- cypherpunks-legacy - lists.cpunks.org

alias in phone book
by Gary Jeffers 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

* Gun control is people control. - Gary Jeffers Why hasn't anyone discussed the utility of phony names in the phone books for fooling state investigators? If you have an unlisted phone number & a state snoop asks for your listing, the phone company will also check the unlisted numbers. What would happen if you had a phony name that the phone company agreed to use. Would the snoops be thrown for a loss? Could phony names be even better than unlisted? The phone company would probably demand your real name for billing purposes. Yours Truly, Gary Jeffers PUSH EM BACK! PUSH EM BACK! WWWAAAYYY BBBAAACCCKKKK! BBBEEEAAATTTT STATE!

1 0

The Clipper *CAN* be Thwarted.
by Irdial-Discs 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

The Clinton administration is artificially forcing the usa/world to adopt the Clipper Chip as the standard for data/voice encryption, by using us government funded economies of scale to create a large pool of cheap devices that would be hard to resist by the communications using/manufacturin g community. In order to stop this obviously undesireable situation from becoming the only option, a similar counter-strategy must be employed to offset the saturation effects of the flood of clipper chips that is to come. How to do it. ------------- 1/ A massive public awareness operation must be started. 2/ A crypographically strong alternative chip must be created. 3/ In the same way that SETI was kept alive by contributions, the creation of this alternative 'Zipper' chip must be funded by the public, and then manufactured in the millions, to take the same advantage of economies of scale that the clipper will. 4/ The zipper chip should then be distributed and publicized to completely discredit the clipper chip. This is a very simplified outline of the kind of plan that needs to be implemented. If we are going to save privacy for everyone, economic warfare tactics must be used to counter the warfare that is being waged against us all. PC based phone scrambling systems will not have the necessary impact that will be needed to kill the clipper chip and all of the nefarious uses it can and will be put to. We must provide a strong, backdoorless, alternative chip that will be attractive to every telephone user and communications device manufacturer, who will reason that it is better to have a device that no one can tap than it is to have a device that even _one_ person can tap. This situation _can_ be turned around.

1 0

what gtoal wrote about something
by Erich von Hollander 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

somebody (was it gtoal?) said something yesterday about how you could have the remailer encrypt the address of the person sending it and put that encrypted address in a block at the end of the message. this would be a good way to do it because the remailer operator cannot reveal a database of aliases and also not having a database makes the remailer easier to maitain and operate, resulting in a remailer with response capabilities, and yet as easy to use as the traditional cypherpunks remailer. i thought that was a cool idea, so i implemented that on the soda remailer (remailer(a)soda.berkeley.edu) give it a shot. just use it as you normally would and you will see how the response feature works. or finger remailer@soda or send mail to remailer@soda with Subject: remailer-info. e

1 0

Re: New anon mailer idea?
by Hal 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Graham Toal's suggestion for automatic insertion of an encrypted return address block is interesting. We had some discussion here last year of a similar approach, although Graham's twist of using a symmetric rather than PK cypher for the return address is new. A few thoughts: - You'd want this feature to be optional. Some people might not want their anonymity limited by having their return address recorded, even in encrypted form. - Graham is right about the advantages of use-once (or use-only-a-few-times) return addresses. Chaum discusses how multiple use of return addresses allows these systems to be broken, similar to the way Graham describes. - The use of a symmetric cypher is a very nice way of getting the use-once capability, along with the "burn after reading" effect of a remailer chain which destroys itself as it goes. But it could be a considerable burden on the remailer operator to maintain the database. One possibility would be to fix a maximum time limit on how long the return addresses are kept "alive" and require some real money to keep them longer. - What we would really like is for the recipient to hit the "reply" button and be able to send his mail back. It sounds like this system would still require some cut-and-paste. We already have programs to create encrypted remailer chain addresses fairly automatically. It would be nice to automate this last little bit. Unfortunately, there seems to be no easy way to make this work under Graham's scheme. - It doesn't look like this would be an easy drop-in to the current remailers, unfortunately. The syntax for how the address would be built up as it passes through a chain of remailers is a little unclear as well. The idea does have a lot of promise, though, and I think it is definately worth keeping in mind for the next generation of remailers. Hal

1 0

Soldier of Fortune magazine.
by Gary Jeffers 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Gun control is people control. The War on Drugs is the War on Citizens. I would like to suggest that some of our more knowledgeable & eloquent Ccypherpunks such as May, Hughes, Frissell or others consider approaching Soldier of Fortune magazine about a series of articles or a regular column on encryption & privacy. SOF may seem to be a childish publication to some of us but it has a readership many times that of Ccypherpunks & we would not be preaching to the converted (I know there are other purposes to cypherpunks as well). I've read some of their writing on the Waco affair & was impressed by their anti-government stance & the heavy detail (much better than the high production value/low content stuff from the mass media). I'm not a regular reader of SOF but they seem to be old fashioned patriots & might be warm to the Cypherpunk cause. We might have a series or a regular column titled CRYPTO - THE COMING GREAT WAR or COMMUNICATIONS - THE NEXT GREAT BATTLEFIELD. We already have a library of articles & copy. Our views would be a bit novel & just might fit right in with SOF. We could make a deal with them so that we could reprint the articles on the Internet. A number of Cypherpunks regularly write good articles. We should make better use of them. Yours Truly, Gary Jeffers PUSH EM BACK! PUSH EM BACK! WWWAAAYYY BBBAAACCCKKK! BBBEEEAAATTTT STATE! P. S. Another name for a chip that subverts the Clipper chip. - THE CLIPPER CRIPPLER.

3 2

Re: US Constitution Online
by jmueller＠gac.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Forwarded message: > Jeff Davis <eagle(a)deeptht.armory.com>: > > For one thing, I suggest that everyone have a refferance with the > > Constitution with in arms reach of their terminals. > > Or *on* their terminals: > ftp://wiretap.spies.com/Gov/World/usa.con > > The same directory contains constitutions and charters of many countries, > from Chian to Slovakia, as well as the covenant of the Hamas, and the Magna > Carta. Maybe someone should mail the Constitution to president(a)whitehouse.gov - just to make sure he hasn't forgotten. -- Joel Mueller - "Here lies one whose name is writ in water." Keats GO -d+(---) -p+ c++@ l+ u++ e m+ s+/- n- h-- f+@ g+(-) w+ t(--) ry? PGP 2.3a Public Key : finger jmueller(a)gac.edu or on keyservers. "This must be a Thursday. I never could get the hang of Thursdays." A. Dent

1 0

Remailer reply addresses
by Hal 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Graham's suggestion about automatic remailer reply chains reminded me of a simpler system which I would like to see. Suppose one site, somewhere, would create new mail addresses upon request, and map them to encrypted remailer chain blocks. (These are nested remailer requests, where the outer layer is encrypted for the first remailer and tells it where to send the message, the next layer is encrypted for the 2nd remailer and tells it where to send, and so on. No remailer sees anything more than where it is sending the message and where it received it from.) A new account is created which maps, say, to a file which has one of these "anonymous return addresses" in it. Any mail incoming for that address simply gets sent to the remailer in the file, with the ARA stuck in front of it. This is not complicated software. I wrote a Bourne/Korn shell script which does the whole thing in a dozen lines. What is needed is a sendmail hack to allow mail to addresses in a specified form (say anxxxxx) to be piped to this script. I don't have a machine where I can do this. If such a site were running, then I could create an ARA block and send it to that site (via a remailer, of course). The site would make me a new address and return it via the ARA. That new address would be my pseudonym. Now, when I want to send something pseudonymously, I just stick a "Reply-To" into the outgoing headers of the message as it leaves the last remailer. The remailer-chain-creation script can easily be modified to do this. The Reply-To points at the address I got back from the pseudonym server site. With this software I could do something which cannot be done today. I could send mail to which someone could hit "r" to reply, and receive that reply, without any one person knowing my pseudonym. This is not that much to ask for! I'd say it is the bare minimum for the use of pseudonyms on the net, yet we don't have it, after all this time. And look how close we are to being able to do it. With this basic system in place, some of Graham's ideas about time-limited or use-limited pseudonyms could be applied as well. Other extensions people have suggested would have the pseudonym server hold messages in inboxes until people trigger a dump to a freshly created anonymous address. A lot of things are possible. But we should walk before we run. Right now I don't feel that we are even crawling yet. Hal

2 1

USWA
by Adam Lake 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I have a thought....... Did anyone ever think of involving the USWA (no, not the United States Wrestling Association) United We Stand America in the Clipper fight? Sounds to me like this would be a mass appeal if it appeared in their newsletter. For anyone who doesn't know, this is Perot's egg hatched a few years ago. I would hope somebody on the list has a contact/is a member. Despite his weak performance in which he was GORED on CNN, I would think he would be a definite ally. adam lake(a)uenics.evansville.edu ----------------------------------------------------------------------------

2 1

Tech: Encryption and Satellites (re: GI)
by Harry Shapiro Hawk 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

We need to learn more about these technology and if any are based on Clipper: As reported in the April 11th issue of Electronic Media: The satellite pirates are finally getting the message... owners of satellite dishes and unauthorized decoding technology are converting to authorized equipment in droves... Key pay cable providers are now going though the second stage of moving from General Instrument's Video Cipher II (VC II) encryption system to its more secure VideoCipher Renewable Security (VCRS) system. Adopting VCRS are HBO, Cinemax, Showtime, TMC, Viewer's choice, REquest TV, Playboy channel, Spice, and Netlink. Netline offers three superstations. "There have been 30,000 to 40,000 conversion customers a month for the past for months." Meanwhile, with the digital era in mind, Primestar Partners is preparing to move its DBS (direct broadcast satellite) from Scientific-Atlanta's analog B-Mac encryption to General Instrument's DigiCipher digital compression technology, which also provides teh most recent security meansures. Primstar expects to start phasing in DigiCipher in January. "We have the ability to make changes to the security as we move forward." The French pay TV service Canal Plus International is developing its own digital system in association with broadcasters in Germany and spain. Hughes' (hi Eric), DIRECTV plans to launch next year with News Datacom Conditional Acesss and Authorization Control system... A spokesperson for New Datacom said the basis for the technology is an algorithm with an efficient proof-of-identity scheme. .... have products for both analog and digital encryption. Harry Shapiro Hawk Manager of Computer Services Warwick Baker & Fiore habs(a)uucp.warwick.com

2 1

Re: fake pgp messages
by cort 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> > in the process of doing stuff to fight traffic analysis, i need to generate > > a bunch of fake pgp messages. it is possible to asciiarmor random > > bits, but this is pretty easy to spot. does anyone know a good > > way to generate a large amount of bogus pgp messages? > > What better way than to generate real pgp messages that encrypt noise files? > Just generate pseudorandom binary data of pseudorandom length (biased > toward the length of real messages), and encrypt with pgp, using the > public key of some person's key from a public server, selected at > random. If you want to be able to spend less cpu time, you could hack a > copy of pgp to simulate doing this, of course, using the symmetric key > cipher (idea) in a stream cipher mode. > Better "noise" might be _real_ words, paragraphs, etc. It occurred to me once that some of the remailer operators could bounce the cypherpunks mailing list around through their remailers to get more traffic/noise. Cort.

1 0