- cypherpunks-legacy - lists.cpunks.org

Re: FBI=LIE
by Dale Thorn 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Adam Shostack wrote: > http://www.nytimes.com/yr/mo/day/news/washpol/fbi-lab.html > Login cypherpunks, password cypherpunks. > WASHINGTON -- For decades the FBI's reputation as a crime-fighting > agency has rested heavily on its high-tech forensic laboratory, which > could solve baffling crimes from a speck of blood, a sliver of paint > or the thinnest filament of human hair. > But an investigation by the Justice Department's inspector > general has put the FBI laboratory, and the way the agency has > used it, under the glare of public scrutiny. The findings, which were > turned over to FBI officials last week, are threatening to shatter the > image of an agency on the cutting edge of scientific sleuthing. The L.A. Times today (Wed) ran an article telling about three top lab people working on the OKC bombing case, and how they were moved or scuttled due to discrepancies. This was a new development. You'll note also that although Fujisaki (sp?) in the 2nd O.J. trial did not permit it to be introduced (to my knowledge), there was evidence that a high-up FBI lab person who testified in the first trial falsified or seriously distorted certain facts to help the prosecution. This may yet be pursued like the Fuhrman thing.

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Re: Fighting the cybercensor
by Dale Thorn 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Sean Roach wrote: > At 08:15 PM 1/28/97 -0800, Steve Schear wrote: > >I think a hole in your thinking is to assume that the assasins have no > >motive other than financial gain. I would submit that there are those that > >have the skills, training and a political agenda coherent with the > >wagerers, lacking only the financial incentive to make the risks > >acceptable. These wetworkers won't consider accepting the bribe of the > >rich/powerful > This may be true, but the example was to show how easy a defensive line > could be thrown up around the powerful. For example, conventional body > guards could be included, ones with no real pay but with the fore knowledge > that they will be buried with the tyrant. These body guards could be ten > children out of each local village. Merely a human shield. [snippo] In Prizzi's Honor, Nicholson sez "If you try to hide in a submarine on the bottom of the ocean, we will find you". But it's not even that difficult. Lob a missile into the place and blow it up. Earth penetrators are getting better too, for the Sadaam types. And there's a zillion more. Does this "rich person" really want to spend his/her life living in a sealed tomb?

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Re: Rejection policy of the Cypherpunks mailing list
by Dale Thorn 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

aga wrote: > On Tue, 28 Jan 1997, Dale Thorn wrote: > > aga wrote: > > > On Tue, 28 Jan 1997, Dale Thorn wrote: > > > > > > But seriously, I was just telling the folks over the weekend, if I > > > > > > had my hand on the button, a lot of people would die very quickly. > > > > > > As in The Day The Earth Stood Still, a single act of aggression would > > > > > > suffice to be immediately terminated. > > > No trial, huh? > > Good question. The law we have right now already assumes that there > > are situations where a criminal will not go peacefully, if at all. > > In some countries (years ago?) such as England, bobbies were known > > to not carry firearms for ordinary street duty. Am I right? But > > here in the USA, that would be unthinkable. > > So my proposal doesn't eliminate the responsibility portion of law > > enforcement. I'd say, if a target were eliminated thru negligence, > > malfeasance, or other wrongdoing under "color of law" or whatever, > > let the courts handle that as they do now. > Just who is doing the eliminating? > > My suggestion would give the law enforcers the ability to dispense > > the first level of justice expeditiously, which they cannot accomplish > > now due to all of the red tape and the corrupt legal system (lawyers > > specialize in getting chronic offenders off, particularly "traffic" > > offenses). By transferring a major portion of the bureaucracy to > > the pencil pushers, we can free up the street cops to do what they > > do best, namely bust or eliminate criminals. > Cops can never be trusted to "dispense justice," and half of the > cops are themselves criminals in what they do. Most cops steal > evidence and lie like crazy in Court. All they want is a conviction, > and it mattters not how it is obtained. All true. But I'm not suggesting the creation of anything new here. Cops already carry guns and kill people. All I'm suggesting is that they be empowered to kill when: 1) The crime is aggression against another person or persons; 2) The evidence is so solid (recorded?) that the officer (who risks being prosecuted if he kills unjustifiably) can carry out the enforcement without undue apprehension; 3) These things are reviewed by the elected representatives of the people, to make sure there's no hanky-panky going on. > > I dare say that the downside of this is much less pleasant than the > > virtual anarchy (in the bad sense) we suffer now. If the police get > > out of control, A.P. will arrive just in time to plug a few of those > > holes, so to speak. Ideally, future robotics should be able to > > provide something like Gort (sp?) to take the place of human officers, > > given advances in the kind of pattern matching needed to deter > > aggression and the like. Those who don't make it past the robots, > > well, the rest of us can learn to behave, and we'll be much better > > off when we do. > > I would trust robots more than humanoids. The Gort (sp?) robot is a perfect example, and I don't think it's all that many years away.

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Re: Libel & the 1st Amendment
by jim bell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 03:22 AM 1/29/97 -0800, Greg Broiles wrote: >At 10:42 PM 1/28/97 -0600, Jim Choate wrote: > >>It has been asserted by at least one member that the 1st Amendment protects >>libelous or other defamatory speech. > >Defamation is not protected by the First Amendment; but the First Amendment >limits the application of defamation law in many circumstances. For >example, the First Amendment requires plaintiffs to prove "actual malice" >if they are a public official, public figure, or a private person seeking >punitive damages. What you ought to explain to us laymen is that the terminology "actual malice" dates from the case New York Times vs. Sullivan, and it used a definition of "malice" that was not in any dictionary at the time. My recollection: Sullivan was a local hero in a particular area in the south in the last 50's (?), gave a speech to a crowd of (?) people who were probably in sympathy with segregation. They proceeded to march. Later, the New York Times claimed (as I vaguely recall it, although it's been years since I read a description) that he had instigated a riot. Sullivan sued, claiming his reputation had been damaged. Arguably, it had, although it's probably equally arguable that Sullivan had done something that would have been looked upon somewhat unsympathetically by non-Southerners. The local (southern, of course) jury found NYT guilty of libel, and awarded Sullivan some huge judgment. (Had the jury been made up of northern people, presumably Sullivan would have lost.) The problem here is that two long-honored principles collided: One, the "free speech" issue, generally tries to guarantee organizations like NY Times the right to print the news and the leeway to do so. The second principle that people should be able to sue for libel in a local court, and be awarded whatever amount of money the jury declares. The problem with this was obvious, after the verdict: It, in effect, allowed essentially any burg in the country, no matter how backwards, potentially to bankrupt any targeted organ of the national news media. Something had to give. Unfortunately, the SC screwed up, as usual. The proper thing for them to do would have been to abandon libel law entirely, recognizing that it did more harm than good. But they blew it: They invented the "actual malice" standard out of whole cloth, raising the standard for libel suits by "public figures," which is really a rather arbitrary standard. Don't go to any ordinary English dictionary for this "malice" definition; it didn't exist before the Sullivan decision, not even in lawbooks. It was really just a rabbit pulled from a hat to try to avoid the collision I mentioned above. Side note: I think that the SC should be unable to re-define ordinary English words. But they try anyway. Basically, it became harder to sue well-known persons. However, what really happened is that they SC had merely put off the problem for another day, because the DEFINITION of a "public figure" was at least as malleable as Jell-O. And oddly, it was eventually revealed that you could be a "public figure" with respect to one subject, but NOT a "public figure" on another. Etc. Ironically, now that Richard Jewell (incorrectly identified as Atlanta bombing suspect) has sued some newspapers (and his former employer) for libel, it seems likely that at least some of those defendants will try to argue that merely being named by the government as a criminal suspect makes him "a public figure." BTW, I think that pressing the Richard Jewell incident would be an excellent way to derail any sort of claim that the government can obey the law. Apparently, they got a number of search warrants based on, essentially, nothing, and to rub this in the government's nose would show that the so-called "probable-cause" standard for warrants is not followed in practice. Jim Bell jimbell(a)pacifier.com

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No Subject
by Mark Krell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

you are forwarding messages to me... stop it. remove markk(a)ra1.randomc.com from your mail list... all of a sudden I'm getting mail from bunches of people i don't know and who don't know me. help me out... go to the place where you got my email address and have them correct their links. Thank you. markk

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Re: Cats Out of Bags
by tmcghan＠gill-simpson.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

According to Duncan Frissell <frissell(a)panix.com> > "In an interview Tuesday, [David L.] Aaron [the Feds' Crypto Ambassador] disputed the {snip} > "When I talk to other governments," he said, "they still don't feel... ===(mis)quoted, paraphrased, and enhanced from current news reports=== The Clinton administration's newly named point man on encryption policy is citing international support for U.S. policies limiting use of encryption and called for industry cooperation. Speaking to the RSA Data Security Conference in San Francisco, David Aaron said that U.S. allies support the concept of lawful access by governments and the use of key recovery mechanisms. The White House's continued restrictions on encryption have been unpopular in the cryptography community and among major U.S. corporations and high tech companies because of the business disadvantage vis a vis foreign firms. Aaron alleges that U.S. trading partners have misgivings about the U.S. government's decision in October to allow 'moderately strong' 56-bit encryption, to be exported, under controlled circumstances, but were willing to cooperate on the policy. "As far as I can see, the international encryption market will not be a free-wheeling affair," he said, adding companies should consider that lawful access and key escrow capabilities may become "a growthe industry" In his speech, Aaron also listed cases where the U.S. government said encryption was used in terrorist plots, drug dealing, child pornography and espionage, adding the White House, "in no way seeks to expand law enforcement powers nor reduce the privacy of individuals." Independent experts strongly disagreed with Aaron's characterization of the international posture following his address here, and leading U.S. legislators said they would continue to push for further reform of the restrictions. "I just don't think it will work," Sen. Conrad Burns, a Montana Republican who has been behind the legislative effort to promote use of stronger levels of encryption, said of the White House encryption policy. "I think if bad people want to do bad things to good people, they certainly won't want to file their key (with any law enforcement authorities)," Burns said in a satellite conference. Marc Rotenberg, director of the Washington, D.C.-based Electronic Privacy Information Center, rebutted Aaron's suggestion that Washington has broad international support for its concept of lawful access by governments to the keys to encrypted files and communications. Rotenberg said at the recent Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) meetings on encryption policy, that was not the case, nor were a number of countries pushing for stronger controls, as Aaron said they had been. Germany, Australia, Japan and Canada all are advancing competing cryptography capabilities, according to Rotenberg. Thomas M. McGhan tmcghan(a)gill-simpson.com http://www.gill-simpson.com voice: (410) 467-3335 fax: (410) 235-6961 pagenet: (410) 716-1342 cellular: (410) 241-9113 ICBM: 39.395N 76.469W

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encrypt_3.html
by Lynx_User＠linux.nycmetro.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Reuters New Media [ Yahoo | Write Us | Search | Info ] [ Index | News | World | Biz | Tech | Politic | Sport | Scoreboard | Entertain | Health ] _________________________________________________________________ Previous Story: Kodak To Buy Wang Software Business Next Story: Netscape Counts On User Upgrades In 1997 _________________________________________________________________ Wednesday January 29 3:26 PM EST U.S. Encryption Envoy Seeks Industry Cooperation SAN FRANCISCO - The Clinton administration's newly named point man on encryption policy is citing international support for U.S. policies limiting use of encryption and called for industry cooperation. Ambassador David Aaron, special envoy for cryptography, said on a speech to the RSA Data Security Conference in San Francisco that U.S. allies support the concept of lawful access by governments and the use of key recovery mechanisms. Key recovery would involve storing encoding keys in escrow so authorities could get access to them to unscramble data in an emergency, such as to uncover criminal activity. The White House's continued restrictions on encryption have been unpopular in the cryptography community and among major U.S. corporations and high tech companies, which argue the limitations put U.S. business at a disadvantage. Aaron said some U.S. trading partners have misgivings about the U.S. government's decision in October to relax U.S. export controls to allow export of moderately strong 56-bit encryption, but were willing to cooperate on the policy. "As far as I can see, the international encryption market will not be a free-wheeling affair," he said, adding companies should consider that lawful access and key escrow capabilities may become "a growing international requirement." In his speech, Aaron also listed cases where the U.S. government said encryption was used in terrorist plots, drug dealing, child pornography and espionage, adding the White House, "in no way seeks to expand law enforcement powers nor reduce the privacy of individuals." But some independent experts who monitor cryptography policy disagreed with Aaron's characterization of the international posture following his address here, and leading U.S. legislators said they would continue to push the White House to further liberalize the restrictions. "I just don't think it will work," Sen. Conrad Burns, a Montana Republican who has been behind the legislative effort to promote use of stronger levels of encryption, said of the White House encryption policy. "I think if bad people want to do bad things to good people, they certainly won't want to file their key (with any law enforcement authorities)," he told conference attendees over a satellite linkup. Burns appeared in the linkup with three legislative colleagues to stress that together they would push to put "get the administration out in front of the cryptography curve." Marc Rotenberg, director of the Washington, D.C.-based Electronic Privacy Information Center, rebutted Aaron's suggestion that Washington has broad international support for its concept of lawful access by governments to the keys to encrypted files and communications. Rotenberg said at the recent Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) meetings on encryption policy, that was not the case, nor were a number of countries pushing for stronger controls, as Aaron said they had been. In fact, countries such as Japan, Germany, Australia and Canada all have competing cryptography capabilities they are promoting, he added. The OECD guidelines are due to be published next month. Copyright, Reuters Ltd. All rights reserved _________________________________________________________________ Earlier Related Stories * Encryption Export Bill Backed In Senate - Wed Jan 29 9:54 am _________________________________________________________________ ________________________ ___________ Help _________________________________________________________________ Previous Story: Kodak To Buy Wang Software Business Next Story: Netscape Counts On User Upgrades In 1997 _________________________________________________________________ [ Index | News | World | Biz | Tech | Politic | Sport | Scoreboard | Entertain | Health ] _________________________________________________________________ Reuters Limited Questions or Comments

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Re: Cats Out of Bags
by tmcghan＠gill-simpson.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

According to Duncan Frissell <frissell(a)panix.com> > "In an interview Tuesday, [David L.] Aaron [the Feds' Crypto Ambassador] disputed the {snip} > "When I talk to other governments," he said, "they still don't feel... ===(mis)quoted, paraphrased, and enhanced from current news reports=== The Clinton administration's newly named point man on encryption policy is citing international support for U.S. policies limiting use of encryption and called for industry cooperation. Speaking to the RSA Data Security Conference in San Francisco, David Aaron said that U.S. allies support the concept of lawful access by governments and the use of key recovery mechanisms. The White House's continued restrictions on encryption have been unpopular in the cryptography community and among major U.S. corporations and high tech companies because of the business disadvantage vis a vis foreign firms. Aaron alleges that U.S. trading partners have misgivings about the U.S. government's decision in October to allow 'moderately strong' 56-bit encryption, to be exported, under controlled circumstances, but were willing to cooperate on the policy. "As far as I can see, the international encryption market will not be a free-wheeling affair," he said, adding companies should consider that lawful access and key escrow capabilities may become "a growthe industry" In his speech, Aaron also listed cases where the U.S. government said encryption was used in terrorist plots, drug dealing, child pornography and espionage, adding the White House, "in no way seeks to expand law enforcement powers nor reduce the privacy of individuals." Independent experts strongly disagreed with Aaron's characterization of the international posture following his address here, and leading U.S. legislators said they would continue to push for further reform of the restrictions. "I just don't think it will work," Sen. Conrad Burns, a Montana Republican who has been behind the legislative effort to promote use of stronger levels of encryption, said of the White House encryption policy. "I think if bad people want to do bad things to good people, they certainly won't want to file their key (with any law enforcement authorities)," Burns said in a satellite conference. Marc Rotenberg, director of the Washington, D.C.-based Electronic Privacy Information Center, rebutted Aaron's suggestion that Washington has broad international support for its concept of lawful access by governments to the keys to encrypted files and communications. Rotenberg said at the recent Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) meetings on encryption policy, that was not the case, nor were a number of countries pushing for stronger controls, as Aaron said they had been. Germany, Australia, Japan and Canada all are advancing competing cryptography capabilities, according to Rotenberg. Thomas M. McGhan tmcghan(a)gill-simpson.com http://www.gill-simpson.com voice: (410) 467-3335 fax: (410) 235-6961 pagenet: (410) 716-1342 cellular: (410) 241-9113 ICBM: 39.395N 76.469W

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cDc GD Update #21-1/97
by Swamp Ratte 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

_ _ ((___)) [ x x ] cDc communications \ / Global Domination Update #21 (' ') January 1st, 1997 (U) Est. 1984 FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE FOR MORE INFORMATION, CONTACT: sratte(a)mindvox.com CDC IS NEW FALLEN SNOW ON A BLEAK DESERT LANDSCAPE cDc communications is tittering with joy on the birth of this shiny new year to make two announcements. We are the proud parents of ten bouncing new articles in the continuing saga of the CULT OF THE DEAD COW publication. These feisty little rugrats will put a smile on the face and a Brussels sprout in the stomach with their hearty blend of entertainment and information. We also can now make public our "Good Times" virus hoax. The Good Times meme was launched by cDc to prove the gullibility of self-proclaimed "experts" on the Internet. Any chickenhead would see through the Good Times virus message as the merest wisp of smoke that it is, while the so-called experts ran around in circles, beside themselves in self-induced panic. Therefore, CULT OF THE DEAD COW claims FULL responsibility for the waves of nausea and unrest that have spread from AOL to CompuServe to Prodigy by the actions of egotistical 'experts' who roam the Information Superhighway like squeegee men, seeking to wring a buck or two from the poor souls they confront at every intersection and stoplight on the infobahn. We have far worse to unleash upon you, should you insist upon pontificating and spreading obvious falsehoods. Heed well the motto of the Hell's Angels: "Those who know, don't tell. Those who tell, don't know." We'd also like to take this opportunity to quell a nasty rumor: cDc has NOT been bought-out over the past few months to ANYONE. cDc, as always is 100% independently owned and operated and has no outside sponsors. Viacom and Ziff-Davis, puh-leeze. Coming soon: cDc presents AUDIO on the Internet via Tarkin Darklighter's Shockwave site. New releases from Weasel-MX, Gravelheaver, Tha Gates, Superior Products, Grey Man, and Crucified Goat are on the way. Also, The cDc Media List version 3 from Omega... something fresh for the spring '97 fashion season. _ _ the tedium is the message _ _ ((___)) INFORMATION IS JUNK MAIL ((___)) [ x x ] _ [ x x ] \ / _ |_|_ _ _|_ _|_ |_ _ _| _ _. _| _ _ \ / (' ') (_|_|| |_ (_) | |_ | |(/_ (_|(/_(_|(_| (_(_)\_/\_/ (' ') (U) (U) .ooM cDc communications .ooM deal with it NEW RELEASES FOR JANUARY, 1997: deal with it ________________________________/text files\________________________________ 321:"Nineteen Seventy-Seven" by OXblood Ruffin. It was a good year... Star Wars, The Sex Pistols, the Apple II, and the Death of Elvis. And you thought they weren't connected? 322:"Pariah '67" by Matt Brown. It's like _The Wonder Years_ with real blood. Like Diet Coke with real sugar. Who would've thought Paul would grow up to drum for Marilyn Manson? Gosh. 323:"CYBERsitter" by Peacefire. Overprotective parents are being led down the primrose path to potential pathos. This is an important press release from the Peacefire organization concerning their efforts against the makers of the CYBERsitter Internet filtering software. 324:"Painted Stranger" by Weasel Boy. Creepy-as-hell goth fiction. People with monochromatic wardrobes and Victorian affectations, incest, tragic young death, The Beast. You know the drill. Hup hup! 325:"Zen of Skateboarding, Part 3: Flowing Stream" by Thoai Tran. Skate and destroy. Death to false skating. The search for beauty and truth continues. 326:"The Great Southern Fire God" by John Crow. Everything would be great if it weren't for those DAMN YANKEES (nevermind The Nuge, this is _serious bidness_). Will the assembly please rise and join with me in singing "Sweet Home Alabama." 327:"Vulnerabilities in the S/KEY One-Time Password System" by Mudge. All that and a bucket of chicken wings. 328:"Pantslessness" by Mark Buda. I don't know about you, but every time I go outside without pants, the squirrels poke at my BARE-NAKED POSTERIOR with twigs. They ain't got covered rumps neither. Freaks! 329:"Quadro-Pounder" by Drunkfux. He wants lots of meat. Huh-huh. 330:"Happyland Cell Block 90210" by G. Allen Perry. "Where am I?" "You're in a cheap run-down teenage jail, that's where." "Oh my God!" -The Runaways Reading is FUNdamental! _______________________________/ - x X x - \________________________________ Fools better recognize: CULT OF THE DEAD COW is a publication and trademark of cDc communications. Established in 1984, cDc is the largest and oldest organization of the telecommunications underground worldwide, and inventor of the "e-zine." Every issue is produced on an Apple II for genuine old-school flavor. You thirst for our body of work, you know you do. Find it at these fine locations, among others: World Wide Web: //www.l0pht.com/cdc.html FTP/Gopher: cascade.net in pub/cDc Usenet: alt.fan.cult-dead-cow BBS: 806/794-4362 Entry:KILL For further information, contact: Email: sratte(a)mindvox.com Postal: POB 53011, Lubbock, TX, 79453, USA Sincerely, Grandmaster Ratte' cDc/Editor, Fearless Leader, and Pontiff "We're into telecom for the groupies and money." #### By THE NIGHTSTALKER and GRatte'. Copyright (c) 1997 cDc communications.

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Re: Last nail for US crypto export policy?
by Bill Stewart 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 10:45 AM 1/29/97 -0500, Dan Geer wrote: >Steve is absolutely right on the money, particularly about the likely >happiness on the government side. I pretty much agree. On the other hand, Ian did a nice job on the radio (NPR, probably was All Things Considered) of pushing the "look, if a college student can break 40 bits in a couple of hours, it's really stupid for the government to limit us like this"; a couple of other people also contributed spin, and it came out pretty strongly against export restrictions. I think we do need to get some sort of push going for 3DES as a replacement for DES - it's strong enough, even though DES is showing its age, and it's an obvious transition from the current technology. It's slower and clunkier than IDEA or RC4/128, but still not bad. # Thanks; Bill # Bill Stewart, +1-415-442-2215 stewarts(a)ix.netcom.com # You can get PGP outside the US at ftp.ox.ac.uk/pub/crypto/pgp # (If this is a mailing list, please Cc: me on replies. Thanks.)

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