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New crypto regs online
by Dave Banisar 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Hola, The new regs for crypto exports are available at: http://www.epic.org/crypto/export_controls/interim_regs_12_96.html Dave ========================================================================= David Banisar (Banisar(a)epic.org) * 202-544-9240 (tel) Electronic Privacy Information Center * 202-547-5482 (fax) 666 Pennsylvania Ave, SE, Suite 301 * HTTP://www.epic.org Washington, DC 20003 PGP Key: http://www.epic.org/staff/banisar/key.html =========================================================================

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[STEGO] BBN
by nobody＠huge.cajones.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Timothy May has been fired from Intel for stealing office supplies. ( )( )________ Timothy May /00 \ _ O_\\--mm---mm /_______)

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Re: Export proposal
by Lucky Green 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 08:56 AM 12/30/96 -0800, Dale Thorn wrote: >What about a fax? That has to make things more complicated, yes? A fax is transmission in electronic form. Clearly banned under the regulations. -- Lucky Green <mailto:shamrock@netcom.com> PGP encrypted mail preferred Make your mark in the history of mathematics. Use the spare cycles of your PC/PPC/UNIX box to help find a new prime. http://www.mersenne.org/prime.htm

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(Fwd) Re: Mr. May's Posts. Other Things.
by Ross Wright 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

This is the message I got in response to my post regarding Mr. May's offensive, racist, and bigoted post about ebonics. I have made overtures towards peace and tried to explain that I thought that the Doctor's verbal slapping was not as bad as it seemed, maybe even he deserved it!. He refuses to answer. He's just a pussy, I guess. Like's to make terroristic threats. To Nam vets, yet. Ballsy, Tim! Maybe the Doctor is not to far from wrong. I would rather have discussed this with you in private e-mail, or over a few beers, but you refuse to answer my e-mail. Received: from you.got.net (root(a)scir-gotnet.znet.net [207.167.86.126]) by adnetsol.adnetsol.com (8.6.12/8.6.6) with ESMTP id UAA29906 for <rwright(a)adnetsol.com>; Fri, 27 Dec 1996 20:25:14 -0800 Received: from [207.167.93.63] (tcmay.got.net [207.167.93.63]) by you.got.net (8.8.3/8.8.3) with ESMTP id UAA13732 for <rwright(a)adnetsol.com>; Fri, 27 Dec 1996 20:17:45 -0800 X-Real-To: <rwright(a)adnetsol.com> X-Sender: tcmay(a)mail.got.net Message-Id: <v03007800aeea52e5d282(a)[207.167.93.63]> In-Reply-To: <199612230801.AAA24862(a)adnetsol.adnetsol.com> Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" Date: Fri, 27 Dec 1996 20:32:00 -0800 To: "Ross Wright" <rwright(a)adnetsol.com> From: "Timothy C. May" <tcmay(a)got.net> Subject: Re: Mr. May's Posts. Other Things. X-PMFLAGS: 35127424 0 ------- Forwarded Message Follows ------- Date: Fri, 27 Dec 1996 20:32:00 -0800 To: "Ross Wright" <rwright(a)adnetsol.com> From: "Timothy C. May" <tcmay(a)got.net> Subject: Re: Mr. May's Posts. Other Things. At 12:09 AM -0800 12/23/96, Ross Wright wrote: >hard on him. This latest rant of his has made me reconsider your >rough treatment of Mr. May. I kinda think he deserves a slapping >right now. Go ahead with your "slapping." Of course, I'd treat a "slapping" as an assault. I'd love to put a clip of hollowpoints through your chest. Your place or mine? Just say "No" to "Big Brother Inside" We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, I know that that ain't allowed. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------: ---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Higher Power: 2^1398269 | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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So secure no technology avail in the world capable of breaking it
by ! Drive 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>From Risks 18.70... Date: 20 Dec 96 15:13:17 EST From: Andrew Weir <100637.616(a)CompuServe.COM> Subject: ATM gangsters Much British media panic has been devoted to the recent conviction of an "ATM gang" of high ambition. A collection of high-grade villains with impeccable pedigrees in robbery, gangsterism and drugs dealing over 30 years compelled a software expert who was in prison for attacking his wife and child to help them in their enterprise. The man revealed his role to a prison chaplain and subsequently acted as an undercover informer on his release. [...] Code-breaking gangsters? But could they have got that far? Newspaper reports failed to emphasise the all-important question as to whether the encrypted information could be decoded. Defence counsel were scathing about the possibilities and called experts to testify that it was effectively impossible. One of the defence barristers said: "The basic method was fatally flawed ... because the encryption system used by the banks is so secure that no current technology available in the world, not even the combined expertise of the world's leading scientists, is capable of breaking it." The judge appeared to accept this, with a proviso. Addressing the defendants, he said in sentencing them: "It was not possible for you, with the equipment and expertise then at your disposal, to carry out this fraud to a successful conclusion. There is, in particular, no evidence that the cards recovered by the police would then work or that the codes had then been broken. However, beyond that I'm not prepared to go. I do not believe it is necessary to go further but for the avoidance of doubt I make it clear that it would, in my judgment, be irresponsible and wrong on the basis of the information before me to accept any additional assurances along the lines that this is a fraud that no one could ever commit." Lawyers being what they are, the judge could not exclude the possibility that the decryption was possible, even though the remoteness of that possibility does not seem to have struck home, particularly when it is considered that the gang's only computer expert was working against them. The gang's expert claimed no expertise in cryptography and yet said in evidence that there had been a successful decryption dry run. This was not corroborated elsewhere, and the judge did not accept it. [...] http://catless.ncl.ac.uk/Risks

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Crypto reg clarification from Commerce Department
by Lucky Green 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I just got of the phone with Bruce Kutz, Export Policy Analyst, Office of Strategic Trade and Foreign Policy Controls. (202) 482-0092. He seems to be the contact person for the new regs. I pointed Mr. Kutz to the section that alarmed me: Sec. 736.2 General prohibitions and determination of applicability. * * * * * (7) General Prohibition Seven--Support of Certain Activities by U.S. persons--(i) Support of Proliferation Activities (U.S. Person Proliferation Activity). If you are a U.S. Person as that term is defined in Sec. 744.6(c) of the EAR, you may not engage in any activities prohibited by Sec. 744.6 (a) or (b) of the EAR which prohibits the performance, without a license from BXA, of certain financing, contracting, service, support, transportation, freight forwarding, or employment that you know will assist in certain proliferation activities described further in part 744 of the EAR. There are no License Exceptions to this General Prohibition Seven in part 740 of the EAR unless specifically authorized in that part. Mr. Kutz seemed surprised. Apparently he had not been aware that this section was included in the new crypto regs. He then assured me that 1. Proliferation in the context of this paragraph applies only to proliferation of a) nuclear (bomb) technology b) missile technology He read to me EAR Sec. 744.6 (a) or (b), which are referred to in the paragraph in question. Sec. 744.6 (a) or (b) seems to support this view. However, he did not explain to me why the paragraph was included in the crypto export regulations when it only applies to nukes and missiles. 2. The Department of Commerce has no intention of banning the financing and contracting of non-US crypto development. 3. Technical assistance to non-US parties requires a license. Mr. Kutz encouraged me to make use of the public comment period and ask Commerce to clarify the section. Public comments will be accepted until February 13, 1997. [Public comment is requested only after the new regs took effect...] I received the impression that Mr. Kutz genuinely believes that the section in question does not apply to crypto. If I was concerned about potentially violating the regulations, I would try to get a written statement from Commerce that Mr. Kutz's view is indeed correct. As always, IANAL. -- Lucky Green <mailto:shamrock@netcom.com> PGP encrypted mail preferred Make your mark in the history of mathematics. Use the spare cycles of your PC/PPC/UNIX box to help find a new prime. http://www.mersenne.org/prime.htm

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Re: New crypto regulations (fwd)
by Jim Choate 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Hi all, Forwarded message: > Date: Mon, 30 Dec 1996 15:57:28 -0800 > From: Mark Johnson <mark(a)hercules.reno.nv.us> > > To hell with it, lets just send it over a modem and claim its Analog not > electronic transfer. If MA-Bell (or sibling) wants to change it from > Analog to Digital for overseas transfer then THEY can go after MA-Bell. > Then if we can't do that then we would not even be allowed to discuss > cryptography (code) verbally as it all gets transformed to electrons now > anyway. The distinction between analog and digital is a technicality and not a distinction I want my civil liberties hanging from. An analog signal is just a digital signal with a word length greater than the resolution of the machine. Also one can claim that because electricity is carried by distinct charges it is digital. Counter this is that the charges themselves can take on multiplicity of ranges. A digital signal is just a analog signal of on and off, direct current one might say that is simply turned on and off. Ad nausium... > What is the difference between me reading(using sound waves) code line > by line to John Doe versus having my computer(using sound waves) > communicating to John Does's computer,Tape Recorder(high quality), or > his well atuned ear which understands MODEMese (or was that MODEMonics)? Realisticaly nothing. The real discussion going on here, broken into a multiplicity of special interests pov's, is whether we as individuals have a right to communicate to each other and exactly under what conditions that communication can be monitored, manipulated, prohibited, etc. Balancing the theory behind democracy and multiplicity of views versus the prohibition of various types of acts, distinct and class(ical), which pose threats to individuals, groups, and potentialy national interests is the point... If looked at rationaly, saying I can tell you something if written in a particular code, alphabetic and artistic issues at point, on a certain type of material is ok while if I transfer the identical information using some other code and media it is not is looney tunes. The 'control' types would like us to believe that media is the real issue here, not what is actualy being said. A point easily confused by somebody who doesn't know what the word(s) mean. A very popular view, and not one I consider 'bad', is that we should err on the side of safety. This means that we don't change the status quo too fast. Not necessarily because we like the results being measured in human misery but because while we might relieve their misery in the short term we might 'unbalance' the political situation. History is rife with the results of such periods. However, I balance this with the realisation that once it is clear something needs to be done it is better to go ahead and commit to the results even though we recognise a priori that some results may not necessarily be to our liking. We just have to deal with them when we figure out which ones they are. The trick between these two is to find a 'litmus test' which will provide an observer some sort of measure of their position between the two (or more) positions. Jim Choate ravage(a)ssz.com

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Re: Crypto reg clarification from Commerce Department
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Lucky Green wrote: >I just got of the phone with Bruce Kutz, Export Policy Analyst, Office of >Strategic Trade and Foreign Policy Controls. (202) 482-0092. He seems to be >the contact person for the new regs. Well done, Lucky. This is what's needed to kick off a lot of commentary during the next 45-days. Backed by research, to be sure. The outpouring of such commentary on the full EAR from May 1995 to March 1996 shaped the final document, and that process is an excellent case study for how to affect the final form of the latest crypto regs. It's worth perusing the full EAR in the Federal Register: March 25, 1996 (Volume 61, Number 58), Pages 12713 et seq. for 325 pages (well over a 2.5MB -- it's also on our site, see URL below). Here's the portion of the EAR that Lucky and Kutz discussed: [Page 12805] Sec. 744.6 Restrictions on certain activities of U.S. persons. (a) General prohibitions--(1) Activities related to exports. (i) No U.S. person as defined in paragraph (c) of this section may, without a license from BXA, export, reexport, or transfer to or in any country other country, any item where that person knows that such item: (A) Will be used in the design, development, production, or use of nuclear explosive devices in or by a country listed in Country Group D:2 (see Supplement No. 1 to part 740 of the EAR). (B) Will be used in the design, development, production, or use of missiles in or by a country listed in Country Group D:4 (see Supplement No. 1 to part 740 of the EAR); or (C) Will be used in the design, development, production, stockpiling, or use of chemical or biological weapons in or by a country listed in Country Group D:3 (see Supplement No. 1 to part 740 of the EAR). (ii) No U.S. person shall, without a license from BXA, knowingly support an export, reexport, or transfer that does not have a license as required by this section. Support means any action, including financing, transportation, and freight forwarding, by which a person facilitates an export, reexport, or transfer without being the actual exporter or reexporter. (2) Other activities unrelated to exports. No U.S. person shall, without a license from BXA: (i) Perform any contract, service, or employment that the U.S. person knows will directly assist in the design, development, production, or use of missiles in or by a country listed in Country Group D:4 (see Supplement No. 1 to part 740 of the EAR); or (ii) Perform any contract, service, or employment that the U.S. person knows directly will directly assist in the design, development, production, stockpiling, or use of chemical or biological weapons in or by a country listed in Country Group D:3 (see Supplement No. 1 to part 740 of the EAR). (3) Whole plant requirement. No U.S. person shall, without a license from BXA, participate in the design, construction, export, or reexport of a whole plant to make chemical weapons precursors identified in ECCN 1C350, in countries other than those listed in Country Group A:3 (Australia Group) (See Supplement No. 1 to part 740 of the EAR). (b) Additional prohibitions on U.S. persons informed by BXA. BXA may inform U.S. persons, either individually or through amendment to the EAR, that a license is required because an activity could involve the types of participation and support described in paragraph (a) of this section anywhere in the world. Specific notice is to be given only by, or at the direction of, the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Export Administration. When such notice is provided orally, it will be followed by a written notice within two working days signed by the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Export Administration. However, the absence of any such notification does not excuse the exporter from compliance with the license requirements of paragraph (a) of this section. (c) Definition of U.S. person. For purposes of this section, the term U.S. person includes: (1) Any individual who is a citizen of the United States, a permanent resident alien of the United States, or a protected individual as defined by 8 U.S.C. 1324b(a)(3); (2) Any juridical person organized under the laws of the United States or any jurisdiction within the United States, including foreign branches; and (3) Any person in the United States. (d) Exceptions. No License Exceptions apply to the prohibitions described in paragraphs (a) and (b) of this section. (e) License review standards. Applications to engage in activities otherwise prohibited by this section will be denied if the activities would make a material contribution to the design, development, production, stockpiling, or use of chemical or biological weapons, or of missiles. ----- The EAR covers all kinds of exports, so encryption and cryptography provisions are found by searching. The Federal Register published it in seven 50 page chunks, and is available at: http://www.access.gpo.gov/su_docs/aces/aces140.html Enter the search term: "Page 12713" (with quotes; repeat six times in sequence). We've combined the seven parts for searching: http://jya.com/ear032596.txt (2,570K)

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No Subject
by Bovine Remailer 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 5:15 PM 12/29/1996, Timothy C. May wrote: >This fascist move by the U.S. government is a huge threat to our liberty. >It may be time to simply give up on communicating with these assholes and >give them the treatment they have earned. > ... >And this a very big one indeed. Not only does it probably put organizations >like C2 out of business, at least in terms of supporting the development of >things like the South African and British Web products, but it also may >mean the *Cypherpunks list itself*, and some of its members, are ipso facto >in violation of this "giving comfort to the enemy" (to paraphrase) language! > ... >This very list advocates violation of the ITARs in various ways (I speak of >"the list" as a person in the sense of the consensus of the list...there >may not be unanimity, but the consensus of the vocal members of the list is >obvious). > > >It may be time for us to go underground. It may be time to take much, much, >much, much more extreme steps. This fascism is unacceptable. While Tim May has had many many great ideas, this is not one of them. To paraphrase Joseph Stalin: Tim, how many divisions do you have? The cypherpunks have virtually no force at all. If the battle is moved to that arena, the cypherpunks (and everybody else) lose big time. If the cypherpunks manage to pull off some sort of "extreme step", those who aren't shot while resisting arrest will go to prison. Worst of all, most people will applaud the action. "Extreme steps" legitimize the radical proposals of the Clipper crowd. While I wouldn't go so far as to say "I feel your pain", I am sympathetic with the frustration you must feel when your own government is the greatest threat to all that it is right and decent. But, "extreme steps" are the wrong approach and play right into the hands of the defense establishment. It saves them the trouble of implementing a "strategy of tension." The right approach is to continually reiterate that the cypherpunks are mainstream and fairly conservative. Many of us like the "bad boy" image, but most of what has been proposed is very solidly rooted in American traditions. If the ITAR regulations can be amended to make discussions on this list a "conspiracy", then they are very likely unconstitutional. Article I, Section I, "All legislative powers herein granted shall be vested in a congress of the United States..." Pretty unambiguous. We should not underestimate the broad public support for private communications which exists in the United States. Even people who are unfamiliar with the issue are shocked when they learn that the U.S. government is trying to gain access to all communications. The only people who want GAK are in the government. There is no constituency in the population which wants it, and quite a few that do not. The more publicly the issue is discussed and the more actively we scrutinize the lies and deceptions of the U.S. government, the more successful we will be. The GAK crowd have not been honest or forthright in their public statements on their plans. We must reiterate this again and again and again. If they cannot be honest about their proposed policy, how can we trust them to hold the keys? Obviously, we cannot. This will be obvious to most Americans, and even some reporters. Red Rackham

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US AIRFORCE SITE HACKED
by BJORN2LUZE＠prodigy.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

It is true, so many government sites have been hacked! The FBI home page was replaced with SATANIC stuff. A picture of the upside down cross as a background and various other changes regarding SATAN. i think it's funny, but hey it's our own goverment. I wonder how often they check their sites. BTW, my friends site - http://pages.prodigy.com/VT/hackersguide has a link to the FBI's MOST WANTED LIST. See if you are there!

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