- cypherpunks-legacy - lists.cpunks.org

oranges spliced with THC gene
by lcs Mixmaster Remailer 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

http://www.sfbg.com/wire/20.html oranges with spliced-in gene for THC 20-30 seeds already distributed until Janet got her hands in it

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100S OF FREE PICS'N'LINKS EVERY DAY!
by STUFFED SAT NOV 14 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

+ 30 SUPERB, HI-RES, HOT PHOTOS + 5 SUPER SEXY STORIES + ZEE ASS + CYBER SEX + FACIAL GLORY + SLUTS 4 ALL + LIBRARY OF EROTICA + ADULT PORN PICS + GIRLS OF WWWONDERFUL + FACIAL BABES + WHITE CHOCOLATE + FREE HARDCORE PORN + BONUS PIC 1 -> http://www.stuffed.net/home/25839.htm + BONUS PIC 2 -> http://www.stuffed.net/home/26453.htm + BONUS PIC 3 -> http://www.stuffed.net/home/20538.htm + BONUS PIC 4 -> http://www.stuffed.net/home/24064.htm + BONUS PIC 5 -> http://www.stuffed.net/home/5402.htm + MUCH, MUCH MORE! ----> http://stuffed.net/home/ <---- This email is never sent unsolicited. Stuffed is the supplement for the Eureka newsletter you subscribed to. Full instructions on unsubscribing are in every issue of Eureka! ----> http://stuffed.net/home/ <----

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Info Age Crime Terror and War
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Senator Kyl has issued a long report, "Crime, Terror & War: National Security and Public Safety in the Information Age," which recounts his Subcommittee's hearings and recommendations on encryption, Y2K, terrorism, info war, domestic preparedness, wiretap, and more: http://jya.com/ctw.htm (97K) It describes a plan to combat threats to critical infrastructure and the US homeland which, if implemented, would criminalize much held dear to a few of this list's subscribers; other lurkers will be overjoyed to read Kyl coming to the rescue of careers and budgets of MIB and their suppliers of technological of political control. He wants DoD to get cracking on domestic protection, move over piddling LEA. Civil liberties, nonsense. Crypto genie out of the bottle, more nonsense. Getting government access to encrypted communications, you bet. Through commercial products, yep. Thanks to FT for forwarding.

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reptilian politicians
by Anonymous 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>November 12th, 1998 the Toronto Board of Health announces they > want to ban private >owner ship of snakes, turtles, any and all exotic pets. >Reaction of pet owners was immediate. In this city of just under 3 >Million people, most said they would not abide by the law and >hide their beloved pets. In california, possession of a ferret is illegal. But its illegal for people eat california horses. Or burros, senators, and other asses. Those in the Ferret Underground (TM) find that horsemeat is now cheaper, and the furry ones love it. --Weasels ripped my flesh

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Privacy and the internet (fwd)
by Jim Choate 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Forwarded message: > Date: Sat, 14 Nov 1998 04:46:03 -0500 > From: Jason Burton <talon(a)who.net> > Subject: Privacy and the internet > > Seeking council. > That's exactly what you should do, get a lawyer. ____________________________________________________________________ Lawyers ask the wrong questions when they don't want the right answers. Scully (X-Files) The Armadillo Group ,::////;::-. James Choate Austin, Tx /:'///// ``::>/|/ ravage(a)ssz.com www.ssz.com .', |||| `/( e\ 512-451-7087 -====~~mm-'`-```-mm --'- --------------------------------------------------------------------

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nm web site
by bill payne 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Saturday 11/14/98 6:13 PM John Young http://www.jya.com/index.htm J Orlin Grabbe http://www.aci.net/kalliste/ As a result of jy's persuasive arguments http://jya.com/whpfiles.htm, we are going to put up a web site. But unlike you-all's sites ours will be somewhat positive 1 masm mixed language programming ... and Microsoft bugs 2 8032 forth programming and hardware 3 pc hardware 4 pro se litigation against the government 5 cypto nonsense 6 ... But, most important, we have learned by your pioneering web information dissemination efforts. And mistakes at other websites. Like bouncing balls. You guys, in my opinion, are the some of the most brilliant, perhaps with the exception of the X-rated sites, at getting the info out there. And yes, we will use THUMBNAIL photos. Of schematics, main boards, .... etc. Simplicity exudes brilliance. Perhaps there is a converse? Thoughtfully, I hope bill

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hello -- do not read
by William H. Geiger III 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

This is a test, this is only a test. -- --------------------------------------------------------------- William H. Geiger III http://www.openpgp.net Geiger Consulting Cooking With Warp 4.0 Author of E-Secure - PGP Front End for MR/2 Ice PGP & MR/2 the only way for secure e-mail. OS/2 PGP 5.0 at: http://www.openpgp.net/pgp.html ---------------------------------------------------------------

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Re: Could E.M. Cordian be Matt Blaze in Disguise? (Nah!)
by Robert Hettinga 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

--- begin forwarded text Mime-Version: 1.0 X-Sender: rah(a)pop.sneaker.net Date: Sun, 15 Nov 1998 00:47:21 -0500 To: Vin McLellan <vin(a)shore.net>, dcsb(a)ai.mit.edu From: Robert Hettinga <rah(a)shipwright.com> Subject: Re: Could E.M. Cordian be Matt Blaze in Disguise? (Nah!) Cc: Matt Blaze <mab(a)research.att.com> Sender: bounce-dcsb(a)ai.mit.edu Precedence: bulk Reply-To: Robert Hettinga <rah(a)shipwright.com> At 12:31 AM -0500 on 11/15/98, Vin McLellan wrote: > (Actually, I'd bet that even Robert Hettinga knows that this is > untrue.) Moi? ;-) Now *why* would I do that to you, Vin? Don't let those ol' Snakes of Medusa bite you, pal. Cheers, Bob Hettinga ----------------- Robert A. Hettinga <mailto: rah(a)philodox.com> Philodox Financial Technology Evangelism <http://www.philodox.com/> 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity, [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire' For help on using this list (especially unsubscribing), send a message to "dcsb-request(a)ai.mit.edu" with one line of text: "help". --- end forwarded text ----------------- Robert A. Hettinga <mailto: rah(a)philodox.com> Philodox Financial Technology Evangelism <http://www.philodox.com/> 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity, [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'

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technical information on Clipper
by smb＠research.att.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

------- Forwarded Message Return-Path: ISL.Stanford.EDU!hellman Received: by research.att.com; Sun Apr 18 02:06 EDT 1993 Received: by inet.att.com; Sun Apr 18 02:06 EDT 1993 Received: by ISL.Stanford.EDU (4.1/25-eef) id AA22827; Sat, 17 Apr 93 23:05:23 PDT Date: Sat, 17 Apr 93 23:05:23 PDT From: "Martin Hellman" <hellman(a)isl.stanford.edu> Message-Id: <9304180605.AA22827(a)ISL.Stanford.EDU> To: DAVIDNEWMANPC(a)mcimail.com, NORMILE.J(a)applelink.apple.com, adw(a)research.att.com, amo(a)research.att.com, bach(a)cs.wisc.edu, berson(a)sri.com, biham(a)cs.technion.ac.il, branstad(a)st1.ncsl.nist.gov, brassard(a)iro.umontreal.ca, burt(a)rsa.com, carl(a)joe.math.uga.edu, caronni(a)nessie.cs.id.ethz.ch, clipper(a)csrc.ncsl.nist.gov, denning(a)cs.cosc.georgetown.edu, diffie(a)eng.sun.com, eor(a)ISL.Stanford.EDU, erdmann@leland, fahn@cs, gfung%ccm.UManitoba.CA(a)cornellc.cit.cornell.edu, gill(a)ISL.Stanford.EDU, gormish(a)ISL.Stanford.EDU, infort%czheth5a.BITNET(a)forsythe.stanford.edu, jeffr(a)sco.com, jhwang(a)ISL.Stanford.EDU, jim(a)rsa.com, jwarren(a)well.sf.ca.us, jwolf(a)ucsd.edu, kurlberg@leland, langford(a)ISL.Stanford.EDU, lenstra(a)flash.bellcore.com, markoff(a)nyt.com, matt(a)rsa.com, merkle(a)xerox.com, minnieho(a)ISL.Stanford.EDU, mitran(a)asic.sc.ti.com, ovseev(a)ippi.msk.su, rivest(a)theory.lcs.mit.edu, roche(a)ISL.Stanford.EDU, rotenberg(a)washofc.cpsr.org, scholtz(a)jimmie.usc.edu, shamir%wisdom.bitnet@forsythe, smb(a)research.att.com, taher(a)rsa.com, voois(a)ISL.Stanford.EDU, welch(a)irving.usc.edu, wesel(a)ISL.Stanford.EDU Subject: Clipper Chip Most of you have seen the announcement in Friday's NY Times, etc. about NIST (National Institute of Standards & Technology) announcing the "Clipper Chip" crypto device. Several messges on the net have asked for more technical details, and some have been laboring under understandable misunderstandings given the lack of details in the news articles. So here to help out is your friendly NSA link: me. I was somewhat surprised Friday to get a call from the Agency which supplied many of the missing details. I was told the info was public, so here it is (the cc of this to Dennis Branstad at NIST is mostly as a double check on my facts since I assume he is aware of all this; please let me know if I have anything wrong): The Clipper Chip will have a secret crypto algorithm embedded in Silicon. Each chip will have two secret, 80-bit keys. One will be the same for all chips (ie a system-wide key) and the other will be unit specific. I don't know what NIST and NSA will call them, but I will call them the system key SK and unit key UK in this message. The IC will be designed to be extremely difficult to reverse so that the system key can be kept secret. (Aside: It is clear that they also want to keep the algorithm secret and, in my opinion, it may be as much for that as this stated purpose.) The unit key will be generated as the XOR of two 80-bit random numbers K1 and K2 (UK=K1+K2) which will be kept by the two escrow authorities. Who these escrow authorities will be is still to be decided by the Attorney General, but it was stressed to me that they will NOT be NSA or law enforcement agencies, that they must be parties acceptable to the users of the system as unbiased. When a law enforcement agency gets a court order, they will present it to these two escrow authorities and receive K1 and K2, thereby allowing access to the unit key UK. In addition to the system key, each user will get to choose his or her own key and change it as often as desired. Call this key plain old K. When a message is to be sent it will first be encrypted under K, then K will be encrypted under the unit key UK, and the serial number of the unit added to produce a three part message which will then be encrypted under the system key SK producing E{ E[M; K], E[K; UK], serial number; SK} When a court order obtains K1 and K2, and thence K, the law enforcement agency will use SK to decrypt all information flowing on the suspected link [Aside: It is my guess that they may do this constantly on all links, with or without a court order, since it is almost impossible to tell which links over which a message will flow.] This gives the agency access to E[M; K], E[K; UK], serial number in the above message. They then check the serial number of the unit and see if it is on the "watch list" for which they have a court order. If so, they will decrypt E[K; UK] to obtain K, and then decrypt E[M; K] to obtain M. I am still in the process of assessing this scheme, so please do not take the above as any kind of endorsement of the proposed scheme. All I am trying to do is help all of us assess the scheme more knowledgably. But I will say that the need for just one court order worries me. I would feel more comfortable (though not necessarily comfortable!) if two separate court orders were needed, one per escrow authority. While no explanation is needed, the following story adds some color: In researching some ideas that Silvio Micali and I have been kicking around, I spoke with Gerald Gunther, the constitutional law expert here at Stanford and he related the following story: When Edward Levi became Pres. Ford's attorney general (right after Watergate), he was visited by an FBI agent asking for "the wiretap authorizations." When Levy asked for the details so he could review the cases as required by law, the agent told him that his predecessors just turned over 40-50 blank, signed forms every time. Levi did not comply and changed the system, but the lesson is clear: No single person or authority should have the power to authorize wiretaps (or worse yet, divulging of personal keys). Sometimes he or she will be an Edward Levi and sometimes a John Mitchell. Martin Hellman ------- End of Forwarded Message

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No Subject
by Anonymous 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 09:35 PM 11/14/98 -0500, John Young <jya(a)pipeline.com> wrote: > >An NSA team presented at NISSC98 in October >"The Inevitability of Failure: The Flawed Assumption >of Security in Modern Computing Environments:" ... >Not that NSA would ever exploit OS weaknesses not warned >about. > Part of the context for this: NSA is trying to encourage their new testing program for security products. My feeling is that program, in turn, is intended to preserve the spaces for all the employees involved in the failed TCSEC/Rainbow testing program. I say "failed" because it hasn't caught on in the private sector, it's expensive and, of course, the laughable "C2 in '92." If you can't trust your OS, Dum-dum-Dah! NSA to the rescue with testing! The new Common Criteria is to replace TCSEC/Rainbow next year, but if it walks like a duck....

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