November 1992 - cypherpunks-legacy

Hackers Conference Report
by tcmay＠netcom.com 11 Nov '92

11 Nov '92

Fellow Cypherpunks, Here's a trip report I just sent to another mailing list I'm active on, the "Extropians" list. That's why I "introduce" Tom Jennings, John Gilmore, and Eric Hughes...clearly they need no introduction to readers of _this_ list (although a lot of new folks have signed up recently, I hear). By the way, I just picked up the latest "Mondo 2000." Our own Jude Milhon's article, "The Cypherpunk Movement," is on pp. 36-37 (Issue #8). The address "cypherpunks(a)toad.com" is mentioned, so we may get even more new folks. Also some good stuff on MindVOX, phreaking, etc. --Tim HACKERS CONFERENCE REPORT I just returned from Hackers 8.0, held 6-8 November in Lake Tahoe, California. Approximately 170 attendees this year. Some Highlights: * Our crypto session went extremely well. The talks were on PGP and FidoNet, Diffie-Hellman key exchange for rlogin, digital time-stamping, and anonymous remailers. More comments later. * Mike Godwin of the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) spoke on the developing conflict between personal privacy and law enforcement, including comments on the "key registration" trial balloon I posted about earlier. (Godwin told me he believes the Denning proposal is deadly serious, that the Department of Justice has put a high priority on limiting the use of cryptography.) * Hacking was well represented. Besides our crypto panel, sessions on cellular phone phreaking and illegal mods to telecom equipment drew large crowds (a "how to" talk on reprogramming the 8051 micro in the Oki 900 cellphone was especially useful). * Eric Drexler gave a talk on nanotechnology (surprise!), with an emphasis on needed work in the next couple of years. Drexler argued that proto-assemblers could be built in as short as 16 years, though there was some skepticism expressed. He also presented a calculation that the "cost" of delaying nanotech is $25 billion a _day_. (I suggested we all skip dinner that night and instead put in another hour in the labs!) * Marvin Minsky answered questions, saying he rarely prepares in advance. AI, robotics, gene expression in embryos, and software were all covered. * Allan Huang of AT&T gave an energetic 90 minute talk on optical computing, going from optical deconvolvers to "computer origami" to optical switches to Sagnac fibers that can store light pulses 6 femtoseconds long! Definitely the most stimulating talk. * Demos in the machine room were better than ever. The "Reality Engine" from Silicon Graphics displayed photorealistic simulations. Lots of Suns, NeXTs, and Macs. Films of SIGGRAPH papers, chaos and fractals, and artificial life were shown at night. Rudy Rucker's session on cellular automata went well. MORE ON CRYPTO Since cryptology and the activities of the "cypherpunks" mailing list are of central concern to me, I'll concentrate on those topics. Our panel was in "prime time," mid-Saturday afternoon, with about 100 in attendance, including a couple of journalists (notably John Markoff of the "New York Times"...if anybody sees an article on this by him, please send me a note about it, OK?). The audience had been prepped for crypto by the comments Friday night by Mike Godwin of the EFF and by a 3 hour rump session on "Digital Cash" from 1 a.m. to 4 a.m on Saturday (remember "hacker hours"). Tom Jennings, one of the chief forces behind FidoNet, an "anarchic" net made up of PCs talking to other PCs, spoke on efforts to spread PGP (Pretty Good Privacy) to as many FidoNet users as possible. It looks like its happening and this will be another avenue to ensure that the "crypto genie" gets safely out of the bottle. John Gilmore, an early UNIX/Sun pioneer and current principal at Cygnus Support, amongst other things, spoke on increasing security against Internet eavesdroppers by using the Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol for rlogin (for example). This is something we can do fairly soon. Stu Haber and Scott Stornetta of Bellcore (formerly part of Bell Labs) reported on their digital time-stamping system. Some document to be "notarized" is hashed to produce a fairly short number which is hard to forge (i.e., it is very hard to find another document which hashes to the same value). This hash value is then published in, say, a widely read newspaper. If a dispute arises about the time a document was written, the published has value is persuasive. Bellcore actually operates such a service (check the legal notices in the Sunday "New York Times"). Eric Hughes, a mathematician who worked briefly for David Chaum's "DigiCash" outfit, described anonymous remailers implemented in Perl and now running. He also mentioned Hal Finney's version which embeds PGP in the remailer, allowing more security. This generated a lot of excitement, as the ideas of "crypto anarchy" became apparent to all. (John Little, owner and operator of the "Portal Communications Company," a Bay Area-based Internet access service, got excited and offered to run the remailers on his system! The genie is further out of the bottle. Now if we can only get GEnie to do the same!) The spirit of contributing to the larger cause of using crypto to _directly_ protect privacy was exhilarating. More people spoke of actual code they plan to write (as with Russell Whittaker's offer a few weeks ago to help with ProComm mods). There was a real sense that Things Had Changed. With PGP 2.0 arriving a few months ago (and still spreading), with the onset of the "Cypherpunks" group (which got a somehat cryptic write-up by Jude Milhon in the just-published Issue #8 of "Mondo 2000"...but since she coined the term "cypherpunks" to describe us, her article can afford to be cryptic, no?), and with the "Hacker Crackdown" all around us (Sun Devil, Legion of Doom, S.266 attempt to ban encryption, FBI's "Digital Telephony Bill," and the latest "trial balloon" to register keys), the time is right. In the next several months I expect the media, via more articles in magazines like "Mondo 2000" and by articles on crypto policy, to focus in on this issue. Even the "Village Voice" is interested in crypto issues (theme: crypto privacy vs. Big Brother). These are exciting times. If I'm ever busted for sedition, money laundering conspiracy, violation of the Munitions Act, RICO Act violations, or just plain old political incorrectness, carry on the fight. The stakes are high. --Tim -- .......................................................................... Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)netcom.com | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero 408-688-5409 | knowledge, reputations, information markets, W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA | black markets, collapse of governments. Higher Power: 2^756839 | PGP Public Key: awaiting Macintosh version. -- .......................................................................... Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)netcom.com | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero 408-688-5409 | knowledge, reputations, information markets, W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA | black markets, collapse of governments. Higher Power: 2^756839 | PGP Public Key: awaiting Macintosh version. -- .......................................................................... Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)netcom.com | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero 408-688-5409 | knowledge, reputations, information markets, W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA | black markets, collapse of governments. Higher Power: 2^756839 | PGP Public Key: awaiting Macintosh version.

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Re: a cryptographic deal with the devil
by efrem＠spitha.informix.com 10 Nov '92

10 Nov '92

>Re. the digital wiretapping "compromise." As a telecom professional I >absolutely resent and will resist any attempts to mandate backdoors into my >PBXs. No compromise on that. Period. We've all heard the arguements many >times: vast surveillance power, diminution of privacy, potential major >security problems... I think you missed the point of my proposal. It is to create a situation in which all taps must be court ordered and eventually disclosed. The police have no business making "investigational" taps, they are not entrepreneurs in search of new business opportunities. My prefered solution is no taps. In my experience taps are more common for political reasons than police reasons. I think anyone who believes anything the FBI says without proof must have not been reading the paper for the last several decades. If the political process will not ban wire (fiber) tapping then it seems sensible to try and force all easedropping into the public record. I see no reason to care where the police put their equipment so long as there is no way they can create taps without going to court and creating a public record. I do not see the difference between building the tap in or making it an extra cost option, unless it can be made a very expensive option. If tap control cannot be reliably accomplished via technology, cryptographic or otherwise, then we might as well just fight against all tapping and for universal encryption even if it is a lost cause. I think it is clear that no organization and especially no government or corporation can be trusted to police itself either at the frontdoor or the backdoor. --efrem

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Analysis of cost to produce random serail generator.
by crunch＠netcom.com 09 Nov '92

09 Nov '92

At Hackers 8.0, we had a discussion about the feasability of someone building a random data generator. I volunteered to look into this with the hopes of making a cheap and inexpensive device that has 2 DB-9 connectors (Serial through box) to be used to generate random serial data at a particular baud rate. Today, I called Newbridge Micro, they faxed me the data sheets, and gave me the number for a local rep in San Jose. (408) 258-3600, but I was appalled at the price. They wanted $52.50 each in 100 quantity. So it is clear that if I use this chip, which really is a hybred, I cannot charge $50 each. So we have to decide what to do, or how much more it will cost. After examining the data sheet, the chip is probed by a pulse, and a bit comes out with an equal probability of a "1" or a "0". Sorta like a coin toss. I think that the perifery cost of the other electronics, such as shift registers, or UART which would be necessary to clock the bits into an 8 bit register, etc, would cost about $6 - $8 in cost, then I will have to fab the boards. I have friend at Douglas Electronics who can give me a good price. It would cost $150 setup charge for the PC boards and $2 per board. 1 ea RBG1210 $52.50 1 ea PC board $2.00 various chips $8.00 Setup $1.50 (1/100th setup charge) Total parts $63.50 (100 quantity) Cost (4 X parts) $254.00 So, it is clear that the cost is rather high, and not everyone can afford this. But if you think that people will want to buy it at that price, I can go ahead and do it, but the cost to me would be about $250 to build just one of them, and I have someone who can loan me the money to make a prototype. This also includes design time and use of an electronics lab to test and get it running. I wouldn't be able to borrow $6350 to build 100 of them, and I think I can talk the rep into letting me purchase them in smaller quantity, so I can build them on demand. I'm just not so sure that people will want to pay $254 for one of these. So please lets discuss this, among our group to determine if this price is reasonable. Although, it IS possible to use a cesium noise source (Don't know the cost of that) and perhaps I can cut that price down by about a half or a third, but the design time would be much increased, and perhaps there would be twice as much electronics, and perhaps the posibility that the randomness won't be as good. John D.

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No Subject
by mcmahonm＠wybbs.mi.org 07 Nov '92

07 Nov '92

Please add my address to the mailing list.

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1993 RSA Data Security Conference
by gnu 06 Nov '92

06 Nov '92

RSA is putting on a conference on public key cryptography on the SF peninsula on January 14th (conference) and 15th (tutorials and exposition). Last year's conference was smaller (one day) and quite interesting. Many of the best cryptographers in the world attended. It's worth prying yourself out of your usual haunts for. The conference is free. Registration is "extremely limited, and is first come, first served". Phone +1 415 595 8782 and ask for Conference Registration, to reserve your place (and a place for anyone else at your company who's interested). I'll see you there! John Gilmore

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Re: a cryptographic deal with the devil
by George A. Gleason 06 Nov '92

06 Nov '92

Re. the digital wiretapping "compromise." As a telecom professional I absolutely resent and will resist any attempts to mandate backdoors into my PBXs. No compromise on that. Period. We've all heard the arguements many times: vast surveillance power, diminution of privacy, potential major security problems... I'd like to suggest something of a compromise which doesn't have these risks. Common carriers (local and long distance telcos) are currently required to provide access to line terminals when presented with a court order for a wiretap. This access could reasonably be extended to requiring the telco to connect a demultiplexer in the case of digital transmission, or some kind of appropriate signal splitter in the case of fiber optics. The agency requesting the tap would of course pay the bill for materials and labor. Now this gets law enforcement their demultiplexed signal path so they can tap only the intended target line, but it preserves the existing structure which prevents law enforcement "hacking," since no backdoors would be involved. For PBXs (this is my department), a slightly distasteful but acceptable compromise would be to have interconnect companies (the folks who install your PBX or key system) register with the local operating telcos, providing the interconnect company's name and contact information on the telco record for each subscriber. So for instance, General Widgets has XYZ Telecom install a new PBX; XYZ Telecom is required to inform the local operating company that they have just acquired General Widgets as a client. Now if a law enforcement agency gets a court order for a tap, they go to the local telco and ask who the interconnect company is for that subscriber. (We're talking here about a scenario in which one or a small number of extensions in a phone system are believed to be used for criminal purposes, so law enforcement has to tap those extensions only and not everyone who is on that phone system.) Now law enforcement visits the interconnect company and presents them with the court order, which requires the interconnect company to provide access to the line terminals of the suspect extension(s), and/or provide a demultiplexer etc. if needed (at law enforcement's expense of course)... and of course, under penalty of contempt of court, refrain from disclosing the situation to the client. Now this gets law enforcement their legitimately needed access to suspect extensions on PBXs, prevents interconnect companies from blowing the whistle to their clients, and still preserves privacy protections since there is no backdoor into the system. Now here is why I think the FBI wants backdoors: Recall that under the "war on drugs" etc., a ruling was handed down (I can't recall which branch of govt originated this) which says that a wiretap may be conducted for up to 72 hours for "investigational purposes" without a court order; and the material recorded may then be used to go and get a court order for a continuing wiretap. This places authority in the hands of law enforcement agencies to conduct taps any time they suspect someone of something, and then go see the judge after the fact. Now without backdoors, law enforcement has to depend on the goodwill of telcos to get access, and is kind of stuck when it comes to PBXs and key systems. I'm willing to bet there is a pretty substantial amount of "investigational" tapping going on, and that the FBI is interested in vastly expanding it. The compromises I'm proposing don't address this investigational tapping, and that's just fine, since that ought to be challenged in court or defeated one way or another. -gg@well

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random numbers (resend)
by Peter Shipley 05 Nov '92

05 Nov '92

[my first send bounced so I am resending] Here is some code to run on a SparcStaion (I or II) to generate random numbers based on noise from the audio chip. I have not tested the true randomness of the out but cause I don't know how. Thus if anyone can please do and send me the results. I suppose some minor tweeking can be made for the mid range gain for a better spread. unfortunatly there is no way to turn off the u-law audio compression the chip uses to outputs data if you plot the out put you will see the problem the compression caused. #! /bin/sh # here be a shar file echo x - Audio/Makefile cat >Audio/Makefile <<'!E!O!F!' LD= $(CC) CC= cc LDFLAGS=-g CFLAGS=-g -I/usr/demo/SOUND -I/usr/local/include LIBS= -L/usr/demo/SOUND/ -laudio audio_rand: audio_rand.o $(LD) $(LDFLAGS) audio_rand.o $(LIBS) -o $@ test: audio_rand audio_rand | head -10000 > \#fff echo "plot '#fff'" | gnuplot !E!O!F! #! /bin/sh echo x - Audio/audio_rand.c cat >Audio/audio_rand.c <<'!E!O!F!' static char *_author = "Peter Shipley\n"; #define AUDIO_CHIP #include <stdio.h> #include <fcntl.h> #include <sys/ioctl.h> #include <sun/audioio.h> #include <sbusdev/audio_79C30.h> #include <multimedia/ulaw2linear.h> static char *_who_did_it = "Peter M Shipley (1992) [v0.1]\n"; /* X: 0-15 R: 16-31 GX: 32-33 GR: 33-34 */ #define MMR2_BITS 45 #define GX_GAIN 32 main() { struct audio_ioctl ai; extern void bzero(); int fd; int j, i; if( (fd = open("/dev/audio", O_RDONLY)) < 0) { perror("open:"); exit(1); } bzero(ai, sizeof(struct audio_ioctl) ); ai.control = AUDIO_MAP_ALL; if ( ioctl( fd, AUDIOGETREG, &ai ) < 0 ) { perror( "AUDIOGETREG ALL:" ); exit(1); } /* set audio input to a unconnected pin (audio input B) */ ai.data[MMR2_BITS] = ( ai.data[MMR2_BITS] & ~AUDIO_MMR2_BITS_AINB); /* set gain of the GX reg to the max */ ai.data[GX_GAIN] = 0x7F; ai.data[GX_GAIN+1] = 0x0; for(i=0;;) { char buf[BUFSIZ]; read(fd, buf, BUFSIZ); for(j=0; j<BUFSIZ ; j++) printf("%d %d\n", i++, audio_u2s(buf[j])); } } !E!O!F! #! /bin/sh echo x - Audio/reg.c cat >Audio/reg.c <<'!E!O!F!' static char *_author = "Peter Shipley\n"; #define AUDIO_CHIP #include <stdio.h> #include <fcntl.h> #include <sys/ioctl.h> #include <sun/audioio.h> #include <sbusdev/audio_79C30.h> static char * print_byte(); static struct _map { char *label; char size; } map[] = { "X filter", 16, "R filter", 16, "GX Gain", 2, "GR Gain", 2, "GER Gain", 2, "Sidetone", 2, "Frequency Tone gen", 2, "Amplitude Tone gen", 2, "MMR1", 1, "MMR2", 1 }; #define NMAPS (sizeof(map) / sizeof(struct _map) ) struct audio_ioctl ai; main() { extern void bzero(); int fd; int oldmmr2; int newmmr2; if( (fd = open("/dev/audio", O_RDWR)) < 0) { perror("open:"); exit(1); } dump(fd); /* bzero(ai, sizeof(struct audio_ioctl) ); ai.control = AUDIO_MAP_GX; if ( ioctl( fd, AUDIOGETREG, &ai ) < 0 ) { perror( "AUDIOGETREG MMR2:" ); exit(1); } ai.data[0] = ai.data[1] = 0; if ( ioctl( fd, AUDIOSETREG, &ai ) < 0 ) { perror( "AUDIOSETREG MMR2:" ); exit(1); } */ sleep(5); dump(fd); } dump(f) int f; { int i,k; bzero(ai, sizeof(struct audio_ioctl) ); ai.control = AUDIO_MAP_ALL; if ( ioctl( f, AUDIOGETREG, &ai ) < 0 ) { perror( "AUDIOGETREG MMR2:" ); exit(1); } k=0; for(i = 0 ; i < NMAPS ; i++) { int j; (void) printf("%s:\n", map[i].label); for(j=1; j <= map[i].size; j++,k++) { (void) printf("%10s", print_byte(ai.data[k])); if ( (j % 7) == 0) (void) fputc('\n', stdout); } (void) fputc('\n', stdout); } (void) fputc('\n', stdout); } static char * print_byte(c) char c; { static char bt[9]; bt[0] = ( (c & 0x01) ? '1' : '0'); bt[1] = ( (c & 0x02) ? '1' : '0'); bt[2] = ( (c & 0x03) ? '1' : '0'); bt[3] = ( (c & 0x04) ? '1' : '0'); bt[4] = ( (c & 0x05) ? '1' : '0'); bt[5] = ( (c & 0x06) ? '1' : '0'); bt[6] = ( (c & 0x07) ? '1' : '0'); bt[7] = ( (c & 0x08) ? '1' : '0'); bt[8] = NULL; return bt; } !E!O!F!

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a cryptographic deal with the devil
by efrem＠informix.com 05 Nov '92

05 Nov '92

It is widely believed that the Police, the FBI, and other government agencies tap many more phones than they admit in public. This is not counting the NSA's monitoring of all the international traffic they can stuff into a computer. Now the FBI wants telephone switch manufactures to supply them with desktop phone tapping technology. Real-time delivery of all conversations straight to the agent's desk. This is scary, but it might an opportunity. Given that congress is likely to eventually allow the FBI this tech toy, would you go along with a deal that all taps would really require a court order and that the exact time and location of all taps would eventually be made public? No cheating possible. I believe such an compromise may be possible via cyptographic technology, I've not worked out the details, but here is a sketch of the idea. The legislation authorizing the tapping facilities would require that each tap be activated by a key supplied by a court. Each tap would require a new key. The switching gear would not only enforce the key mechanism, but transmit a record of the tap to some agency outside the court system. Both the courts and this agency would be required to periodically make public all old taps. Part of this information would include tamper-proof sequence codes and signatures to guarantee that all taps were in fact reported. The law would effectively be enforced by the switch hardware. We would not only know how many phones were tapped, but whose phones were tapped. This last would pose a privacy problem, The law could just require tappees being eventually informed of the invasion of their lives, rather than public disclosure. Problems: * We consent to the process, it legitimates phone taps. * The hardware would be in place for massive monitoring of communications if the government could get the public to accept dropping the limitations of the scheme. [It might be possible to limit the abuse by having the switches communicate and not accept anymore than a 1,000 taps a year.] * The lobbying for this would be difficult. Additional opportunity: * By proposing and lobbying for this type of scheme, it could be made obvious that the cops and mega cops want to maintain much closer surveillance than they are willing to admit. However, you'd have to be prepared for them to accept the compromise. They may figure on making all their illegal taps via other means. --efrem

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random numbers
by unknown＠example.com 05 Nov '92

05 Nov '92

Here is some code to run on a SparcStaion (I or II) to generate random numbers based on noise from the audio chip. I have not tested the true randomness of the out but cause I don't know how. Thus if anyone can please do and send me the results. I suppose some minor tweeking can be made for the mid range gain for a better spread. unfortunatly there is no way to turn off the u-law audio compression the chip uses to outputs data if you plot the out put you will see the problem the compression caused. #! /bin/sh # here be a shar file echo x - Audio/Makefile cat >Audio/Makefile <<'!E!O!F!' LD= $(CC) CC= cc LDFLAGS=-g CFLAGS=-g -I/usr/demo/SOUND -I/usr/local/include LIBS= -L/usr/demo/SOUND/ -laudio audio_rand: audio_rand.o $(LD) $(LDFLAGS) audio_rand.o $(LIBS) -o $@ test: audio_rand audio_rand | head -10000 > \#fff echo "plot '#fff'" | gnuplot !E!O!F! #! /bin/sh echo x - Audio/audio_rand.c cat >Audio/audio_rand.c <<'!E!O!F!' static char *_author = "Peter Shipley\n"; #define AUDIO_CHIP #include <stdio.h> #include <fcntl.h> #include <sys/ioctl.h> #include <sun/audioio.h> #include <sbusdev/audio_79C30.h> #include <multimedia/ulaw2linear.h> static char *_who_did_it = "Peter M Shipley (1992) [v0.1]\n"; /* X: 0-15 R: 16-31 GX: 32-33 GR: 33-34 */ #define MMR2_BITS 45 #define GX_GAIN 32 main() { struct audio_ioctl ai; extern void bzero(); int fd; int j, i; if( (fd = open("/dev/audio", O_RDONLY)) < 0) { perror("open:"); exit(1); } bzero(ai, sizeof(struct audio_ioctl) ); ai.control = AUDIO_MAP_ALL; if ( ioctl( fd, AUDIOGETREG, &ai ) < 0 ) { perror( "AUDIOGETREG ALL:" ); exit(1); } /* set audio input to a unconnected pin (audio input B) */ ai.data[MMR2_BITS] = ( ai.data[MMR2_BITS] & ~AUDIO_MMR2_BITS_AINB); /* set gain of the GX reg to the max */ ai.data[GX_GAIN] = 0x7F; ai.data[GX_GAIN+1] = 0x0; for(i=0;;) { char buf[BUFSIZ]; read(fd, buf, BUFSIZ); for(j=0; j<BUFSIZ ; j++) printf("%d %d\n", i++, audio_u2s(buf[j])); } } !E!O!F! #! /bin/sh echo x - Audio/reg.c cat >Audio/reg.c <<'!E!O!F!' static char *_author = "Peter Shipley\n"; #define AUDIO_CHIP #include <stdio.h> #include <fcntl.h> #include <sys/ioctl.h> #include <sun/audioio.h> #include <sbusdev/audio_79C30.h> static char * print_byte(); static struct _map { char *label; char size; } map[] = { "X filter", 16, "R filter", 16, "GX Gain", 2, "GR Gain", 2, "GER Gain", 2, "Sidetone", 2, "Frequency Tone gen", 2, "Amplitude Tone gen", 2, "MMR1", 1, "MMR2", 1 }; #define NMAPS (sizeof(map) / sizeof(struct _map) ) struct audio_ioctl ai; main() { extern void bzero(); int fd; int oldmmr2; int newmmr2; if( (fd = open("/dev/audio", O_RDWR)) < 0) { perror("open:"); exit(1); } dump(fd); /* bzero(ai, sizeof(struct audio_ioctl) ); ai.control = AUDIO_MAP_GX; if ( ioctl( fd, AUDIOGETREG, &ai ) < 0 ) { perror( "AUDIOGETREG MMR2:" ); exit(1); } ai.data[0] = ai.data[1] = 0; if ( ioctl( fd, AUDIOSETREG, &ai ) < 0 ) { perror( "AUDIOSETREG MMR2:" ); exit(1); } */ sleep(5); dump(fd); } dump(f) int f; { int i,k; bzero(ai, sizeof(struct audio_ioctl) ); ai.control = AUDIO_MAP_ALL; if ( ioctl( f, AUDIOGETREG, &ai ) < 0 ) { perror( "AUDIOGETREG MMR2:" ); exit(1); } k=0; for(i = 0 ; i < NMAPS ; i++) { int j; (void) printf("%s:\n", map[i].label); for(j=1; j <= map[i].size; j++,k++) { (void) printf("%10s", print_byte(ai.data[k])); if ( (j % 7) == 0) (void) fputc('\n', stdout); } (void) fputc('\n', stdout); } (void) fputc('\n', stdout); } static char * print_byte(c) char c; { static char bt[9]; bt[0] = ( (c & 0x01) ? '1' : '0'); bt[1] = ( (c & 0x02) ? '1' : '0'); bt[2] = ( (c & 0x03) ? '1' : '0'); bt[3] = ( (c & 0x04) ? '1' : '0'); bt[4] = ( (c & 0x05) ? '1' : '0'); bt[5] = ( (c & 0x06) ? '1' : '0'); bt[6] = ( (c & 0x07) ? '1' : '0'); bt[7] = ( (c & 0x08) ? '1' : '0'); bt[8] = NULL; return bt; } !E!O!F!

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Please remove me from the list
by Matt_Kelly 04 Nov '92

04 Nov '92

Please remove me from the cypherpunks distribution list. This is the second time I've asked. thanks, MattKelly(a)antioc.antioch.edu

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