at the CIA, their cronies at the FBI, Hillary Clinton (whoops, she's probably OK) etc, etc, ad nauseam. This doesn't mean I wouldn't _like_ to make sure they're carefully monitored, I just look at the volume of paperwork/electronic files generated by even the most lowly federal agencies and imagine that such a watchdog agency might be logistically incapable of doing the job properly, assuming it could do it in an unobstructed and non-compromised way in the first place. There would have to be a highly selective, maybe viciously random way of keeping potential abusers in line. And who watches the watchdog? Kevin Costner? Speaking of which, has anyone seen this movie "A Few Good Men?" Jack Nicholson plays this meansumnabitch Marine Colonel who basically takes the law into his own hands, blinded by his self-righteous view of his job to protect "us" to the point where he has a young Marine murdered (Jack's great in this one, guys, go check out the bargain matinee). Now, I'm not saying that all government agents are that sick and perverse in the zealous pursuit of their goals, but I acknolwedge that such people can and probably do exist and that if we remain divided and unguarded, we all live at their mercy. I figure the only things that keep us safe at night are pure luck and the few government dudes who let a few details slip into the hands of say, the few crypto-anarchists who can balance things out. A world of absolutes is not a fun world and it's not a safe world. Someone's gotta break the rules every once in a while or we all go down the tubes. Of course, I _personally_ would _never_ break any of the fine laws of our beloved nation, but I know deep in my heart (but not anywhere on my hard disks) that such brave people exist and that the effect of their less-than-legal efforts is the delicate equilibrium in which we continue to prosper and innovate. I have more to say in this, but it's almost dawn and I have to flitter back to my coffin. dave

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