November 1992 - cypherpunks-legacy

(fwd) A Silver Bullet to Limit Crypto?
by tcmay＠netcom.com 12 Nov '92

12 Nov '92

Cypherpunks of the World, Here's a new analysis of the key registration proposal I just posted to a couple of groups. -Tim Newsgroups: sci.crypt,alt.privacy,comp.org.eff.talk From: tcmay(a)netcom.com (Timothy C. May) Subject: A Silver Bullet to Limit Crypto? Date: Wed, 11 Nov 1992 18:36:44 GMT Key Registration as a "Silver Bullet" to Limit Crypto Use Two weeks ago, and more than 500 related messages ago, I posted the "Trial Balloon to Ban Encryption?" message, alerting sci.crypt and other newsgroups to the Dorothy Denning "trial balloon." Prof. Denning has continued the balloon metaphor, calling her first proposal a "lead balloon" and her improved, law-enforcement-friendly version a "copper balloon." Others have called it a "uranium balloon," i.e., it's worse than the lead balloon. In reading the hundreds of comments about ways to bypass the Denning proposal, about the many clever schemes to avoid detection, I came to some realizations about the likely reason for key registration. Also, at the recent Hackers Conference in Lake Tahoe, lots of interesting points came up (crypto, PGP, anonymous remailers, digital cash, privacy, and the "Crypto Crackdown," to borrow Bruce Sterling's title of "The Hacker Crackdown," were hot topics). Mike Godwin of the EFF, who may be reading this in comp.org.eff.talk, spoke on such policies...he told us this kind of crackdown on crypto tools is a priority of several government agencies and that the issue will not go away with the new administration. But why scheme to register keys, by whatever means, if the system is so easily thwarted and bypassed? Neither Prof. Denning nor her colleagues, both in and out of the NSA and FBI, are dummies. The "silver balloon," or silver bullet, is this: * a formal key registration system will directly affect and limit use of the _most important_ part of public key systems: the ability to use public key directories (like phone books) rather than set up all communications on a one-to-one basis (as private key systems require, for key exchange, and as many of the key registration bypasses implicitly or explicitly require). * enforcement, at least for publicly announced P-K keys, can be by insisting that a special message ("This is J. Random User.") be signed with one's registered/deposited key and then verified with the public key to ensure the same private key-public key pair is used. (Yes, there are still bypasses and clevernesses to spoof these systems, but most "publicly visible" use of P-K methods, the main raison d'etre for public keys, will be affected and effectively controlled.) Keys can and will be registered under this proposal, but many people will simply not bother with the hassle and just won't use P-K methods (thus making the monitoring job easier). * bypassing the key registration laws by "going underground" is always possible, but for this purpose one can already use one-time pads, pack message bits into the least significant bits of digital recordings and images, and generally do all sorts of other devious things. The key point is that the wide use of public key methods is reduced, which may be the real motivation. * reducing the wide use of crypto technology by the masses allows the monitoring agencies a slightly easier job in monitoring those who _are_ using crypto. One can imagine exactly the same arguments for restricting or registering voice scramblers for phone use: by requiring registration, fees, etc., many users will simply not bother to use scrambling (and there may be related to spread the idea that anyone using scrambling--or crypto in general--is somehow suspect, must have something to hide, etc. * the key registration ideas discussed so far severely limit use of crypto protocols that _dynamically_ generate lots of public keys. Cryptographic voting, most forms of digital cash, anonymous remailers, and several other exciting uses all tend to generate a lot of keys "on the fly." Are all of these to be registered? How? For how much money per registration? And how long will it take? Weeks? Instead of concentrating on how these kinds of uses, mentioned by many people, effectively make the Denning/Rivest/Micali proposals unworkable, we should look instead at how these proposals may _in fact_ be aimed at limiting the explosive use of crypto for these new applications. A government afraid of digital cash, of anonymous remailing networks, of information markets in technologies, and of lots of other interesting uses, may see key registration as a way to contain this explosion. Even if the private keys kept at the "trusted key authority" were _never_ looked at by court order or otherwise, the key registration act itself would place severe limits on the use of modern cryptographic protocols for novel uses and for wide use by the public. In this sense, the key registration idea may be a silver bullet, or balloon, to head off these uses. A chilling effect (the "liquid nitrogen balloon"?). Any thoughts on this view? -- .......................................................................... Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)netcom.com | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero 408-688-5409 | knowledge, reputations, information markets, W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA | black markets, collapse of governments. Higher Power: 2^756839 | PGP Public Key: awaiting Macintosh version.

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mac pgp
by Eric Hollander 12 Nov '92

12 Nov '92

I uploaded MacPGP to my powerbook, and used it to generate a key pair. The user interface is easier than the Unix user interface, so I have no problem with that, but I do have a big problem with speed. It expects me to type in my pass phrase at about 20 words per minute. It beeps me if I type it faster than that. This makes it too annoying to be used regularly. It should be able to accept full-speed typing on a powerbook 100. I know that a 100 is not a very fast machine, but still, this is just basic keyboard input. My powerbook is about as secure as you can get (it's with me close to 24 hours a day and probably emits very little radiation and it's not on any kind of net), so ideally it would be my main crypto machine, but I don't want to type my pass phrase at 20wpm, so for now I'll stick with the IBM RS/6000 I normally use PGP on, despite its much weaker security. The other speed problem is key generation. This is very slow. Maybe I am spoiled by the RS/6000, which is extremely fast, but I still feel like it should be faster. Also, it does not allow itself to be backrounded properly under system 7 during key generation. However, I must say that I am glad that Fiedorowicz and others are working on this port. It's a good start. e

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Re: Mac PGP version
by fen＠genmagic.com 12 Nov '92

12 Nov '92

>I found the address for the Mac version of PGP. > >anon-ftp to mac.archive.umich.edu >directory /mac/util/encryption > >Would someone try this out and report back to the list how it works? I pulled it down and found it to be a "nice little app" with certain problems evident from the beginning. The major bug is **no source code**!! How can I trust an app to make my keys? Why don't I just ask the NSA for them? What I would have liked (and expected) was a set of diff (or changed) files from the PGP 2.0 distribution, and perhaps an extra top-level app-maker file to put the nice wisiwyg on top. This would show me an example, and let me build PGP into other apps that I might build. The next bug is no email address for Z. Fiedorowicz, so I can't complain to him directly. And the third apparent bug (now I haven't used this much yet) is that the help file offers help for the standard MPW-style command line operations, but the app is entirely menu-driven. I hope that ZF doesn't take this as purely negative. I am sure that he did a good implementation, and I thank him for doing the work and for providing a nice gui. But I would especially like to get the source code (preferably as minimal changes to the standard distribution so that it is clear that the same internals are used for each). Thanks, Fen -----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- Version: 2.0 mQBNAisBeSgAAAECAKvzX/54a9kC5FPXfIN7vjep64zkqXwPzr8VXkiJXyklRTRI kyxcuNlS7ipDveilmSDYYP3W5JJMCC1HSIeCc4kABRG0HkZlbiBMYWJhbG1lIDxm ZW5AZ2VubWFnaWMuY29tPg== =bZWg -----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----

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PGP problems with large key rings?
by karn＠qualcomm.com 11 Nov '92

11 Nov '92

I'm encountering problems when I try to form a large key ring (on the order of 150 keys, each with several signatures). The file is large enough (60+ Kb) but it is apparently trashed; when I run "pgp -kv" on it I only see 4 keys. This is under UNIX, so I don't think memory exhaustion is the problem. I'm not sure I have the latest version of the UNIX port, so if somebody could steer me to the right repository I'd like to try that too. Phil

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a name for cryptographic currency
by Eli Brandt 11 Nov '92

11 Nov '92

Nothing makes it big with a dodecasyllabic name. How about "cryp"? (Rhymes with "scrip"?) The idea is for science-fiction writers to ditch these central-intelligence "credits", and start naming currency "1gAu L5 Consortium cryp" and the like. Eli ebrandt(a)jarthur.claremont.edu

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re: (fwd) A Silver Bullet to Limit Crypto?
by Tom.Jennings＠f111.n125.z1.FIDONET.ORG 11 Nov '92

11 Nov '92

U> From: tcmay(a)netcom.com (Timothy C. May) U> U> Here's a new analysis of the key registration proposal I U> just posted to a couple of groups. U> U> -Tim I've been crossposting selected messages, such as this one, to FidoNet's PUBLIC_KEY conference, just FYI... --- ReadMail * Origin: tomj(a)fidosw.fidonet.org / World Power Systems (1:125/111) -- Tom Jennings - via FidoNet node 1:125/555 UUCP: ...!uunet!hoptoad!kumr!fidogate!111!Tom.Jennings INTERNET: Tom.Jennings(a)f111.n125.z1.FIDONET.ORG

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Random number generators
by Eric Hughes 11 Nov '92

11 Nov '92

There seems to be some confusion over this random number device. Perry Metzger forwarded me some information about Newbridge Microsystems and the part number of a chip that made random numbers. At the crypto BOF at hackers I mentioned that there was a need for a hardware random number generator and that I knew of some chip to do it. John Draper, who was there, expressed a desire to work on such a device. I forwarded him the information about the chip. What I didn't know was the cost or design of this chip. It appears to use a radioactive source to make random numbers. This may account for the cost. In any case, it is likely that most applications don't need this kind of chip. What is needed, though, is _some_ kind of chip. John Draper is eager to manufacture such a device, once we have a design. Would those people willing to help on this design please get in touch with him directly and start a conversation about it. The conversation could reasonably be discussed on the list, if enough are interested. FYI, random numbers are used generally to create single-use session keys in a wide variety of crypto protocols, including Diffie-Hellman key exchange. Hardware random number sources will be a standard component of all computers in the near future. As far as the design of the device itself goes, the numbers that come out of it don't have to be fully random. Non-randomness can be corrected in software. Two characteristics of the output, though will help such correction. First, the number of ones and zeros should be the same. Not only is this useful for correction, but it is easy to do in hardware. Second, effort should be made to make sure that the generator does not pick up cyclic noise from its environment. This means attention to coupling, shielding, and packaging. No extra expense, likely, but definitely to be thought about some. Eric

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Remove my name please
by estensla＠mipos2.intel.com 11 Nov '92

11 Nov '92

Please have my name removed from the mailing list! Thanks

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Mac PGP
by strat＠intercon.com 11 Nov '92

11 Nov '92

I will try out the port that Eric Hughes just mentioned, and I also want to make it known that I'm willing to assist in any Macintosh efforts along these lines. (FYI - I use MPW for development). Bob Stratton Engineer, InterCon Systems Corp strat(a)intercon.com +1 703 709 5525 (W)

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Mac PGP version
by Eric Hughes 11 Nov '92

11 Nov '92

I found the address for the Mac version of PGP. anon-ftp to mac.archive.umich.edu directory /mac/util/encryption Would someone try this out and report back to the list how it works? Eric

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