January 1993 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: This list...
by Peter Honeyman 26 Jan '93

26 Jan '93

eavesdropping on the list would not reveal lurkers. peter

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New Anonymous Remailer site avail.
by The Phantom 26 Jan '93

26 Jan '93

After the forcing down of the penet site, with the help of Hal Finney I've set up a remailer located at phantom(a)mead.u.washington.edu. Mail is not cc'ed or kept track of, unless I start getting complaints about abuse, which I will investigate. PGP public key available via finger at phantom(a)mead.u.washington.edu. I'm pretty sure if all of the encryption bugs are worked out, but I would much appreciate someone helping me out on this; If you do send a message through it and have problems, let me know. Aw, heck, here's the public key - -----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- Version: 2.1 mQCNAitcsHIAAAEEAPZ3Ex1rEwKLeANRoaRyTA72htDFGiGPmWkowByZyUtRkTRp Vs/WdhgoJ1VLz76Chyb63I+ejpekeJfOud98gMh2HtVoTjNGYAawpCKo15tFyzYn BFYVy0NjroyxwM6YnPCsYfYMpvyjEa5mfgrlyzvYBBeTDRD89vYoe7Eue0fDAAUR tDJBbm9ueW1vdXMgUmVtYWlsZXIgPHBoYW50b21AbWVhZC51Lndhc2hpbmd0b24u ZWR1PokAlQIFECtcqWpkhnxaNc7AOQEBZ+8EAIOOvsFf/niUrWw0BRvPhSEmtzrA kQJt3q7kPXutjj3IsJ1/oR8oGhv4iPQ5BmNvvd5dnsbbCqOurhaftVgzlSpyQcYi VryeNVvpdeX1+VTS7N+lAHVAlqnimoaEtUUIftDoDIjNNKRDi+nU4GbbL+1MqveC 1LKQMIi1WPjr6Wpw =1XNo -----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- Matt Matt Thomlinson University of Washington, Seattle, Washington. Internet: phantom(a)u.washington.edu phone: (206) 528-5732 PGP 2.0 key availaible via email or finger phantom(a)hardy.u.washington.edu

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Re: anonymous server compilation?
by dclunie＠pax.tpa.com.au 26 Jan '93

26 Jan '93

> Hello. To my knowledge no public listing of known anonymous servers has > been compiled. > pax.tpa.com.au > -------------- Unfortunately, the anonymous sytem at pax has been closed, as the local network in Australia was considered unsuitable for this kind of thing, partly due to the narrow bandwidth of the link to the US, and partly because of the prevailing attitude at the US end that anonymous mail is generally a bad thing. david

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Re: public servant privacy
by edgar＠spectrx.Saigon.COM 25 Jan '93

25 Jan '93

My friend Dave del Torto said recently: Tim May notes (appropriately) that: >>Strong crypto means even Ollie North can fully protect his >>records. Yes, but shouldn't he be _required_ to "open" his files if he is under criminal investigation just like a drug-dealer who's required to open the locked trunk of his car? Actually, the drug dealer is *not* required to open his locked car trunk. But he might as well, otherwise the police (with search warrent) will force it open, probably causing some damage which they will not pay to repair. There doesn't seem to be any practical way to "force open" a (strongly) encrypted message without the key. Failure to produce the key when ordered might be an excuse for firing a govt. employee, but it can't be the basis for a criminal prosecution (5th Amendment). "Murdering Thug" further commented: Well, there are really two conflicting issues here: 1) The Fifth Amendment - the right not to testify against yourself, hence the Miranda warning when you're arrested. You can claim that being forced to decrypt your hard disk by the cops violates your Fifth Amendment rights, and refuse to decrypt it. 2) Obstruction of Justice - by not handing over the key to your hard disk, you may be obstructing an investigation. By not decrypting your hard disk under court order, you maybe be held in contempt of court. Number 2 may work for law enforcement if they are investigation a third party and ask to see your hard disk in order to help their investigation. A good example is an Internet site that is being used as a telnet launch-pad by some hacker. If that site refuses to cooperate and keeps their files encrypted, the police/court may charge you with obstruction of justice or contempt of court. HOWEVER, if you feel that by decrypting these files, you would be providing testimony/evidence against yourself, you can plead the 5th, and tell them to go screw themselves. Pleading the 5th will fail if you are offered *immunity* from prosecution for anything you reveal (as Ollie North was, recall, for his testimony before Congress). If you still don't want to testify (to avoid providing damaging evidence against your friends, for example) your next line of defense is "I forget". Very hard for the prosecutor to prove beyond reasonable doubt that you really remember that secret key. -- edgar(a)spectrx.saigon.com (Edgar W. Swank) SPECTROX SYSTEMS +1.408.252.1005 Silicon Valley, Ca

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This list...
by pmetzger＠shearson.com 25 Jan '93

25 Jan '93

>From: peter honeyman <honey(a)put-in-bay.citi.umich.edu> >> The whole point of this list is to develop techniques to ensure privacy -- >> most of us understand that there isn't much right now. >but but but ... sendmail already offers an easy way to hide the membership >of a mailing list. why not use it? Prehaps that would be of value, but its best not to think of it as worth too much. After all, the bad guys can likely just subscribe to the list, and they could always just eavesdrop on the outgoing mail. Fixing this "hole" is o.k. so long as no one believes that it has actually added to security in any substantial way. Its best that no false sense of security be engendered. Everyone should know and understand that the structures as they exist are almost completely insecure. Perry

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This list...
by Phiber Optik 25 Jan '93

25 Jan '93

I'm not one to overlook the obvious. Is it desireable that any Tom, Dick, or Harry can telnet to toad's SMTP port, and use the sendmail expand command to list everyone on this mailing list? I'm sure less net-savvy users on this list are unaware, and it should be said.

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signature trades
by Marc Horowitz 25 Jan '93

25 Jan '93

I'm going to be in New York City on Wednesday, January 27. I'll be available in the evening if people want to get together somewhere and trade signatures face-to-face. I know some people on this list are in that area. Email me personally; I'll coordinate and send mail to everyone who expresses an interest. If you have a good idea for a place to meet, please make a suggestion, since I don't know all that many places to meet. Marc PGP key in case you want to encrypt: -----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- Version: 2.1 mQBNAirbf1kAAAEB/jCF0mjoZe7YYWpSxOJFlfr6F+39KvuL0k5DptL4A0C95Pqh dpkbGbD3kolxy469SyQiB6Xlx2V5zIvlrIy0uVEABRG0HE1hcmMgSG9yb3dpdHog PG1hcmNAbWl0LmVkdT6JAI0CBRArV5t3QvCl/Jcp1JsBAW75A79O9ZXpSCIAlk/V bVmdFJ2uXBpmJj1KdP8FInk+6zTwFSVjphtZ8WCGo0U8UPP509zeOpk9Pd+0FVv0 9j9vnJcFjCrXJq4rbxCimFpqpXZaMsF4AQ0ry6wi7MdhOZXrkTTEsKRo1MPhAQg6 yUFb95nKrl1Ub5STZ7OJAJUCBRArV5thVN1fojxmJGcBAZKzA/9gobjB0g2ECwhO wZweiGu0oivh2u++njPW5VgLtHgqLU4blTew1YdOgIe053pifdEblTBnXPri8vDs 0GBoPjXNlhPz/l/JZvhaPYnAPpJ2Q3sE8La4pcs1o5UTlKmOE8rtu8fIMB6Lz5gC v6jo0KhRQpcGepkJGEk8gdKzdmVY2okAVQIFECsztFcfWxp2jm/yjQEBDwoCAINK AcYmW1lm4F5T/pegjD+CZHyrlGDwDGRKOMMbLhBuZbxbBlQsFGO5bcviiJSMyLIE UUQcbDUC+uKU6zpIEhSJAJYCBRArKWOyr3CNl7EvuMEBAeaWBAICCWysNgLatvry zPnAxZICFQP4Qwm8JuP5x/uguyqDEnpnD6g+iZEV6NKsL8Z09XAec2/8KAg7yKYu it8oQe8/yMJH26Iv1BLCjXN6kgFkeCt3usezBH22/yBQ6vsU9KMIRCfx30XD9MpV jUle75y3B8IN0vEQVPGQSs7KBJKeowKJAJUCBRArFJoTpsOAT/N2gT0BAQrYA/0c BKMxFlvQMacpPR2/O7ZNlJhRoTp8q3mQNl5fW2+gY6uOEfR3Q5OmgR/HQOQmx01+ PmmqrCpeDYE4hNZN+KnHw8OQlTwe7RCtNisl+0HcSxweprbSJgVEUAWMCLwkg3bF 2NP9kXO+btZBFXtaF2FFHu7Sd11Ud4qllY6eix95TIkAdQIFECruHvx1Eb4Sc5bT twEBTXsC/i3l36A4j5OwBsTUBOcRCCZaGtwOMVR/Gf1LKkzbDQK4MMbKWeNCeDrr p9WMad2sPzgn3qb1xPxW2TJs7KPzaKY/44NJNRTaUedNTok1/g+JECl8kO5hlcxF 5GBIpasyc4kAlQIFECsMey1cv+w5Zs6JtwEB+VAD/ReV12oKmYPDGoYdmi18EZ6E bBF67LlQYVzeTAj1gX+QZOI8cqsHeiKTpY2UUSaTVtmXD8bzKW7RQrlK4eT5YPBS 9UF4czyhYh3ZVcVQzjDRLP29x0+yUX7o0l9VhMO9JMNaTlsfuwZoNY6gabHN7bMu JdyB9JC41CU82xw2zAGEiQBVAgUQKwx5YQeIzKyfnzi7AQH2cwH/cpWg2vHeJJL4 ZzFDg/+3ijvxjHDQCmvF9F2SjEX9IVAeBAy+AShkcD+adce0nLxdKCYBWYPb0xtZ iI3PFgDPa4kAlQIFECsKculuC7y+W0FWIQEBAU0D/0uhXjhGgHP0P3Bjq8onmN7H goLQHjZML0kzinLzGsa7tWJzNafEDnEsxZX1XrTeV6JEsf31T7EN09vSHtcJEjSy IyTHIWnXqgTnvoBmBQNSzEIDF1XVUdTa95SG8HU0os98exo64hutBCP8yVihe/1J PpGBtEMQWuh1UbAP1iWxiQBuAgUQKtxRRDh0K1zBsGrxAQE2UwLFF7GJeCwfBJg4 ILXqll0zRmLnBIx42RG5fJwHs5m/uZt8qp7qYXK0D6pqgtypFJavdfVGbC+A4Dhh Vw7WKjSQRuXrvhd5Yje+qal6aEpTOD+zDaOZxccTosmJAFUCBRAq24DnVQVm+k0M TuEBAflaAf9M33fLLs1VFZLjDAZWQzkFMl5toykd32uRQBW55REMIRWO1A+mQBmn IcOHC7RL9wdWwmKGkC0YxFGnCRRdSZi0iQBVAgUQKtuCsMyL5ayMtLlRAQF8nAH9 GVgelMbV7O1oUqop644DSoeoGHgWU2koqshXLta/55dx43Lw9o1PVY90Oap+oCVs Ys0xE5TlSQOc4GGJP/HtoQ== =37CN -----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----

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e-mail...
by Phiber Optik 25 Jan '93

25 Jan '93

To the genius (Matthew Sean Pardo, mpaf1216(a)pelham.med.unc.edu) who thought he was being clever by sending what he thought was "anonymous" mail to me (by telnetting to port 25), you missed my point. There's no need for the EXPN command to be used remotely. I can only suggest that John Gilmore disable it at toad, though it probably doesn't matter anymore. If anonymity and privacy are as key as people are making them out to be on this list, I find it ironic that privacy is lacking on such a simple level.

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Rational PC mail , was Re: PGP on BBS
by pfarrell＠cs.gmu.edu 25 Jan '93

25 Jan '93

Marc(a)mit.edu writes: > >What you are all talking about here is a solved problem. Many such >network protocols exist. SLIP is probably the best example. If you >use SLIP to connect to the BBS instead of a dumb terminal connection, >you get a real network link which supports multiple connections to >multiple destinations. And free SLIP implementations exist. The >author of one of the most popular is on this list, in fact. It is a solved problem. It doesn't even require SLIP. I spent lots of hours over the past year trying to get SLIP to work with the GMU computers. it is officially "not supported" With NUpop and Eudora, SLIP is optional. The NUpop docs say that SLIP slows down the transfer, and recommends simple ASCII async connection using a reliable modem (MNP or V42/V.42bis) >Of course, this requires that your "terminal" be somewhat intelligent, >but even a lowly 8088 PC running DOS can run SLIP. > >If you do this, all you need is a BBS which supports network services, >instead of the current menu-based sort of systems we have now. If you >want to encrypt, you do so locally. In fact, you'd probably do almost >everything locally. Using a computer as a computer is clearly the way to go. There are a number of low-cost or free Unix providers, I expect that they do, or can be talked into supporting POP. I expect that current terminal/menu based BBSes will disapear once folks realize how much better easier, faster, and all around better programs that use computers as computers work. Pat Pat Farrell, Grad Student pfarrell(a)cs.gmu.edu Department of Computer Science, George Mason University, Fairfax, VA PGP key available via finger or request #include standard.disclaimer

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no subject (file transmission) (fwd)
by avalon＠coombs.anu.edu.au 25 Jan '93

25 Jan '93

CFP'93 The Third Conference on Computers, Freedom and Privacy 9-12 March 1993 San Francisco Airport Marriott Hotel, Burlingame, CA The CFP'93 will assemble experts, advocates and interested people from a broad spectrum of disciplines and backgrounds in a balanced public forum to address the impact of computer and telecommunications technologies on freedom and privacy in society. Participants will include people from the fields of computer science, law, business, research, information, library science, health, public policy, government, law enforcement, public advocacy and many others. Some of the topics in the wide-ranging CFP'93 program will include: ELECTRONIC DEMOCRACY - looking at how computers and networks are changing democratic institutions and processes. ELECTRONIC VOTING - addressing the security, reliability, practicality and legality of automated vote tallying systems and their increasing use. CENSORSHIP AND FREE SPEECH ON THE NET - discussing the problems of maintaining freedom of electronic speech across communities and cultures. PORTRAIT OF THE ARTIST ON THE NET - probing the problems and potential of new forms of artistic expression enabled by computers and networks. DIGITAL TELEPHONY AND CRYPTOGRAPHY - debating the ability of technology to protect the privacy of personal communications versus the needs of law enforcement and government agencies to tap in. HEALTH RECORDS AND CONFIDENTIALITY - examining the threats to the privacy of medical records as health care reform moves towards increasing automation. THE MANY FACES OF PRIVACY - evaluating the benefits and costs of the use of personal information by business and government. THE DIGITAL INDIVIDUAL - exploring the increasing capabilities of technology to track and profile us. GENDER ISSUES IN COMPUTING AND TELECOMMUNICATIONS - reviewing the issues surrounding gender and online interaction. THE HAND THAT WIELDS THE GAVEL - a moot court dealing with legal liability, responsibility, security and ethics of computer and network use. THE POWER, POLITICS AND PROMISE OF INTERNETWORKING - covering the development of networking infrastructures, domestically and worldwide. INTERNATIONAL DATA FLOW - analyzing the issues in the flow of information over the global matrix of computer networks and attempts to regulate it. The conference will also offer a number of in-depth tutorials on subjects including: * Information use in the private sector * Constitutional law and civil liberties * Investigating telecom fraud * Practical data inferencing * Privacy in the public and private workplace * Legal issues for sysops * Access to government information * Navigating the Internet INFORMATION For more information on the CFP'93 program and advance registration call, write or email to: CFP'93 INFORMATION 2210 SIXTH STREET BERKELEY, CA 94710 (510) 845-1350 cfp93(a)well.sf.ca.us A complete electronic version of the conference brochure with more detailed descriptions of the sessions, tutorials, and registration information is also available via anonymous ftp from sail.stanford.edu in the file: /pub/les/cfp-93 or from sunnyside.com in the file: /cfp93/cfp93-brochure or via email from listserv(a)sunnyside.com by sending email with this text: GET CFP93 CFP93-BROCHURE

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