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What can I do about my computer freezing?
by NICETY7078＠aol.com 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

My computer freezes when I use AOL and sometimes when I'm just using the basic functions of Windows 98. My defragmentor keeps starting over and over and my scan disk never finds anything wrong, but there has to be. Any advice? NICETY7078(a)aol.com ANSWERS:

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cleversafe says: 3 Reasons Why Encryption is Overrated
by Zooko Wilcox-O'Hearn 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

[cross-posted to tahoe-dev(a)allmydata.org and cryptography(a)metzdowd.com] Disclosure: Cleversafe is to some degree a competitor of my Tahoe- LAFS project. On the other hand, I tend to feel positive towards them because they open-source much of their work. Our "Related Projects" page has included a link to cleversafe for years now, I briefly collaborated with some of them on a paper about erasure coding last year, and I even spoke briefly with them about the idea of becoming an employee of their company this year. I am tempted to ignore this idea that they are pushing about encryption being overrated, because they are wrong and it is embarassing. But I've decided not to ignore it, because people who publicly spread this kind of misinformation need to be publicly contradicted, lest they confuse others. Cleversafe has posted a series of blog entries entitled "3 Reasons Why Encryption is Overrated". http://dev.cleversafe.org/weblog/?p=63 # 3 Reasons Why Encryption is Overrated http://dev.cleversafe.org/weblog/?p=95 # Response Part 1: Future Processing Power http://dev.cleversafe.org/weblog/?p=111 # Response Part 2: Complexities of Key Management http://dev.cleversafe.org/weblog/?p=178 # Response Part 3: Disclosure Laws It begins like this: """ When it comes to storage and security, discussions traditionally center on encryption. The reason encryption b or the use of a complex algorithm to encode information b is accepted as a best practice rests on the premise that while itbs possible to crack encrypted information, most malicious hackers donbt have access to the amount of computer processing power they would need to decrypt information. But not so fast. Letbs take a look at three reasons why encryption is overrated. """ Ugh. The first claim -- the today's encryption is vulnerable to tomorrow's processing power -- is a common goof, which is easy to make by conflating historical failures of cryptosystems due to having too small of a crypto value with failures due to weak algorithms. Examples of the former are DES, which failed because its 56-bit key was small enough to fall to brute force, and the bizarre "40-bit security" policies of the U.S. Federal Government in the 90's. An example of the latter is SHA1, whose hash output size is *not* small enough to brute-force, but which is insecure because, as it turns out, the SHA1 algorithm allows the generation of colliding inputs much quicker than a brute force search would. Oh boy, I see that in the discussion following the article "Future Processing Power", the author writes: """ I donbt think symmetric ciphers such as AES-256 are under any threat of being at risk to brute force attacks any time this century. """ What? Then why is he spreading this Fear, Uncertainty, and Doubt? Oh and then it gets *really* interesting: it turns out that cleversafe uses AES-256 in an All-or-Nothing Transform as part of their "Information Dispersal" algorithm. Okay, I would like to understand better the cryptographic effects of that (and in particular, whether this means that the cleversafe architecture is just as susceptible to AES-256 failing as an encryption scheme such as is used in the Tahoe-LAFS architecture). But, it is time for me to stop reading about cryptography and get ready to go to work. :-) Regards Zooko --- Tahoe, the Least-Authority Filesystem -- http://allmydata.org store your data: $10/month -- http://allmydata.com/?tracking=zsig I am available for work -- http://zooko.com/rC)sumC).html --------------------------------------------------------------------- The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending "unsubscribe cryptography" to majordomo(a)metzdowd.com ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

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cleversafe says: 3 Reasons Why Encryption is Overrated
by Zooko Wilcox-O'Hearn 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

[cross-posted to tahoe-dev(a)allmydata.org and cryptography(a)metzdowd.com] Disclosure: Cleversafe is to some degree a competitor of my Tahoe- LAFS project. On the other hand, I tend to feel positive towards them because they open-source much of their work. Our "Related Projects" page has included a link to cleversafe for years now, I briefly collaborated with some of them on a paper about erasure coding last year, and I even spoke briefly with them about the idea of becoming an employee of their company this year. I am tempted to ignore this idea that they are pushing about encryption being overrated, because they are wrong and it is embarassing. But I've decided not to ignore it, because people who publicly spread this kind of misinformation need to be publicly contradicted, lest they confuse others. Cleversafe has posted a series of blog entries entitled "3 Reasons Why Encryption is Overrated". http://dev.cleversafe.org/weblog/?p=63 # 3 Reasons Why Encryption is Overrated http://dev.cleversafe.org/weblog/?p=95 # Response Part 1: Future Processing Power http://dev.cleversafe.org/weblog/?p=111 # Response Part 2: Complexities of Key Management http://dev.cleversafe.org/weblog/?p=178 # Response Part 3: Disclosure Laws It begins like this: """ When it comes to storage and security, discussions traditionally center on encryption. The reason encryption b or the use of a complex algorithm to encode information b is accepted as a best practice rests on the premise that while itbs possible to crack encrypted information, most malicious hackers donbt have access to the amount of computer processing power they would need to decrypt information. But not so fast. Letbs take a look at three reasons why encryption is overrated. """ Ugh. The first claim -- the today's encryption is vulnerable to tomorrow's processing power -- is a common goof, which is easy to make by conflating historical failures of cryptosystems due to having too small of a crypto value with failures due to weak algorithms. Examples of the former are DES, which failed because its 56-bit key was small enough to fall to brute force, and the bizarre "40-bit security" policies of the U.S. Federal Government in the 90's. An example of the latter is SHA1, whose hash output size is *not* small enough to brute-force, but which is insecure because, as it turns out, the SHA1 algorithm allows the generation of colliding inputs much quicker than a brute force search would. Oh boy, I see that in the discussion following the article "Future Processing Power", the author writes: """ I donbt think symmetric ciphers such as AES-256 are under any threat of being at risk to brute force attacks any time this century. """ What? Then why is he spreading this Fear, Uncertainty, and Doubt? Oh and then it gets *really* interesting: it turns out that cleversafe uses AES-256 in an All-or-Nothing Transform as part of their "Information Dispersal" algorithm. Okay, I would like to understand better the cryptographic effects of that (and in particular, whether this means that the cleversafe architecture is just as susceptible to AES-256 failing as an encryption scheme such as is used in the Tahoe-LAFS architecture). But, it is time for me to stop reading about cryptography and get ready to go to work. :-) Regards Zooko --- Tahoe, the Least-Authority Filesystem -- http://allmydata.org store your data: $10/month -- http://allmydata.com/?tracking=zsig I am available for work -- http://zooko.com/rC)sumC).html --------------------------------------------------------------------- The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending "unsubscribe cryptography" to majordomo(a)metzdowd.com ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

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Re: [liberationtech] Assange's claim about Tor losing US government support due to WikiLeaks
by Rohan Dixit 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

Thanks for the clarification, Andrew. It's dicey navigating the politics of grant funding in a quasi-public forum like this one, but thanks for the sincere effort. As a disclaimer, I'm completely out of the loop (nor was I ever in it, actually) but I'd guess the federal government believes organizations like Wikileaks are not in their long-term interests. Given the political-economic context this is all happening in, it doesn't seem entirely implausible that grant committees look more favorably on non-controversial applicants. Whether or not that's the case here is probably irrelevant.. By chance, I had the opportunity to read a paper on Cryptome purported to come from Mr. Assange. He describes a conspiratorial government as a connected network, with "leaks" (a la Wikileaks) as methods of making links between the network harder to effectively form and communicate across. I wonder if anyone has any thoughts on it. It seemed to me that the logical consequence of this idea is a completely open surveillance of all members of government, i.e. "sousveillance" (sous- below) as opposed to "surveillance" (surv- spying from "above"). It's curious that things like releasing candidates' tax records, and the larger and larger public scrutiny of politicians generally, shows that this process is happening naturally regardless. Here's a link to the Cryptome PDF: http://cryptome.org/0002/ja-conspiracies.pdf Best, Rohan On Sun, Feb 19, 2012 at 12:28 PM, SiNA <sina.rabbani(a)gmail.com> wrote: > can you explain why this news is such a big deal? who cares what cryptom > thinks? > > Why do so many people hate Jake and Tor? > On Feb 19, 2012 10:41 AM, "Evgeny Morozov" <evgeny.morozov(a)gmail.com> > wrote: > >> Those of you who've read Assange's recent interview with The Rolling >> Stone<http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/news/julian-assange-the-rolling-stone-…>may have noticed this claim (in response to a question about forms of >> pressure that US government exerted on WikiLeaks and their supporters): >> >> The Tor Project, which protects people around the world from being spied >>> on or censored, lost some $600,000 to the U.S. government, as a result of >>> one of their people, Jacob Appelbaum, having filled in for me once at a >>> conference in New York. This type of indirect pressure has been applied to >>> a great many people. >> >> >> I was a bit puzzled by it. So were people at Cryptome<http://cryptome.org/2012/01/0053.htm>, >> who asked Tor about it. Here is what Andrew Lewman (who's on this list) >> wrote to them: >> >> I read this statement as well. It is news to me that we were penalized >> for Jacob. Maybe wikileaks has unreleased information from one of our >> USG funders. If so, they should publish it for all to review. >> >> >> Now, Andrew's statement is carefully worded, i.e. it does allow for the >> possibility that Tor lost the USG money but they think it was not >> Jacob/WikiLeaks-related. >> >> So it would be good to know whether a) Tor did lose some or all of USG >> support between late 2010 and early 2012? and b) there is any evidence >> to link this to WL, as Assange did? >> >> Whatever the motivation, USG cutting support to circumvention tools is a >> big news item all in itself, regardless of the link to Assange. I wonder >> why it wasn't more widely reported, if true - perhaps, by Tor project >> itself?- because ultimately this would all be visible on Tor's financial >> statements. >> >> Evgeny >> >> >> _______________________________________________ >> liberationtech mailing list >> liberationtech(a)lists.stanford.edu >> >> Should you need to change your subscription options, please go to: >> >> https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech >> >> If you would like to receive a daily digest, click "yes" (once you click >> above) next to "would you like to receive list mail batched in a daily >> digest?" >> >> You will need the user name and password you receive from the list >> moderator in monthly reminders. >> >> Should you need immediate assistance, please contact the list moderator. >> >> Please don't forget to follow us on http://twitter.com/#!/Liberationtech >> > > _______________________________________________ > liberationtech mailing list > liberationtech(a)lists.stanford.edu > > Should you need to change your subscription options, please go to: > > https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech > > If you would like to receive a daily digest, click "yes" (once you click > above) next to "would you like to receive list mail batched in a daily > digest?" > > You will need the user name and password you receive from the list > moderator in monthly reminders. > > Should you need immediate assistance, please contact the list moderator. > > Please don't forget to follow us on http://twitter.com/#!/Liberationtech > _______________________________________________ liberationtech mailing list liberationtech(a)lists.stanford.edu Should you need to change your subscription options, please go to: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech If you would like to receive a daily digest, click "yes" (once you click above) next to "would you like to receive list mail batched in a daily digest?" You will need the user name and password you receive from the list moderator in monthly reminders. Should you need immediate assistance, please contact the list moderator. Please don't forget to follow us on http://twitter.com/#!/Liberationtech ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

1 0

What can I do about my computer freezing?
by NICETY7078＠aol.com 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

My computer freezes when I use AOL and sometimes when I'm just using the basic functions of Windows 98. My defragmentor keeps starting over and over and my scan disk never finds anything wrong, but there has to be. Any advice? NICETY7078(a)aol.com ANSWERS:

1 0

Re: [liberationtech] Assange's claim about Tor losing US government support due to WikiLeaks
by Rohan Dixit 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

Thanks for the clarification, Andrew. It's dicey navigating the politics of grant funding in a quasi-public forum like this one, but thanks for the sincere effort. As a disclaimer, I'm completely out of the loop (nor was I ever in it, actually) but I'd guess the federal government believes organizations like Wikileaks are not in their long-term interests. Given the political-economic context this is all happening in, it doesn't seem entirely implausible that grant committees look more favorably on non-controversial applicants. Whether or not that's the case here is probably irrelevant.. By chance, I had the opportunity to read a paper on Cryptome purported to come from Mr. Assange. He describes a conspiratorial government as a connected network, with "leaks" (a la Wikileaks) as methods of making links between the network harder to effectively form and communicate across. I wonder if anyone has any thoughts on it. It seemed to me that the logical consequence of this idea is a completely open surveillance of all members of government, i.e. "sousveillance" (sous- below) as opposed to "surveillance" (surv- spying from "above"). It's curious that things like releasing candidates' tax records, and the larger and larger public scrutiny of politicians generally, shows that this process is happening naturally regardless. Here's a link to the Cryptome PDF: http://cryptome.org/0002/ja-conspiracies.pdf Best, Rohan On Sun, Feb 19, 2012 at 12:28 PM, SiNA <sina.rabbani(a)gmail.com> wrote: > can you explain why this news is such a big deal? who cares what cryptom > thinks? > > Why do so many people hate Jake and Tor? > On Feb 19, 2012 10:41 AM, "Evgeny Morozov" <evgeny.morozov(a)gmail.com> > wrote: > >> Those of you who've read Assange's recent interview with The Rolling >> Stone<http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/news/julian-assange-the-rolling-stone-…>may have noticed this claim (in response to a question about forms of >> pressure that US government exerted on WikiLeaks and their supporters): >> >> The Tor Project, which protects people around the world from being spied >>> on or censored, lost some $600,000 to the U.S. government, as a result of >>> one of their people, Jacob Appelbaum, having filled in for me once at a >>> conference in New York. This type of indirect pressure has been applied to >>> a great many people. >> >> >> I was a bit puzzled by it. So were people at Cryptome<http://cryptome.org/2012/01/0053.htm>, >> who asked Tor about it. Here is what Andrew Lewman (who's on this list) >> wrote to them: >> >> I read this statement as well. It is news to me that we were penalized >> for Jacob. Maybe wikileaks has unreleased information from one of our >> USG funders. If so, they should publish it for all to review. >> >> >> Now, Andrew's statement is carefully worded, i.e. it does allow for the >> possibility that Tor lost the USG money but they think it was not >> Jacob/WikiLeaks-related. >> >> So it would be good to know whether a) Tor did lose some or all of USG >> support between late 2010 and early 2012? and b) there is any evidence >> to link this to WL, as Assange did? >> >> Whatever the motivation, USG cutting support to circumvention tools is a >> big news item all in itself, regardless of the link to Assange. I wonder >> why it wasn't more widely reported, if true - perhaps, by Tor project >> itself?- because ultimately this would all be visible on Tor's financial >> statements. >> >> Evgeny >> >> >> _______________________________________________ >> liberationtech mailing list >> liberationtech(a)lists.stanford.edu >> >> Should you need to change your subscription options, please go to: >> >> https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech >> >> If you would like to receive a daily digest, click "yes" (once you click >> above) next to "would you like to receive list mail batched in a daily >> digest?" >> >> You will need the user name and password you receive from the list >> moderator in monthly reminders. >> >> Should you need immediate assistance, please contact the list moderator. >> >> Please don't forget to follow us on http://twitter.com/#!/Liberationtech >> > > _______________________________________________ > liberationtech mailing list > liberationtech(a)lists.stanford.edu > > Should you need to change your subscription options, please go to: > > https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech > > If you would like to receive a daily digest, click "yes" (once you click > above) next to "would you like to receive list mail batched in a daily > digest?" > > You will need the user name and password you receive from the list > moderator in monthly reminders. > > Should you need immediate assistance, please contact the list moderator. > > Please don't forget to follow us on http://twitter.com/#!/Liberationtech > _______________________________________________ liberationtech mailing list liberationtech(a)lists.stanford.edu Should you need to change your subscription options, please go to: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech If you would like to receive a daily digest, click "yes" (once you click above) next to "would you like to receive list mail batched in a daily digest?" You will need the user name and password you receive from the list moderator in monthly reminders. Should you need immediate assistance, please contact the list moderator. Please don't forget to follow us on http://twitter.com/#!/Liberationtech ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

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Re: [tor-talk] Network diversity [was: Should I warn against Tor?]
by Gregory Maxwell 19 Jul '13

19 Jul '13

On Fri, Jul 19, 2013 at 9:45 AM, adrelanos <adrelanos(a)riseup.net> wrote: > Seems like high latency mix networks failed already in practice. [1] > > Can't we somehow get confidence even against a global active adversary > for low latency networks? Someone start a founding campaign? So have low latency ones, some things fail. Today you'd answer that concern by running your high latency mix network over tor (or integrated into tor) and so it cannot be worse. Answering the "you need users first, and low latency networks are easier to get users for" concern. The point there remains that if you're assuming a (near) global adversary doing timing attacks you cannot resist them effectively using a low latency network. Once you've taken that as your threat model you can wax all you want about how low latency mix networks get more users and so on.. it's irrelevant because they're really not secure against that threat model. (Not that high latency ones are automatically secure either— but they have a fighting chance) On Fri, Jul 19, 2013 at 10:03 AM, Jens Lechtenboerger <tortalk(a)informationelle-selbstbestimmung-im-internet.de> wrote: >> but going much further than that may well decrease your security. > > How, actually? I’m aware that what I’m doing is a departure from > network diversity to obtain anonymity. I’m excluding what I > consider unsafe based on my current understanding. It might be that > in the end I’ll be unable to find anything that does not look unsafe > to me. I don’t know what then. Because you're lowering the entropy of the nodes you are selecting maybe all the hosts themselves are simply NSA operated, or if not now, they be a smaller target to compromise. Maybe it actually turns out that they all use a metro fiber provider in munich which is owned by an NSA shell company. In Germany this may not be much of a risk. But if your logic is applied to someplace that is less of a hotbed of Tor usage it wouldn't be too shocking if all the nodes there were run by some foreign intelligence agency. _______________________________________________ tor-talk mailing list tor-talk(a)lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://ativel.com http://postbiota.org AC894EC5: 38A5 5F46 A4FF 59B8 336B 47EE F46E 3489 AC89 4EC5

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Re: [tor-talk] Network diversity [was: Should I warn against Tor?]
by Gregory Maxwell 19 Jul '13

19 Jul '13

On Fri, Jul 19, 2013 at 8:35 AM, Jens Lechtenboerger <tortalk(a)informationelle-selbstbestimmung-im-internet.de> wrote: > [For those who are confused about the context of this: I started the > original thread. A write-up for my motivation is available at [0].] I > Links to my code and a README.txt clarifying necessary prerequisites are > available at [0]. Best wishes Jens [0] > https://blogs.fsfe.org/jens.lechtenboerger/2013/07/19/how-i-select-tor-guar… It's _very_ hard to reason about this subject and act safely. It is common for ISPs to use segments in their network which are provided by third party providers, even providers who are almost entirely facilities based will have some holes or redundancy gaps. Because these are L1 (wave) and L2 (e.g. ethernet transport) they are utterly invisible from the L3 topology. You can make some guesses which are probably harmless: a guard that is across the ocean is much more likely to take you across a compromised path than one closer— but going much further than that may well decrease your security. These concerns should be reminding us of the importance of high latency mix networks... they're the only way to start getting any real confidence against a global passive observer, and the are mostly a missing item in our privacy tool toolbelt. _______________________________________________ tor-talk mailing list tor-talk(a)lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://ativel.com http://postbiota.org AC894EC5: 38A5 5F46 A4FF 59B8 336B 47EE F46E 3489 AC89 4EC5

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19 Jul '13

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