- cypherpunks-legacy - lists.cpunks.org

New improved remailers
by charliemerritt＠BIX.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I hope this is not a duplicate, I have not seen cypherpunks resend it. Problems @ toad, I guess. ORIGINAL: In-Reply-To: <9401212232.AA06926(a)bilbo.suite.com> Subject: Re: Remailers: The Next Generation Remailers could maintain a constant stream of bits going, inserting messages as they came in, then going back to random noise.

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PGP docs - where?
by Jeremy Smith 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

The zipfile pgp23docA.zip at aql.gatech.edu is corrupted. I was wondering if anybody knew of another site where I might find a working copy? ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- Jeremy Smith -*jersmit(a)eis.calstate.edu*- Please leave your name and number after the seizure. -----------------------------------------------------------------------------

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Re: Internet Banking
by mcb＠net.bio.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Matthew Bernardini writes: > I am new to this list, so excuse me if this topic has already been > discussed, but I think you need to take a 200 level course in economics > called Money and Banking. I think the idea is so obsessed with tax-evasion > and privacy protection that you have ignored all the economic consequences > of the ideas you are proposing. The whole idea of my article was to take a look at the digital/private/offshore bank concept in the light of economic reality and the actual capital/financial markets. My credentials in economics are informal rather than formal, though I did write my senior paper in law school on an economic topic (airline regulation). I am certainly not a specialist but would like to think that I am not ignorant regarding banking economics and monetary theory. > 1) Who will insure your money ? Can you trust anyone but the US gov't to > back your funds ? Even in the S&L scandal the gov't refunded money to > people that weren't insured by the FDIC. Do you think they would come to > the cypher-punk rescue if your money up and flew to Brazil ? Actually, I would trust practically anyone *but* the U.S. Government to back my funds! I am very much opposed to mandatory, monopolistic governmental deposit insurance, since it gives the illusion that the government actually knows what is going on inside your bank, and completely isolates bank customers from ever having to inquire into the reputation or financial worthiness of a bank. This distorts the hell out of the market. Because of the FSLIC, people just blithely put their money into random S&Ls, some of which were totally corrupt organizations, because Uncle Sam would be there to rescue their butts. (At our expense.) I could go on about this, but this isn't a libertarian economics seminar -- suffice it to say that I believe there is a significant market ot be made in private deposit insurance, and that is what I would look for to insure my ideal/future bank deposits. > 2) A doctoral thesis could be written about this one, but what about the > Federal Reserve ? You would wreak havoc on interest rates, inflation, > international balance of payments, and international trade. How would this > electronic bank adjust for inflation or an expanding/shrinking electronic > money supply ? Take a look at some historical texts that describe the > problems that the Early American Revolutionaries had in breaking from the > British Currency. It took several failed efforts, and the currency of the > United States has been constatnly evolving ever since. Central banks (e.g., the Federal Reserve) are dangerous because they allow governments to manipulate the money supply for political purposes. The power of *individual* central banks has been weakening steadily in favor of to international currency rate agreements (like the ERM), and eventually, at least for international purposes, are likely to be supplanted by a much more stable market-based system of global currency arbitrage. This is already taking shape, as major multinational players presently seek to reduce their currency exchange risk by complex, software-model-driven hedging programs. (You might want to look into the products/services of companies like Capital Market Technologies or BARRA.) > 3) Interest Rates and Inflation ... > > 4) Interest Rates and Inflation .... > > 5) You guessed it, Interest Rates and Inflation. Interest rates (at least the "real" portion that is not ascribable to inflation) are market-driven. I don't understand how this is affected by private/offshore/digital banking. > What about Capital Markets ? > What about foreign labor unit exchanges? > Is mexican labor worth as much as US labor? Again, how are these specifically related to the issues at hand? Banks act as depositaries, transaction processors, and lenders. Each of these services are market-based, fee-for-service activities. As far as currency, the bank can either avoid the exchange risk entirely (either by hedging, or by requiring that members/customers use a specified currency), or alternatively can go into the currency arbitrage business itself as a profit center. (Though the nature of the market is such that the more arbitrageurs there are, the less profit there is in arbitrage.) Fundamental questions of labor economics (etc.) do not seem to be involved at this level, so far as I can tell. -- Michael C. Berch mcb(a)net.bio.net / mcb(a)postmodern.com

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Re: Remailers: The Next Generation
by tcmay＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Cypherpunks, I tried to send this out earlier, but I haven't seen it at my site. I've been having problems with messages either not getting out or not being delivered back to me, so I don't know if this made it out to you. If not, here it is. If so, I'm sorry for the duplication. --Tim Forwarded message: From: tcmay (Timothy C. May) Message-Id: <199401220929.BAA27006(a)mail.netcom.com> Subject: Re: Remailers: The Next Generation To: cypherpunks(a)toad.com Date: Sat, 22 Jan 1994 01:29:19 -0800 (PST) Cc: tcmay (Timothy C. May) Hal Finney has added many useful points: > I don't know if charging for messages can be made to work. Karl has a > remailer which requires digital tokens. You can get them for free just > by sending an email message. But I'll bet almost no one uses them. > Why should they, when there are free ones? > > That is the big problem. The free ones undercut the pay-per-use Good point. My hunch is that "nothing is free" and the usual evolution will be followed: initially free-but-poorly-supported capabilities, followed by some flavor of commercial services which are in competition with the "free" services, and then a widening gap in quality/robustness between the free and fee services. For example, my own Netcom service costs $17.50 a month and competes with local free or nearly free BBS services that offer some form of Internet access. The advantages of Netcom are sufficient to make it worth paying for. Another example, in a different situation, is the explosive increase in bookstores in the last 20 years, even when libraries offer books for free. People _will_ pay for convenience, features, robustness, etc. It may be a marketing struggle, but eventually fee-based services seem to win out over free-but-flaky systems. > remailers. Unless the pay remailers offer significantly more features > and advantages to the users, they won't be used. Especially if we are > talking about actually mailing physical cash to the remailer operators > in order to receive tokens, this will be terribly inconvenient and will > further raise the threshold barrier against for-pay remailers. I agree this is a speed bump. In fact, most folks are making very little use of existing features (chained hops, encryption) and overall volume seems pretty low. Part of my reason for proposing a formal "second generation" is that enough new features, and greater ease of use (standards, scripts, automatic selection of routings, ratings services) may tip the balance toward wider use. Also, the loss of penet-type servers with a centralized point of attack (e.g., Julf's machine) may suddenly and urgently shift the burden onto Chaumian-style distributed systems. (Just a hunch I have.) > So, the question is whether the value can be made large enough. Most > of Tim's comments are focussed on the security of the remailers. For > some applications this is important, particularly the more world- > shaking ideas we have discussed. (And despite the skepticism I > expressed last week about the degree to which cryptography can change > the world, I do believe it can be a strong force for positive change.) > If people are fighting for freedom against a powerful adversary, they > will need the kind of security Tim is talking about. Yes, I confess that my slant on things is toward the "ideal mix," that extremely strong system of distributed mixes that will provide the underpinning for the untraceable system we all want (for the reasons of protecting privacy in a surveillance society that Hal mentioned) and for the more radical stuff that some of us want. Working toward the ideal digital mix seems to be the right thing to do, as a strong foundation will make so many other things easier. Making the systems easier to use is of course also important, and several of my points were oriented toward this. But I agree my focus is on making the next generation more bullet-proof. (As an aside, more people will be willing to run turn-key remailers if they are convinced the remailer functions are sufficiently robust to head off charges that they knew what was flowing through their remailers, that the system won't barf and dump a bunch of messages into the trash or into their machine logs, and that the software will run without their involvement. Such robustness will allow and encourage the spread of cheap remailer boxes. Price competition on remailer rates will make the burden of paying drop. This is the hope, at least.) > now. I frankly don't see improved security as a major problem that > needs to be addressed in the short term. It's worth mentioning that Perhaps Hal is right, perhaps not. But regardless of the exact priorities, agreeing on some standards, some scripting conventions, and encouraging a "pinging service" (like what Karl Barrus does with his periodic summary, but with more statistics on delays, packet sizes, etc.) seem like some things we need to do. Thinking of several of these as aspects of the next plateau, the "second generation," may help to focus energies on adding features. > In my opinion, what the remailer network needs is, first, > standardization, as Tim has proposed. Secondly, it needs reliability > and robustness. Third, it needs to be easier to do two-way messaging. I agree with all of this. I did not address two-way mail, using either the "onions" (a kind of return-rely envelope) proposed by Eric Messick and Hugh Daniel about a year ago, or the "pools" described by Miron Cuperman. (Readers may recall that the "BlackNet" experiment I ran called for respondents to encrypt their replies, with no mention of their names or addresses, to the public key of BlackNet and then post the cyphertext to one of several groups...thus was 2-way anonymous communication created.) One project that could be interesting is this: a merger or hybrid of the distributed, hard-to-kill Cypherpunks remailers and the wildly successful, centralized, easier-to-kill penet system of Julf. That is, multiple penet-type sites, using mixes between. Or meshed in other ways. The idea is to make sure that greater security against legal and governmental action is built-in. (I realize Julf's system keeps a mapping between real IDs and pseudonyms, and this centralized mapping is the point of attack. Still, some decentralization, some scattering across multiple national borders, would be useful. Perhaps something involving secret-sharing protocols.) Oh, and I agree with the comments a couple of people made that running constant traffic between remailers is a good way to ensure message latency does not result in excessive delays. We've actually talked about this before, but nothing has been done on this. One of the problems (also a strength) is that our various remailers are all run by different people, on different machines, etc. They are not like Western Union telegraph offices, with coordinated policies. Setting up regular communications, robust connections, is thus not as easy as it might be with uniform remailers. (A speculative solution: a group of remailer sites can agree to form a kind of "guild," agreeing to work together to keep uptimes high, use standardized software, etc. All voluntary. Like franchises of McDonalds. The participating remailers could agree to run traffic at certain rates between their machines, work together to ensure adequate robustness, issue a report on all of their machines, etc. Remailers that don't want to participate can still be used, but would likely have poorer interaction with other machines and might eventually lose business.) --Tim May -- .......................................................................... Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)netcom.com | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero 408-688-5409 | knowledge, reputations, information markets, W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA | black markets, collapse of governments. Higher Power:2**859433 | Public Key: PGP and MailSafe available. -- .......................................................................... Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)netcom.com | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero 408-688-5409 | knowledge, reputations, information markets, W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA | black markets, collapse of governments. Higher Power:2**859433 | Public Key: PGP and MailSafe available.

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A Lesson for Mr. Remailer Operator on Ethics, Accountability, and Anonymity
by L. Detweiler 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I am quite perplexed that Mr. Remailer Operator has sent me and my postmaster mail about how he never intended to create a climate of `an unruly net of irresponsibility' by running his service. He claims that (1) I wrote the SQUISH announcement (2) I am therefore responsible for it (3) even if posted through a remailer. Mr. Remailer Operator, What *are* you trying to accomplish with a remailer? All assertions disguise Mr. Remailer Operator's own responsibility to the net. Yes, Mr. Remailer Operator, you have *responsibility*. Mr. Remailer Operator, if I wished to be responsible for my posting, I would post it under my own name. But you have provided a service that supposedly removes this accountability, by guaranteeing to me that you will not reveal my identity to anyone. Don't you see the reasoning? How is it that you, Mr. Remailer Operator, can claim that the people who use your remailers are responsible for what they post, but then defy anyone who wishes to trace them? Don't you understand? accountability== tracability. You cannot have one without the other. All this froth about `true names' has nothing to do with personalities or whatever-- the root issue is *accountability* and thereby *traceability*. Those who are not traceable are not accountable. Those who are traceable are accountable. By creating your remailers, Mr. Remailer Operators, you have created an extremely volatile atmosphere on the net. You have completely failed to address the *obvious* issues that your design entails. What if someone mailbombs through your remailers? Sends death threats? Libel? you are Not Accountable, right? but what does that *mean*? that you will *allow* mailbombs, death threats, and libel through your remailers? I'm getting this strange sense of deja vu as I write this. When I first joined your little conspiracy club, over a year ago now, these were some of the first subjects I wrote about. I asked how you would deal with anonymous death threats, mailbombs, use of your remailers by terrorists and drug dealers, and criminals, and net.psychopaths. But no one was interested. Everyone denied that Mr. Remailer Operator should ever even have to worry about these things. `Not Liable' was the catchphrase. Mr. Remailer Operator, you didn't, and still apparently don't, seem to realize that this is not a real answer that holds up in the real world of use. Mr. Remailer Operator, you cannot continue to pretend that you have no ethical or moral decisions to make in the design of technology! Mr. Remailer Operator, you have a *duty* to consider them foremost! And in fact, in *neglecting* your duty, Mr. Remailer Operator, in your *negligent* design, you, Mr. Remailer Operator, are learning the *hard* way. Isn't it kind of pathetic that you, Mr. Remailer Operator, are just now coming face to face with the effects of *your* technology? Do you, Mr. Remailer Operator, really believe that there is no ethics or morality associated with the development and use of technology? Mr. Remailer Operators, please come up with a coherent policy on the following subjects, or expect that you remailers will be *abused* by people *taking advantage* of your own *failures of judgement*. - What happens when someone mailbombs someone through your remailer, Mr. Remailer Operator? - What happens when someone mailbombs a list through your remailer, Mr. Remailer Operator? - What about `libel'? What about `harassment'? What about `violent death threats'? Mr. Remailer Operator? You, Mr. Remailer Operators, have clung to two mutually inconsistent philosophies-- one is that you are providing a responsible service to the Net, that there are `positive' uses of anonymity, and that people are going to use those, and that you will not be accountable for what originates from your site merely by putting in disclaimers into your messages, `I am not responsible'. All is ASCII, right? no harm can be done by the mere existence of a remailer, right? Libel and harassment and death threats do not exist, right? But then when someone uses your remailer, Mr. Remailer Operator, in the obviously malicious ways, that anyone with the tiniest smidgeon of brain cells could anticipate, like mailbombs, massive mailing list campaigns, libel, violent death threats, etc., you claim that it is Libel and Harassment and Violent Death Threats. Or, at least, someone other than psychopunk co-conspirators-- the `in crowd'. Oh no! We have to stop this! Yee Gad! Obviously, the lesson is that Good Anonymity is that which can go through Mr. Remailer Operator's remailer without upsetting Mr. Remailer Operator or having people yell at Mr. Remailer Operator, and Bad Anonymity is anything that upsets Mr. Remailer Operator or causes people to yell at him. I encourage Mr. Remailer Operator to further develop this interesting code of the Ethics of Anonymity, which he has so far denied even exists, but by his own shrieking obviously it does! Mr. Remailer Operators, I have long warned you about the negative consequences of your supposed belief that No One is Responsible for Anything on the Net, and you have found that this is simply an untenable and unbearable philosophy from your own experience. What are you going to do to change that? * * * This is not merely one of the most condescending and exasperating messages I have ever written. It is a list of suggestions! I recommend the following (the deja vu is thick again): 1. Remailers should *not* be able to send anything to any list on the Lists of Lists or any other known mailing list, by default. If the moderator approves it, the remailers are allowed. 2. Mailbombing through the remailers should be dampened with limitations on the size of messages and the frequency. 3. The ability for *anyone* to state that they do not want to receive anonymous mail should be *automated*-- and the remailers should act as a *whole network* in propagating these `requests for denial' between them. 4. You should keep and pass around lists of people that have caused one remailer operator problems, so that others have the option of denying service. When I first proposed these ideas, they were Heretical Blasphemy. Do you still oppose them? Do you need some more (painful) Lessons? I ask you, Mr. Remailer Operator, *What* exactly is the purpose of a remailer? How is it that You, the Cypherpunks, have gone this long without really having any serious clue about what you are actually doing? about what effect remailers actually have on cyberspatial morale and etiquette and human relations in general? How can you deny that Netiquette does not exist when you run your remailers, but complain and screech at the top of your lungs about Netiquette based on what comes out? What kind of machine, or monster, have you created, Mr. Remailer Operator?

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more unbearably upsetting, tasteless, and disruptive taunts and ridicule with some delightful Leader Libel thrown in on the top
by L. Detweiler 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Hello, darlings. I wanted to share with you a revolutionary idea that will sound completely alien to you, but it could help you immensely in your perilous experience with disruptive posts to the list. Surely this has been proposed, but been rebuffed. Why? It is a brilliant idea: ONLY MEMBERS ARE ALLOWED TO POST. Imagine! All those annoying remailer messages would just *vanish*! Whoa, what a concept! Too bad it is heretical blasphemy. Anything that stands in the way of Unaccountable Anonymity is a Bad Thing (tm). Interestingly, if this rule were in practice on the cypherpunks list, and `member' is taken in the sense of `email addresses', I would not have been able to post this message. Many cypherpunks have taken great note of the fact that I post `blindly' in the sense that I do not subscribe under the ld231782(a)longs.lance.colostate.edu address but post to the list anyway under it. I ask these people, though, what makes you think that I am not receiving the delightful frenzied contortions of late on your list through some other address? Would you call me a hypocrite? I have never claimed that such a use is pseudospoofing-- the definition clearly applies to *postings* and *outgoing mail*. I suppose there is some `deception' going on if I receive mail from a different address than from which I post if people can see the list subscribers and assume that those who post are those on the list. But obviously, in many scenarios, this is a ridiculous assumption, particularly here. This brings up another question. Is the cypherpunks mailing list private? If it is private, then it is nobodies business who is receiving what through what addresses, and any use of different addresses for reception (such as that I hinted I do) are completely honest. Periodically someone discovers that they can use the SMTP EXPN command on toad.com to get a list of everyone on the cypherpunks list (supposedly), and suggest ever so delicately that E.Hughes, Mr. Master Programmer, who has clutched his Stone Age Mailing List Software so fanatically and so persistently for some incomprehensible reason, ought to get his act together and prevent people who do not subscribe from posting, and people from peeking at the mailing list. Is the latter an `invasion of privacy'? In a sense the former is too. So, I ask you cypherpunks-- is your mailing list subscriber base `public knowledge' or not? If it isn't, then figure out a way to conceal it; if it is, then don't complain when somebody uses it for malicious purposes you don't like. Are outsiders allowed to post? if they are, then stop whining at me about posting `blindly'. If they aren't then could someone please handhold Mr. Hughes, the Master Programmer, Mr. Cypherpunks Write Code, in getting some new mailing list software? * * * Of course, there are real reasons why you have Stone Age Software for your mailing list. The first reason, as I have already alluded to, is that Mr. Hughes is a iron-fist dictator who belligerently and obstinately opposes any modification in the status quo that he didn't invent in the first place. Yes, this is the kind of person who will oppose a good idea just because someone other than himself thought of it. And this amusing tension between him and Mr. May is most entertaining-- the latter ever so delicately and gently attempts to suggest some change to the list that would make it more beneficial, that would keep out the troublemakers, but Mr. Cypherpunk God has spoken long ago, that Nothing Shall Change. The second reason is more obscure. The cypherpunks love to talk about how some modifications in their software may prevent Newbies from posting. But this is nothing but putrid hypocrisy (as usual). The leaders do not give the slightest damn about Newbies, because Newbies are by definition not Insiders, and they are clueless, and it takes so much trouble to educate them, doing things like writing comprehensive and coherent posts. This may cause people to (unjustly, or rightly?) accuse the leaders of negligence to Newbies. The leaders have tried to come up with comprehensive posts on certain subjects, but they prefer to post them under their Tentacles like H.Finney to get the commensurate increase in reputation. At least, E.Hughes does. T.C.May does not really have the attention span to write anything longer than a few paragraphs or refine his writing on any subject over a long period of time. So he instead writes things like the `anonymity outline' to claim that he thought of anonymous whistleblowing first, when in fact all he did was write down the word `whistleblowing' in a long, rambling, useless salad of words. But I digress. As for Newbies, the leaders will often post disinformation from their tentacles suggesting that Newbies aren't really treated like dirt, and this is actually an effective tactic against all of the braindead idiots who subscribe to the list. So if the list software is not changing because of Newbies, why is it not changing? For a long time many people, myself included, attempted to get E.Hughes, (aka God), to do something sensible like split this list into sublists. The topic perpetually comes up. But both the leaders are opposed to this for several reasons. T.C.May is opposed to it because his God, E.Hughes, is opposed to it, but also because it decreases the opportunity to tickle (or molest, depending on whether you are S.Boxx) people with tentacles. You see, when there are a lot of lists, it is more difficult to maintain the presence of personalities in front of all the people you are trying to trick. It is so much easier to have one `cypherpunk central' where H.Finney can post something about Chaumian systems, etc., and all the Newbies can look up in admiration. The reason that Mr. Hughes has not barred `blind posting' is for the same reason. Oh, the leaders love to talk about *supposed* reasons why this is not a good idea, to ban `blind' posting. They have always perfected their disinformation techniques to the point that they even begin to believe their own lies. The *real* reason, of course, is that it is another big headache for tentacle maintenance, and of course again E.Hughe's own spectacular obstinacy. It goes against the leader's belief that every mailing list should be open to *any* idiot that wants to post, even if they are outside tentacles or anonymous remailers, when in fact the uses of anonymous remailers in legitimate, nonfrivolous groups are virtually nil. Of course, they will argue about my claim that this is so, and I shall enjoy watching them do their damage control with all their tentacles in response. * * * By the way, I have said some nasty and perhaps even LIBELOUS things in here about Mr. Hughes, the list moderator, and his close personal friend, T.C.May. Maybe you would like to get your lawyer to send me a letter. So far no one has, even after J. Bowery ranted and raved and shook his feathers in a flurry at me in the newsgroups. I have asked, a long time ago, that Mr. Hughes send me mail telling me to stop posting to the list. It is amazing in all the time all the cypherpunks have been shrieking at me, Mr. Hughes has never done so. Apparently he believes (like I do) that all my posts are extremely constructive and brilliantly executed. Otherwise, why does he put up with them? Well, he did say once that he was going to censor me on the list, but apparently that is nothing but an empty threat. I guess he realizes how hypocritical that would be for him to do, and how that would fit in perfectly that the image I have been ascribing to him, the Iron Fisted Dictator. Anyway, cypherpunks, please do not whine to me that my Cypherpunks postings are `disruptive'. Tell the List Moderator, the Iron Fisted Dictator, the Conspiracy Leader, the Master Medusa, Mr. Nazi Reincarnated, the Evil One, the Antichrist, to send me or my postmaster mail explaining why I should be Dead in Cyberspace. If your Leaders request that I stop posting to Cypherpunks, I will comply. Rather simple, isn't it? Why have you not tried this approach for so long? You did it with Helsingius and S.Boxx, didn't you? `Mr. Helsingius, please *stop* that raving lunatic, that violent madman, that ranting psychopath, from posting those BAD NO GOOD AWFUL NASTY VIOLENT PSYCHOPATHIC EVIL DEATH THREAT LIBEL HARASSMENTS. Why don't you do it again? No one is watching. No one gives a damn what happens to S.Boxx, anyway. You should kill him, for all I care.

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Re: Found a snake/tentacle!
by L. Detweiler 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

greg(a)ideath.goldenbear.com (Greg Broiles) posted this on the cy{ph,b}erwonks list: >S. Boxx is a TENTACLE of the evil SNAKE L. Detweiler. > >Where do I pick up the money? Unfortunately, L.Detweiler and S.Boxx are not on the lists. As I understand the rules, you get 0 points unless you can show that L.Detweiler came up with some of the various contortions or squirms in response to people asking him about S.Boxx or whatever. But it seems it would obviously give you more points to go after more valuable tentacles, like greg(a)ideath.goldenbear.com, and prove that E.Hughes is actually posting through that site. BTW, I think I already have over a thousand points if I played SQUISH. The question is, will anyone beat me into submitting before the deadline? what a delightful contest. Glad that everyone is enjoying it, even Medusa.

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CA legislative data *online*
by L. Detweiler 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Darling cyberanarchists out there, I am delighted to foward this announcement that all of CA bills and legislative data are now available for perusal based on the passage of a revolutionary bill for Cyberdemocracy, AB1624. You will obviously want to stay away from this FTP site at all costs, because to visit it would indicate that you are actually interested in this nation's government, democracy, and may even want to participate in the system you live in, all antithetical to the goals of `cyberanarchy', as you have yelled into my and others' ears with excruciating noise and frequency. ===cut=here=== Date: Sat, 22 Jan 1994 17:50:40 -0800 From: Al Whaley <Al.Whaley(a)snyside.sunnyside.com> Subject: GOV-ACCESS #4: Calif legislation, statutes & constitution NOW ONLINE (fwd) According to Jim Warren: >From jwarren(a)well.sf.ca.us Sat Jan 22 17:36:08 1994 Date: Sat, 22 Jan 1994 17:11:30 -0800 From: Jim Warren <jwarren(a)well.sf.ca.us> Subject: GOV-ACCESS #4: Calif legislation, statutes & constitution NOW ONLINE Jan. 22, 1994 On Friday, Jan. 21, 1994, the California Legislature began offering global online access to almost-all public information about legislation-in-process, all current state statutes, and the volumous California Constitution. The state is prohibited from charging *anything* for access to or re-use of this electronic information. Access is by Internet ftp and ftpmail ["ftp" = file transfer protocol]. Note: ftpmail allows anyone with access to the Internet at least for email purposes to access these files (that are often large). ftpmail provides access for users of FidoNet, CompuServe, GEnie, Prodigy, etc., as well as offering Internet users an option to direct ftp . README and help files provide complete details. FOR A GOOD TIME, CALL ... To receive the help file, send the following email: To: ftpmail(a)leginfo.public.ca.gov subject: <optional, the system ignores the subject-line> Message lines: connect leginfo.public.ca.gov help quit To receive the two README files, send the following email: To: ftpmail(a)leginfo.public.ca.gov subject: <optional, the system ignores the subject-line> Message lines: connect leginfo.public.ca.gov get README_WELCOME cd pub get README_FIRST quit And await details of how you may finally participate in the process of your own governance. According to the National Conference of State Legislatures, California is the first state in the nation to offer almost all of its public legislative, statutory and constitutional information via the Internet, *especially* without charge by the state. - --jim Jim Warren, columnist for MicroTimes, Government Technology, BoardWatch, etc. jwarren(a)well.sf.ca.us -or- jwarren(a)autodesk.com 345 Swett Rd., Woodside CA 94062; voice/415-851-7075; fax/415-851-2814 - -- al(a)sunnyside.com +1-415 322-5411 Tel, -6481 Fax, Box 60, Palo Alto, CA 94302 ------- End of Forwarded Message

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Re: Where can I get RFC-822?
by norm＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 11:22 1/21/94 -0700, Philippe Nave wrote: >If I recall correctly, RFC-822 defines the standards for e-mail. Anybody >know where I can get a copy? I have e-mail access and can ftp (at least for >a while yet) from this system. Any help will be appreciated. If you can use ftp then the following is the root of all RFC's: For anonymous ftp, please use host ftp.nisc.sri.com:rfc/rfc882.txt

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Re: Remailers: The Next Generation
by norm＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Perhaps the following nested headers might be more cost-effective to quantizing message length: Pad-Me-By: 3289 (Add 3289 random bytes to the end of this message) Truncate-Me-To: 1433 (Remove all but the first 1433 byte of this message.) The message would then change size as it traveled thru the mixes.

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